Special
Economic Zones:
Profits At Any Cost
By C.R. Bijoy
22 October, 2007
Countercurrents.org
No
other economic 'reform' in India has seen such a rapid expansion of
militant protests and conflicts as Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Local
inhabitants, particularly in Raigad (Maharashtra), Jhajjhar (Haryana)
and Nandigram (West Bengal) cutting across caste, class and party affiliation
rose up in revolt, with Nandigram seeing the most militant uprising
leading to at least 14 deaths in police firing on 14 March 2007. These
come in the wake of growing struggles against land acquisitions for
industries met nonchalantly with deadly state terror, as in Kashipur,
Lanjigarh and Kalingangar in Orissa, Singur in West Bengal or Bastar
in Chattisgarh turning central India into a war torn zone.
The intensification of the
expropriation of livelihood resources of the masses since the 1990s
with the launch of the New Economic Policy, followed by what is popularly
referred to as ‘globalisation’, which in fact is liberalization,
privatization and globalization, facilitated by the troika – the
World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organisation
– has seen an outburst of conflict between the state and the people.
The rapid accumulation of capital leading to over-accumulation, the
emergence of finance capital as the engine of change and control, and
the materialization of the marauding global capital for accumulation
through dispossession as a distinct outgrowth for control of resources
and market are set to change the political discourse of geographies
and her peoples.
SEZ that promises to usher
in a new era of rapid growth and employment as never before evoke intense
debate. The West Bengal government has put all SEZ's on hold. The plans
for a large multi product SEZ in Kalinga Nagar has been dropped by the
Orissa government. Rehabilitation policies are being revised by Punjab
and Haryana. Maharashtra government is planning to reduce the size of
the planned MahaMumbai SEZ. The Finance Ministry and the Reserve bank
of India are unhappy with the SEZ policy on grounds that the policy
offers excessive exemptions which will lead to revenue loss and spur
real estate speculation. The Rural Development Ministry objected to
the large-scale acquisition of agricultural land threatening spinning
off further food insecurity. The IMF and the Asian Development Bank
have criticised the tax exemptions being provided making SEZ ‘business-friendly’
rather than ‘market-friendly’, inherently violating market
principles and market reform which they ardently promote.
A number of patch work remedies
are proposed. Avoidance of acquisition of prime agricultural land, improvement
in the compensation package offered in rehabilitation, offer of shares
in the companies in the project to the displaced, compensation for agricultural
labourers and sharecroppers besides land owners, ceiling on the area
of SEZ's and no land acquisition by the state governments but instead
the private developer to buy land at the market price directly from
the land owners are some proposed remedies. The Parliamentary Committee
on Commerce has demanded a freeze on new SEZs pending a fresh look at
the policy, ban on use of irrigated crop land, a ceiling on the extent
of land for SEZs and that too on lease rather than purchase. The Commerce
Ministry meanwhile issued a new notification making SEZ developers responsible
for the rehabilitation of displaced persons “as per the policies
of the State government”. At the same time the Commerce Ministry
has further liberalized exemption to now include contractors in SEZ
units to claim exemptions to further promote SEZs while the Finance
Ministry on the other hand is trying to tighten tax exemptions.
The Manufacturing of SEZ,
the High-Speed Engine of Growth
However, what is noteworthy is that SEZ policy, followed by SEZ Act
and Rules, emerged and established without much parliamentary debate
over the last eight years across both the National Democratic Alliance
and the United Progressive Alliance regimes. The SEZ has, as its predecessor,
the Export Processing Zones (EPZs) which are ‘industrial zones
with special incentives to attract foreign investment in which imported
materials undergo some degree of processing before being exported again’
(The International Labour Organisation, 1998). EPZs are 'enclaves' dedicated
to the promotion of export processing, isolated and insulated from the
domestic economy with relaxed and liberal state controls in import,
infrastructure and, in some cases, labour laws, simplified bureaucratic
procedure, and favoured treatment to foreign and often domestic investors.
