Will Iran Be Next?
By Mark Gaffney
Information
Clearing House
29 May, 2003
Those who have hoped that
a U.S. military victory in Iraq would somehow bring about a more peaceful
world are in for a rude awakening. The final resolution of this war
and the U.S. occupation of Iraq will likely not be the end, rather,
only the prelude to a succession of future crises: in Kashmir, Syria,
North Korea, and Iran. This article will focus primarily on the latter
case.
In the coming months the
United States and its ally Israel will either accede to the existence
of an Iranian nuclear power program, or take steps to prevent it. At
the eye of the storm is Irans nuclear power plant at Bushehr,
on the Gulf coast, currently under construction. The reactor is scheduled
for completion later this year. Its nuclear fuel rods will then be delivered.
By June 2004 it should be fully operational. The controversial project
has been in the works for more than a quarter century. As it nears completion,
tensions between Iran and the U.S./Israel are sure to rise. Iran is
a signatory of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which affirms the
right of states in good standing to develop nuclear power for peaceful
use. Although there is no evidence Iran has yet violated the NPT, the
U.S. and Israel believe that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. This is
the crux of the problem. And two recently discovered Iranian nuclear
sites, at Arak and at Natanz, have only heightened suspicions.
It is very possible--some
would say probable--that the U.S., possibly in conjunction with Israel,
will launch a "preventive" raid and destroy the Bushehr reactor
before it goes on line. Such a raid would be fateful for the region
and the world. It would trigger another Mideast war, and possibly a
confrontation with Russia, with effects that are difficult to predict.
A war with Iran might bring about the collapse of the NPT, lead to a
new arms race, and plunge the world into nuclear chaos. Such a crisis
holds the potential to bring the world to the nuclear brink. This article
will review the background, and provide an analysis. I will discuss
the reactor at Bushehr first, then the other suspect sites.
The Reactor at Bushehr
The Bushehr nuclear plant
has a long history. Launched in 1974, the project was the showcase of
the late Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. The original plan called for the
construction of two 1200-1300 megawatt reactors on the southern Iran
coast, side by side. The contractor was the Siemens company, a well-known
German firm. The project was 85% finished at the time of the 1979 Iranian
revolution, when work was halted. During Irans subsequent war
with Iraq the unfinished reactors were bombed repeatedly, and severely
damaged. After the war Iran attempted to persuade Siemens to finish
the project, without success, due to increased proliferation concerns
and heavy U.S. pressure on Germany.
U.S. support for the Shahs
dictatorial regime undoubtedly set the stage for the 1979 Islamic revolution,
when radical students, backed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, seized the
U.S. embassy and held American diplomats hostage for 444 days. The resulting
break in U.S.-Iran relations has never healed. During the 1981-1988
Iran-Iraq war the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein, who was perceived as
a bulwark against revolutionary Shiism, just as Hitler, many years
before, was mistakenly perceived by some in the West as a bulwark against
Soviet communism. Nevertheless, the U.S. supplied both sides with arms.
During the war, the U.S. policy was: let them destroy each other--a
policy that was unworthy of a Christian nation.
At the start of the Bush
Presidency there were signs that relations with Tehran might improve.
Positive statements by Secretary of State Colin Powell were reciprocated
by Irans foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi. Then came Bushs
"axis of evil" speech, which dashed hopes of a thaw. The current
U.S. policy of vilification has been attributed to Pentagon hawks and
to Israeli PM Ariel Sharons supporters in the Bush administration.
Last November, Sharon called upon the U.S. to bring about regime change
in Tehran, after first dealing with Iraq. (Mansour Farhang, "A
Triangle of Realpolitik" The Nation, March 17, 2003) And similar
statements have been made by rightist commentators in the U.S. press.
