The Future Of
The Indian Past
By Romila Thapar
03 April, 2004
SACW
[The full text
of the Seventh D. T. Lakdawala Memorial Lecture delivered at FICCI Auditorium,
New Delhi on 21 February 2004, organised by the Institute of Social
Sciences.]
I
would like to express my gratitude to the Institute of Social Sciences
and its director, Dr George Mathew, for doing me the honour of inviting
me to deliver the Seventh D.T. Lakdawala Memorial Lecture. Given the
eminence of my predecessors, this is a more than ordinary privilege
for me. The person we are remembering today was an economist with a
deep concern for social and economic justice in Indian society. For
him, as for many others, the protection of the values that accompanied
this concern was essential. These values, necessary to the present,
were for him equally crucial to the projection of the future. The link
between the present and the future was therefore, intrinsic.
In a seemingly contradictory
way, looking into the future requires an understanding of the past.
Such an understanding can illumine the present and enable one to think
more meaningfully about the future. History as a commentary on the past
becomes essential to this process. How the past is to be understood
is one among the many alternatives for the future that Indian society
is facing in present times. I shall be speaking about the choices before
us that will determine the future of the Indian past. Such choices are
dependent on our understanding of the past, but among other things,
are also tied to the shape that we wish to give to the future society.
What is sometimes referred to as the controversy over history, and on
which I am speaking this evening, is an indicator of this connection.
The tradition of
liberal, independent historical writing in India is now under attack
from an official interpretation of Indian history. Many historians are
currently opposing the attempt to use history in support of an ideology
of religious nationalism. The opposition was sparked a couple of years
ago by the government condemnation of existing school textbooks in History
published by the NCERT. These textbooks were discredited so as to justify
their being replaced in 2003 by a history that would endorse the current
political ideology. Historians have been troubled not just by the content
of the new textbooks but also by the manner in which these changes have
been made.
The school curriculum
was changed by government fiat, without consulting the educational bodies
that had earlier routinely been consulted, such as, the Central Advisory
Board of Education. Such a consultation would have prevented the implementation
of what many now regard as a sub-standard curriculum for schools, quite
apart from the rather drastic re-orientation of history.
Middle School students
are to be taught the following subjects: a package entitled "Social
Studies" consisting of potted versions of history, economics, civics
and geography; Vedic Mathematics; Simple Sanskrit; and Yoga and Consciousness.
On the completion of Middle School they will be tested to ascertain
whether they go into the academic stream or the vocational stream and
the tests will draw on the Intelligence Quotient, Emotional Quotient
and Spirituality Quotient - whatever these may be.
An immediate action
was the arbitrary deletion of passages from the existing history textbooks.
The government claimed that various religious organizations had demanded
these deletions.
Their objections
were not discussed by any committee or organization of professional
historians prior to the passages being deleted. Discussion in school
of the deleted passages was also prohibited. These passages included
seminal questions, among them the origin and evolution of caste society
in India. In a society where caste remains hegemonic, it is ironic not
to allow a discussion on how social hierarchies came about. Other deletions
referred to the eating of beef in early India, to the difficulty of
dating the Mahabharata and the Ramayana because of later additions to
the texts, to the mention of a brahmanical reaction contributing to
the decline of the Mauryan empire, and so on. The rationale for these
deletions remains unclear. It would seem that these were random objections
made by anyone who chose to and were used to discredit the books. A
year later these textbooks were replaced by hastily put together new
ones, some of which were pedagogically incompetent, apart from their
slanted history.
One is not arguing
against the periodic revising of textbooks but rather, one is insisting
upon such revisions observing accepted pedagogic procedures such as
were observed in earlier years; and also urging that textbooks should
provide updated, refereed, knowledge, and in a manner that encourages
students to think critically and independently. In other words, to perform
the role expected of textbooks. At the best of times, textbooks raise
pedagogical problems as they did even in the last fifty years. But one
had hoped that educational policies would keep addressing these problems
and improving on the process of educating students. Unfortunately what
is happening now is a series of retrograde steps in terms of structure
and content.
One possible amendment
to this would lie in the availability of a range of professionally vetted
textbooks. Together with this, examining boards concerned with school
education, in prescribing such books, should be made responsible to
regularized procedures of discussion among schoolteachers and historians.
There is furthermore, an urgent need for transparency in and information
on, what is being taught in schools run by organizations that describe
themselves as religious and cultural, be they the Shishu Mandirs of
the RSS, the Madrassas, the schools run by Gurdwara Committees or Church
mission schools. As for state schools there is an additional fear that
a sub-standard curriculum will intensify the current bifurcation in
education: where quality education is available in private schools for
those that can afford such schooling, and a near worthless education
for those that cannot. We have been far too casual about what is taught
in school and are reaping the consequences of adopting a system that
is politically malleable.
Textbooks are not
just learning manuals. They are also the media through which societies
transmit the definition as well as the rights and obligations of citizenship,
and these in turn help formulate identities. Future citizens have to
learn to assess the institutions that constitute their state and society,
an assessment linked to encouraging a critical enquiry in the young
mind. Far from making it an investment, education is being reduced to
a rather meaningless game of scoring marks. When to this is added a
doubtful content in what is taught, the system of education begins to
annul education.
Not satisfied with
changing school textbooks, the government has also claimed the mandate
to propose a uniform history syllabus for colleges and universities
throughout the country. This has been done through the funding body,
the University Grants Commission. There is a hint that non-compliance
may affect funding. The proposed syllabus is seriously deficient as
it ignores developments in methodology and historiography of the past
half-century. Some universities are currently teaching far more advanced
history courses.
There is now a greater
interference in the autonomy of universities, with attempts to centralize
admission procedures, exams, syllabi and funding, not with the intention
of raising standards but to exercise maximum governmental control. The
state will of course demand the right to intervene in state-funded institutions,
but the intervening should not violate the professional autonomy of
the institution. Legitimizing obscurantism through introducing Departments
of Astrology cannot be a unilateral decision. It has to be seen in the
context of whether the same funding could be used more effectively in
other areas, as for instance, in developing libraries for students.
It is claimed by the University Grants Commission that introducing Departments
of Astrology at University level will prove that astrology is Indiaís
contribution to world science and that it can solve the problems of
the world. That many Indian scientists have described it as a leap backwards
did not deter the UGC.
