Home

Follow Countercurrents on Twitter 

Why Subscribe ?

Popularise CC

Join News Letter

Editor's Picks

Press Releases

Action Alert

Feed Burner

Read CC In Your
Own Language

Bradley Manning

India Burning

Mumbai Terror

Financial Crisis

Iraq

AfPak War

Peak Oil

Globalisation

Localism

Alternative Energy

Climate Change

US Imperialism

US Elections

Palestine

Latin America

Communalism

Gender/Feminism

Dalit

Humanrights

Economy

India-pakistan

Kashmir

Environment

Book Review

Gujarat Pogrom

Kandhamal Violence

WSF

Arts/Culture

India Elections

Archives

Links

Submission Policy

About CC

Disclaimer

Fair Use Notice

Contact Us

Search Our Archive

Subscribe To Our
News Letter



Our Site

Web

Name: E-mail:

 

Printer Friendly Version

The Fall Of Muammar Gaddafi

By Chandra Muzaffar

01 September, 2011
Countercurrents.org

At the time of writing, Muammar Gaddafi has yet to be captured or killed by the rebels. Whatever his fate, one thing is absolutely certain: the Gaddafi era is over.
What brought about the downfall of this often eccentric, sometimes ruthless, leader who ruled over Libya for almost 42 years?

Causes

Gaddafi was one of the main causes of Gaddafi’s downfall. As noted in the JUST Commentary of March 2011, Gaddafi was an autocratic ruler who in the last two decades allowed wanton abuse of power, corruption and nepotism to discredit and destroy his leadership. There was hardly any latitude for freedom of expression in his highly personalised style of governance. Dissenters were imprisoned, tortured or killed.

These were some of the reasons why a sizeable segment of the citizenry turned against Gaddafi and his family. Some of the tribes and clans, respected grassroots religious figures, professionals and even members of his Cabinet and elements within the State’s security apparatus started to desert him from the early days of the uprising. A lot of young people in particular were determined to oust him.

Add to this the concerted opposition of ruling elites within the region. Gaddafi had antagonised a number of them at Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meetings. It explains why the Arab League eagerly endorsed the idea of a “No Fly Zone” over Libya which effectively crippled Gaddafi’s air force. Qatar was directly involved in military operations, apart from helping to export oil controlled by the rebels and providing them with financial assistance. Like Qatar, the United Arab Emirates also helped to finance and train the rebel soldiers.

More than the opposition of Arab rulers, it was NATO’s massive military involvement which brought down Gaddafi. NATO’s bombing campaign--- 20,000 sorties, with more than 7,500 strikes against ground targets--- pulverised Gaddafi’s military infrastructure. And, contrary to official denials, Western military personnel, in unmarked combat clothing, not only provided training to the rebels but also accompanied them in their operations. In other words, there were Western boots on the ground in disguise. In the final assault upon Tripoli, it is alleged that NATO backed officers played a pivotal role in the planning and execution. Without NATO, some analysts have rightly observed, the rebels would not have succeeded in defeating the Gaddafi forces.

The media was also a significant factor. Arabic television channels gave full backing to the rebels. Al-Jazeera was an outstanding example of a television network that went out of its way to campaign for the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. Arabic newspapers also got into the act. Needless to say, the mainstream Western media made no attempt to conceal its bias. In this regard, it is worth noting that the impact of social media was much less in the case of Libya compared to the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt.
Having looked at some of the causes for the fall of Gaddafi, let us now probe these causes further to understand their real significance and deeper implications.

Deeper Implications

One, Gaddafi’s regime was the epitome of the “despotic dynasty” that has come to characterise so many of the Arab states in the last five or six decades. In a despotic dynasty the ruler, often unelected, would have been in power for a long period of time, and seeks to preserve and perpetuate his power through family and relatives, in collusion with the military, and by resorting to harsh, oppressive and autocratic measures. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were despotic dynasties of varying shades and degrees. There are other despotic dynasties--- some monarchical, some republican--- that are still standing in the Arab world. The Arab uprising has shown that the masses will not accept this form of governance any more. This is perhaps the single most significant achievement of the uprising.

The rejection of despotic dynasties has expectedly strengthened calls for honest, upright men and women in power who are accountable and answerable to the people through fair and free elections, on the one hand, and for the creation of mechanisms that will enhance popular participation in the democratic process, on the other. Equally important, there is outright anger in much of the Arab world against the lifestyles of the powerful: their ostentatious opulence and their hideous extravagance. It is related to a far more significant demand for the reduction of economic disparities and the equitable distribution of wealth and opportunities.

Two, while there was a movement for change, it would be wrong to describe it as “peaceful” or “non-violent.” That the anti-Gaddafi protest resorted to arms within a few days of its eruption in Benghazi is an indisputable fact. This raises a fundamental question about people’s struggles for political change. The struggle for change has to remain peaceful and non-violent however difficult the circumstances may be. Only if it is peaceful, will it be able to minimise the danger of bloody feuds and violent factional wars after its victory.

The defenders of the violence that marred the anti-Gaddafi movement argue that faced with Gaddafi’s brutal security apparatus, the movement had no choice but to fight. But other movements for change --- against the Shah of Iran in 1979; Marcos in the Philippines in 1986; East European dictatorships in 1989; and Indonesia’s Suharto in 1998--- which also had to confront armies that were sometimes far more formidable than Gaddafi’s, refrained by and large from using weapons. What explains their non-violent approach?

