Iran,
The U.S., And The Twisted
Path To Confrontation
By
Jim Miles
29 November,
2007
Countercurrents.org
Book
Review: Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies – Iran, the U.S., and the
Twisted Path to Confrontation. Barbara Slavin. St. Martin’s Press,
New York. 2007.
If
I had to provide an overall rating for Barbara Slavin’s “Bitter
Friends, Bosom Enemies” I would have to tell the reader that it
is well worth reading, but with several qualifications that make the
recommendation somewhat underwhelming. It is an uneasy read, something
I could not quite put into thought until two phrases summed it up.
First the
phrase “accurate yet superficial” came to mind, as what
Slavin says is true, but does not carry a broader or deeper perspective
that other works do. Most of what is reported here, other than some
of her personal interviews, is very much newspaper level journalism,
a phrase I use pejoratively indicating a narrow perspective that is
available from reading or listening to most U.S. media rather than other
media and more academic research. There is also a very important misrepresentation
of information early in the work that helped set up the uneasiness of
the read. I’ll return to that in a moment.
The second
phrase that describes this work is “out of context”. As
the title implies a duality and equality of some kind, and as the jacket
cover states “Slavin portrays the complex love-hate relationship
between Iran and the United States,” there is actually very little
of that duality or of the exploration of the relationship. The three
last shorter chapters of the book finally do discuss the relationship,
accurately, yet superficially. Before that, the text is almost completely
about Iran.
Further to
it being out of context, there are a few major omissions. Israel’s
role in the situation would make the title be more appropriately “ménage
a trois” rather than the duality of “bosom buddies.”
Yet Israel is mentioned in passing very superficially and without any
mention of the double standards of the U.S. perspective between Israel
and Iran vis a vis terror, the Iraqi war, and nuclear weapons, among
a few topics that could be explored. Another major omission, related
to Israel, is the roll of the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC), its influence within the American regime, and the effect it
has had on decisions and governance in general within Congress. AIPAC
is only mentioned once in passing in the text and does not rank enough
importance to make the index. A bit more emphasis is given to Dick Cheney
and the neocons, but again mainly in passing comments and without any
real examination of their powers and influence within the American government.
A real comparison of Iran and the U.S. should include these elements
more critically exposed as well as a comparison of government structures
and their abuse within the U.S. Finally, while Russia, Iraq, Turkey,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Kurds, the Taliban, and all
the other players in the Middle East are at least mentioned, there is
no depth to the analysis, mostly a lot of information that could be
gleaned from American media with only a small assist from outside media.
As I indicated above, these are omissions, major omissions given the
pretext, but what is included appears to be accurate and truthful.
There is
however the misrepresentation of information that helped create my overall
sense of unease with the text. In her second chapter “Iran and
the Bomb” Slavin provides the information about Iran having “mastered
centrifuge technology” in 2006 and is thus “able to enrich
a small amount of uranium”. She then continues, and it is worth
a full textual quote:
“A
year later, Iran had installed more than 1,300 centrifuges at Natanz
and produced more than 175 tons of uranium hexafluoride, the gaseous
form of uranium that is fed into centrifuges for enrichment. That’s
enough for more than 20 weapons….According to former U.S. intelligence
director John Negroponte, the Iranians “seem to be determined…to
develop nuclear weapons.”
The uranium
data is referenced to David Albright, March 27, 2007 and the Negroponte
quote is referenced to a BBC broadcast.
This implies
quite directly that Iran is capable of producing 20 nuclear weapons.
This seemed highly improbable from other materials available, leading
to a reference search on David Albright. A different story appears.
Speaking
with prepared testimony, David Albright, President of the Institute
for Science and International Security (ISIS), before the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and
Trade, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Asia, on March 15, 2007[1],
presented a much weaker position for Iran, with much more nuance:
“Once
the module is fully operational, Iran would need approximately 6-12
months to produce enough highly enriched uranium for its first nuclear
weapon. The shorter time period assumes that the cascades operate near
their theoretical peak performance.”
3000 refuges
working full out and properly could produce enough enriched uranium
for one or two weapons per year. “This benchmark could be reached
within a year or two.”
“As
of late February, no uranium hexafluoride had been introduced into either
of the two cascades under vacuum.”
Albright
emphasizes the “if” – if it is fully operational,
if it is working full out, if it is working properly, and then provides
some context to indicate that the Iranian facilities, while they might
have 3000 refuges, there is a good chance they are not operating optimally
and will not be able to for some time. As for Negroponte’s view
– remember this is one of the Nixonites who assisted in the murder
of thousands of Hondurans for fear of America being attacked by hordes
of communist sympathizers – the IAEA says that "the Agency
has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material
in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear
material, and has provided the required nuclear accountancy reports
in connection with declared nuclear material and activities."[2]
There is no reference provided for the twenty weapons that could be
made from this amount of processed uranium.
Is it worth
all this effort for a matter of half a paragraph from the whole work?
Considering that the current push towards “World War III”
is all about nuclear weapons and less and less about “terror”,
yes, it is very significant as it sets the tone for the whole book.
While Slavin does not actually lie, she does by juxtaposition make Iran
seem like a very well armed and potent adversary of a nuclear kind.
The Israelis have been warning the west about this potential every year
for the past decade or more, always with Iran a year or two away from
making the bomb (of course, ignoring their own intransigence and recalcitrance
in relation to their own nuclear weapons and the protection of their
U.S. cohorts in arms).
My final
overall criticism (there are other little ones along the way –
concept of terror, use of language, misquoting Ahmadinejad) is more
of a warning. The reader needs to be aware that any work that quotes
Negroponte as an authority and whose text is considerably referenced
to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and its members is
looking at the story from the American far right. The Institute for
Near East Policy carries much weight for right wing rhetoric, including
George P. Schultz, Richard Perle, James Woolsey, Paul Wolfowitz, and
Alexander Haig as members of the Board of Advisors. Other reference
searches turned up other equally right wing friendly sources from other
areas, many from Washington based ‘think-tanks’, also including
among them a Canadian, Jamie Glazov, a rather rabid born again convert
from the Soviet Union who sees the world primarily in black and white,
good and evil.
Read the
book, but keep the above caveats in mind. While sympathetic to the Iranian
people in general, and while Slavin does provide some information indicating
some U.S. reluctance to negotiate rather than bomb, there is the underlying
bias that Iran in a political sense is mainly at fault for the way things
are. A broader perspective is needed, one that this work does not provide.
[3]
[1] David Albright - Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status and Uncertainties.
Prepared testimony by David Albright, President, Institute for Science
and International Security (ISIS), Before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Subcommittee
on the Middle East and Asia, March 15, 2007. www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/
AlbrightTestimony15March2007.pdf
Slavin’s interview took place on March 27, 2007, indicating perhaps
that she heard only what she wanted to hear from the interview rather
than what was said.
[2 Farhi,
Farideh. “Politics of Reporting on IAEA Reports,” November
18, 2007. Znet.
www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?
SectionID=67&ItemID=14321
[3] For two
broader, deeper, more contextual writings, see “Target Iran”
by Scott Ritter (Nation Books, N.Y., 2006) and “Treacherous Alliance”
by Trita Parsi (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2007).
Jim
Miles is a Canadian educator and a regular contributor/columnist
of opinion pieces and book reviews to Palestine Chronicles. His interest
in this topic stems originally from an environmental perspective, which
encompasses the militarization and economic subjugation of the global
community and its commodification by corporate governance and by the
American government. Miles’ work is also presented globally through
other alternative websites and news publications.
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