Dismantling the
autonomy of universities is being permitted by academics, who either
out of apathy, or a wish to conform to government directives, do not
protest against the changes. One remembers the words of Miguel de Unamuno,
rector of the University of Salamanca in 1936, that at times silence
is a lie for it can be interpreted as acquiescence. The latest attempt
of the Government has however, met with some resistance. Various university
teachersí associations have rejected the UGCís proposed
Model Act for Universities of the Twenty-first Century in India. It
is seen as an attempt to introduce control by the government and corporate
houses and to eliminate democratic procedures, not to mention the responsibilities
of the state for funding higher education.
Attempts are also
being made to dismantle specialized institutions of technology (IIT)
and management (IIM) by changing the fee structure and the syllabus.
Since this impinges in a more observable way on the future prospects
of the middle-class, a small protest is beginning to be heard. But now
that the court has validated the Governmentís objective, the
protest may become ineffectual. The objective is that the degree of
self-financing of these institutions - which is considerable - is to
be drastically reduced so that they become dependent on heavy Government
subsidies. There is little logic in this. The funds for these subsidies
would be better spent by the Government on financing primary and secondary
education and on providing full scholarships for impoverished students
to be trained in the IITs and IIMs. Nor is the element of greed altogether
absent in these objectives. The wealthy alumni of the IIMs and IITs
send funds for the institutions where they were trained as a gesture
of appreciation. It has been proposed that such funds should now be
channeled through the central Bharat Shiksha Kosh, so that the funds
can be used anywhere and not necessarily on the institutions for which
they were intended.
At the level of
research there has been the virtual banning of two major publications
putting together documents taken from the National Archives pertinent
to the two decades prior to Indian independence. From 1970 to 1983,
documents from the Archives in Britain referring to these events were
published under the title of The Transfer of Power. Indian historians
decided to publish documents from the National Archives in India on
the same period in a multi-volume project. Some volumes had already
been published but another two sets of volumes had just reached the
press when the present government decided to prohibit their publication,
with no reasonable explanation for this action. The government, it would
seem, can ban the publication of documents from the National Archives,
even when they are not time-barred.
An atmosphere has
been created in which any group can object to a book, and threats can
lead to the banning or the withdrawal of such books. Organizations claiming
the right to arbitrarily decide what is intellectually and culturally
permissible now resort to physical attacks on persons and books. The
recent incident when the major Sanskrit library, the Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute was ravaged by such an organization, has received
little condemnation by the self-appointed protectors of Sanskrit and
the Vedic tradition. Books are banned because they question the political
agendas of certain groups, and the banning becomes a demonstration of
power. The other side of this is that these books continue to be published
outside India. If the banning of books becomes a habit in India there
will be different histories read inside and outside India. The difference
will not be because of academic views but because of the dictate of
politics and the suppression of free expression.
We may well ask
why there should be a fear of independent historical writing. The reasons
behind the fear need investigation. Reducing history to the lowest and
most doubtful common denominator means that this is not only an attempt
to wreck the discipline, but has wider social implications. Since the
earlier textbooks are dismissed because they are said to be not only
Marxist in their orientation but also anti-national, an understanding
of this allegation has to begin by briefly reviewing the history of
nationalisms in India.
Nationalisms sometimes
require a demarcation between the Self and the Other through constructing
narratives that define each. These are not permanent categories but
are projected as such. The reformulation of cultural idioms creates
a contest over who does the reformulating and with what intention. Defining
the Self and the Other is a complex process and inevitably varies in
time and in the requirements of the particular nationalism. It is also
worth investigating the point at which the Other becomes the Enemy.
Colonial societies,
emerging from colonial experience and its policies, have known more
than a single nationalism. In India there were two recognizable forms,
generally distinct but occasionally over-lapping. One was inclusive
nationalism dating from the late nineteenth century. This kneaded together
the segments of Indian society and opposed colonial power. For this
anti-colonial nationalism, the Other - the one to be contested - was
the colonial power. The focus was on the sovereignty of an Indian identity,
based on democratic and secular institutions.
Nationalism attempts
to knead together the segments of society that were characteristic of
earlier times. This gives primacy to particular features. Anti-colonial
nationalism also focused on what shape the future society should take
after independence. Implicit in this was a liberal, secular, democratic
society, although what this entailed in terms of re-orienting society
was not worked out in any detail. But there were other kinds of nationalism
that made religion the keystone. There was an assertion that there should
be a return to ëtraditional cultureí. But this in effect
did not and cannot happen. The encounter with Orientalism, produced
a new interpretation of Indian history, religion and culture, reflecting
in part the perspective of Orientalism and in part a reaction against
some of these perspectives. The Indians that dominated intellectual
life in the nineteenth century were responding to both a colonial discourse
about India and a nationalist construction of what was viewed as a traditional
discourse. The colonial discourse gave primacy to history as a component
of that reformulation.
In the early twentieth
century two new nationalisms acquired visibility. The earlier nationalism
was contesting aspects of current imperial views of history, whereas
these later forms were more rooted in the colonial discourse. These
were groups drawing on a religious identity - either Hindu or Muslim
- and for whom the identity of an independent nation-state derived from
the religion of the majority community in the proposed state. This kind
of nationalism drew substantially on the inheritance of identities moulded
by colonial policy and the colonial interpretation of Indian history.
Discussions in this context highlighted formulations equating community
and religion. These nationalisms projected imagined, uniform, monolithic
religious communities and imbued them with a political reality. Both
nationalisms took shape almost simultaneously in the early twentieth
century and have become virtually mirror images of each other - each
maintaining the viability of separate nation-states. For religious nationalists,
the Other, the one to be contested, was not the colonial power, to which
they pledged loyalty, but the followers of the other religion, as also
those who opposed religious nationalism, such as Mahatma Gandhi whom
they assassinated. Political parties propagating this nationalism claimed
to speak for communities as defined by religious labels - either Hindu
or Muslim. The focus on the Indian citizen faded in their vision.
Muslim religious
nationalism aspired to and eventually succeeded in establishing a Muslim
majority state, Pakistan. India was not intended as a state to be ruled
by a Hindu majority but influential Hindu opinion now seems to be seeing
it as the Hindu counterpart to Pakistan. Such a change would meet the
ultimate intentions of colonial policy aimed at creating two nations
identified by majority religions. The two-nation theory was essential
to both Hindu and Muslim nationalisms and in the early twentieth century
was spawned by each.
Prior to the recent
past, Indian historians were in dialogue with colonialism and mainstream
nationalism. It has been said that post-colonialism is not only a dismantling
of colonial institutions but an ongoing dialogue with the colonial past.