The investors are to process all intermediate imports within the zone
and to export without adversely affecting the domestic economy, attract
foreign investment into and promote exports from the industrial and
manufacturing sector within these initiatives that are not be extended
beyond a specified geographical area, namely a ‘zone’.
EPZs emerged in response
to the emergence of finance and global capital as the major economic
players, the rapidly accumulating capital that seeks to move out to
invest, the growing competition between developing nations to attract
foreign direct investment and the thirst of capital to have an unfettered
play in the pursuit of profit. Around 1967 Western capitalism was faced
with a crisis of stagnation in growth, co-existing with high rates of
inflation creating an economic downturn and slump along with the over-accumulation
of capital. To snap out of this crisis, capitalism evolved a mechanism
where the adjustment process heavily depended on lowering the cost of
labour, raw materials and production by migration of capital to the
peripheral regions of South Asia in the form of EPZ. This led to the
decision of US firms to locate assembly operations in low-cost East
Asian locations in the 1960s, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, where
the US had particular political and strategic interest besides influence.
Both these countries established their first EPZs in 1965 around the
same time as India. Now an international phenomenon, EPZs increased
from 176 across 47 countries in 1986 to over 3,000 across 116 countries
by 2002. This does not include the enormous numbers of industrial parks,
free zones and other areas which strongly resemble EPZ's but are not
officially declared as such. Three countries in particular –Taiwan,
South Korea and China – are often cited as major successes in
using EPZ's as part of their industrialisation strategy.
South Korea under US occupation
and Taiwan under the Kuomintang had gone through far-reaching land reforms
freeing agricultural surpluses for use in industrialization with the
virtual elimination of the feudal landlordism. EPZ formed a part of
the larger domestic industrial and economic development of these countries
through export-oriented strategy. Moreover the EPZs were not central
to this strategy.
Taiwan's first export-processing
zone was set-up in 1965 in Chien-Jiang, Kaohsiung City, followed by
the opening of more zones managed by Taiwan's Export Processing Zones
Administration. Average annual growth in exports was high at about 61
percent from 1967-79 but new investment had largely dried up by the
early 1980s with infrastructure becoming redundant, duty-free arrangements
improving elsewhere in Taiwan, and investment migrating elsewhere in
the Asian region in search of greener pastures in terms of higher returns
per dollar of investment and lower wage rates.
South Korea organized special
industrial parks and export processing zones focused on the under-developed
regions away from the high investment receiving Seoul. The industrial
parks for export production and the export-promotion zones were initially
expected to spearhead the development of capital-intensive heavy industries
such as iron, steel and petrochemicals, but in the 1980s shifted focus
to high-technology industries as computers, semiconductors, telecommunications
and biotechnologies. But these zones waned in importance that by 1985
the SEZ manufactured good exports amounted to only 2.9 percent of the
country's total manufacturing exports.
In the case of China, the
situation was different with a socialist command economy, state ownership
of land in urban areas and village commune ownership (collectivization)
of land in the rural areas, and strong labour security. EPZs for earning
much needed foreign exchange earnings commenced in the 1960s and SEZs
beginning in 1979 with four SEZs, at Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, and
Xiamen. Hainan Island was opened as the fifth SEZ in 1984 when ‘open
door’ economic privileges were also offered to fourteen coastal
cities. This opening up was carried out while insulating the economy
of the remaining region of the country, as a strategy for regional development
and that too of the poorer southern coastal areas. The strategy adopted
was liberalization in a gradual manner with SEZ as the vanguard of market
socialism. Unlike South Korea and Taiwan, SEZ in China was of central
political and economic importance. In 1981, China clamped a moratorium
on further SEZs. Large scale foreign investment came in from Hong Kong,
Macao and Taiwan to tap geographical proximity and economic advantages
as wage rates. The 1987 Land Administration Law provided the country's
first property rights with provincial governments, municipalities and
SEZ's also empowered to create their own land regulations as long as
they did not contradict the national legislation.