The U.S. blocked several
attempts by Iran to enlist a contractor to complete the Bushehr reactor;
until, finally, in 1995, after ten years of shopping, Iran signed a
$800 million deal with Victor Mikhailov, chief of Minatom, the Russian
Ministry of Atomic Energy. The Russians agreed to finish reactor-1,
and have been on site ever since. The project has been plagued by technical
problems and repeated delays. The Russian engineers were compelled to
modify the original German design. But, apparently, all of the problems
have now been overcome, and reactor-1, slightly downsized to 1000 Megawatts,
is finally nearing completion. It will go on line as early as December
2003. But reactor-1 is only the beginning. Iran envisions as many as
five additional 1000 megawatt reactors. Iran has received nuclear technology
from China, Russia, and several other nations. But Russia has been the
principal supplier since the mid-90s .
The Russians have stubbornly
resisted U.S. pressure to cancel the project. Russia, perennially strapped
for cash, desperately needs the foreign exchange. One Minatom official
claimed that the project had already generated 20,000 Russian jobs,
with the promise of more to come. The Russians foresee an expanding
nuclear relationship, and have rejected U.S. enticements. Moscow clearly
regards its commerce with Iran as a matter of national pride/prestige.
Russia has also refused the
U.S. demand for special inspections. The Russians point out that the
reactor will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
oversight. The IAEA visited Bushehr and other suspect sites after the
first Gulf War, and as recently as February 2003, with no violations
reported. Washington remains unconvinced, however. While all of Irans
nuclear facilities are subject to IAEA oversight, Iran has refused,
thus far, to accept the new safeguards introduced in 1993 to overcome
past failings. The strengthened protocols are "capable of detecting
future Iraqs," according to Khidhir Hamza, a former Iraqi nuclear
scientist. Irans refusal has undermined confidence. (Khidhir Hamza,
"Inside Saddam's secret nuclear program," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, September/October 1998)
Russia did agree to drop
the most objectionable part of the deal, the transfer of gas centrifuge
technology. The light water reactor will be fueled with low enriched
uranium (LEU) supplied by Russia. LEU fuel is not suitable for bombs.
Moscow also made another concession: it agreed to return the reactors
spent fuel to Russia for storage. This will greatly reduce the risk
of a diversion of plutonium. To allow for this the Russian government
had to modify existing Russian law. (Christine Kucia, "Russia,
Iran Finalize Spent Fuel Agreement," Arms Control Today, January/February
2003)
After failing to block the
deal outright, President Clinton imposed sweeping sanctions on Iran
to prevent the sale of dual-use technologies. Some of Irans procurement
activities had raised eyebrows in Washington. The U.S. also lobbied
others to join in the embargo, with only limited success. Germany and
France took umbrage at the policy.
The Iranian government has
flatly denied the charges of proliferation. The Iranians have also protested
the punitive U.S. treatment, which they regard as a violation of their
right under article IV of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to develop
nuclear power for peaceful use. In May 1995 Iranian President Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani told ABC News that Iran was not seeking nuclear weapons.
Rafsanjani challenged the critics to produce evidence of a secret bomb
program. As recently as December 2002 the current Iranian president
Mohammad Khatami stated that his countrys willingness to return
the spent fuel to Russia shows good faith, and demonstrates that his
country has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. Iranian officials
have stressed that the Bushehr reactor is urgently needed to fill a
shortfall of electric-generating capacity. Iran, like other countries,
needs electricity for development.
Israel and the U.S. have
not been mollified. Israeli officials questioned why Iran, blessed with
an abundance of oil, needs reactors for electrical generation. And recent
statements by Secretary of State Colin Powell echoed this theme. The
point is well taken. Irans leaders are badly informed if they
believe nuclear power is the long-term solution to their energy needs.
Nuclear power is inappropriate for Iran for the same reasons that it
is inappropriate for any state, including the U.S. The reasons include
the grave risks of nuclear accidents and terrorism, as well as the unresolved
waste disposal problemnot to mention the diabolical possibility,
however remote, that spent fuel might be diverted for reprocessing and
bombmaking. The Iranians need to understand that such a diversion would
ultimately threaten them.