History becomes an avenue for such a dialogue. Mainstream nationalism
was critical of some negative colonial theories about the Indian past,
but it did not replace these with alternate theories to explain the
past. Thus the colonial argument that the pre-modern Indian polity was
based on "Oriental Despotism" was rejected, but the rejection
was not replaced by alternate equivalent theories of how the pre-modern
Indian polity may have functioned. These explanations came from a later
generation of historians in the last half-century. Mainstream nationalism
was distanced from the religious variety, although there was some overlapping,
as for instance, in the delineation of the ancient ëgolden ageí
being viewed as the renaissance of Hinduism.
These trends have
been recognized as common to nationalisms confronting colonization in
other parts of the world, as for example, the role of Negritude in African
nationalism. Nevertheless mainstream nationalism was different from
the religious nationalisms, more frequently referred to as Hindu and
Muslim communalism, which justified the exclusion of the Other by resort
to history. History textbooks in Pakistan assert the superior claim
of a Muslim presence over the Hindu Other, and the new textbooks in
India project the reverse but the nature of the projection is similar.
The insistence of
this new identity undermines the values that were sought in India after
independence. Democracy is now threatened by religious majoritarianism,
claiming that the basic definition of Indian society derives from religious
communities, therefore, the wishes of the religious community that forms
the majority, should prevail. This is a denial of the equal status of
other religious groups. The secularizing of Indian society as a necessary
part of modernization is described as alien to Indian civilization and
therefore to be discarded. If secularism is alien so too are its essentials,
namely, the ensuring of human rights and the equality of all citizens.
A pertinent question
would be to ask what makes a religious identity, seem necessary to the
politics of the present. A possible reason is that a new middle class
has replaced the old middle-class that had emerged from the colonial
experience. Its expanded social base brings in middle-castes and others
that had a lesser status earlier and are now moving towards center-stage.
New elites require legitimating and this takes the form of a new identity
validated by a new interpretation of history.
Globalization as
a dominant mode of capitalism has created community interests in India
that are a departure from earlier ones. A small but strikingly wealthy
fraction within this middle-class is now the role model. The aspirations
and frustrations among those still at the margins, intensifies into
competition, insecurity, and aggression. When unemployment is aggravated,
it is diverted into an attack on what is perceived as the enemy within,
namely the minorities. This condition is common to the countries of
South Asia. The culture of the economy that controls the Market imposes
its imprint, sometimes to the discomfort of subordinated economies.
Current nationalisms - ethnic, religious, linguistic - cannot be entirely
isolated from globalization.
Anti-colonial nationalism
had a strong economic component and a vision of converting the colony
into an independent nation-state with a well-delineated economic structure.
Attention to the prevalence of poverty, disease, ignorance and inequality
were concerns at the forefront of the movement and in the immediate
post-independence decades. They were values for their own sake and allowed
us to live lives of greater freedom. These have now faded. With globalization
trying to control the economies of developing countries, nationalist
ideologies in these countries focus on other identities. It is not pure
coincidence that Hindu nationalism has become increasingly visible and
assertive over the last decade with globalization making inroads into
the Indian economy.
Religious nationalism
gives the illusion of a developing country asserting its independence
against globalization. But in fact it builds up a dominant group that
controls the new economy whilst speaking in the voice of religion and
that can ride safely on globalization. The success of nationalism with
a single identity is then used to validate the curtailing of the freedom
of expression, through arguing that other identities and opinions are
subversive. This is demonstrated by banning books and by assaults on
films, art galleries and libraries, claiming that these methods are
justified as a mechanism of keeping the culture pure and uncontaminated.
Where humans are declared as subversive, curbing this supposed subversion
often takes the form of organizing riots or terrorism.
Not unconnected
with aspects of globalization is the increasing frequency of terrorism
which has intensified prejudices, especially where identities of terrorist
groups and of particular religions, are seen as coinciding. The patriot
and the nationalist are redefined in keeping with the ideology of those
in power, as we saw in Gujarat. The slogan of the war against terrorism
has focused on Islam and the West as counterweights drawing also on
the theory of the clash of civilizations. This conveniently overlaps
with ideologies that see their own backyards threatened by Islamic militants,
as in India. Few in India pause to count the number of militant groups,
that are terrorizing areas of the sub-continent and are not concerned
with matters of Islam, such as the PW, the Naxalites, the BODO, the
ULFA, a variety of groups in the north-east some of whom go back fifty
years, and various mafias acting like private militias. Yet the image
of the terrorist is predominantly that of the Islamic militant. And
fewer still give thought to why terrorist groups emerge or question
the validity of the argument that religion is the most important defining
feature of terrorism and militancy.
State terrorism
of considerable magnitude has also become a feature of our times. There
is a thin line between agencies of law and order providing protection
to citizens, and the same agencies being diverted by the state to participate
in what would otherwise be called acquiescing in terrorist activities.
Such seeming ambiguities threaten human rights but are sought to be
justified by resort to nationalism, and in turn to history, and both
bring in the support of sections of the middle-class.
Combined with this,
the fears of the middle-class are increased by movements surfacing from
within the society but from below, in the form of Dalits and Backward
Castes asserting rights. The middle-class that remains unsuccessful
feels trapped. There are perhaps echoes of the anti-Brahmin movement
of a century ago. The lowering of the standards of education places
the Backward Castes and the Dalits at a further disadvantage. The introduction
of a non-pedagogically approved curriculum could well be a move to exclude
such groups from the better jobs. The solution in relation to high quality
specialized training is not to dilute education but to increase the
number of scholarships and provide for better training in schools.
Politicizing religion
creates an over-arching identity. This seems to marginalize social inequalities,
but nevertheless, the inequalities remain. The empowerment of the weak
has no place in this ideology. The constant projection of the Muslim
and the Christian as the Other diverts attention from the inequities
of society.
In creating a religious
nationalism many aspects of a religion have to undergo the kind of restructuring
that allows a religion to lend itself to a political ideology, generally
of a fundamentalist kind. Since religions have an extensive social function,
apart from the belief and practice that they endorse, they have had
multiple social roles, some tolerant and some intolerant. But such variant
histories are seldom referred to when the claim is made that every religion
is inherently tolerant. The introduction therefore, of social and political
configurations, as for instance, a modern fundamentalist form, is always
possible but requires some reformulation of the religion.
A new faction of
Hinduism labeled Hindutva or "Hinduness," is a reformulation.
