One
Country: Reviewing
An Alternative Vision
By Remi Kanazi
18 January, 2007
Countercurrents.org
For years the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict has been mired by a series of failed peace negotiation, enmeshing
Israeli Jews and Palestinians in a seemingly intractable struggle. Even
59 years after the creation of the state of Israel the quest for Jewish
security has not been realized, while Palestinians—those dispossessed
in 1948, 1967, and the 3.8 million living under Israeli occupation—have
not seen a just resolution to a conflict that has marred their history
and shaped their identity. The international community, including many
Israeli and Palestinians, still subscribe to the notion that the two-state
solution is the only way to settle the conflict.
Ali Abunimah’s new
book, One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse,
exposes the impracticality of partition and presents an alternative
vision, one that encompasses both peoples on the basis of equal rights.
The vision Abunimah presents is a one state solution.
One Country begins by revealing
the various layers of Israel’s occupation and the grim realities
of the proposed two-state solution. The accepted international and Palestinian
call for a two-state solution is based on 22 percent of historic Palestine—the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Palestinians
(entitled under United Nations Resolution 194) insist on the right of
return to their homeland or to be duly compensated for their expulsion.
Yet, no Israeli prime minister or prominent figure to date has endorsed
this right, nor has any Israeli government proposed a full withdrawal
from the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Abunimah reveals
that, during the Camp David talks of 2000, Israel’s most “generous”
offer to the Palestinians included just 76.6 percent of the West Bank
(while Israel would effectively annex East Jerusalem and the territorial
waters of the Dead Sea) and demanded that “at least 80 percent
of the settlers remain in place.” Abunimah further states, “Israel…insisted
on permanent control of Palestinian airspace and a long list of onerous
‘security’ arrangements that would rob the Palestinian state
of any real independence from Israel and introduce enormous opportunities
for delay and backsliding as had happened with the Oslo Accords.”
Israel couldn’t simply
withdraw from the entire West Bank. Israel’s impetus was predicated
on the notion that the expansion of its borders and the enlargement
of the demographic majority were necessary for its survival. Once the
settlements were integrated into the Israeli narrative, successive US
administrations acquiesced and declared—privately and publicly—that
Israel was “entitled” to keep “parts” of the
settlements in a final two-state solution. The settlement process, however,
sectioned Palestinians off into inaccessible ghettos, dividing Palestinian
land in such a way that a contiguous state became inconceivable. Israel
never diverged from its initial plan to annex the settlements into the
greater state. Abunimah correctly asserts, “It is not credible
that a society would invest billions of dollars in roads and housing
that it truly intended to give up.”
Whether Camp David 2000 or
a host of other proposals, including the supposedly dovish Geneva Initiative
(which scarcely deviated from the Camp David proposal), no plan had
envisioned two separate states that would satisfy both Israelis and
Palestinians. An initiative has yet to be produced by the Israeli left
or right that resembles anything more than a continuation of the mistakes
of Oslo and the self-serving policies that emerged during its “peace
process.” Abunimah argues that those on the left, such as Yossi
Beilin, have advocated plans that, “seek Palestinian endorsement
of Israel’s annexation of territory and its refusal to readmit
Palestinian refugees to their country.” Abunimah further suggests,
“The leaders of the mainstream Israeli left came to embrace Palestinian
statehood in theory while undermining it in practice.” The appropriation
of Palestinian land and the expansion of settlements accelerated under
leftist governments, debunking the myth that “dovish” administrations
were needed to make peace with the Palestinians. What the Palestinians
continue to need is a viable partner willing to engage with their government
on the basis of equality and acceptance exemplified by action rather
than words.
A new line of thinking transpired
during Ariel Sharon’s administration. The iron-fisted military
man, once fixated on annexing the remainder of occupied Palestine, came
to grips with Israel’s demographic reality: Israel could not forever
control the occupied territories without eventually assuming responsibility
of its inhabitants. This transition triggered the shift towards unilateralism,
ironically transforming Sharon (in the eyes of the international community)
from a military strongman into a “man of peace.” The views
articulated through unilateral “disengagement” and represented
in the platform of Sharon’s new Kadima party were nothing more
than Sharon’s attempt to ensure Israel’s Jewish majority,
even if they necessitated militaristic and territorial reshuffling.
