Samrra
Killings An Inside Story
By A Combat Leader
Soldiers
For The Truth
02 December, 2003
The
convoy which was attacked while driving through Samara was not a supply
convoy as reported, but was carrying large amounts of new Iraqi currency
to stock local Iraqi banks and US greenbacks used to pay for goods and
services the US forces need to accomplish their missions in Iraq. This
convoy was heavily guarded by Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles.
It was akin to a huge Brinks Truck delivery.
The reports of 54
enemy killed will sound great on the home front, but the greater story
is much more disturbing and needs to be told to the American Public.
When we received
the first incoming rounds, all I could think of was how the hell did
the Iraqis (most of these attackers being criminals, not insurgents)
find out about this shipment? This was not broadcast on the local news,
but Iraqi police knew about it. Bing, Bing Bing, You do the math.
Of greater importance
in the scale of the attack and the coordination of the two operations.
Iraqi Rebel Guerilla Units elements still retain the ability to conduct
synchronized operations despite the massive overwhelming firepower "Iron
Hammer" offensive this month.
Hack, most of the
casualties were civilians, not insurgents or criminals as being reported.
During the ambushes the tanks, brads and armored HUMVEES hosed down
houses, buildings, and cars while using reflexive fire against the attackers.
One of the precepts of "Iron Hammer" is to use an Iron Fist
when dealing with the insurgents. As the division spokesman is telling
the press, we are responding with overwhelming firepower and are taking
the fight to the enemy. The response to these well coordinated ambushes
was as a one would expect. The convoy continued to move, shooting at
ANY target that appeared to be a threat. RPG fire from a house, the
tank destroys the house with main gun fire and hoses the area down with
7.62 and 50cal MG fire. Rifle fire from an alley, the brads fire up
the alley and fire up the surrounding buildings with 7.62mm and 25mm
HE rounds. This was actually a rolling firefight through the entire
town.
The ROE under "Iron
Fist" is such that the US soldiers are to consider buildings, homes,
cars to be hostile if enemy fire is received from them (regardless of
who else is inside. It seems too many of us this is more an act of desperation,
rather than a well thought out tactic. We really don't know if we kill
anyone, because we don't stick around to find out. Since we armored
troops and we are not trained to use counter-insurgency tactics; the
logic is to respond to attacks using our superior firepower to kill
the rebel insurgents. This is done in many cases knowing that there
are people inside these buildings or cars who may not be connected to
the insurgents.
The belief in superior
firepower as a counter-insurgency tactic is then extended down to the
average Iraqi, with the hope that the Iraqis will not support the guerillas
and turn them in to coalition forces, knowing we will blow the hell
out of their homes or towns if they don't. Of course in too many cases,
if the insurgents bait us and goad us into leveling buildings and homes,
the people inside will then hate us (even if they did not before) and
we have created more recruits for the guerillas.
The Commander of
the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, Colonel Frederick Rudesheim, said after
this battle that "We are going to continue to take the fight to
this enemy. This is the most significant contact we have had to date
in the city of Samarra. We are going to have to respond accordingly."
This is a great
attitude for a combat commander to have when fighting an armored force
on force, but Colonel Rudesheim is not trained in Counter-Insurgency
and my soldiers are taking the heat. We drive around in convoys, blast
the hell out of the area, break down doors and search buildings; but
the guerillas continue to attacks us. It does not take a George Patton
to see we are using the wrong tactics against these people. We cannot
realistically expect that Stability and Support Operations will defeat
this insurgency.
As one would expect
from using our overwhelming firepower, much of Samarra is fairly well
shot up. The tanks and brads rolled over parked cars and fired up buildings
where we believed the enemy was. This must be expected considering the
field of vision is limited in an armored vehicle and while the crews
are protected, they also will use recon by fire to suppress the enemy.
Not all the people in this town were hostile, but we did see many people
firing from rooftops or alleys that looked like average civilians, not
the Feddayeen reported in the press. I even saw Iraqi people throwing
stones at us, I told my soldiers to hold their fire unless they could
indentfy a real weapon, but I still can't understand why somebody would
throw a stone at a tank, in the middle of a firefight.
Since we did not
stick around to find out, I am very concerned in the coming days we
will find we killed many civilians as well as Iraqi irregular fighters.
I would feel great if all the people we killed were all enemy guerrillas,
but I can't say that. We are probably turning many Iraqi against us
and I am afraid instead of climbing out of the hole, we are digging
ourselves in deeper.