To quote a founding statement, the aim is "to Hinduize all politics
and to militarize all of Hindudom". In order to be effective, this
change requires political support. Hindutva has taken on many meanings,
varying according to occasion. It is also equated with Hindu Rashtra
or else with what is called "cultural nationalism". This involves
choosing and defining a single culture - in this case that of upper
caste Hinduism. But equally important is the question of who defines
it, how is the choice made, what is its agenda, and what happens to
the marginalized or discarded cultures. This is of central importance
not only to non-Hindus but also to the Backward Castes, Dalits and adivasis.
Setting itself up as the sentinel of Hinduism, Hindutva is not sympathetic
to views on Hinduism other than its own rather trivial assertions about
the religion, bereft of the creativity of intellectual and aesthetic
exploration. That which has often given Hinduism its sensitivity to
the acceptance of unbounded belief systems, is reduced to a lifeless
ordering of religiosity. When this reductionism is challenged, a claim
is made that religious and cultural sentiments have been hurt, and violence
is resorted to in the guise of defending religion and tradition.
Interestingly, this
reformulation of Hinduism, also borrows from certain aspects of Islam
and Christianity, aspects that were previously not regarded as essential
to Hinduism, such as, emphasizing historicity - preferably of a founder,
locating a sacred topography, adopting a sacred book, and simulating
an ecclesiastical authority. I have elsewhere referred to this as Syndicated
Hinduism.
Hindutva promises
empowerment through its organizations at various levels and encourages
political mobilization directed towards the creation of a state dominated
by a religious majority. The cadres of the RSS are trained in military
fashion, attend schools, youth clubs and institutions associated with
this ideology, and work in unison with the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi
Parishad (ABVP), the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Bajrang Dal and
the political party currently in power - the BJP, Bharatiya Janata Party.
To be effective
as a political ideology Hindutva has to redefine Hindu identity. Such
a redefinition is rooted in ideas of origins. This focuses on history
as was recognized by one of the founding ideologues of Hindutva. VD
Savarkar, writing in the 1920s, stated that an Indian could be only
that person who could claim that the land of his fathers, pitribhumi,
and the land of his religion, punyabhumi, both lie within the territorial
boundaries of British India. Furthermore, there had to be a commitment
to a common Indian culture, inevitably defined by Hindutva. These qualifications
automatically led to Muslims and Christians, being regarded as foreigners.
Subsequently, Communists were added to this list ! Issues of race and
language that dominated contemporary European fascist movements were
introduced as further qualifiers. And, as we know, in periods of confusing
change, the preference is for a theory that simplifies the social world
into ëusí and ëthemí.
The rewriting of
history is intended to bring about a new bonding by privileging the
identity and origins of the majority community, and by the same token,
indicating that religious minorities are foreign. I would like to refer
to two examples of how attempts are being made to establish this.
The ancestry of
the Hindus is to be linked to a lineal descent from the Aryans. ëAryaní
was initially a language label but it is often used indiscriminately
to refer to race, peoples and ethnic groups. Aryan culture is now projected
as the oldest and is assessed as superior to all others. This argument
draws on nineteenth century ideas on the superiority of Aryan culture
and its genesis from a single, unadulterated source - the Vedic corpus.
The date given by most scholars for the earliest section of the Vedic
corpus, the Rigveda
, is around 1500
BC. But in order to maintain that it is the oldest culture, the authorship
of the earliest urban civilization in India that of the Indus, generally
regarded as pre-Aryan and dating to the third millennium BC, is also
being declared as Aryan. The attempt therefore is to take back the date
of the Rigveda, to 3000 BC or even earlier, and to read it into the
archaeology of the Indus civilization. Attempts are being made to change
the label for the Indus civilization to ëSarasvati Civilizationí
thus evoking the Rigveda and Hindu connections. It is further held that
the Aryans were indigenous to India. This strengthens their role as
the founders of Indian civilization and ancestors of the Hindus. Aryanism
and Vedic culture are projected as the foundational culture of Indians.
Historians who contest
this formulation are described as anti-Indian, anti-national, and of
course, "Commies". Yet historians have argued that such a
chronology is difficult to reconcile with the archaeological and linguistic
evidence. It is at least fifteen hundred years too early and there is
little in common between the sophisticated urbanism of the Indus civilization
and the agro-pastoralism of Rigvedic society. The two cannot be equated.
At most it can be considered that some elements of the former may have
found their way into the latter but such statements would have to be
supported with firm evidence. That there was a graduated migration of
Aryan speakers from across the Indo-Iranian borderlands and an inter-weaving
of cultures remains a viable argument.
The Aryan theory
when it was first promulgated in the late nineteenth century, was taken
up in India by a range of people of different social backgrounds, each
group seeing in it those perceptions of the past that were suitable
to its own concerns. Thus, Jyotiba Phule writing in Marathi and in support
of the lower castes and Dalits had an entirely different take on the
theory. He maintained that there was an invasion of alien, Aryan Brahmans,
as a result of which the indigenous inhabitants were subjugated, oppressed
and relegated to lower caste status. The conflict therefore was over
the establishment of caste identities and not religious identities and
there was an inversion of the present idea of who was indigenous or
alien. Aryanism supports the notion of upper caste Hindus being racially
and culturally superior to lower castes, Dalits and adivasis, and concedes
the legitimacy of the dominance of the upper castes.
Theories of Aryan
arrival from across the borderlands or alternatively those proposing
indigenous origin have been debated for over a century. If Aurobindo
supported indigenous origin, Tilak argued for the long march from Arctic
lands. The central question today is not whether ëthe Aryansí
were indigenous or foreign. Historians have moved on from this to analyses
seeking insights into the interface of the many cultures and societies,
old and new, of this period and of their evolution. The complexity of
cultures is being analyzed as also of the various societies that went
into the making of the dominant cultures, such as those featured in
Vedic compositions. The Vedic corpus makes a distinction between the
arya and the dasa and various other communities, a distinction that
is also reflected in the non-Aryan linguistic elements in Vedic Sanskrit.
The interface between diverse societies and cultures means that not
all of them conformed to the current, popular definition of "Aryan."
The existence of diversities involves analyzing the varying processes
from which these societies evolved, such as how languages mutate and
spread, populations move, myths and rituals encapsulate changing ideas,
economies evolve, social hierarchies are established, dominant groups
emerge and state-systems become visible. Historical processes have also
to be differentiated. Thus, invasions or migrations are not identical
processes and they differ in origin, intention and impact. Ascertaining
these variations is crucial to understanding cultural evolution and
change through interaction among and between societies, both in this
period and in later times. A more meaningful debate would be to examine
the validity of the received version of what is meant by ëthe Aryaní.
