Olmert's
Truth
By Uri Avnery
13 March, 2007
Gush
Shalom
If God wills, even a broomstick
will shoot. That is an old Yiddish adage. One could add now: If God
wills, even Olmert can sometimes tell the truth.
The truth, according to the Prime Minister's testimony before the Inquiry
Commission headed by Judge Vinograd that was leaked to the media yesterday,
is that this was not a spontaneous reaction to the capture of the two
soldiers, but a war planned a long time ago. We said so right from the
start.
Olmert told the commission
that immediately after assuming the functions of acting prime minister,
in January 2006, he consulted with the army chiefs about the situation
on the northern border. Until then, the prevailing doctrine followed
Ariel Sharon's decision - logical from his point of view - not to react
in force to provocations in the north, so that the Israeli army could
concentrate on fighting the Palestinians. But this enabled Hizbullah
to build up a large stockpile of rockets of all kinds. Olmert decided
to change that policy.
The army prepared a two-pronged
plan: an operation on the ground aimed at the elimination of Hizbullah,
and an aerial offensive, aimed at the destruction of the Lebanese infrastructure,
in order to put pressure on the Lebanese public which in turn would
put pressure on Hizbullah. As the Chief of Staff, Dan Halutz, said at
the beginning of the war: "we shall turn Lebanon's clock back 20
years." (a rather modest aim, compared to the famous proposal of
an American colleague: to "bomb Vietnam back to the stone age".)
The Air Force was also tasked with destroying Hizbullah's rocket arsenal.
But nowadays it is not proper
anymore to attack a country without a convincing reason. Already before
the First Lebanon War, the Americans demanded that Israel attack only
after a clear provocation that would convince the world. The necessary
justification was provided at the right time by the Abu Nidal gang,
which tried to assassinate the Israeli ambassador in London. In the
recent case, it was decided in advance that the capture of Israeli soldiers
would constitute such a provocation.
A cynic might argue that
this decision turned Israeli soldiers into bait. It was known that Hizbullah
wanted to capture soldiers in order to force a prisoner exchange. The
regular Israeli army patrols along the border fence were, in a way,
a standing invitation to Hizbullah to carry out their evil design.
THE CAPTURE of the soldier
Gilad Shalit by Palestinians near the Gaza border fence turned on a
red light in Israel. Olmert said in his testimony that from that moment
on, he was convinced that Hizbullah was about to try to carry out a
similar exploit.
If so, the prime minister
should perhaps have ordered the army to halt the patrols along the northern
border, or to reinforce them in a way that would deter Hizbullah. That
was not done. The poor members of the fateful patrol set out on their
way as to a picnic.
The same cynic might argue
that Olmert and the army chiefs were interested in a pretext in order
to execute their war plans. They were convinced, anyhow, that the soldiers
would be brought home in a jiffy. But, as the British royal motto says,
Honi soit qui mal y pense - Shame upon him who thinks ill of it.
Anyhow, Hizbullah attacked,
two soldiers were captured, and the planned operation should have started
rolling smoothly. But that did not happen. The war did indeed break
out, as planned, but from then on almost nothing went according to plan.
Consultations were hasty, the decisions confused, the operations indecisive.
It now appears that the plan was not yet finalized and confirmed.
The Vinograd commission is
supposed to find the answers to some tough questions: If the war was
planned such a long time in advance, why was the army not ready for
war? How come the army budget was reduced? How come the emergency arsenals
were empty? Why were the reserve forces, which were supposed to carry
out the operations on the ground, called up only when the war was already
in full swing? And after they were finally deployed, why did they receive
confused and contradictory orders?
All these show that Olmert
and the generals were grossly incompetent in their military decision-making.
But they also lacked any understanding of the international scene.
HASSAN NASRALLAH has openly
admitted that he made a mistake.
He did not understand that
there had been a change in Israel: instead of Sharon, an old war-horse
who was not looking for action in the north, a new man had arrived,
an inexperienced politician itching for war. What Nasrallah had in mind
was just another round of the usual: the capture of some soldiers and
a prisoner exchange. Instead, a full-blown war broke out.
But Ehud Olmert's mistake
was even bigger. He was convinced that the United States would give
him a blessing for the road and allow him to roam in Lebanon at will.
But American interests, too, had changed.
In Lebanon, the government
of Fuad Siniora has succeeded in uniting all pro-American forces. They
have loyally carried out all of Washington's orders, have driven out
the Syrians and have supported the investigation of Rafiq Hariri's murder,
which is to provide the Americans with a pretext for a massive strike
against Syria.