By the 1990s these export
promotion zones became import processing zones with net exports barely
16 percent of gross exports due to the high import component. Property
markets emerged by 1991 with administrative allocation of land and rise
of a speculative market in land rights. Only less than half the land
transferred was actually developed. The ‘Zone fever’ spread
with the provincial and local government declaring special zones that
the number was estimated from 6000 to 8700 zones covering 15,000 square
kilometers, often in violation of national or provincial regulations
that more than 1000 such zones were cancelled by the national government.
Uncontrolled speculative spin-offs forced the government to impose restrictions
on the construction of hotels, restaurants and commercial buildings.
Economic and Technical Development Zones (ETDZ) and National Industrial
Development Zones for New and Advanced Technology (NIDZNAT), smaller
high-technology oriented zones, sprung up close to the cities numbering
54 by 2006. 5 million hectares of arable land were transferred to such
zones between 1986 and 1995. By 1997 the government imposed a blanket
moratorium on conversion of land-use across the country followed by
a law in 1998 restricting conversion of agricultural land. The Hainan
Development Bank that invested heavily in such zones closed down bankrupt.
Some of the biggest public sector corporations faced financial crises
and bankruptcies. The preferential tax treatment offered to investors
are being removed and made uniform across the country. In Shenzhen,
the biggest of all SEZs, a third of the workers received less than minimum
wages and about half the firms owed workers wage arrears. Runaway pollution
problems cost the country more than US$200 billion a year, roughly 10
percent of China's gross domestic product and pollution-related deaths
is estimated at 750,000 annually.
India set up the first special
EPZ in Kandla, Gujarat, as early as in 1965. Santacruz Electronics Export
Processing Zone (SEEPZ) followed becoming functional in 1973. Four more
zones were set up by the Central government in 1984 at Kochi (Kerala),
Chennai (Tamil Nadu), Falta (West Bengal), and Noida (Uttar Pradesh).
Another one was set up in Visakhapattanam (Andhra Pradesh). SEEPZ in
Mumbai for instance transformed the labour-intensive jewellery industry
with its cottage industry status to a highly mechanized modern industry
accounting for 55 percent of the Indian jewellery exports in 2002-03.
The unit established by Tata Group in partnership with Burroughs, an
American company, in 1977 in SEEPZ saw the beginning of India’s
export in software and peripherals. Citibank established a 100 per cent
foreign-owned, export-oriented, offshore software company in SEEPZ in
1985. The first private EPZ started operations in 1998 in Surat, Gujarat.
All these eight EPZs, including the one at Surat, have since been converted
to the new SEZ scheme.
Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) to the total investment in EPZ was a low at 16.7 percent. The
share of EPZ in the country’s export was a mere 5 percent in 2004-05
accounting for 1 percent of employment in the factory sector and 0.32
percent of factory investment. All these indicate that the hype over
EPZ has no basis as far as India is concerned.
EPZs were justified as necessary
in order to overcome the often repeated shortcomings on account of the
multiplicity of controls and clearances; absence of world-class infrastructure,
and an unstable fiscal regime and with a view to attract larger foreign
investments in India. The Special Economic Zones (SEZs) Policy was announced
in April 2000 offering more lucrative incentives/benefits. During the
period 1 November 2000 to 9 February 2006 SEZs functioned under the
provisions of the Foreign Trade Policy with all existing zones being
converted into SEZs. Statutes to formalize the fiscal incentives became
operational subsequently.
The Special Economic Zones
Act, 2005, passed by Parliament without much parliamentary debate in
May, 2005 receiving the Presidential assent on the 23 June, 2005 supported
by SEZ Rules, came into effect on 10 February, 2006. The Left parties
opposed any relaxation of labour laws and insisted on the removal of
two clauses in the Bill pertaining to the Central government's power
to modify or withdraw the application of any law to SEZ's, and a clause
empowering the State governments to withdraw application of labour laws
in SEZ's which were amended by the Commerce Minister through amendments
in Parliament. The debate over SEZ Act came up only with people’s
resistance that emerged subsequently.