The U.S. Record
Nevertheless, the critics,
especially those in the U.S., have conveniently forgotten the central
role the U.S. played over many years in touting the "many peaceful
applications of nuclear energy." The critics need to be reminded
that it was the U.S., no one else, who, beginning in the 1950s, aggressively
promoted the miracle of cheap and inexhaustible nuclear energy for world
economic development. That "vision" was conceived in Washington,
not Tehran. Are we now to hold the Iranians responsible because the
failed U.S. policy succeeded too well? Are the Iranians to blame because
they internalized the false values that Washington strove mightily to
inculcate worldwide? The Iranians are not alone. In recent years China
and India have also purchased reactors from Russia. And China has even
begun exporting reactor technology. China and Russia are both driven
by the need for foreign exchange. In this they mirror past policy decisions
born in the U.S.A.
We must be honest about this.
Despite the optimistic forecasts of the early years, and the promises
of an end to world poverty, the U.S. Atoms for Peace program was not
motivated by altruism. From the outset, Washingtons atomic program
was driven by self-interest. The U.S. nuclear industry figured to cash
in on the "vision." The export of safe and clean nuclear technology
was to become a major growth industry. Little or no thought, until much
later, was given to the dark underside, the grave risks and many hidden
costs. No one thought to ask whether the nuclear path itself might be
the problem. In the words of Amory Lovins, "Atoms for Peace was
one of the stupidest ideas of our time, conceived in a spirit of political
daydreaming, commercial euphoria, and scientific amnesia." In our
enthusiasm to promote nuclear we happily supplied know-how, including
research reactors, all with indirect military utility, to just about
anyone, including Israel, the Shah, and many others. If the "hard
path" still radiates prestige in world capitols, we in the U.S.
have only ourselves to blame. The heady promises of cheap, clean and
unlimited electricity for economic development have become sand in an
hourglass that is about to run out.
Had we in the U.S. wisely
acknowledged that our commitment to nuclear was a mistake, had we renounced
the nuclear path, had we launched a Manhattan Project, urgently needed,
to convert the U.S. economy to run on clean hydrogen fuel and other
renewables, we would now be in a position of world leadership. Unfortunately,
it never happened. One searches the U.S. record in vain for moral high
ground. The half-life of President Clintons 1994 decision to supply
North Korea with two light-water reactors will haunt Washington for
years to come. Clintons reactor deal with Pyongyang made a mockery
of his opposition to Russias similar assistance to Iran. Clintons
policy position that Russian light-water reactors are dangerous, while
ours are safe, was laid to rest by a 1999 Congressional study which
revealed that the spent fuel from the reactors planned for North Korea
would not be as "proliferation resistant" as claimed. Sufficient
plutonium for as much as fifty bombs/year could be extracted from the
waste. Despite the report, construction of the North Korean reactors
started last year, and continues, though it is a safe bet they will
never be completed.
The Bush-Cheney White House
likes to blame Clinton. But the Bush-Cheney record is no better. During
the run-up to the last presidential election V.P. candidate Dick Cheney
vigorously touted the benefits of nuclear power. As late as May 2001
Cheney was promoting the next generation of nuclear reactors as safe,
and also good for the environment, since they emit few greenhouse gases.
I should add: the V.P. made a point of explicitly rejecting conservation
and renewable alternatives. Then came 911, and the slow dawning realization
of the true risks of nuclear terrorism. As my friend Harvey Wasserman
at Greenpeace likes to point out, had the two planes hit the Indian
Point nuclear reactor located just a few miles north of Manhattan instead
of the World Trade Towers, most of New England today would be a toxic
wasteland, rendered uninhabitable for thousands of years. This is the
plain truth, no exaggeration. Unfortunately, reality is in short supply
at the White House. The facts have not yet penetrated what Seymour Hersh
calls the advisory "cocoon" around the president. The Bush
policy is: never speak ill of industry. Despite 911, there has been
no retreat from nuclear by the U.S., here where it counts most, however
well-advised such a retreat might be.
Regarding nuclear weapons,
the U.S. record is just as bleak. In February 2003 there was a White
House leak--probably intended--that next summer President Bush will
convene a conference of experts to discuss the next generation of U.S.
nuclear weapons. (Julian Borger, "U.S. Plan For New Nuclear Arsenal:
Secret Talks May Lead to Breaking Treaties," The Guardian UK, February
19, 2003) The leak was no surprise, given the change in U.S. military
doctrine announced last September to a policy of preemptive attack.
