Grave
Crisis Over India-US
Nuclear Deal
By Praful Bidwai
27 August, 2007
The News
The
confrontation between the United Progressive Alliance and the Left over
the India-United States nuclear deal has ballooned into a major crisis,
which could potentially dislodge the government. The roots of the crisis
lie in the way the "123 agreement" was negotiated, without
political leaders being taken into confidence about its context or content,
or involved in resolving differences over its text.
Opposition to the deal, whether
genuine, procedural or contrived, is widespread. But it's only when
the Left presented its critique on August 7 that matters came to a head.
This was the first well-informed and -reasoned critical analysis of
the deal after the "123" text was made public.
Even so, an ugly confrontation
might have been avoided but for two events. First, Singh gave an interview
to the Kolkata-based Telegraph (Aug 11), challenging the Left to withdraw
support to the UPA. Second, US State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack
was reported to have said that under "123", "all nuclear
cooperation [would be] terminated" if India conducts nuclear test.
This was one day after Singh said that testing is India's "sovereign
decision", and won't cause
sudden termination.
If the second event created
confusion, the first provoked the Left. Singh taunted it for not having
"thought" things "through", and said: "It is
an honourable deal Šif [the Left parties] want to withdraw support,
so be itŠ" Singh's self-styled advisers calculated that this
would help him play the CPM's so-called "moderate modernisers"
in West Bengal off against its "hardliners" to trump their
opposition. This betrayed a serious misunderstanding of how the Left
parties make policy decisions. It also underrated the unanimity among
them on foreign policy and security issues.
The Left's reaction was ballistic.
Within three days, Singh was begging CPM general secretary Prakash Karat
for a reconciliation meeting. Thus began the worst-ever crisis in UPA-Left
relations. The CPM, joined by the other three Left parties, demanded
that that the government suspend further talks with the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group to complete the
deal.
Or there would be "serious
consequences". Without the Left's support, the UPA would fall short
of a parliamentary majority by 30 to 50 seats. Instead of sincerely
exploring a via media, the UPA deviously resorted to accusing the Left
of acting at China's and Pakistan's behest. This tendentious charge
was articulated through Right-wing pro-US China-Pakistan-baiters masquerading
as "experts". In reality, there is no live contact between
the Indian Left and the Chinese Communist Party, over some of whose
policies the Left has serious misgivings.
India is now witnessing the
most vicious attack on the Left since the 1962 China War. Every Tom,
Dick and Harry in the media--from semi-literate television anchors,
to former intelligence spooks, to pitiable third-edit writers--is unleashing
vitriolic anti-Communist assaults. This new McCarthyism betrays malignant
intolerance. Such intolerance can only have dangerous consequences for
public debate. If every dissenting opinion is attributed to the "foreign
hand" by suppressing its rational content, and if every difference
on principle is reduced to an "ego clash" between personalities,
there can be no rational discourse on policy issues. That does not bode
well for Indian democracy.
It's simply undeniable that
the Indian Left represents the most important current driven by ideology
and principle in politics, which perhaps concentrates more brainpower
per capita than any other party. Despite the Left's conduct in Singur
and Nandigram--of which this writer has been strongly critical--, its
objection to the deal on strategic grounds cannot be dismissed. As this
column argued two weeks ago, the nuclear deal is inseparable from the
larger US game-plan to recruit India into a junior strategic partnership,
not least to counter China, and more broadly, to create an anchor for
a Washington-dominated security architecture in Asia. The deal cannot
be divorced from the Defence Framework agreement of June 2005, nor from
India's two votes against Iran at the IAEA, nor from the 27 recent high-level
military exercises with the US.
The Left's critique of the
deal is foundational. It's centred on the US's deeply destabilising
world role, and its attempt to ignite a second Cold War by encircling
Russia with NATO and targeting China and Iran through "Son of Star
Wars" Ballistic Missile Defence. The US remains the globe's most
belligerent power, which has made the world more insecure through its
Global War on Terror and its Empire project.
True, the Left did not consistently
emphasise the deal's strategic dimensions in the past two years, and
often concentrated on its text rather than context. Since December,
it has been more concerned to point to differences between the Hyde
Act and Singh's assurances to parliament. It didn't really agitate the
issue in public. Any genuine, principled opposition to the deal should
logically have focused on its harmful global and regional consequences
for nuclear disarmament, and its promotion of an inappropriate, costly,
hazardous and environmentally unsound energy trajectory through nuclear
power development--besides its consequences for the loss of India's
strategic and foreign policy autonomy via a strategic embrace of the
US. These are significant errors of omission.
However, the government's
errors of commission are graver. Singh acted like a typical bureaucrat,
and left the deal's negotiation to bureaucrats alone, without bringing
political leaders on board. He consistently underplayed its strategic
consequences, and fomented the illusion that the deal would offer a
magic bullet for India's energy problems. He capitulated to US pressures.
Former US assistant secretary of state Stephen Rademaker says India's
votes on Iran were obtained through "coercion".
Singh continues to pay lip-service
to disarmament, while knowing fully well that the deal will enable India
to stockpile 1,600 kg of plutonium every year--enough for more than
300 bombs, in addition to the existing estimated inventory of 100-150
warheads. This is a recipe for a nuclear arms race with Pakistan, and
worse, China, which can only reduce the security of all three.
Now, the UPA faces a crisis
of survival. It would be foolish for it to brazen this out. It can still
rescue the situation by doing four things. The first is to distance
itself strategically from Washington demonstrably--by cancelling the
huge military exercises with the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore
planned for September. Second, it should initiate what might be called
a "domestic Hyde Act" to prevent the transfer of any imported
nuclear material/equipment out of India which would jeopardise the continuous
operation of Indian reactors.
Third, the UPA must update
the Rajiv Gandhi plan of 1988 for global nuclear disarmament and place
it before the United Nations. That's the only concrete way of fulfilling
the National Common Minimum Programme's promise that India would seize
"leadership" in fighting for a nuclear weapons-free world.
Finally, the UPA must launch a national debate on nuclear power, reviewing
India's (unhappy) experience with it, analysing its international performance,
and focusing on its hazards, costs and unsustainability.
The UPA must suspend negotiations
on the deal while these processes are under way. Similarly, the Left
must clarify that it won't vote against the government or contribute
to its fall, thus helping the BJP. That could promote an honourable
solution.
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