Nuke
Nightmare: Bush's Drive
To Armageddon
By Joel Wendland
06 July, 2004
Countercurrents.org
"It's
a fairly radical new way of thinking," declared Linton Brooks of
the National Nuclear Security Administration after the passage of most
of the Bush administration's proposed new nuclear policy and funding
agenda in the 2003 Energy Bill. "We essentially got what we wanted,"
the Bush appointee chortled. Brooks described the Republican-controlled
Congress' acceptance of the Bush nuclear doctrine as a "fundamental
shift" in nuclear policy. Brooks lauded the move from test bans
and non-proliferation to the development of a new generation of weapons
and planning for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons.
Included in the
funding package, according to Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
(CACN), was $49.3 million for "mini-nukes" and testing programs:
$7.5 million was earmarked for development of the "bunker buster,"
$6 million for studying other "low-yield" weapons, $10.8 million
for "modern pit" manufacturing facilities, and about $25 million
for testing preparations. (A "modern pit" is the basic nuclear
core material of an atomic weapon in storage.) Another $700 million
was allocated for
manufacturing new pits, storing tritium, and updating nuclear production
and maintenance facilities
On the heels of
this success the Bush administration proposed additional funding increases
in its 2005 budget, more than doubling the spending on a "mini-nuke"
program. Additionally, the administration called for $4 billion for
building a new "modern pit" production facility "able
to
produce 125 - 450 plutonium pits per year," says the CACN. Sources
also say that Bush will be asking for almost $500 million, over five
years, for research on its "bunker buster" bombs. While these
proposals have currently bogged down, if Bush administration and a Republican
dominated Congress maintain power after the November election, we can
expect to see a renewed blitz to pass them.
Linton Brooks was
correct. Bush's nuclear policy represented a qualitative shift from
how past administrations regarded the use of the nuclear arsenal. While
Bush claims an expanded nuclear policy is necessary to conduct a "war
on terrorism," it is clear that this line is only a cover for a
policy the far right has pursued openly since the 1990s. As early as
1990, then Pentagon chief Dick Cheney sought to skirt test bans and
"to integrate the possible use of nuclear weapons to respond to
biological or chemical attacks." George H.W. Bush hinted his support
for a new policy by openly opposing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) on his last day in office in 1993. In 1999 Senate Republicans
rejected the CTBT signed by Clinton in 1996. Throughout this period,
the Republicans' rejection of the CTBT was linked to a perceived need
to reconstitute the "star wars" missile defense program as
exemplified by the exaggerated nuclear hysteria generated by the 1998
(Donald) Rumsfeld Commission report.
By 2000, however,
Republican Senators John Warner and Wayne Allard pushed a "provision
to allow initial development studies on a nuclear weapon with an explosive
yield of less than five kilotons," according to the San Francisco
Chronicle. The Warner-Allard initiative overturned a 1994 law banning
"undertaking research and development that could lead to a precision
nuclear weapon" or "mini-nuke." Even then, Republicans
sought the development of nuclear weapons "intended not to deter
a potential enemy but for use in small, regional wars."
Production for use
was now on the agenda. With Bush's selection as president in 2000, this
nuclear agenda moved from doctored commission reports and Senate hearings
to the Pentagon and the White House. While many Democrats, including
Clinton and Gore, ill advisedly supported "star wars," they
did not want to move away from non-proliferation, the CTBT, nor did
they push "mini-nukes." In his January 2001 report to the
president, Clinton's Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John
Shalikashvili warned against expanding the role of nuclear weapons and
making them more useable. Echoing critics of "mini-nukes,"
Shalikashvili remarked that "if the world's strongest conventional
power needed new types of nuclear weapons, other nations would have
even more incentive to
acquire them."
In the early months
of his administration, Bush took steps to separate the U.S. from its
CTBT obligations (along with other arms control agreements such as the
1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty). In July 2001, the Bush administration
announced it would not seek Senate approval of the CTBT,
and he asked State Department officials to search for a legal way to
"bury" the treaty, according to the New York Times. By September
6, 2001, Bush still only openly linked his position on the CTBT to his
view of the need for "star wars," prompting a former Canadian
foreign minister to angrily remark, "This is a government that
has retreated so far back into the dark ages that there isn't even a
candle lit any more."
Within two months
after September 11th, the Bush administration signaled a shift in its
rationale for opposing the CTBT. The administration boycotted a UN conference
that November promoting the treaty, saying that banning testing would
undermine "the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear arms,"
reported Reuters. The "star wars" mantra was not cited.
Under this public
shift in policy rationale, a more closely guarded policy was being developed
in the bowels of the Pentagon and the White House. While usable nuclear
weapons as Bush administration policy predated September 11th, the terrorist
attacks temporarily gave the concept a much-needed boost. The Bush administration's
nuclear policy first received concrete expression in an initially secret
document called the Nuclear Posture Review (not released until January
2002). The NPR was developed in the first year of Bush term - not just
in the weeks after September 11th. The administration's NPR relied heavily
on a report originally published in January of 2001 by the National
Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), whose board of advisors includes
former advisers to the Reagan administration and a Boeing officer whose
specialty is missile defense. NIPP's reports are published in such far-right
periodicals as National Review and the Washington Times.