That change paved the way for the "preventive" invasion of
Iraq, which has effectively frozen further U.S.-Russian nuclear arms
reductions. The shift in military doctrine was unprecedented, yet stirred
hardly a ripple in the U.S. media. Most Americans probably do not even
know that it happened, or do not understand the significance. The fact
that the U.S. government has embraced a first-strike nuclear posture
is Americas best-kept open secret. No doubt, the next generation
of U.S. nukes will be smarter and leaner, designed not for deterrence
but for actual use. And, no doubt, we will be told that their purpose
is defensive, i.e., to save the lives of U.S. servicemen and women.
Tell a small lie and you only make people suspicious. Tell a whopper
and they fall at your feet.
Arak and Natanz
Events took a dangerous turn
in August 2002 when an Iranian opposition group, the National Council
of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), staged a press conference in Washington
DC and reported the existence of two previously unknown nuclear facilities
in Iran. The first, located at Arak, 150 kilometers south of Tehran,
is believed to be a plant for manufacturing heavy-water. The other,
at Natanz, about 100 kilometers north of Esfahan, is probably a uranium-enrichment
facility. Neither is operational yet--both are under construction. Satellite
photoanalysis of the Natanz site shows that part of the facility is
being constructed below ground, and hardened with thick concrete walls.
(Click here for photos and commentary)
Days later, Iranian officials
acknowledged the sites. They also announced long-range plans for a complete
nuclear fuel cycle. The Iranians, in other words, intend to develop
their own fuel processing capability. The country has an abundance of
uranium ore. In March 2003 Iranian officials announced the completion
of a fuel fabrication plant near Esfahan that will soon start production.
(Paul Kerr, "IAEA Taken Aback By Speed Of Irans
Nuclear Program," Arms Control Today April 2003)
All of this raises troubling
questions about Irans nuclear intentions. Heavy-water is used
as a moderator in some reactors. The problem is that this type of reactor
lends itself to the production of plutonium for bombs. Israel is known
to have made the plutonium for its nuclear arsenal in a reactor of this
kind. The reactor at Bushehr was specifically designed to use light-water
to make recovery of plutonium more difficult. Why, then, do the Iranians
need heavy-water, when light-water reactors could supply the needed
electricity with greater transparency? A heavy-water plant implies a
heavy-water reactor. As of yet, however, its location remains unknown.
Also: Why does Iran need
a uranium-enrichment plant, given that Russia will provide LEU fuel
for the Bushehr reactor, and could do the same for future reactors?
Why are buildings at Natanz being constructed underground? Why are they
being hardened? The fact that Iran is building a uranium-enrichment
facility means that Iran already has gas centrifuge technology. Who
supplied it?
While there is no evidence
that Iran has violated the NPT--yet--the facts are alarming. The NPT
stipulates that each signatory must work out a safeguards arrangement
with the IAEA. Both of the recently disclosed nuclear sites will be
subject to IAEA inspections. However, Irans agreement does not
require inspections of a new facility until six months prior to the
first arrival of nuclear material. The facilities at Arak and Natanz
appear to be considerably more than six months from completion; hence,
no violation. Still, questions remain. Why did Iran inform the IAEA
about these plants only after the NCRI forced the issue? The fact that
Iran intends to make its own LEU will make transparency more problematic.
Even if Natanz is inspected regularly, what would stop Iran from enriching
uranium to weapons-grade, i.e., 90%+, at a hidden facility? Clearly,
Irans leaders are playing a dangerous game, staying within the
letter of the NPT, yet building up a nuclear infrastructure that could
be used to make bombs in the future.