While Israel “disengaged” from the Gaza Strip and removed
8,500 settlers (keeping full control of Gaza’s borders, airspace,
and ports), it added an additional 14,000 settlers to the West Bank
that same year. Given the demographic reality, separation was deemed
vital, while annexing as much territory with as many settlers as possible
remained the fundamental goal. Continued land appropriation, the further
development of the apartheid wall, and the incessant efforts to increase
the settler population only fan the flames of the conflict and sends
a direct signal to the Palestinian people that a unilateralist Israel
is disinterested in peace. Abunimah asserts that unilateralism “offers
Israel a Jewish-Zionist state at the price of constant bloodshed and
growing Palestinian desperation, which, despite all efforts to wall
it out, will deprive Israelis of the normality they crave. It is not
a solution, but a dangerous delusion.”
Extremist elements in Israel
are also facing a daunting certainty: the influx of Jews into the state
of Israel is not stably rising and guaranteeing a demographic majority
is not possible given that the Palestinian birthrate within Israel far
exceeds the Jewish birthrate. Some extremists have called for the outright
expulsion of the Palestinian population living within Israel to neighboring
Arab states, going further than the policy of keeping Arabs out the
country and Palestinians from returning to their homes. Others have
called for selective birth control laws for the Arab population, while
one Russian-language newspaper, Abunimah writes, “published an
article proposing that Arab men should be threatened with castration
and that Arab families ‘who have more than one child’ be
‘deprived of benefits, lose their jobs, and [put] under threat
of exile.’” Groups calling for the expulsion of Palestinians,
such as Yisrael Beytenu and the National Union, are not fringe factions
without power. The leader of Yisrael Beytenu, Avigdor Lieberman, now
serves as Israel’s Minister of Strategic Affairs and as Deputy
Prime Minister, while Yisrael Beytenu has been in the Kadima-led coalition
government since October of 2006. Abunimah notes, “Even if most
Israeli politicians do not openly advocate expulsion, their tolerance
of those who do is alarming.” The fears of such extreme policy
were heightened after this summer’s war on Lebanon, which forced
hundreds of thousands of Lebanese civilians to flee their homes. These
extremist attitudes reinforce the failure of the Israeli “peace
camp” and further illustrate the infeasibility of the two-state
solution.
Abunimah’s comprehensive
criticism of the two-state solution is an insightful, well-founded argument
that is essential for any reader looking for an alternative approach
to resolve the conflict. Abunimah proposes that “Creating a single
state for Israeli Jews and Palestinians could in theory resolve the
most intractable issues: the fate of Israeli settlements built since
1967, the rights of Palestinian refugees, and the status of Jerusalem.”
The alternative: perpetual conflict, absent of security for Jews or
Palestinians, coupled with regional turmoil and the continuation of
biased American foreign policy that stands to benefit no one except
a select few in Israel, America, and a handful of quislings in the Palestinian
Authority.
Over time most Israelis and
Palestinians have come to the realization that no matter the settlement,
the Jews and Palestinians of Israel will remain living together and
the Palestinians of the occupied territories will stay on their land.
Abunimah presents a solution that meets the geographical needs of both
peoples. He argues, “The main attraction of a single-state democracy
is that it allows all the people to live in and enjoy the entire country
while preserving their distinctive communities and addressing their
particular needs. It offers the potential to deterritorialize the conflict
and neutralize demography and ethnicity as a source of political power
and legitimacy.” Abunimah lays out a plan consisting of eight
principles (based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
Belfast agreement) for the one-state solution. Drawing upon such well
regarded documents and models gives his argument the credibility that
the two-state solution sincerely lacks. While calls for a two-state
solution have come with slogans and promises of peace, little work has
been done outlining what achieving peace entails.
Many Israeli Jews contend
that Palestinians do not want to participate in a free and fair society
with the Jews of Israel. Yet, as in most societies, issues such as economics
and education bind people together—while conflict and oppression
pull them apart. Abunimah points out that, “Within Israel a significant
number of Arab voters have traditionally supported the Labor Party for
economic and social policy reasons despite its alienating Zionist ideology.”
The road to a one-state solution will not be easy, but it is the only
practicable solution that ensures the security of both peoples. Abunimah
often cites Belgium’s democratic process, a “modern one-person,
one-vote democracy…with modest safeguards” as a model which
Israelis and Palestinians can look to. Belgium continues the process
of constitutional reform which, as Abunimah notes, has led to a decline
in separatism in Belgian society. Many of Abunimah’s detractors
fear that the one country proposal may indeed work, which would run
counter to the ideals of political dominance and exclusivity. Abunimah’s
insight gives reason to be hopeful, and his approach comes with a deep
sincerity that should be admired and taken seriously.