Unraveling SEZ: A Boon or
A Bane
The Act provides for drastic simplification of procedures and for single
window clearance on matters relating to central as well as state governments
for generating additional economic activity; promoting exports of goods
and services, investment from domestic and foreign sources; creating
employment opportunities; and developing infrastructure facilities.
Single Window SEZ approval mechanism is provided through a 19 member
inter-ministerial SEZ Board of Approval (BoA). The functioning of the
SEZs is governed by a three tier administrative set up. The Board of
Approval is the apex body. Each Zone has an Approval Committee dealing
with approval of units in the SEZs and other related issues. Each Zone
is headed by a Development Commissioner, who is ex-officio chairperson
of the Approval Committee. Once approved the Central Government notifies
the area of the SEZ and units are allowed to be set up in the SEZ.
A whole range of incentives
and facilities are offered under the Act including duty free import/domestic
procurement of goods; 100% Income Tax exemption on export income; exemption
from minimum alternate tax, Central Sales Tax, Service Tax and State
sales tax and other levies, customs/excise duties, and dividend distribution
tax; external commercial borrowing up to US$500 million in a year is
permitted without any maturity restriction; provision of standard factories/plots
at low rents with extended lease period, and infrastructure and utilities.
Most taxes and cesses are not applicable to goods procured from the
Domestic Tariff Area. The fifteen year income tax holiday consists of
total exemption for the first five years, 50% for the next five years,
and 50% on reinvested export profits for the following five years, while
Developers get a 10 year 100% tax exemption. Electricity taxes and duties
are to be removed for electricity that is to be used within the processing
area.
The main difference between
an EPZ and SEZ is that the former is just an industrial enclave while
the SEZ is an integrated township with fully developed infrastructure.
In addition, state governments also enacted their own SEZ laws, primarily
to cover state subjects.
All that is required to create
an SEZ is simply finding land for it. Objectives of exports, employment,
industrialization etc., are in effect deemed irrelevant to the declaration
of the SEZ. It is however required that the unit would have a positive
net foreign exchange earning within the first five years; the Developer
confirms availability of space in the processing area for the unit,
the applicant (a resident with a good financial record) undertakes to
fulfill applicable environmental and pollution control norms; certain
industries are to fulfill the respective sector-specific requirements;
and units involving transfer of machinery from the Domestic Tariff Area
(as per a clause added in October 2006) will not be approved. The State
government is also to provide water, electricity and other services
required by the developer. SEZ's includes restaurants, housing and apartments,
gymnasiums, club houses, multiplexes, shopping arcades and retail space,
schools, convention or business centres and even swimming pools. Hotels
are allowed in all SEZ's except IT, gems and biotech SEZ's. The performance
of the SEZ units is to be periodically monitored by the Approval Committee
and units are liable for penal action under the provision of Foreign
Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, in case of violation of the
conditions of the approval.
366 SEZs were granted formal
approvals granted as on August 2007 covering a land area of 48,968.9724hectares.
Of this, 142 have been notified as on 24 August 2007 for an area of
18,933.83908 hectares. Further in-principle approvals have been granted
for an additional 176 for 157,169.0131hectares. The Ministry of Commerce
claims that these zones would attract investment of about Rs.100,000
crores including Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of US$5-6 billion creating
500,000 jobs by end of 2007. Total investment expected by end 2009 is
Rs 300,000 crores creating additional 40 lakh jobs, by December 2009.
The critique of SEZ has largely
been around the issue of land acquisition and its fall out in terms
of how much land, what kind of land and the compensation package; but
SEZ portends much more than these. There is also the anticipation that
SEZs will take the country to unprecedented growth levels. Speculations
are rife with cynicism alongside that these are misplaced. But what
is not being recognized nor debated is that SEZ, more than an ‘economic
growth model’, is more of a ‘governance model’ that
gives almost full rein to capital, and that too predatory capital.
The Transfer of Power: Abrogation
of Democracy to Corporate Governance
SEZ's will be notified as ‘industrial townships’ under Article
243Q of the Constitution which exempts them from the provisions of Part
IX of the Constitution that provides for elected local governments.