Israels record
The Israelis have charged
that Russias nuclear commerce with Iran is politically motivated:
aimed at the U.S. presence in the Gulf. While there is probably some
truth to this, the same criticism could be leveled at Israel. During
the Apartheid years Israel engaged in massive nuclear commerce with
Pretoria, with effects that were felt throughout southern Africa. The
alliance included trade in uranium, transfers of weapons technology,
and cooperation in staging at least one joint nuclear test--for which
Israel has never been held accountable. (See my book Dimona the Third
Temple, 1989, chapters four and five) The relationship flourished for
more than a decade. And though it did not survive the dissolution of
Apartheid, the Israeli government simply shifted venues. India became
the latest partner of convenience. By the year 2000 Israels nuclear
commerce with India reportedly reached $500 million per year. (Yossi
Melman, "India's Visiting strongman Wants to Expand Nuclear Cooperation
with Israel," Ha'aretz, June 16, 2000)
The relationship with India
has continued to expand, and is surely causing grave concerns in Islamabad.
If the recent reports are correct that Pakistan supplied gas centrifuge
technology to North Korea in exchange for missiles, this means an arms
race is currently raging out of control in southern Asia. ("U.S.
Says Pakistan Gave Technology to North Korea," The New York Times,
Oct. 18, 2002) Such a move by Pakistan smacks of desperation. The prospect
of future transfers of Pakistani gas centrifuge technology is frightening.
But Israels role in all of this, making a bad situation worse,
has never been discussed, or even mentioned, in American discourse,
insofar as I know. It is simply assumed that Israel can do as it pleases.
Israels nuclear trade with India raises serious questions, not
the least of which is whether Israel could be destabilizing the Indian
sub-continent.
I should add: the U.S. record
in South Asia is no better. U.S. nonproliferation policy vis-a-vis Pakistan
over many years has been a model of inconsistency and short-term expedience.
The facts are disgraceful, and reveal Washingtons total lack of
seriousness about limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.
U.S. policy has been more
consistent in the case of Iran, probably because there is no official
relationship. Under U.S. pressure, Russia agreed to drop several missile
technology deals with Tehran in the late 1990s, a positive move. (Scott
Peterson, "Russian nuclear know-how pours into Iran," Christian
Science Monitor, June 21, 2002) Still, the Israelis complain that Russian
assistance, including missile guidance technology, has continued. Especially
troubling is the specter of "loose" Russian scientists, which
prompted the Clinton administration to slap sanctions on several Russian
scientific institutions/companies. (Aluf Benn, "The RussianIranian
Connection," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February
2001) While the slow and halting development of an Iranian intermediate
range missile is cause for concern, given Israels tiny size, hence
its unique vulnerability, similar charges, again, could be leveled at
Israel, which acquired French missile technology as early as 1963. Israels
Jericho missile makes Irans efforts look primitive. Israel even
has a space program, and has been launching satellites since 1988.
The U.S. has sought to thwart
the transfer of Russian missile technology to Iran. But did the U.S.
similarly try to block Israels acquisition from Germany a few
years ago of three Dolphin-class submarines capable of launching conventional
and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles? Did the U.S. even complain? Of course
not. As Ive observed, it is assumed that Israel can do as it pleases.
The 1,720-ton diesel-electric submarines are among the most technically
advanced subs of their kind in the world. Each can be equipped with
four cruise missiles, which Israel reportedly tested in the Indian Ocean
in 1999. (Uzi Mahnaimi and Matthew Campbell, "Israel Makes Nuclear
Waves with Submarine Missile Test," London Sunday Times, June 18,
2000) The subs will cruise the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and, ominously,
the Persian Gulf--which tends to confirm the views of the late Israeli
scholar, Israel Shahak, a leading dissident, who argued that Israels
strategic goal is hegemony from Morocco to Pakistan. (See Israel Shahak,
Open Secrets, 1997, chapters four and eight)
The prospect of nuclear-armed
Israeli subs patrolling the coasts of Iran and Pakistan is disturbing.
The forward deployment of Israeli nukes is unprecedented, and dangerous.
It can only inflame tensions in the region. As early as 1983 a U.S.