The primary reason that Abunimah’s
vision for a one-country solution can work is that it positions the
two peoples forward based on equality. In a conflict such as this, intention
matters as much as action: if two people are progressing down a positive
path, and good faith measures are employed, the fear of the other will
slowly subside with each positive step. One Country is not an insidious
outline of what Palestinians must do to gain access to all of historic
Palestine. Abunimah makes a point throughout the book to not only address
Palestinian issues such as the right of return and Palestinian property
rights but also discusses the property rights of Jews who were stripped
of their residency in the Arab world after 1948. Moreover, Abunimah
understands the personal significance Jews see in having their Diaspora
be able to return to Israel. This was a belief that the late Edward
Said advocated: the Palestinian people cannot be brought forward by
marginalizing the Jewish population, but rather the goal is to strengthen
the two communities by embarking on a path together. Abunimah tackles
such contentious issues as Israel’s education system, the disparity
of funding within Israeli society regarding Jews and Palestinians and
presents “a suggestion for a shared future for Israelis and Palestinians
in a society that is democratic and tolerant, where two peoples who
have fought for decades agree on rules that all can live by.”
Nonetheless, it is hard to
imagine how Israeli and Palestinians could do the unthinkable and forge
a future together after so many years of conflict. They both can learn
much from the South African model and the fall of apartheid. Abunimah
suggests that peace and reconciliation seemed impossible to the white
Afrikaners and the native black population. After 400 years of white
South African rule, with diverging narratives of their respective history,
it appeared virtually inconceivable that a peaceful resolution to the
conflict could materialize, but it did.
Abunimah exposes the patent
similarities of the Zionist and white Afrikaner narratives, which both
were “shaped by memories of expulsion, persecution, redemption,
and rebirth and guided by a single-minded quest for national survival.”
Both groups staked their claim upon the myths that the native populations
were uncivilized and that the native rejection of the newcomer’s
dominance was based upon hatred. Zionists and Afrikaners alleged that
they brought their respective uncivilized population a superior way
of life, with new technological advances, and argued that the native
population should have been appreciative of their arrival. It is unsurprising
that the Israeli government was a critical supporter of the apartheid
government, even after the international community had turned on the
apartheid regime and imposed sanctions. Abunimah notes, “To the
ears of Palestinians or Africans, the justifications of Zionists and
Afrikaner pioneers presented a stark choice: Submit or disappear.”
The Afrikaner population also presented the theory that if they were
to relinquish control and give rights to the barbaric African population,
the black population would use its new-found power to seek the destruction
of the Afrikaner people. Zionists use the same rationale: giving up
control to the Palestinian population would lead to the Jews being driven
into the sea. The fall of apartheid and the process of reconciliation
in South Africa shattered the myth that the marginalized and oppressed
black population would seek retribution against the Afrikaner population.
Abunimah asserts that once
whites were forced to get over their fear of black supremacy and retribution,
the implementation of a just solution and the process of reconciliation
became much easier. He explains that reconciliation was vastly brought
forward by Nelson Mandela, “Mandela urged South Africans to embrace
any Afrikaner who abandoned apartheid, and thus Afrikaners gained a
legitimacy in the eyes of other South Africans that they were unable
to wrest through centuries of domination. It is an incredibly simple
and powerful maneuver, yet one that so far has been beyond the ability
of most Israelis and Palestinians.” Abunimah insists that Palestinians
must look towards Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC) and
its Freedom Charter, a move that could be instrumental in bringing the
Palestinians forward to reach out to the Israeli people. Unfortunately,
it is usually the oppressed who must come forward with a vision of peace
and hope, engaging on an internal and global campaign to lift the unjust
measures placed upon their people. The Palestinians have yet to fully
realize this model, which Abunimah contends, is due in large part to
the freshness of Palestinian wounds, while black South Africans had
been dealing with white dominance for more than 400 years. He argues
that this is why the principle of equality will quell the fears of both
peoples, “The moment Israelis and Palestinians commit themselves
to full equality, there is no rationale for separate states.”
A key step Palestinians must
take is the further development and utilization of the resistance movement.
While the Palestinian movement has expanded internally, it still has
much work to do. Protests, such as the ones against the apartheid wall
in Bil'in (which includes not only Palestinians, but Jews and international
activists), are crucial steps in the right direction, but they haven’t
sparked a broader movement in the occupied territories and Israel, which
could significantly affect Israeli society. The global divestment movement
has ignited interest and dialogue among several churches, as well as
numerous teacher and labor unions. Arts and culture has served as a
model of resistance, including the Made in Palestine art exhibit in
the US, the showcasing of My Name is Rachel Corrie after one theater
company canceled the show in New York City, the myriad Palestinian film
festivals spanning across the globe and the Palestinian hip hop movement
that has emerged not only in the occupied territories but throughout
the Diaspora. In addition many individuals and groups have used the
internet as a tool for documenting and sharing the Palestinian narrative,
including websites such as the Electronic Intifada (which Abunimah co-founded).