Low-yield nukes,
bunker busters, the administration's problems with testing bans and
other non-proliferation treaties, expanded research and production facilities,
citation of Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, China, and Russia
as potential nuclear targets and expanding the "scale,
scope, and purpose" of nuclear strike capabilities were hot topics.
Most significant was that the NPR lumped conventional and nuclear weapons
together in potential first-strike scenarios. One report produced for
the Congressional Research Service said that the administration's NPR
"has grouped nuclear weapons and conventional weapons together
as 'offensive strike weapons.' It argues that the ability to use conventional
weapons would reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. But by grouping the
two together, in one interpretation, the Administration's policy could
begin to blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons
and increase the likelihood of nuclear use." Further the NPR opened
the possibility of using nuclear weapons against countries that did
not possess nuclear weapons.
The administration
broadened the list of potential country targets to include those which
might use and weapons of mass destruction later in 2002 with its National
Security Presidential Directive-17 (NSPD-17). Geared specifically toward
mobilizing the military and public opinion for the "war on terror,"
a potential permanent war with the "axis of evil," and the
ultimate goal of an invasion of Iraq, this document expanded the administration's
policy of nuclear weapons usage. Later in 2002 the
president's Nuclear Weapons Council directly recommended "a return
to nuclear testing" and breaking with international treaties that
banned testing. By early 2003 a Department of Energy memo urged some
of its offices to "take advantage of the repeal of the ban on testing."
Recommending even further expansion of potential nuclear usage, the
Pentagon's Defense Science Board early 2004 called for the construction
of "mini-nukes" usable against terrorist organizations and
lamented the "political constraints" that prevent more aggressive
pursuit of such a policy.
His call for developing
new weapons and new production facilities for new and old weapons contradict
Bush's claim that the main goal is non-proliferation and reduction of
the arsenal. Currently, according to the NPR and other sources, the
U.S. possesses close to 8,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and
an estimated additional 3,000 to 5,000 non-deployed reserve or inactive
stockpiles.
The international
community is deeply concerned with or opposed to the Bush administration's
new nuclear policy. Certainly countries that have been named as immediate
potential targets have few reasons to disarm or avoid developing stockpiles.
In addition to objections from expected quarters, however, friendly
countries have raised serious concerns and criticisms. Beijing's China
Daily described the nuclear policy as having "reduced the trustworthiness
of the United States" for which it will pay a "high diplomatic
price." The Moscow Times predicted that the policy "may drastically
lower the nuclear threshold and trigger numerous local and regional
nuclear wars." Australia's Sydney Morning Herald opined that the
Bush administration's plan scorned multilateralism and signaled its
intention "to pursue a strategic and diplomatic agenda shaped by
self-interest." The Oslo Dagsavisen suggested Bush's policy would
kill the Non-Proliferation Treaty leading to "greater vulnerability
and increased insecurity for everyone." In its response to the
NPR, Le Monde characterized the plan as "irresponsible" worthy
of "a nation in panic." The Rotterdam NRC Handelsblad predicted
the collapse of the coalition in the "war on terror" as now
seems taking place.
From right to left
politically, expert opinion has highlighted the danger of Bush's nuclear
policy. While Republicans expressed little or no opposition to the NPR
after the September 11th attacks, more recently dissent has appeared
in their ranks. After the passage of the 2003 Energy bill that included
funding for new nuclear testing and research, some congressional Republicans
expressed concern about the U.S. image on the non-proliferation issue.
How could we claim to support non-proliferation
while building our own arsenal and developing plans for testing it?
Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) expressed criticism from within the president's
party. He declared the administration to be "out of bounds"
on this issue and said that the Energy bill would result in a "major
national scandal."
In his testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 2002, Carnegie
Non-Proliferation Project Director Joseph Cirincione called the NPR
a "deeply flawed document" that "could cause irreparable
harm to the national security of the United States." Adoption of
NPR's
recommendations as policy, he said, "could be construed as a material
breach of United States obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty." Cirincione said the NPR "sees nuclear weapons as
simply another weapon." The NPR's program would encourage other
countries to also back out of the NPT and escalate the proliferation
of nuclear and other WMD. Cirincione's fears expressed in 2002 came
to pass in the 2003 Energy bill.
A report by the
Center for Defense Information forcefully pointed out major contradictions.
The administration's 2005 budget proposal, it said, would massively
underfund international non-proliferation programs by about $2 billion
while calling for huge increases in new nuclear programs here. The spending
on non-proliferation programs that Bush did propose "is mitigated,"
the report continued, "by funding put into new nuclear weapons
programs, as other countries will be less likely to cooperate with the
United States on non-proliferation projects if we act to counter those
objectives." Other countries, the CDI concluded, "will see
[Bush funding proposals] as an indication that the United States is
not serious about cooperating on non-proliferation programs since it
continues to augment its own nuclear weapons program." Analysis
conducted by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) suggested
that stated plans for arsenal reduction is contradicted by the administration's
own projections of the number of warheads over the next few years. "The
total number of warheads remains essentially the same," said the
NRDC.
