Hindutwa And The Politics of Terror
When Ashok Singhal described Godhra and the riots that followed as an `experiment', which in his opinion had been a grand success and needed to be replicated elsewhere, most people were deeply disturbed; even though they thought he meant only that Hindus need have no qualms about defending themselves. The Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and others have been endorsing this line in their pre-election tours of Gujarat, with statements that `we' can, should and will respond if attacked; while staying clear of the Election Commission's guidelines by leaving the pronoun undefined. In fact, however, the VHP leader was addressing a much larger `problem'. To fully understand the meaning of his statement, one has to look at the whole thing in a strategic rather than tactical sense.
Thanks to the turbulent phase of casteist politics which preceded the Hindu resurgence, or reaction — as the case might be — many people saw Hindutva as a unifying force. However, since this alliance had been cobbled together to give casteist forces something else to chew on, since the rallying cry was for all Hindus to unite against the common enemy, every BJP leader worth his salt knew that friction would in fact increase rather than decrease in the long run.
To begin with, at any rate, the nation would be torn further apart, rather than brought together. The salience of caste divisions would anyway have fallen off as rapid urbanisation continued, and with it the spread of urban influences into the hinterland. But urbanisation would hardly make a dent on the Hindu-Muslim problem, which the `anti-Muslim' movement could be counted on to exacerbate. Ideologues had a ready answer. Some were more candid, some less, but between them they managed to rally people behind the idea of `taking care of the (?) problem, once and for all'.
The game plan was to drive a wedge between Hindus and Muslims, in the country as a whole — so as to increase combustibility in an ever-larger `catchment area'. Afterwards, a steady stream of provocations, whether or not intended as such, whether triggered by outside forces or not, would suffice to provoke anti-Muslim violence. When and where did not matter very much. Action would be followed by reaction and as threat perceptions increased, so would support for the BJP. Since a similar process would be set in train among Muslims, the threat to both Muslims and Hindus would become ever more real. Quixotically, Hindu radicals believe that this very thing will eventually bring about a happy ending; as Muslims begin to painfully realise that, even if outside support is freely available, only silent submission can bring peace to their lives, not violence. It is this logic that L. K. Advani and others peddle when they tell Muslims that they will be `safer with the BJP'.
The end result is that we must prepare ourselves for increasing violence in the years to come if, whether on account of success or failure, the BJP moves towards more muscular varieties of Hindutva. Violence will spread and intensify if the party has its way, especially as it turns on rural and semi-urban areas that have so far escaped its attention (which is one reason why it is safer to have Congress Governments at the State level).
Finally, there will be a sharp increase in extra-judicial killings as policemen and others increasingly take the law into their own hands. It has for long been argued that no viable alternative is available, because of the nature of the ground realities, in the courts and outside them. This line of thought got a boost when the U.S. President, George W. Bush, gave Israel's Premier, Ariel Sharon, a free hand in dealing with the `second intifada', which the latter had needlessly brought upon himself in a fit of foolishness or bravado as the case might be. Human rights were put on the backburner at that time; and now, after 9/11, they have disappeared from view altogether. In Kashmir; and elsewhere as well.
Published In The Hindu
10/12/2002