The
Mecca Agreement:
What Should We Expect?
By Ramzy Baroud
17 February, 2007
Countercurrents.org
The
Mecca agreement, signed between rival Palestinian groups, Hamas and
Fatah on February 8, under the auspices of the Saudi leadership, was
welcomed by thousands of cheering Palestinians throughout the Occupied
Territories, and seen as the closing of a chapter of a bloody and tumultuous
period of their history. Officially, although more subtly, there is
an equal eagerness to bring a halt to an oppressive command of economic
and diplomatic sanctions that have rendered most Palestinians unemployed
and living well below the poverty line.
In fact, almost all Palestinians
want to remember, if they must, the bloody clashes that claimed the
lives of over 90 people since December as a distant memory, a bitter
deviation from a norm of unity and national cohesion, according to which
they want their struggle to be remembered.
Diplomatically, aides to
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah, and advisors
to Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh are fanning out across the globe, each
group heading to its traditional political milieus: the former group
to Western Europe and the United States, and the latter to Middle Eastern
and Islamic countries. Both Fatah and Hamas are keen to demonstrate
that by endorsing the agreement, their fundamental position remains
unchanged, an arduous task indeed.
The official reactions to
the agreement, emanating from the four corners of the globe are hardly
encouraging. The so-called Middle East Quartet – consisting of
the United States, the United Nations, the European Union and Russia
– although they welcomed the agreement, hoping that it might produce
the desired ‘calm’, reiterated their conditions that must
be unreservedly ratified by the Palestinian government if the sanctions
are to be lifted; these conditions are the recognition of Israel, the
renouncing of violence and the acceptance of past agreements signed
between both parties, namely the Oslo Accords.
Though the Quartet is seen
to have withheld its final judgement on whether the formulation of the
unity government constitutes an acceptance, either directly or by implication
of its three conditions, Israel is embarking on its own diplomatic campaign
to heighten pressure. Israeli Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, who was
recently in Munich to attend a global security conference, has reportedly
met EU’s defence and security coordinator Javier Solana, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel and foreign ministers of Austria, Sweden and
other countries. She has also spoken to US Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice twice over the phone, as reported in the Israeli daily Haaretz.
Her phone diplomacy has also reached Germany, Britain and Norway. Livni’s
behavior is but a mere expression of the attitude that is currently
being developed in Israel; the international community must continue
to pressure Palestinians until the three conditions are satisfied in
full from an Israeli point of view.
The main predicament to
the Israeli quest, however, is the same old dilemma: Palestinians can
never, under any circumstance and no matter how great concessions are;
meet Israeli expectations, for these expectations are crafted in so
clever a way that makes is practically impossible for any Palestinian
leader or government to comply. Neither late President Yasser Arafat,
who wore an Israeli flag pin side by side with a Palestinian one on
his Khaki jacket managed to live up to Israel’s seemingly ‘reasonable’
demands, nor did his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, who was ironically elevated
in his political relevance to become the darling of Israel and Washington
when Hamas swept the majority of the vote in the legislative elections
of January 2006, which subsequently led to the devastating sanctions.
The Israeli government labelled Abbas ‘weak’ and ‘indecisive’.
He too, by the same standards, was not able to meet Israel’s conditions,
why should we expect Hamas or any other to do so?
The practical Israeli position
– as opposed to rhetorical - is rather clear and should not involve
any exaggerated analysis: let Palestinians continue to be collectively
punished, succumb to internal feuds and dwell in their limitless misery
to allow Israel the needed time to further consolidate its territorial
schemes in the West Bank and occupied Jerusalem: locking up more Palestinian
communities in Bantustan-like localities, while Jewish settlements continue
to be conveniently linked up to so-called “Israel proper”
using the pretext of security and the mammoth and encroaching imprisonment
wall as the means to such and end.
The Mecca agreement’s
import stems from whether it will present Israel with the opportunity
to discredit Palestinians’ intentions, thus prolong the international
sanctions and internal chaos. Interestingly, these two points are also
the core of the Palestinians efforts, who hope that the agreement, in
which Hamas commits to ‘abide’ by past agreements signed
by the PLO and Israel, is sufficient to end the effective state of chaos
in the Occupied Territories and convince the international community
that enough concessions have been made and that time has arrived for
the sanctions to be lifted.
This is likely to be the
Israeli and Palestinian quest for the next few weeks, especially as
the final judgment on the Mecca agreement is likely to be pronounced
after two significant meetings: a tripartite summit that would bring
together Rice, Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Monday,
February 19, and two days later, a crucial meeting in Berlin of the
Quartet’s ministers.
Evidently, the US final
position is expected to be slightly amended, if not a carbonic copy
of that of Israel; no surprises there since President Bush’s administration
foolishly amalgamated its Middle East policy with Israel’s self-serving
national and regional agenda. But one must not be too hasty as to make
such a determination without consulting the significance of the place
in which the agreement was signed: Saudi Arabia.
There is no doubt that the
Saudi position has finally revitalized the role of Arab states in regional
conflicts (the Mecca agreement was signed after incessant talks between
Fatah and Hamas in Egypt and Jordan). London-based Saudi analyst Mai
Yamani suggests that the Mecca agreement is an attempt to quell Iran’s
growing influence in the region. "Iran has been financing Hamas,
while the Saudis in the last few months even refused to meet (Hamas
Prime Minister Ismail) Haniyeh. They realised that if there is more
chaos in the Palestinian territories Iran will have more influence."
If that assessment is accurate,
partly or entirely, and considering the US’ own endeavours to
undermine Iran’s strategic outreach in the region, it might indeed
be rational for the US to live with the Mecca agreement and deal with
the ‘moderate’ elements within the Palestinian government,
even if temporarily. Yet again, the US hardly behaves in accordance
with its own interests in the Middle East if such attitudes run counter
to Israel’s own regional designs.
The next a few weeks will
reveal the potency of the Mecca agreement, as opposing interpretations
of what it in fact means and how such meaning should be implemented
will determine the next step for all parties involved. Its failure,
however, which remains a dreadful possibility, shall have detrimental
affects on the Palestinian people, any prospect for their coveted future
unity and will further undermine their national agenda for years to
come.
Ramzy Baroud’s
latest book, The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s
Struggle (Pluto Press), is available at Amazon.com and also from the
University of Michigan Press. Baroud is a veteran journalist and a human
rights advocate at a London-based NGO; he is the editor of PalestineChronicle.com;
his website is ramzybaroud.net
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