Since Iraq's nuclear
threat was proven to be phony, the Bush administration has single-handedly
returned the threat of global nuclear war to the table. The Global Security
Institute as argued that "The NPR reflects a major shift in the
military and ethical rationale for nuclear weapons, no longer defining
them as devices of deterrence, but as weapons of war." While Bush
claimed that "mini-nukes" would reduce collateral damage,
experts at the CACN argued that radioactive fallout from low-yield nuclear
weapons can't be contained. In fact, wrote Robert W. Nelson in the Journal
of the Federation of American Scientists, a strike using "low-yield"
weapons "does not appear possible without causing massive radioactive
contamination." Further, the use of such nuclear weapons against
military or terrorist forces that have or may use chemical or biological
weapons may release rather than destroy deadly chemical or biological
agents.
After winning funding
for its new nuclear policy, the next obstacles are the international
treaties that restrain full-scale launching of the new program. Withdrawing
from the ABM treaty and boycotting the conference on the CTBT and refusing
to seek its ratification were politically easy enough. Next is the 1970
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Clinton emphatically supported the NPT
at its 2000 international review conference, calling for "universal
adherence to the NPT and of strict compliance with its terms" and
noting "the crucial role of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)
safeguards in enforcing the Treaty's undertakings." While Bush's
State Department recently expressed similar sentiments, Bush's open
contempt for the IAEA during its drive to invade Iraq and the development
of this new nuclear policy suggests otherwise. As indicated by polls,
overwhelmingly Americans support non-proliferation and major reductions
in the arsenal, so weakening or withdrawing from the NPT may prove politically
trickier.
The Bush administration's
policy may have already wrecked the NPT in effect. In 2002 CACN echoed
other critics saying that the NPR "undermined" the NPT and
countries that have agreed to NPT's restrictions may feel obliged to
"abandon the treaty in the face of a U.S. buildup."
In fact, last May
a preparatory meeting (called PrepCom) for the NPT's routine five-year
conference ended in "dissension.dimming hopes" for continued
"international consensus" on the treaty's future, according
to a report by the Arms Control Association (ACA). At this meeting,
U.S. representatives tried to focus the meeting's attention on their
claim that Iran had tried to acquire nuclear weapons. They demanded
that the treaty's signatories punish Iran by refusing "all nuclear
cooperation." U.S.
officials also expressed their frustration with the IAEA for refusing
"to conclude that [Iran's] activities were intended to build nuclear
weapons." U.S. officials even suggested that the IAEA didn't need
conclusive evidence to impose sanctions on Iran. In a replay of the
hype surrounding the drive for war on Iraq that included erroneous claims
about "mushroom clouds over American cities," U.S. representatives
pushed hard to focus on
Iran.
The U.S. obsession
with Iran was countered by the "[non-aligned movement] states and
other delegations, such as the seven members of the New Agenda Coalition
- Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, and Mexico."
According to the ACA report, "These states made clear their belief
that the slow pace of disarmament by the five nuclear-weapon states,
most pointedly the United States, and the continued possession of nuclear
weapons by India, Israel, and Pakistan outside the treaty pose equal
or more serious threats to the NPT's continued vitality." Aside
from the fact that many countries may no longer be prepared to believe
uncritically U.S. claims regarding the possession of WMD by other countries,
many countries seem to regard the Bush administration's nuclear buildup
as hypocritical and cynical.
Notwithstanding
the State Department supportive pronouncements, the Bush administration's
commitment to the NPT is waning (if it even exists). While it seeks
to use the treaty to enforce inspections in and disarmament of states
like Iran and North Korea, it rejects calls for its own
compliance with the treaty, especially where it contradicts the new
nuclear policy formulated in the NPR. "The Bush administration,"
says the ACA report, "also has already acted contrary to several
of the 13 [NPT disarmament] steps by, among other things, withdrawing
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to pursue strategic missile defense
systems and declaring that it will not ask the Senate to reconsider
its 1999 rejection of the CTBT. In fact, U.S. officials insisted at
the PrepCom that those commitments no longer be formally referenced."
In other words, the Bush administration unilaterally rejected basic
measures of the NPT and says, "Let's forget about that."
A reelected Bush
administration will try to push the NPT into extinction. The only feasible
alternative scenario is replacing the Bush administration with an administration
that is committed to NPT's original goals. Without "regime change,"
aggressive confrontations with nuclear and non-nuclear powers that object
to the U.S. running roughshod over its treaty commitments to disarmament
and non-proliferation will intensify. It is not impossible to envision
the actual unfolding of events outlined in Bush's NPR: first-strike
use of nuclear weapons leading to an extended and destructive period
of global warfare.
Joel
Wendland is managing editor of http://www.politicalaffairs.net
Political Affairs magazine and writes
http://classwarnotes.blogspot.com