According to Olmert's leaks,
Condoleezza Rice called him just after the outbreak of the war and conveyed
to him the up-to-date American orders : it was indeed desired that Israel
should deal a crushing blow to Hizbullah, the enemies of Siniora, but
it was absolutely forbidden to do anything that would hurt Siniora,
such as bombing Lebanese infrastructure outside Hizbullah's territory.
That emasculated the General
Staff's plans. The main idea had been that if the civilian population
in Lebanon was hurt sufficiently, it would put pressure on the government
to act decisively against Hizbullah, enough to liquidate the organization
or, at least, to disarm it. It is very doubtful whether this strategy
would have succeeded if it had been carried out, but because of the
American intervention it was not carried out.
Instead of the massive bombardment
that would have destroyed the basic industries and facilities, Halutz
had to be satisfied - after Condeleezza's phone call - with bombing
the roads and bridges that serve Hizbullah and the Shiite population
(including the supply lines for Syrian arms to Hizbullahland.) The damage
was extensive, but not sufficient to bring Lebanon to its knees - if
that was at all possible. Apart from that, the air force succeeded in
destroying some of the long-range missiles, but the short-range missiles
were not hit, and it was those that created havoc among the population
in northern Israel.
On the ground, the operation
was even more confused. Only during the last 48 hours of the war, when
it was already clear that the cease-fire was about to come into force,
was the major offensive, in which 33 Israeli soldiers died, set in motion.
What for? In his testimony, Olmert asserts that it was necessary in
order to change some points in the UN resolution in Israel's favor.
We know today (as we said at the time) that these changes were worthless
and they remained on paper.
THE INTERVENTION of Condoleezza
Rice in the conduct of the war is interesting also in another respect.
It sheds light on a question that has been engaging the experts for
some time now: in the relationship between the United States and Israel,
do American interests override Israeli, or is it the other way round?
This discussion came to a
head when the American professors, Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer,
published their research paper, according to which Israel imposes on
the United States a policy that is contrary to the American national
interest. The conclusion upset many who believe the opposite: that Israel
is but a small wheel in the imperial American machine. (I permitted
myself to argue that both versions are right: the American dog wags
its Israeli tail, and the Israeli tail wags the American dog.)
When Condoleezza Rice encouraged
Israel to go to war but vetoed an essential part of the war plan, it
seems that she proved the two professors wrong. True, Olmert got American
permission for his war, which served American interests (the elimination
of Hizbullah, which opposed the pro-American Siniora government, though
it officially belonged to it), but only with severe limitations (in
order not to hurt the Siniora government).
THE SAME principle is now
operating on the Syrian front.
Bashar al-Assad offers Israel
peace negotiations without prior conditions. This way, he hopes to avert
an American attack on his country. Like the two professors, he believes
that the Israeli lobby rules Washington.
Almost all the important
experts in Israel are in agreement that the Syrian offer is serious.
Even in "security circles" some are urging Olmert to seize
the opportunity and achieve peace in the north.
But the Americans have put
an absolute veto on that, which Olmert has accepted. A vital Israeli
interest has been sacrificed on the American altar. Even now, when Bush
is already entering into some kind of a dialog with Syria, the Americans
are prohibiting us from doing the same.
Why? Very simple: the Americans
are using us as a threat. They hold us on a line, like an attack dog,
and tell Assad: if you don't do as we wish, we shall release the dog.
If the Americans reach an
agreement with the Syrians, using this threat among others, it is they
who will garner the political profits from any accord we reach with
Syria in the end.
That reminds me of the events
of 1973. After the October war, Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire negotiations
started at km 101 (from Cairo). At some stage, General Israel Tal took
over as the chief of the Israeli delegation. Much later, he told me
the following story:
"At a certain point,
General Gamasy, the Egyptian representative, approached and told me
that Egypt was now ready to sign an agreement with us. Full of joy,
I took a plane and rushed to (Prime Minister) Golda Meir, to bring her
the happy news. But Golda told me to stop everything immediately. She
said to me: I have promised Henry Kissinger that if we arrive at an
agreement, we shall transfer the whole matter to him, and he will tie
up the loose ends."
And that is what happened,
of course. The negotiations at km 101 were stopped, and Kissinger took
control of the scene. It was he who reached the agreement, and the US
was credited with it. The Egyptians became loyal followers of the US.
The Israeli-Egyptian agreement was postponed for five years. It was
achieved by Anwar Sadat, who planned his historic flight to Jerusalem
behind the backs of the Americans.
Now the same may happen on
the Syrian front. In the best case. In the worst case, the Americans
will not reach an agreement with the Syrians, they will prevent us from
achieving an agreement for ourselves, and thousands of Israelis, Syrians
and Lebanese will pay the price in the next war.