The concept of civilization
as a stage of socio-economic change remains an acceptable idea. But
the nineteenth century definition of the term as a territory within
the boundaries of which there was a single religion and language of
significance is open to question. Now we know that each civilization
is not only diverse within itself, but that its characteristics often
emerge from an intersection with cultures beyond its geographical boundaries.
The northern areas of the sub-continent have repeatedly been host to
large numbers of settlers from central and western Asia throughout the
centuries. Migrants coming by sea were common to the coastal areas of
the peninsula. The debate therefore about defining who is indigenous
and who is foreign, spanning five millennia, is a spurious debate.
Insisting on a single
source for Indian civilization, such as the Vedic corpus, excludes the
many facets of thought and structures that went into its making and
into subsequent philosophies. The rich tradition of perceptions, rationality,
logic and dialectics, also get excluded since these often draw on the
intellectual controversies of various times. Some of the most thought-provoking
insights into early Indian social ethics come from comments not only
in Buddhist and Jaina texts, but also from other sources, and these
were often initiated by questioning the dominant culture. Even dominant
cultures themselves evolve from such questioning. The marginalization
or negation of controversy obstructs the understanding of cultures.
Controversies were
recorded not only in pre-Islamic India but also after the arrival of
Islamic schools of thought. These included the ideas within a tradition,
and also those that emerged when the formal boundaries of Hinduism and
Islam were transgressed at various levels, as in some Bhakti, Shakta,
Natha and Sufi thought of the second millennium AD. Such crossings of
boundaries have been seminal to many contemporary Hindu and Islamic
beliefs and practices. At the other end of the spectrum there was dialogue
between and among scholars of Sanskrit, Persian and the regional languages.
The fading of formal religious boundaries was particularly evident in
the non-elite sections of society - in effect the majority of people.
The second focus
in the rewriting of history relates to the role of Muslims or of Islam
in Indian history, where the past is again used to justify an ideology
of the present. It is argued that the arrival of Islam, resulted in
two distinct and separate nations in the Indian sub-continent whereas
earlier there had been only one, the Hindu ; further, that the coming
of the Muslims was a disaster because they oppressed the Hindus and
caused the decline of Hinduism.
The history of the
second millennium AD is therefore viewed as the history of two communities
- Hindu and Muslim, each represented as uniform, monolithic, mono-cultural,
right across the sub-continent, and each hostile to the other. Yet actually
each was constituted of multiple communities of varying identities and
diverse relationships. Some relationships led to conflicts, others were
friendly, depending on the requirements of each. Groups identified themselves
by caste, occupation, language, region and religious sect. Even labels
such as ëHinduí or ëMuslimí were not widely
adopted until some centuries later. Among the many forms in which Islam
arrived in the sub-continent - through pastoralists, traders, armies,
migrants and religious sects - and even where conquest was the mechanism
of control, relationships required social negotiations. But the study
of such negotiations and the articulation of ensuing relationships have
no place in the new history. It excludes the presence of plural relationships
and multi-cultural societies. This would require conceding that such
groups not only contributed to the making of Indian identities in the
past, but equally important, that identities change over time.
Conversion is frequently
referred to in this history. Even where it is said that some percentage
of Muslims and Christians were converts from Hinduism, conversion is
viewed only as the change from the formal manifestation of Hinduism
to the formal definition of the other religions. There is little recognition
that conversion is not a complete break from the previous way of life.
The vast majority of Christians and Muslims who were converted from
Hinduism tended to carry their customary law and their cultural ways
with them, introducing innovations in the practice of the religion to
which they converted. This is recognized as part of the process of the
conversion of large groups in the history of any religion. In India
conversions were frequently by jati / caste or by a segment of the caste,
and therefore caste practices were not easily shed. These relationships
need to be explored so as to understand the link between religion and
social forms. Nor did conversion by itself change the social status
of a caste. The inequality of caste, although denied in the theory of
Islam and Christianity, was effectively incorporated into Muslim and
Christian society, with predictable variations.
Regional cultural
norms tended to segregate groups even if they belonged formally to the
same religion, whether Hinduism or Islam or any other. There were differences
in social practices relating to caste, language, custom and sect. There
were differences in food taboos, rules of kinship and marriage, access
to property, language, between, for instance, the Meos of Rajasthan,
the Khojas of Gujarat, the Navayats of the Konkan and the Mapillas of
Kerala, all officially Muslim. Such differences often made them more
akin to local non-Muslim communities than to each other. In recent times
however, with attempts to homogenize such groups through Islamization
or through the threat of the erosion of their culture, the differences
are being erased. Among Hindus too such differences kept segments segregated.
The intersections among these groups and their study are an ongoing
process in the history of regional cultures, and the latter are obviously
ancestral to the Indian present, and more immediate than the ëgolden
agesí of the remote past.
The new history
presents the arrival of Islam as that of the Muslims conquering the
Hindus and the Hindus resisting them. Reference had earlier been made
to Muslim epics of conquest in Persian and Hindu counter-epics of resistance
in Hindi, creating two antagonistic communities in conflict. This view
is now shared by the official histories of India and Pakistan. It is
of course to be expected, that conquest will be met with resistance
in all periods of history, but the purpose of both have to be viewed
in greater depth. Resistance was more frequently over territory, political
power and status, although references to religious differences were
not excluded. Alliances and enmities were known to cross religious loyalties
and pragmatic concerns in such cases had priority.
This becomes evident
from what are cited as ëHinduí epics, as for example, the
court literature of various Chauhan Rajputs facing Mohammad Ghuri and
Allah-al-din Khalji. Far from being concerned only with Hindu resistance
to the Muslim, their narratives focus on court intrigue, and campaigns
against neighbours who were almost hereditary enemies, issues of competitive
status, political legitimacy and marriage alliances. Religious difference
is not absent but is only one among many other factors. One such epic
has a long peroration on a Khalji princess wishing to marry the Rajput
prince of Jalor. She recalls their many previous births when they were
husband and wife. He rejects her, arguing that such a marriage would
be unacceptable to a Rajput, but it is unclear whether this was because
of the difference in caste or in religion? In another such epic, when
Ranthambor, the capital of the Rajput raja Hammira was besieged by the
Khalji Sultan, the raja was deserted by most of his Rajput ministers
and courtiers, but his Muslim advisor, Mahimashahi, remained loyal to
him till the last.