Instead, an industrial township authority is constituted with the same
powers and duties as a municipal body. There would be no democratic
local governance institutions in SEZs. The developer is to construct
the zone and also be effectively in control of the local governance
in terms of provision of infrastructure and basic services such as education,
health, transportation and so on. The Development Commissioner, along
with the Developer, effectively replaces local democratic institutions
centralizing powers with every arm of the state such as public services,
police, judiciary and local governance coming under the control of the
Development Commissioner, the Developer and the Central government.
This is evident from the three tier governance system in place.
Full powers are bestowed
by Section 49 of the SEZ Act on the Central government to modify or
repeal any Central law in its application to SEZs (with the exception
of labour law), a power normally vested in the parliament. This exception
is ‘relating to trade unions, industrial and labour disputes,
welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employers’
liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and
maternity benefits applicable in any Special Economic Zones.’
However, this exception is virtually nullified by the Rules that require
that State governments declare SEZ's to be public utility services and
delegate the powers of the Labour Commissioner to the Development Commissioner
whose specified mandate is for ‘speedy development’ of the
SEZ, especially the promotion of exports. Moreover, the SEZ Act only
bars the Central government from relaxing labour laws but not the States.
These include exemptions from the Minimum Wages Act, Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, Employees State Insurance Scheme, requirements
for posting information, and so on.
The Development Commissioner in most States is the authority for most
clearances and for labour rights. The judicial and policing functions
are altered with ‘No investigation,
search or seizure shall be carried out in a Special Economic Zone by
any agency or officer’ without the permission of the Development
Commissioner under Section 22 of the Act with the exception being only
in the case of ‘notified offences’, notified by the Central
government under section 21 of the Act, which are also to be intimated
to the Development Commissioner. Special courts are provided under the
Act in SEZ's for both civil and criminal matters who alone can try and
adjudicate any civil dispute within an SEZ or any trial of a ‘notified
offence’. Ordinary criminal trials of non-notified offences can
take place in ordinary courts, but investigation of such crimes is not
possible without the authorization of the Development Commissioner.
Appeals from the special courts will lie directly with the High Court
of the State. These provisions produce a system of a separate judiciary
for the SEZ with the Development Commissioner playing a key role. The
net effect is the transfer of power over resources, governance and people
within the Zone to big business and investment capital, and the creation
of a new economic, geographical and political reality.
The SEZ Act itself insists
that all those employed or residing in the Zone is to have an identity
card with entry restricted to only ‘authorized persons’
into the processing area. The Zone will effectively be a secured enclosure,
fenced off by boundary wall or wire mesh of a minimum height of two
meters forty centimeters with top sixty centimeters being barbed wire
fencing with mild steel angle and with specified entry and exit points.
This clause was replaced in March 2007, with a requirement that the
processing area and an FTWZ (Free Trade Warehousing Zones) shall be
‘fully secured with measures approved by the Board of Approval.’
Economic Parasitism
Unlike India, the so-called ‘success’ stories of Taiwan,
South Korea and China have two important features namely, (a) in all
these countries the EPZs/SEZs followed a thorough land reforms that
effectively eliminated the feudal landlordism which in the case of India
remain cursory and (b) EPZs/SEZs formed part of a national economic
and development strategy of the countries as a whole whereas India expects
the SEZs to be the engine of rapid transformation of the national economy
and development. That these ‘successes’ came with its own
baggage of acute problems as enumerated earlier is another fact. Together,
what it portends is further economic and political crisis besides the
social and environmental fallouts.
SEZs are expected to bring
in a flood of investment, especially FDI due to the unbridled incentives.
Rs.3,000 crores is estimated by the Ministry of Commerce to be invested
in the SEZs by the end of the fiscal year 2006 – 2007. In contrast,
India received an FDI of Rs. 1.06 lakh crores in 2006 (Union Budget
2007-2008). FDI also has shown a preference to acquire existing companies
or invest in infrastructure rather than greenfield export-oriented projects.