Naval commander, E.V. Ortlieb, warned against the forward deployment
of nukes, which can put a naval officer in the unenviable position of
having to use his weapons, or face losing them. (E.V. Ortlieb, "Forward
Deployments: Deterrent, or Temptation?", Proceedings, U.S. Naval
Institute, December, 1983)
Even if Israel makes a determined
effort to avoid a confrontation on the high seas, the Israeli patrols
could still trigger a crisis. Accidents do happen, as we know from two
recent incidents: the unfortunate collision near Pearl Harbor of a U.S.
Navy submarine with a Japanese fishing boat, and the mid-air encounter
of a U.S. spy plane with a Chinese fighter while on patrol off the coast
of China. If such snafus can happen to the U.S., they can certainly
happen to Israel, and in circumstances that are far from congenial.
Has the U.S. protested Israels forward deployment of nukes on
the high seas? Of course not. Washington does not protest weapons that
(officially) do not exist. The U.S. government has never acknowledged
that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, even though the world knows otherwise,
thanks to the whistleblower, Mordechai Vanunu. (London Sunday Times,
Oct. 5, 1986) The continuing policy of denial can only hinder efforts
to "rein in" Israel in the event of a nuclear crisis. One
could hardly imagine a more explosive mix.
Israels decision to
patrol Persian Gulf waters with nuclear-armed subs seems perversely
calculated to strengthen Iranian fundamentalists while undermining moderates
who would prefer to denuclearize the Middle East and pursue a less costly
and much less risky path of negotiations and military disengagement.
Of course, President Bushs decision to invade neighboring Iraq,
and the continuing presence of the nuclear-armed U.S. fleet in the Gulf
have, no doubt, produced the same effect, probably magnified several
times.
Current U.S/Israeli policies
have all the earmarks of a self-fulfilling prophecy. President Bush
lied to Congress when he presented forged documents about Iraqs
alleged nuclear weapons program. (Seymour Hersh, "Who Lied to Whom?",
The New Yorker, March 20, 2003) The documents were phony. But that didnt
matter. The president got his sanction for war. Bush went on to invade
a nation that did NOT have nukes (Iraq), while studiously ignoring the
provocations of North Korea, which included nuclear taunts. The men
around Bush were determined to follow their Iraqi playbook. North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il spoiled everything by inconveniently rearing his
ugly head out of turn. Consider the resounding signal that Bushs
war sent like a shot round the world. We were told that the wars
purpose was to roll back Iraqi WMD (none of which have so far been found).
But the actual message was different. Indeed, as the U.N. chief inspector
Hans Blix pointed out, Bush sent precisely the wrong signal. The actual
message is that the U.S. only attacks countries that cannot defend themselves.
Under the circumstances, who could blame Irans leaders if they
should take the actual message to heart, and decide tomorrow to withdraw
from the NPT, as North Korea has done, and openly develop nuclear weapons?
Who could blame them for concluding that their best chance to avert
U.S. aggression is to arm themselves with nukes as soon as possible?
At this juncture it seems
unlikely that Iran can allay the current high level of distrust and
avoid a confrontation simply by agreeing to the strengthened IAEA protocols.
Inspections anywhere, anytime are certainly needed, and a step in the
right direction. But this will probably not be enough. What would stop
Iran in the future from bolting the NPT, and building bombs?
A Sane Solution to the Current
Crisis
The cases of Iran and North
Korea reveal the fundamental weakness of the NPT. If the nonproliferation
regime is to survive, sweeping reforms must be introduced. The sane
path would be for the U.S. to immediately convene an international conference,
at which all of the signatories would sit down (in concert with the
U.N.) and hammer out a resolution of the impasse. This might be achieved
by: 1. Revoking the withdrawal clause (under article X); and 2. Providing
a robust mechanism for common security. Drastic action would be needed,
because the only effective way to provide for common security would
be to replace the U.N. Security Council veto with a simple 2/3 majority
vote in the event of an overt nuclear threat/attack. This would enable
the Security Council to swiftly come to the assistance of a member state.