It is claimed that
the new history now being imposed has been constructed from an entirely
indigenous, Indian point-of-view. It is therefore hailed as a departure
from the earlier writing of Indian history, condemned as Eurocentric
and written from a western perspective, even by Indian historians. But
actually this history has no new theories of historical explanation,
Indian or other. Such explanation would be expected normally from a
historiography claiming to change the paradigm. This history merely
repeats the theories of nineteenth century colonial history, some of
which had been rejected even a century ago by nationalist historians.
This is not a dialogue with the colonial past, but merely a fresh dressing
up of the colonial view.
The two central
themes namely, the Aryan foundations of Indian civilization and the
nature of Muslim rule in India are taken from European and colonial
writing. It is well known that Friedrich Schlegel in 1808 maintained
that Sanskrit was the ancestral Indo-European language, isolated and
unique, a view now regarded as out-dated. He deduced from this that
those who spoke it were imbued with the deepest wisdom. The genesis
of language, whether from a single source or from many, dominated the
nineteenth century debates among European Orientalists and in the German
Romantic movement in particular. The sub-texts of these debates were
often related to European self-perceptions especially in the heyday
of imperialism. Language was assumed by some to be the collective creation
of a national culture, and when race - and the Aryan race in particular
- was added to this as another determining feature of culture, the combination
as in Germany, was to be volatile.
It was also the
century when ëthe Aryaní as an entity came to be defined
and established in Europe. The invention of the Aryan race and the superior
Aryan culture was the outcome of what in Europe was called, ërace-scienceí.
It had an impact on current social theories in Europe and on socio-religious
reform movements in India. The prominence of Sanskrit and of the Vedic
corpus in the elite cultures of India, draws on a continuing brahmanical
tradition that gives it priority, although others such as the heterodox
sects and those articulating regional cultures and languages, had contested
this even in earlier times. However, the Vedic corpus as initiating
Indian history is the contribution of nineteenth century Orientalism.
Max Mueller popularized the term ëAryaní in the Indian context
linking it closely to the Vedic corpus. He argued that this was the
most creative period of the Indian past. But he also maintained that
the Aryans came from outside India and had links with the speakers of
Indo-European. So half his thesis has been accepted and the other half
turned outside in !
The currency of
these ideas also influenced nineteenth century Indian thinkers such
as Swami Dayanand, Shri Aurobindo and Swami Vivekananda. Their intellectual
context was both the debate with European Orientalism on the Hindu religion
and on Hindu culture and tradition, as well as the attempt to revive
earlier debates in Indian thought. Their construction of Hindu civilization
therefore, needs to be seen both in terms of their intention of evoking
a pristine, original civilization, and at the same time having to react
to Orientalist views. The nature of the colonial impact was such that
in the nineteenth century the reconstruction of an indigenous culture
was inevitably also responding to this impact.
In 1875, the colourful
Mde. Blavatsky founded the Theosophical Society, with Col. Olcott, among
others. Olcott was closely connected with the short-lived merger of
the Theosophical Society and the Arya Samaj. He and many Theosophists
maintained that the Aryans were indigenous to India and that they civilized
the rest of the world. A much-discussed question at that time was whether
the British and the Indians could be related by blood, since they both
belonged to the Aryan race ! Religion was clearly less important as
a marker of identity than race in these discussions. Needless to say,
contrary views such as those of Jyotiba Phule, which made caste the
primary identity, were ignored.
The second theme,
of the antagonism between the Hindu and the Muslim in Indian history,
is closely linked to colonial interpretations of Indian history. That
all Muslims were foreigners was stated in late eighteenth century Orientalist
writings. In the nineteenth century, James Millís History of
British India, expounding this theory, became a hegemonic text. Mill
divided Indian history into three periods: Hindu civilization, Muslim
civilization and the British period. The use of the label ëcivilizationí
for Hindu and Muslim with its focus on religion and language demarcating
civilizations intensified the divisions. We have lived with this periodisation
for almost two hundred years. Although historians in the last fifty
years have questioned its viability, it is now again being reinforced.
Mill argued that
Hindu civilization was stagnant and backward, and Muslim only marginally
better. Governance prior to the coming of the British was that of Oriental
despots. British rule was an agency of progress because it could legislate
change for the improvement of India. Millís projection was that
the Hindus and Muslims formed two uniform monolithic communities, permanently
hostile because of religious differences, with the Hindus battling against
Muslim tyranny and oppression. This view was an assumption in much of
colonial writing on India.
H.M. Elliot and
John Dowson in their multi-volume, History of India as Told by Her Own
Historians, state that Muslim rule had to be depicted as oppressive
and tyrannical in order to convince Hindus that they were better off
under British rule. The dichotomy was cut deeper by the colonial emphasis
on legal systems defined by religious codes, and community numbers measured
through the census. The subsequent introduction of separate electorates
validated the divide. The colonial view held that the Muslims of India
were largely foreign, because of their supposed descent from immigrants.
That the majority of those constituting various Muslim communities were
converted from Hinduism was conveniently ignored. The dichotomy created
by colonial perceptions was useful to both Hindu and Muslim religious
nationalisms.
One may well ask
why are the proponents of this new history repeating the colonial history
of the nineteenth century and claiming it not only as new but indigenous?
It should be recognized that since the political ideology derives from
a colonial source, it is not surprising that the historical interpretation
it wishes to project, does the same. If a claim is made to shifting
the paradigm in history, then a way of explaining the past has to be
constructed that is significantly different from previous attempts.
It must provide new perspectives of the nature of the data and its comprehension.
It must be accompanied by a viable theory of explanation relating to
the new paradigm. But the supposed new history neither addresses the
questions and the concepts that other historians are addressing, nor
does it raise fresh ones.
Obviously history
has to be rewritten from time to time since it is not a frozen body
of information. Like all knowledge it has to be continually updated
through advances in data and methods of analyses. This process is part
of a critical enquiry, on which the historical method is founded. The
assumption that such a method is not required in the reinterpretation
of history is a premise that is disputed by those opposing the supposed
new history.
In the last half-a-century,
historians of India have moved away from the rather limited debates
of colonial and nationalist interpretations, towards more precise methods
of enquiry and a more critical use of sources and interpretations. Most
of the changes are obvious and are observed by historians working on
any aspect of history in any part of the world. Nevertheless they need
to be re-iterated where they are not being observed in claims made to
historical writing. An awareness of updated information and readings
is essential.
In speaking of a
historical method a number of features of historical research are essential.