The projected large FDI into SEZs is skeptically viewed as chasing a
mirage. FDI as a percentage of total investment in EPZ's varied in Asia
from a high 90% in Malaysia and 85% in Taiwan to a low of 16.7% in,
significantly, India. Once the infrastructure is in place, production
and exports increases initially following initial large investments.
Later, there is a ‘leveling off’ of foreign investment and
exports. The cost of labour and general costs tend to rise subsequently
driven by increased cost of living and services.
The exports are offset with
high import component lowering net exports induced also by the reduction
of duties and tariffs on imports. The importance of Zone to export promotion
then declines leading to the inevitable reappraisal and reintegration
into the domestic economy. In addition, under WTO the incentives provided
in SEZs are treated as ‘export subsidies’ which lead to
countervailing duties by the importing countries under the WTO Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Already India is subject to
the largest number of countervailing measures for its exports from EPZs
(and now SEZs) than any other country. And SEZ exports currently ranges
between 7% to 9% of India's total exports only, which falls to half
if one were to account for the invisibles.
The incentives dished out
to SEZs will create a tilted playing field between SEZ and non-SEZ investors.
Given the incentives, SEZs, rather than start new initiatives, would
simply attract existing enterprises to relocate themselves from the
domestic economy to SEZs to avail of the incentives in order to maximize
profits. This would amount to a mere shift in existing investment from
the outside to the SEZs rather than new investments. Of the SEZs notified,
IT/ITES constituted the bulk of them (66%) with single sector IT SEZ
forming the majority. This is followed by Pharma/chemicals (7%) and
Textiles/Apparel/Wool (4%). It looks that the relocation process is
in effective swing as can be noticed by the exceptional number in the
IT sector. The government in November 2006 itself decided to stop further
in-principle approval of IT SEZs. The Software Technology Parks Initiative,
the main scheme is also scheduled to end by 2009. The majority of SEZ
investment is from the private sector. Real estate sector applicants
form the majority in the private sector followed by IT companies forming
nearly three quarters of non-public sector approvals. IT and multi product
SEZ's, form the bulk of all applications by real estate companies. Real
estate development rather than export generation is a factor to reckon
with.
Further, with strains emerging,
the removal of the imposition of duties on sales of products in the
Domestic Tariff Area would result in the entry of SEZ units into production
for the domestic market with its damaging effect on the competitiveness
of existing production outside SEZs for the domestic market. This portends
closures of industries and resultant unemployment outside the SEZs.
With favored position and
pampering along with relaxation of regulatory mechanism, SEZs could
become the hub of economic offenses. For instance, the 33rd Report of
the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance found that show cause
notices had been issued for more than Rs. 3,400 crores between 2002-2003
and 2004-2005 for fraud in export oriented units (EOU's) and some other
export schemes.
Redrawing Land Maps
The establishment of SEZs, and a large number of them, requires substantial
land to be acquired or purchased by developers. About 2 lakh hectares
are required for establishing the approved and in-principle approved
SEZs. The notorious Land Acquisition Act 1894 has been used to acquire
lands in many cases whether the developer is a public sector or private
sector, at a price well below market prices not taking the dependants
of the land as an affected party in the acquisition normally. Land can
be acquired under this Act only for ‘public purpose’ which
are defined in Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act and does not
include companies. However, the judiciary has deftly reinterpreted the
law to say that once the government has acquired a land, the government
can sell, dispose or transfer rights of its land at will to whomsoever
it wants to, irrespective of the original intent of acquisition. In
effect, land acquisition by the State has made a decisive shift from
‘public purpose’ to also ‘private profit’. But
with militant resistance, the developer purchasing land directly from
the owner without the mediation of the state is a proposed remedy.