The absence of such a provision has long plagued the U.N., and probably
explains why India and Israel refused to sign the NPT in 1968. In the
absence of credible security guarantees, both opted to provide for their
own security needs. And Pakistan was compelled to follow suit simply
to match rival India. The key to a new global security framework would
depend upon success in persuading the current non-signatories to realize
the many benefits of common security at a tiny fraction of the immense
costs and risks of building and maintaining a nuclear deterrent. (Avner
Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 1998, pp. 123-7, 287-9; also see William
Epstein, The Last Chance, 1976, p. 222)
The two reforms would work
together in synergy. The revocation of the withdrawal clause is also
essential, because the commitment to non-proliferation must be made
irreversible. Locking states into the NPT would create strong incentives
to remain honest. The threat of U.N. sanctions would be a powerful deterrent.
Of course, to win the support of member states like Iran for such reform,
Israel, Pakistan and India would have to enter into the discussions,
agree to sign a strengthened treaty, open their nuclear sites to inspection,
and begin to deconstruct their nuclear arsenals. If this sounds like
fantasy, the alternative future, i.e., nuclear terrorism, is positively
surreal.
The above proposal--I recognize--is
no substitute for global conversion to clean hydrogen fuel and renewable
wind and solar. But it would have the salutary effect of buying time
for the NPT: it would create a breathing space in which a transition
to clean energy might proceed. Such a proposal is reasonable. Yes, and
for this reason it probably has no chance of gaining serious consideration
in the Bush White House. The men around the president have already demonstrated
their contempt for international treaties and for the hard work of negotiations.
Diplomacy? Thats for wimps and hand wringers. The administration
has already rejected out of hand the Kyoto protocols for climate change,
and has refused to participate in the International War Crimes Tribunal.
It has scrapped its own ABM treaty, and shredded the U.N. Charter. So
it is probably too much to expect that Bush would attempt, at this date,
to strengthen the NPT through existing legal frameworks. Nor is it likely,
in any event, that the U.S. would voluntarily surrender its U.N. veto,
even to prevent nuclear war. The U.S.--recall--has itself refused to
rule out nuclear first use. How ironic that the Bush administration
would view a robust mechanism for global security as a hindrance to
unilateralism! The only remaining question is: what treaty will Bush
trash next? The NPT?
Tensions in the Gulf will
mount in the coming months. The reactor at Bushehr could be the flash-point.
Israeli officials have warned that they will not tolerate their enemies
to develop nuclear power, even for peaceful use. The shock waves of
a raid on Bushehr would be felt far beyond the Mideast.
Ramifications
The precedent for such a
raid occurred on June 7, 1981, when Israeli PM Menachem Begin ordered
an attack on the Osirak nuclear plant near Baghdad. Within hours a squadron
of Israeli F-15s and F-16s reduced Osirak to smoking rubble. The reactor
was scheduled to go on line within days or weeks. Much of the world
responded by condemning Israel. The reactor had been under French contract,
and, like Bushehr, was also subject to IAEA inspections. Most believed,
at the time, that Iraq was in full compliance with the NPT. While there
is no evidence Iraq planned to secretly divert plutonium from the reactor
for reprocessing and weapons, after the 1991 Gulf War U.N. Special Committee
(UNSCOM) inspectors discovered massive evidence of a clandestine Iraqi
uranium-enrichment program, involving calutrons (cyclotrons). At which
point, many observers dropped their former criticism and began to praise
the Israeli logic of preemption. Today, those "lessons" have
become official U.S. military doctrine.
The problem is that the evidence
does not support the conclusion. The discovery by UNSCOM of the secret
Iraqi bomb program showed the efficacy NOT of preemption but of inspections.
Although U.S. intelligence agencies may have been aware that the Saudis
were secretly funding an Iraqi bomb program, the calutrons appear to
have escaped detection by U.S. surveillance. Saddams uranium-enrichment
program was completely untouched during the war, despite massive U.S.
bombing. The calutrons were found and destroyed because the international
community, i.e., the U.N., made a firm commitment to inspections. And
this success story, which remains untold and largely unknown in the
U.S., happened despite the Clinton policy of regime change, which often
conflicted with the U.N.s stated mission of disarming Iraq. (Milan
Rai,War Plan Iraq, 2002) Israels 1981 raid may even have prodded
Saddam Hussein to launch (or accelerate) his clandestine bomb program.