Historical evidence consists of artifacts and texts in the main. The
oral tradition is included but has its own methods of testing for reliability
or assessing its intentions. Artifacts include visible remains such
as architecture and icons from past periods as well as those that have
to be excavated. Artifacts and texts have to be interpreted by historians
and this raises the question of the basis on which interpretations are
made. These are determined by the readings which when they depart from
earlier accepted ones have to be justified. This was known to earlier
historical research but now there are many more techniques of analyses
that can bring variant readings. The many debates on the date of the
Arthashastra are a case in point. Earlier views drew on arguments based
on internal evidence and corroboration from other sources. More recently
the text was subjected to a computer analyses based on linguistic forms.
Concordances of the symbols on the seals from the settlements of the
Indus civilization were also facilitated by the use of a computer. Similar
techniques and analyses have been made of titles and designations from
Chola and Vijayanagara inscriptions and these studies have enhanced
our understanding of the structure of administration in south India.
Interpreting a period
of history means viewing it from the perspective of various social groups:
the many voices of a history. Historical evidence is no longer limited
to the narrative of the victorious alone. Narratives also draw from
and speak to the Other, and historians now seek the voice of the Other.
But fantasy has to be differentiated from demonstrated evidence.
Sources therefore
are questioned before their versions are accepted. There has been a
further fine-tuning of the chronology of texts, using internal criticism
or even new technical aids. A random use of sources ranging over five
centuries to make a point is no longer acceptable. Where chronology
is under discussion, precisely dated sources are given priority over
evidence that comes from texts extending over large periods of time,
as for example the Mahabharata and the Ramayana. The latter constitute
a different aspect of historical investigation.
A significant change
of the last few decades has been that of viewing history as a process
and not merely a narrative of events. This involves discussing concepts
from comparative history and from other disciplines that often leads
to a better-defined investigation and encourages more pertinent questions.
The emphasis on historical context is a major methodological departure,
very different from isolating evidence and treating it as individually
self-sufficient as was done earlier. Not only are the contents of texts
studied but also their context in terms of the author, the audience,
the purpose and the genre. This has enriched our understanding of texts
and provides greater precision.
The scope of history
has widened enormously to include the study of changing forms of caste,
gender studies, diverse economies of various periods, the role of technologies,
processes of state-formation, the social context of religious sects,
the history of ideas, the impact of environment and ecology on human
activity and vice versa - in fact the normal components of what today
is regarded as appropriate to historical investigation. The much wider
range of causal analyses resulting from the broadening of the scope
of history now requires a discussion of priorities in ascertaining causes.
Over and above this, the historical context of ideas and historiography
- the history of historical ideas - has become a prerequisite for historical
research. The historian is not creating a belief about the past, but
is attempting to understand the past through a logical analysis of the
evidence.
Those who promote
the new history, object to much of the history that has been written
in recent decades. It is persistently referred to as anti-national and
Marxist on the assumption that this in itself will discredit it. The
label of Marxist has become a catchall for any kind of history that
now is disapproved of by religious nationalism, whether of the Hindu
or the Muslim variety, or any other. This is because such histories
often incorporate a range of opinions, enrich the understanding of the
past by extending causal analyses, question popularly accepted or received
notions and encourage an awareness of historical method and critical
enquiry as the basis of research.
Historians in the
last fifty years have made extensive analyses of the themes initiated
by colonial historiography. Millís periodisation and the concept
of Oriental Despotism have been set aside. Marxist historians have criticized
Karl Marxís Asiatic Mode of Production, as the dominant political
economy of pre-modern India; and instead of directly applying familiar
theories, there is a greater interest in the range of Marxist methodologies
used in historical analyses. The notion of a "Golden Age"
has also been questioned, as it has in the current historical writing
on virtually all civilizations.
Recent studies have
made visible the multiple cultures that are essential to understanding
the Indian past and present. The boon to the Indian historian is the
continuing presence of what has been called "the living past ",
which has sensitized historians to one kind of comparative method. A
view of history from the perspective of under-privileged groups that
this provides, presents a more complete picture of society than was
known in earlier studies. Above all, this kind of history cannot be
controlled by a single ideology.
Yet such a control
over knowledge is now being attempted. Issues relating to culture, aesthetics
and philosophy have also to conform to the formulaic projection of what
is referred to as "the Indian tradition". It is argued that
Indian civilization has been continuous and without a rupture, and that
this is unlike the experience of western civilization that is seen as
having broken with Greco-Roman Classicism and Medieval Christianism
to arrive at Modern Enlightenment. It is maintained that the Indian
reality of the past and the present, can only be understood through
Indian theoretical constructs contained in Sanskrit texts. This is said
to be the Indian cultural continuity. If taken literally this would
in effect be the end of history. It is legitimate to base theories of
Indian culture and tradition on textual sources - which is precisely
what historians do. But it is intellectually illegitimate to ignore
what one might call the double agenda of history: that each text has
a historical context and an intention in the act of its composition;
and that each subsequent reading of a text or of an event, is also conditioned
by the context of the event and of the person writing about it and the
audience for whom it is intended. Obviously texts from the past must
be read, but they must be read with a comprehension of their time and
function, which in turn requires that the reading be analytical. This
is recognized in the methods basic to the humanities and the human sciences,
where these are part of the larger discourse.
There is yet another
aspect that has to be brought into the discussion of the role of religious
nationalism in the discipline of history. This involves the attempt
by Indians who live outside India to introduce belief into the construction
of Indian history. Nationalism focuses on the link between power and
culture and seeks to use culture in its access to power. Culture becomes
a euphemism for power. The redefinition of Indian culture as essentially
Hindu, and preferably of the upper caste, has also become the ideology
of a section of the Hindu diaspora. This diaspora, among the richest
in many parts of the world, is a wealthy patron of the politics of religious
nationalism in the homeland, and like all wealthy patrons intervenes
in these politics. Some have called such activities, ëlong-distance
nationalismí, and others have maintained that distance is not
a safety zone but a field of tension.
Where nationalism
moves beyond the boundaries of the nation-state, culture becomes an
abstract construction. It grows out of the fantasies about the past
of the home country and these also form part of the response to confrontations
with the culture of the host country. There is a tendency towards conservatism
and a drawing on the earlier debates emerging from colonialism and nationalism.
To the degree that the rewriting of history is a political act, history
inevitably becomes the ground for contestation. The contest is over
the shape and the intention of reformulating history.
The ministers of
the Government of India, publicly abuse those of us who as historians
are opposed to the current official view of Indian history. But the
more sustained, vitriolic attacks come interestingly, from a section
of Hindus in the diaspora and more particularly those in the United
States. The experience and articulation of the diaspora has now become
a subject of study among sociologists and political analysts and various
reasons have been suggested to explain the forms of its articulation.