Engaging and supporting these forms of resistance and engendering new
methods are vital for the Palestinian people and the supporters of their
plight.
Palestinian groups internally
continue to keep the moral upper hand through the cessation of suicide
bombings that target civilians, but must continue to embark upon a campaign
of resistance. Abunimah argues, “It was only when internal and
external pressure made the monopoly on power too costly to maintain
that whites grasped for a way out and listened seriously to the ANC’s
ideas. Hence, continued resistance and struggle to raise the cost of
the status quo for the powerful party is also essential. But a delicate
balance requires that resistance exacts a price yet avoids creating
so much new suffering that reconciliation becomes impossible.”
It is easy for those within
Israel and America to evade negotiations by proclaiming that they will
not engage in dialogue until Palestinian rocket attacks stop (attacks
which have killed fewer than five Israelis in the last five years).
On the other hand, Palestinians argue, how can they stop their attacks
when Israel conducts “operations” inside the occupied territories
that often kill more than five civilians in a single day? Nonetheless,
negotiations toward a future together must take place, as was the case
in South Africa, proceeding whether or not the conflict comes to calm.
Abunimah explains, “Like Israel, the white government of South
Africa always insisted that it would not negotiate as long as violence
continued,” yet Abunimah cites former apartheid President F.W.
de Klerk who stated, “South Africa was burning with violence,
but no one allowed himself the luxury of believing that we could wait
with the negotiations until the violence ceased.”
The lessons from South Africa
are invaluable to both Israelis and Palestinians. Abunimah contends,
“What Palestinians can learn from South Africa is that the promise
of a future of reconciliation rather than revenge can rob an unjust
system of the support it needs to survive because such systems are often
built on fear—in the case of Israel and South Africa, the fear…of
being destroyed. The lesson for Israelis is to listen to their enemies
rather than demonize them, which may lead to a secure future free of
the burden of ruling others by force.” This is not to suggest
that the process can happen overnight, but through incremental steps,
which actuate positive results, this process can gain momentum, bringing
a better future to both peoples.
Palestinian polls consistently
show that Palestinians want peace for their people and that they are
willing to coexist with Israelis. The major gripes Palestinians continue
to have is the unjustness of occupation, the rejection of the right
of return and the absence of a proposed settlement that includes their
narrative and rights. After 39 years of occupation, Palestinians remain
adamant in their calls for democracy and equality within their society.
Despite the fact that Hamas was overwhelmingly elected into power in
the January 2006 elections, Palestinians have not called for the installation
of Islamic Law, rather they used their democratic vote to call for reform
and oust the thuggish and self-serving Fatah-led government. While different
cultural and community identities would persist in a one-state solution,
they would not necessarily alter the feasibility of the two peoples
living together as many other diverse societies do today (and as is
the case with the 1.3 million Palestinians living inside of Israel,
albeit under unequal conditions). Edward Said commented on the possibilities
of one state in 1998, “Once the initial acknowledgment of the
other as an equal is made, I believe the way forward becomes not only
possible but also attractive.”
Many other great thinkers,
including Azmi Bishara, Joesph Massad and George Bisharat have called
for a one-sate solution to end the current conflict. Abunimah asserts,
“Those who believe in a two-state solution for years came to realize
that it only offered false promises of peace.” It would be foolish
to suggest that a one-state solution will happen overnight, while an
untold number of obstacles must be overcome and surely new obstacles
would emerge, but a growing number of Palestinians and Israelis are
coming to the conclusion that a one-state solution is the only reasonable
solution to end the impasse, which makes its realization all the more
achievable. Abunimah’s book may not be the key to a one state
solution, as he readily admits, but it is surely a well founded guide
to help Palestinians and Israelis begin to resolve the conflict.
One Country is an inspiring
message of hope and reconciliation, and presents an intricate and well-crafted
path for two peoples that deserve not only reconciliation, but also
a prosperous future.
*One Country: A Bold Proposal
to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse is available at www.Amazon.com.
Remi Kanazi
is the primary writer for the political website www.PoeticInjustice.net
He is the editor of the forthcoming book of poetry, Poets for Palestine,
for more information go to Poetic Injustice. He lives can reached via
email at [email protected]
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