Certainly the raid did not prevent an Iraqi bomb. For similar reasons,
a solo raid on Bushehr would not block Iran from developing nukes, and
might even provoke a decision in Tehran to do so.
A raid on Bushehr would likely
be the opening salvo in another "preventive" war: a series
of air attacks aimed at Irans nuclear infrastructure. Israel could
not mount such a campaign by itself, for geographic and logistical reasons.
It would require full U.S. involvement. Not surprisingly, Israels
hard-line supporters have sought for many years to persuade Washington
of the need for just such a military solution to the Iranian "problem."
No sooner did the dust settle following the first Gulf War than the
lobbying began in earnest. And many of those who led the charge currently
hold high positions in the Bush government. Need I mention that such
a war would only confirm to the world what many in the region have long
believed: that U.S. Mideast policy is not only about oil. It is also
about serving the narrow interests of a recalcitrant Israel. (Israel
Shahak, Open Secrets, 1997, chapters four and eight)
Such an air war would be
launched from bases in neighboring Iraq, and from carriers in the Gulf.
Israel might join in the attacks. U.S-Israeli military cooperation increased
after 911. Since 1997 the Israeli Air Force has conducted annual training
exercises in Turkey, presumably to prepare for just such a war. Turkey
has rugged terrain similar to Irans. According to Noam Chomsky,
before the current conflict some 10% of the Israeli Air Force was permanently
based in Turkey. (personal communication, April 16, 2003)
Would such an air war succeed?
Yes, perhaps, then again, maybe not. In their current state of hubris
the men around the president obviously believe they can accomplish anything
with U.S. military power, now supreme on the planet. However, our leaders
are not infallible. For every action there is a reaction, and, all too
often, unintended consequences. Such a war would undoubtedly be perceived
by the world as a serious escalation, and would likely produce a new
anti-U.S coalition. Various states, in defiance of U.S. threats, might
even come to Irans assistance. The common border shared by Russia
and Iran raises the stakes. To understand why, we need only consider
how the U.S. would respond to a foreign attack on, say, Mexico. The
Russians might supply Iran with advanced military arms, ground-to-air
missiles, etc.
Pakistani strong-man Pervez
Musharraf would face growing pressure at home to assist a fellow Islamic
state. With assistance from Russia and/or Pakistan, the Iranians might
reconstitute their nuclear program in deep tunnels carved out of the
countrys rugged mountains, impervious to bombardment. To insure
military success, the U.S. might be compelled to launch commando assaults
with special forces, or even invade and occupy the country. Notice,
this implies regime change, precisely what Ariel Sharon has advocated.
Such a path--I hasten to add--would be insane, for reasons that should
be apparent to anyone who can find Iran on a map. Iran is not Iraq!
Iran is five times larger, a rugged mountainous country of sixty-five
million people.
What if invading U.S. forces
should meet return fire, in kind? One shudders at the reaction in Washington
should the Iranians turn on U.S. troops the same depleted uranium weapons
that the U.S. has been using with such horrible effect on others. That
would bring George W. Bush eyeball-to-eyeball with Vladimir Putin, the
obvious supplier, and who knows, possibly with Pervez Musharraf. Lest
we forget, both are nuclear-armed (unlike Saddam Hussein) and capable
of defending themselves. The assumption that Putin will back down in
a crisis on his own border could be a serious miscalculation. If U.S.
hawks insist on victory, and escalate, events could spin out of control...
To prevent such a catastrophe
we must all work together. We must stop Bushs next war BEFORE
it starts.
*******
Mark Gaffney is a researcher,
writer, poet, environmentalist, anti-nuclear activist, and organic gardener.
Mark was the principal organizer of the first Earth Day in April 1970
at Colorado State University. Marks first book was a pioneering
1989 study of the Israeli nuke program: DIMONA THE THIRD TEMPLE. From
1989-1993 Mark helped National Audubon Society inventory and map Oregons
remaining old growth forests. Marks forthcoming book is a radical
study of early Christianity: SECRETS OF THE NAASSENE SERMON. Mark can
be reached for comment at [email protected]