It is being suggested that these arise from problems of self-projection.
Many persons in the diaspora come from the middle class in India and
experience cultural alienation in the host country. Whereas in the homeland
they are part of the majority community and have therefore had a dominant
status, in the host country however, they have to come to terms with
being a minority, and that too, one among many others. They too are
seeking an identity and a bonding as well as asserting a status. If
the bonding has to derive from religious nationalism, they disallow
any critique of the Hindu past since for them this is a romanticized
golden age.
It has also been
argued that the endorsing of an upper-caste Hinduism is an attempt at
ësanskritizationí by various castes both in the homeland
and in the diaspora. Middle incomes in the diaspora become the equivalent
of accelerated upward mobility when compared to the economic index and
life-style in the home country. This then is taken as the cue for an
appropriate middle-class/upper caste pattern of living as well. Social
anthropologists and historians have debated the concept of ësanskritizationí
as a social process in various periods of history where some castes
claimed higher status and adopted the life-style of upper castes. In
contemporary society the claim is less to a higher caste and more to
acceptance of status through life-style.
An argument frequently
made in the home country is in the nature of a complaint: that there
is perhaps an element of guilt among those that have migrated from the
homeland into a society with a higher living standard, leaving the extended
family to fend for itself against the overwhelming odds involved in
attempting upward mobility in India.
Some members of
the Hindu diaspora who are given to attacking academics and others not
sharing their views, are generally in professions related to management
and businesses or in technical fields. There seems to be an assumption
among many of them that a proficiency in technical professions gives
one the right to define all knowledge, even that of the humanities and
social sciences. The attempt to claim this right takes the form of aggressively
critiquing those scholars who do not support Hindu nationalist views.
Most of what is stated by these critics contradicts the professionally
accepted view - to put it mildly. It is not surprising that the impressive
defense of the targeted scholars has come largely from academics and
others working in the humanities and the social sciences.
Running through
the critiques like a chorus is the familiar accusation that the liberal
historians are communists and an appeal is made to the ghost of McCarthy
to rescue Indian history. Such critiques often descend into hatchet
jobs, layered with political invective and personal vilification. If
the intention is to expose a lack of scholarship, as is also claimed,
this has to be demonstrated through scholarship and not through political
polemics. Had the intention been to advance scholarship, technical expertise
might have been used in various ways, as for instance, in computer-aided
analyses of archaeological and historical artifacts, or scientific investigations
of material remains, rather than lengthy statements that read like period
pieces of a century ago. Admittedly however, there is also a need for
recognizing the possible misuse of modern technologies that are used
to authenticate dubious claims, such as the so-called Harappan horse
seal, now notorious as "the Piltdown seal," which was exposed
as a computer manipulation.
The authors of these
critiques are also increasingly claiming the authority to intervene
in academic decisions taken by universities and research institutions
in North America, in effect to threaten academia through marshalling
numbers and claiming that their religious sentiments have been offended.
The model seems to be that of some sections of the host country. Obstructing
free discussion has antecedents in the United States, one aspect of
which is, for instance, the contest between creationism and evolutionism
in the educational curriculum in some states of the Union.
With the passing
of time the culture of migrant groups has to adjust to the new environment
of the host country, however much they may wish to ëfreezeí
the culture with which they arrived, and which they assume remains relatively
unchanged in the homeland. But the latter changes and currently this
is happening in India at an accelerated pace. There is therefore a gradual
divergence in culture and thinking between migrant settlers and their
homeland. This is perhaps most poignantly evident in the use of the
original language of a migrant community after a few generations.
The point in time
when certain historians are projected as anti-national is linked to
the assertion of particular religious identities and their political
potential, as was the case with some working on the history of the Sikhs
at the time of the Khalistan movement. The assertion of a new political
ideology in the home country, supporting religious nationalism, might
well explain the present activity in the diaspora. What this underlines
is the link between religious nationalism in the home country and its
manifestation in the diaspora. At some point therefore the politics
of the host country will also have to take into account the politics
of such minority groups - and this may well be part of the intention.
And what of the
future? At the level of pedagogy, the monitoring of curriculum procedures
and the quality of textbooks will have to continue, with a constant
effort to keep the discussion on these, open and active. Attitudes to
the content of textbooks, is reflective of how the discipline of history
is viewed at particular times. It becomes relevant therefore, to understand
this activity in the context of the present, and not only as an exercise
in constructing the past. The centrality of history to the present is
that although its concerns are with the past of the society, it is also
an effective means of moulding the present in terms of how societies
perceive themselves and their identities.
There is some urgency
for historians to continue to explore the history of religion and what
is broadly called ëcultureí. These are significant aspects
of historical discourse and it must be expected that there will be innovative,
even if controversial, explorations. This will also demonstrate how
such concepts can be and are being high-jacked for political purposes.
Such explorations do not mean a return to something pristine called
ëreligioní or ëcultureí. It would mean teasing
out the historical strands and linking them to their social roots and
contexts, and their actual and ideological roles in different social
landscapes. Since they are part of a historical process they cannot
be unshackled from their time. Definitions of religion have tended to
suppress the role of popular religion - the religion of the majority.
This will not only have to be made visible but take its rightful place
in redefining the religions of India. Those that have been excluded
as having no history - women, Dalits and lower castes, people of the
forests - their history will be essential to explaining the past. These
explanations will lead to fresh readings of the past.
The discourse on
Indian history among academics both in India and elsewhere will have
to be maintained through protecting the right to free expression. This
will involve resisting attempts by various organizations in India and
in the Hindu diaspora to silence divergent views; a silencing that now
resorts not only to abuse but even to physical assaults. Historical
writing across the intellectual and academic spectrum has to be available
to whoever wants to read it. There will be those who will continue to
polemicise rather than problematise, but their obstruction of independent
historical writing will remain marginal. The intellectual maturity now
demanded in the discipline of Indian historical writing has, and will
continue to have, its practitioners in India and elsewhere.
However, the apprehension
is that the discipline of history in India at a broader level may be
forced to go into reverse, in an effort to instill an ideology of religious
nationalism. The justification for this will be sought in the claim
that the religion and culture of India are being protected. But there
can be no concession to the claim that a history propagating religious
nationalism is the way to protect the religion and culture of Indian
society. There can be no justification for abuse and violence against
the books and the authors that one disagrees with. Protection lies in
the right to free debate, dialogue and discourse, as has been the tradition
in the past. Protection lies in preventing the closing of the Indian
mind.