The
Mecca Charity Show
By Roni Ben Efrat
13 March,2007
Challenge
"Only Saudi diplomacy has
succeeded in bearing the historical responsibility for all parties,
gathering the warring brothers in Holy Mecca and extinguishing a fire
that could have burnt everyone."
Thus, on February 14, 2007,
Turqi al-Hamad praised the Saudis for brokering an agreement between
Hamas and Fatah, pulling them back from the brink of civil war. Al-Hamad
writes for the pro-Saudi daily, al-Sharq al-Awsat, so his tribute comes
as no surprise. At first glance, indeed, the Mecca Agreement may seem
a great wonder, considering what we published here two months ago. We
divided - and still divide - the Middle East into two axes. One included
the US, Saudia Arabia and Fatah, and the other included Iran, Syria
and Hamas. Under these circumstances, how was agreement possible? The
answer lies in a temporary conjunction of interests between Saudi Arabia
and Iran. When we unpeel a few layers, however, the dovish feathers
fall away: the Mecca Agreement is a mere time-out - not the basis for
a new beginning.
What is the "temporary
conjunction of interests"? Again, Iraq! Riad and Teheran, representing
the Sunnis and Shiites respectively, are both interested, each for its
reasons, in an American withdrawal. Iran then stands to become the main
influence in Iraq, given the Shiite majority there. Both the Iranians
and the Saudis worry that Iraq cannot be brought under control as long
as the Americans are present. There is the growing prospect of an all-out
Sunni-Shiite war that could inflame the region. An orderly American
pullout, both nations hope, would keep the ethnic conflict confined
and under control.
The Saudis want Iranian support
for an arrangement that will take account of Sunni interests in Iraq.
In exchange, they are willing to smooth down the two conflicts in which
they have a say: in Lebanon and Palestine. This was likely the background
of a series of recent meetings between Prince Bandar bin Sultan (the
Saudi national security advisor, a personal friend of the Bush family)
and Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani. However, if Seymour
Hersh's hunches are correct (New Yorker, March 5), beneath its guise
as peacemaker - and while Washington turns a blind eye - the Saudis
are breeding a fresh crew of Qaeda-like Sunni extremists to match the
Shiite nuclear menace. One does not need an atom bomb, we have learned,
to bring large buildings down.
The first project of Riad
and Teheran was to settle the Lebanon conflict. Under their joint pressure
in the last two months, Siniora has agreed to raise the proportion of
Hezbollah representatives in his government to one third, enough to
give them veto power. Hezbollah, for its part, has agreed to the establishment
of an international tribunal that will investigate the 2005 assassination
of Rafiq Hariri. Syria, the prime suspect, opposes the tribunal, so
it no doubt feels betrayed by its old friends, Iran and Hezbollah.
As for the bloody strife
between Hamas and Fatah, here the Saudis mounted the best show in town.
The Mecca Summit based its format on Camp David and Shepherdstown; each
were billed as a last ditch effort, with terrific momentum leading up
to them. They failed, however, whereas in Mecca no hint of possible
failure was allowed. The final terms were established in advance. Even
Syria blessed the outcome, hoping that the Saudis would put in a good
word for it with the West.
The agreement itself, which
is the basis for a Palestinian unity government, is extremely misleading.
At the head of the unity government will be the present PM, Ismail Haniyeh
of Hamas, but his deputy will be from Fatah. Hamas will have 9 ministers
and Fatah 6, but there will also be 5 independents and 4 from other
parties. The Finance Minister will be the universally respected Salam
Fayyad. The Interior Minister, who has yet to be agreed on, will be
from Hamas's list of independent candidates. Hamas retained its position
of not recognizing Israel, but it accepted the earlier agreements signed
by the PLO. It refused to say it would adhere to them, as Fatah wanted,
but on the other hand it gave up a clause it had always included before:
that it would only recognize those agreements "which serve the
Palestinian people." Both sides promised not to slide again into
conflict. Both felt the harsh criticism coming from the Palestinian
street.
On the surface - but only
there - it looked as if Hamas had come out ahead:
1. From the moment of its election in January 2006, Hamas wanted a national
unity government with Fatah, but the latter refused, thinking it could
undermine the Hamas regime by getting the West to withhold funds. Now
Fatah has given up this ambition.
