Combating Piracy In The Gulf Of Aden
Via Multilateral Means: A Pyrrhic Victory?
By Nazery Khalid
02 April, 2009
Countercurrents.org
Pirates ahoy!
The multilateral, UN-sanctioned initiatives to deter piracy in the waters off Somalia and in the strategic Gulf of Aden (GOA) have been touted by many maritime security analysts as a great leap forward in the fight against piracy. Indeed, the school of thought of multilateral actions to combat this scourge at sea is fast converting disciples and winning adherents on the back of several cases of skirmishes between pirates and naval forces in GOA in favor of the good guys.
However, upon deeper contemplation, this approach may be nothing more than a hollow victory and no more than a stop gap, short term response of the issue of piracy. To the skeptics, the few victories registered by naval forces against the pirates in this crucial waterway are merely a treatment of the syndrome and do little to address the root cause of the problem. Some even contain - not without legitimate reasons - that the multilateral response may set a dangerous precedent in the fight against piracy that may cause apprehension to states bordering piracy prone waters.
There is no question that piracy off Somalia and in the GOA is perceived as a serious problem not only by the shipping industry but the maritime powers. In 2008 alone – an annus horribilis for shipping in GOA - more than 100 vessels were attacked by pirates and more than 40 of them were hijacked for ransom. Millions of dollars in ransom have been paid thus far million and increased insurance premiums have added up to the operational costs of shipowners and shippers shipping through the GOA. In addition to the high costs incurred and the disruption to the flow of international trade, the threat to life of crew members and property, namely the victimized ships and the cargo they carry, is very real.
Worried by the spate of piracy attacks in this most critical passage, the international community has sprung into action. The navies of several nations have unilaterally dispatched their war ships to the GOA to protect their merchant ships passing through the busy and treacherous waters. Among the navies which have sent warships to the GOA include US, Britain, France, Germany, China, India, Malaysia and most recently Japan.
Multinational naval response : Effective solution or unwelcome intervention?
Although the ‘send in the cavalry’ response is well meaning and is lauded by the shipping community, it has opened a Pandora’s box of maritime security calculations that could well lead to serious ramifications on the manner piracy is fought and the implications to littoral states in the affected areas. To the more critical maritime security analysts, the worsening piracy situation in GOA has inadvertently provided an opportunity for naval powers to demonstrate their prowess on the pretext of confronting the pirates. The manner in which naval forces have been deployed ion GOA has raised questions on whether a new precedent of intervention could be established in such situations, amid their good intention of the international naval forces secure the area.
Prompted by the maritime powers, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has passed four resolutions authorizing - with some important qualifications – foreign intervention to repress piracy. The resolutions even include authorizing the hot pursuit onshore of pirates operating off Somalia – a controversial subject but seen as many as an essential weapon in the armory to fight piracy effectively.
Not surprisingly, there was some resistance by developing countries toward the resolutions. The clash between the maritime powers and strait states as exemplified by Indonesia’s opposition to the UN Resolution was not the first in this ongoing saga. A similar struggle - with a similar outcome - presaged the adoption of the first of UNSC’s resolutions on the GOA, Resolution 1816, which stated that “states cooperating with the country’s transitional Government would be allowed, for a period of six months, to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and use ‘all necessary means’ to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with relevant provisions of international law.” This qualification is important and was not initially included in the Resolution. Indonesia made it clear that the Resolution must be consistent with international law, especially the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and not create a precedent for intervention in other waters where piracy is rampant.
There are many unanswered questions regarding such interventions. Foremost on the minds of many is ‘can a naval vessel legally fire on a ship believed to be carrying pirates’? Secondly, if private security personnel escorting merchant vessels engage ships they believe to have pirates onboard, would they be held accountable for a fatal exchange of gunfire of the ships’ crews if they turn out to be harmless civilians? Thirdly, if pirates are arrested at sea, which country has jurisdiction over them and who can or should prosecute the pirates—the arresting country, the flag country of the pirated ship, or the pirates’ home country?
According to some legal interpretations, piracy occurs only on the high seas - in other words, outside the jurisdiction of any state - and the act of piracy only begins when the perpetrators try to board a vessel. Given this, it is a matter of debate if naval forces are well suited to be the lead agency in the fight against pirates. Regarding the issue of hot pursuit ashore, no less than the US Defense Secretary under the George W Bush administration, Robert Gates admitted that the US lacked sufficient intelligence to pursue the fight against pirates. To compound this, naval forces are, from a political and logistical standpoint, much better equipped and oriented only to prevent ship hijackings by pirates rather than to resolve hostage situations at sea.
This ‘interventionist movement’ in GOA has attracted the support and participation of China and Japan, much to the consternation of several nations in South East Asia. While Beijing and Tokyo may have their own political motives to be involved in GOA, they have publicly stated their long term strategic interests in the safety and security of the Strait of Malacca. In times of conflict, they can be expected to protect their vessels traversing the Strait carrying much of their energy supplies and imports, and even deny access to their adversaries in the crucial passageway. Indeed, Japan has in the past proposed an international force to ensure safety and security in the Strait of Malacca, and China has expressed its interest to assist the littoral states to maintain the Strait any way it can.
Off Somalia, pirates run rampant because the country has a weak and ineffective government, often described as a failed state. It is not just a question of lack of enforcement at sea but of disorder on land and the growth of land-based networks and infrastructures in Somalia and certain socio-economic factors which create a conducive environment for piracy to foment and thrive. This disorder and a sense of victimization gives rise to an uncommon brazenness among Somali pirates which is not seen elsewhere in areas rampant with piracy.
Fighting piracy in Gulf of Aden : Lessons from Strait of Malacca
Although piracy was rampant in the Strait of Malacca and Indonesian waters in the last decade, the number of cases has declined dramatically. This can be attributed to the efforts of the littoral states to fight piracy at the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral levels. The littoral states have even invited co-operation from outside powers – as long as assistance is rendered on their terms and does not infringe on the sovereignty and sovereign rights.
To the passive observer, these multinational approach to fight piracy seem like a straightforward case of the international community working hand in hand to eradicate piracy in waters where there is much international stake riding on them. However, upon closer inspection, they can be construed as a part of a purposeful strategy to placate the maritime powers and keep them at arms length from getting involved in the Strait. The littoral states have done well to preserve the notion – if not the reality - that their sovereignty reign supreme in the Strait, while they welcome international assistance to maintain the sealane.
This strategy must be pursued with increased vigor and vigilance if piracy and the new bogeyman of maritime terrorism are not to become valid excuses for foreign interventions. Rather than condescendingly extend the Somali intervention ‘lessons’ to South East Asia, the international community should instead promote political and social stability and offer no-strings-attached economic assistance and encourage indigenous involvement and eventual control of the anti-piracy response in GOA.
Nazery Khalid , Senior Fellow, Maritime Institute of Malaysia
[email protected]
The opinions expressed are the authors’ own and do not represent MIMA’s official views on the subject.