Because these movements were genuinely popular mass movements with millions and millions of people on their side--- like the movements in Iran and the Philippines--- the armies that confronted them did not dare to embark upon some wild shooting spree. In a sense, the Tunisian and Egyptian armies also held back their fire-power because they knew that almost the entire nation was behind the peaceful protesters. But in Libya, the protest movement did not command total overwhelming support from the populace for at least the first four months. It was propped up to some extent by external forces from within and without the region. Besides, as we have seen, there were already armed groups some linked to Al-Qaeda among the protesters in the initial phase itself who were totally committed to violence. It is in its resort to violence that the Libyan rebel movement is different from the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings.

Three, though a number of Arab rulers loath Gaddafi, their aversion to him was not the only reason why they chose to support his ouster. Since government leaders in Paris, London, Rome and Washington wanted Gaddafi out, Arab leaders were only too happy to help fulfil their agenda. Colluding with the centres of power in the West is an Arab elite trait in vogue for a long while which expressed itself in both the Kuwait War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003. If collusion that often leads to betrayal of the interests of the Arab people is rife, it is because many Arab rulers are dependent upon the military and political power of the West to keep themselves on their thrones.

Four, this brings to the fore NATO’s blatant intervention in Libya which raises fundamental questions about its role in global politics. This is the second time that NATO is involved in a military adventure outside its geographical zone. Is this going to become a pattern in the future --- whereby NATO obtains UN Security Council mandate to employ its massive air-power to conquer some resource rich or strategically critical state in the Global South? Will the continent of Africa in particular be the target since the scramble for control over its abundant natural resources among the big powers has already begun in earnest? Are we witnessing --- in the wake of the abysmal failure of the US, Britain and its allies to establish control over Iraq and Afghanistan--- a modified approach to Western hegemony?

Instead of direct invasion and occupation (a’la Afghanistan and Iraq), will Western states henceforth use air-power via NATO to emasculate a recalcitrant state’s defence, train and arm rebels, and embark upon covert operations in order to overthrow its leadership? At the same time, one can expect these hegemonic forces to pile up pressure against the targeted regime through the UN’s Human Rights Council, the International Criminal Court (ICC), Western human rights NGOs and the media. Of course, they will keep telling the world that they are doing all this to prevent human rights violations and protect civilians. Indeed, the UN’s “Right to Protect” is going to be evoked more and more in the future to justify the hegemons’ intervention and aerial bombardment. It is worth recalling that in the old colonial days, it was “feuding princes”, “chaos and anarchy” or simply “the need to bring civilisation to backward people” that was the justification for conquest and subjugation.

The ulterior motives behind intervention will of course be concealed from the public. But the man- in- the -street knows that in the case of Libya it is its vast oil reserves that are the real reason for the West’s intervention. Why should oil be the reason, one may want to ask at this juncture, when Gaddafi had opened doors to major Western oil companies in recent years? True, he had provided access but what the companies wanted is control over Libyan oil. Gaddafi would not allow this. He had after all nationalised oil in the early years of his rule. Besides, Gaddafi, as we observed in an article in the JUST Commentary (May 2011), has been trying to galvanise African states into a sort of United States of Africa that will resist Western attempts to exploit Africa’s resources. He was also opposed to the US idea of an African military command, Africom, which seeks to reinforce the US grip upon the continent.

It was because Gaddafi was, all said and done, an obstacle to larger Western economic and military designs in Libya and Africa that he had to be eliminated. In fact, right from the outset, regime change was the goal of the Western powers and their local proxies. They have achieved their goal. But it is regime change courtesy NATO bombs---- not a change of government through mass peaceful ‘people power’.

Five, if we probed further the role of the biased Arabic and Western media in the Libyan conflict we would discover that they had transgressed basic media ethics. CNN, BBC and Al-Jazeera among other television stations portrayed Libya as a country that had lagged behind in economic and social development. None of these channels highlighted, or elaborated on, the fact that Libya recorded the highest human development index score for Africa in 2010, according to the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report 2010. Even more disappointing, not a single prominent media outlet gave any attention to the details of the African Union (AU) mediation plan which sought to end hostilities immediately and lay the foundation for a negotiated settlement between the Gaddafi regime and the rebels. Neither did any mainstream television or radio or newspaper accord any emphasis to the involvement of militant groups in the uprising in Benghazi or investigate how and from where they received their weapons or what the sources of their funding were. The media also deliberately downplayed the pivotal role of NATO, especially its clandestine ground operations, in ensuring the defeat of the Gaddafi regime.

What Next?

Now that Gaddafi has been defeated, what can we expect in Libya? Resistance from Gaddafi supporters may continue for some time for at least two reasons. He had distributed arms to a broad cross-section of the population a couple of months ago. Tribal attachments are still strong and there are tribes ---in Sirte for instance---which remain loyal to Gaddafi. What this means is that there is a possibility of a prolonged civil war in Libya.

The situation is exacerbated by a National Transition Council (NTC) that comprises disparate groups ranging from longstanding human rights activists to individuals who have just left the Gaddafi leadership, to Muslim Brotherhood ( Ikhwanul Muslimin) functionaries, to hardened religious militants. Once the enemy is no longer a threat, will these groups be able to hold together? Or will severe in-fighting hamper and hinder the NTC’s work to such an extent that it will be rendered ineffective? If it is not able to function, how will it address the humanitarian crisis caused by a shortage of food and fuel and other basic necessities of life that looms large in Tripoli and other parts of the country?

To put it another way, is Libya heading towards an Iraq-type situation---- political chaos and social turmoil? If it is, the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi would have been a pyrrhic victory.

Dr. Chandra Muzaffar is President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST) and Professor of Global Studies at Universiti Sains Malaysia.

Malaysia.
1 September 2011.

 

 



 


Comments are not moderated. Please be responsible and civil in your postings and stay within the topic discussed in the article too. If you find inappropriate comments, just Flag (Report) them and they will move into moderation que.