Acquisition of prime agricultural
land became a major issue with all its serious implication which is
now attempted to be restricted with restriction of acquisition on single
crop agricultural land alone beside waste and barren land. Double cropped
agricultural land, if necessary, is to be limited to 10 percent of the
total land. More over such areas have powerful farming interests and
is at the heart of agricultural economies. That the category of waste
and barren land most often constitute survival resource base for the
most marginalized in vast numbers is ignored. Land acquisitions, or
alternatively land purchases, are therefore to increasingly focus on
the marginal and tribal areas. Official rehabilitation schemes rarely
work satisfactorily, be it by the state or the private sector. However,
holding the state responsible is easier than the private purchaser in
a democracy. The proposition to take the land on lease is also floated
to ostensibly ensure permanent income to the oustees.
The lands are invariably
located in close proximity to raw materials, urban centers and transportation
facilities. At least 35 percent of the acquired land is to be used as
processing area while the rest could be for residential, and recreational
facilities. The acquisition bypasses and belittles local self-governance
institutions of the panchayats. The SEZs moreover become the nodal points
for speculation fuelling large scale real estate activities around the
Zones with the emergence of powerful land mafias in connivance with
authorities to dispossess people of their lands in the surrounding areas
driving land prices up within SEZs and around it. The attraction to
SEZs is likely to vanish in due course defeating the main attraction
of low cost SEZ. Almost as though recognizing this reality, the Reserve
Bank of India has asked the banks to treat SEZ lending as real estate
business and not infrastructure.
Promoting Disparities and
False Hopes
SEZs will aggravate regional disparities. Over three-quarters of all
approved SEZs are located in six States – Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat,
Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. Maharashtra and Andhra
Pradesh alone account for more than a third of all approvals. These
states are all relatively well developed States with high industrial
capacity. These are also highly urbanized with the partial exception
of Maharashtra. Obviously, investment is channelised to areas of high
levels of industry and investment which further propels these states
to showcase their ‘success’ further.
Employment to the tune of
5 lakhs to as much as 40 lakhs is bandied about officially by the Ministry
of Commerce. As indicated earlier, relocation of industries from outside
to the SEZs to take advantage of the relative advantage would simply
mean mostly the translocation or migration of existing labour than generation
of new employment. In addition, the likely negative impact of SEZs on
manufacturing outside the SEZs could spell a decline in employment outside.
Between 1998 and 2003, while investments grew by 73%, employment growth
showed only a 13.7% rise in EPZs. Net increase in employment, considering
the growth in employment in SEZs, would therefore be actually far low.
The working conditions, in
the context of the relaxed application of labour laws, could continue
the turnover rate of 30% or 40% seen in the erstwhile EPZs. Labour abuse
and violence in EPZs has led to consumer movements in the US for instance,
demanding multinationals to respect labour rights. Workers are told
that they could not organise trade unions because of the ‘zone’
status which are declared public utility services, a designation under
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Labour inspectors are reportedly
issued orders by the Commerce Ministry not to visit the zones without
prior permission from the Ministry. There is also the unemployment caused
due to land acquisition or change in land use in and outside SEZ. The
long term impact such as impact of pollution and change in land use
in the surrounding areas could be colossal if one is to go by past experience.
The loss to the government
on account of SEZ is incredible. In 2004 – 2005, the government
already incurred a loss of Rs. 41,000 crores – a staggering 72%
of customs revenues and 23% of total indirect tax revenue of any kind.
The Finance Ministry estimates that Rs. 1.75 lakh crores will be lost
over the next five years.
These capital driven enclaves
have all the bearings of impending economic crisis and the concomitant
political and legal turmoil. SEZs are not simply about land-based displacement-inducing
projects driven by the nexus of capital and state. It is also about
the replacement of democracy by governance by corporations, the new
form of governance by capital supplanting people. It is also about growth
with inequity, and social and environmental injustice. It is also about
democratization of control over and governance of resources by people
in response, as a matter of right and struggle.
[Email: [email protected]]
References:
1. Aggarwal, Aradhna. Revisiting the Policy Debate, Economic and Political
Weekly, November 4, 2006, pp. 4533-4536
2. Gopalakrishnan, Shankar. Negative Aspects of Special Economic Zones
in China, Economic and Political Weekly, April 28, 2007, pp.1492-1494.
3. http://sezindia.nic.in/HTMLS/about.htm
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