2. The formulas of the Mecca
agreement contain no essential concessions by Hamas. (Israel can claim
that the Quartet's demands have not been met.)
3. Because the accord was
signed at Mecca, Hamas receives pan-Arab legitimacy for its position.
The Saudis will pressure the West to recognize the new government. Moreover,
the latter can now receive a billion dollars in funds from the Arab
league.
All this, as said, is appearance. In Mecca both sides swept differences
under the rug. The real test of their unity will come when their government
is pressed to accept the conditions set by the Quartet and Israel. It
must do so to unfreeze the West's donations. Hamas cannot govern without
this money, the lack of which triggered the clashes. To get it, however,
Hamas will have to go along with the line that seeks accommodation.
Here, once again, Hamas reveals
a characteristic lack of consistency. We saw this first a year ago,
when it chose to take part in elections that were based on an infrastructure
provided by the Oslo Accords. It accepted the Oslo framework without
the content. Now it deepens its entrapment by entering a unity government,
hoping to gain Western funds without accepting Western conditions. Saudi
Arabia has won a brief span of glory, but what about the Palestinian
people?
Certainly, there's no question
as to the horror of the bloody scenes we witnessed between Fatah and
Hamas. They occurred in utter opposition to the popular will. The Palestinian
street rejoiced sincerely over the Mecca Agreement.
The problem, however, is:
unity for the sake of what? The Oslo Accords did not establish the basis
for a true Palestinian state, rather the mold for a state dependent
on handouts: a donations state, which would serve Western and Israeli
interests. From the beginning, the donations were intended to finance
a political entity composed of corruptible, docile elitists like those
in other Arab regimes. The Palestinian Authority, under Fatah leadership,
wasted a whole decade without establishing an infrastructure and without
creating real jobs. It purchased quiet by handing out cash in paper
bags to the workers of a bloated public sector.
The election of Hamas did
not bring a change of direction. Even if we acknowledge that the movement
is not corrupt, it offered no alternative to the donations state. On
the contrary, the notion of charity rather than work is a principle
of the Hamas movement. Now this notion has become the basis of the entire
unity government. Unless the latter can thaw Western coffers, the streets
will again erupt.
Thanks to Mecca, then, the
situation of the Palestinian people has become even more entangled:
its leaders in both Hamas and Fatah have bound it more strongly to the
regional interests of the US, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The particular
Palestinian problems will have to wait for a different balance of forces.
The war between Fatah and
Hamas created a superfluous conflict, whose settlement puts the ball
in Hamas's court. The demands will now be on Hamas, not Israel, especially
the demand to release abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and to stop
the Qassam rockets. Furthermore, Israel and the US can now apply all
their weight in getting Hamas to meet the Quartet's conditions: to disband
terrorist organizations, to abide by former agreements, and to recognize
Israel.
These things happen at a
time when many of the senior leaders in Israel are mired in scandals
of sex or corruption. The tie between money and politics is deepening
social gaps. The immorality of Occupation has spread to all walks of
life. The last shadow of a political agenda (the Convergence Plan) disappeared
in the summer's Lebanon war.
We should not wonder that
Israel, having bound its fate to America, would display political shortsightedness
and a lack of social sensitivity. What is worrisome, rather, is that
the Palestinian people, having suffered so long, hitches its interests
to the wagon of the Saudi kingdom, instead of cultivating, from within
itself, an alternative voice that will reflect its needs. Between the
corrupt Arab regimes and the path of Islam, a third way must be found,
secular and realistic, that will rebuild the society on a new class
basis. National unity, yes, but not for the sake of a donations state,
rather for the sake of a state that can achieve Palestinian rights!
Only a self-reliant state, based on a viable economy, will pull the
rug from beneath the feet of the bully next door.
CHALLENGE
is a bi-monthly leftist magazine focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict within a global context. Published in Jaffa by Arabs and Jews,
it features political analysis, investigative reporting, interviews,
eye-witness reports, gender studies, arts, and more. This article first
appeared in Challenge #101 and is reprinted with permission.