Bush's
Real Goal In Iraq
By Jay Bookman
The official story
on Iraq has never made sense. The connection that the Bush administration
has tried to draw between Iraq and al-Qaida has always seemed contrived
and artificial. In fact, it was hard to believe that smart people in
the Bush administration would start a major war based on such flimsy
evidence.
The pieces just didn't fit. Something else had to be going on; something
was missing.
In recent days, those missing
pieces have finally begun to fall into place. As it turns out, this
is not really about Iraq. It is not about weapons of mass destruction,
or terrorism, or Saddam, or U.N. resolutions.
This war, should it come,
is intended to mark the official emergence of the United States as a
full-fledged global empire, seizing sole responsibility and authority
as planetary policeman. It would be the culmination of a plan 10 years
or more in the making, carried out by those who believe the United States
must seize the opportunity for global domination, even if it means becoming
the "American imperialists" that our enemies always claimed
we were.
Once that is understood,
other mysteries solve themselves. For example, why does the administration
seem unconcerned about an exit strategy from Iraq once Saddam is toppled?
Because we won't be leaving.
Having conquered Iraq, the United States will create permanent military
bases in that country from which to dominate the Middle East, including
neighboring Iran.
In an interview Friday, Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld brushed aside that suggestion, noting that
the United States does not covet other nations' territory. That may
be true, but 57 years after World War II ended, we still have major
bases in Germany and Japan. We will do the same in Iraq.
And why has the administration
dismissed the option of containing and deterring Iraq, as we had the
Soviet Union for 45 years? Because even if it worked, containment and
deterrence would not allow the expansion of American power. Besides,
they are beneath us as an empire. Rome did not stoop to containment;
it conquered. And so should we.
Among the architects of this
would-be American Empire are a group of brilliant and powerful people
who now hold key positions in the Bush administration: They envision
the creation and enforcement of what they call a worldwide "Pax
Americana," or American peace. But so far, the American people
have not appreciated the true extent of that ambition.
Part of it's laid out in
the National Security Strategy, a document in which each administration
outlines its approach to defending the country. The Bush administration
plan, released Sept. 20, marks a significant departure from previous
approaches, a change that it attributes largely to the attacks of Sept.
11.
To address the terrorism
threat, the president's report lays out a newly aggressive military
and foreign policy, embracing pre-emptive attack against perceived enemies.
It speaks in blunt terms of what it calls "American internationalism,"
of ignoring international opinion if that suits U.S. interests. "The
best defense is a good offense," the document asserts.
It dismisses deterrence as
a Cold War relic and instead talks of "convincing or compelling
states to accept their sovereign responsibilities."
In essence, it lays out a
plan for permanent U.S. military and economic domination of every region
on the globe, unfettered by international treaty or concern. And to
make that plan a reality, it envisions a stark expansion of our global
military presence.
"The United States will
require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast
Asia," the document warns, "as well as temporary access arrangements
for the long-distance deployment of U.S. troops."
The report's repeated references
to terrorism are misleading, however, because the approach of the new
National Security Strategy was clearly not inspired by the events of
Sept. 11. They can be found in much the same language in a report issued
in September 2000 by the Project for the New American Century, a group
of conservative interventionists outraged by the thought that the United
States might be forfeiting its chance at a global empire.
"At no time in history
has the international security order been as conducive to American interests
and ideals," the report said. stated two years ago. "The challenge
of this coming century is to preserve and enhance this 'American peace.'
"
Familiar themes
Overall, that 2000 report
reads like a blueprint for current Bush defense policy. Most of what
it advocates, the Bush administration has tried to accomplish. For example,
the project report urged the repudiation of the anti-ballistic missile
treaty and a commitment to a global missile defense system. The administration
has taken that course.
It recommended that to project
sufficient power worldwide to enforce Pax Americana, the United States
would have to increase defense spending from 3 percent of gross domestic
product to as much as 3.8 percent. For next year, the Bush administration
has requested a defense budget of $379 billion, almost exactly 3.8 percent
of GDP.
It advocates the "transformation"
of the U.S. military to meet its expanded obligations, including the
cancellation of such outmoded defense programs as the Crusader artillery
system. That's exactly the message being preached by Rumsfeld and others.
It urges the development
of small nuclear warheads "required in targeting the very deep,
underground hardened bunkers that are being built by many of our potential
adversaries." This year the GOP-led U.S. House gave the Pentagon
the green light to develop such a weapon, called the Robust Nuclear
Earth Penetrator, while the Senate has so far balked.
That close tracking of recommendation
with current policy is hardly surprising, given the current positions
of the people who contributed to the 2000 report.
Paul Wolfowitz is now deputy
defense secretary. John Bolton is undersecretary of state. Stephen Cambone
is head of the Pentagon's Office of Program, Analysis and Evaluation.
Eliot Cohen and Devon Cross are members of the Defense Policy Board,
which advises Rumsfeld. I. Lewis Libby is chief of staff to Vice President
Dick Cheney. Dov Zakheim is comptroller for the Defense Department.
'Constabulary duties'
Because they were still just
private citizens in 2000, the authors of the project report could be
more frank and less diplomatic than they were in drafting the National
Security Strategy. Back in 2000, they clearly identified Iran, Iraq
and North Korea as primary short-term targets, well before President
Bush tagged them as the Axis of Evil. In their report, they criticize
the fact that in war planning against North Korea and Iraq, "past
Pentagon wargames have given little or no consideration to the force
requirements necessary not only to defeat an attack but to remove these
regimes from power."
To preserve the Pax Americana,
the report says U.S. forces will be required to perform "constabulary
duties" -- the United States acting as policeman of the world --
and says that such actions "demand American political leadership
rather than that of the United Nations."
To meet those responsibilities,
and to ensure that no country dares to challenge the United States,
the report advocates a much larger military presence spread over more
of the globe, in addition to the roughly 130 nations in which U.S. troops
are already deployed.
More specifically, they argue
that we need permanent military bases in the Middle East, in Southeast
Europe, in Latin America and in Southeast Asia, where no such bases
now exist. That helps to explain another of the mysteries of our post-Sept.
11 reaction, in which the Bush administration rushed to install U.S.
troops in Georgia and the Philippines, as well as our eagerness to send
military advisers to assist in the civil war in Colombia.
The 2000 report directly
acknowledges its debt to a still earlier document, drafted in 1992 by
the Defense Department. That document had also envisioned the United
States as a colossus astride the world, imposing its will and keeping
world peace through military and economic power. When leaked in final
draft form, however, the proposal drew so much criticism that it was
hastily withdrawn and repudiated by the first President Bush.
Effect on allies
The defense secretary in
1992 was Richard Cheney; the document was drafted by Wolfowitz, who
at the time was defense undersecretary for policy.
The potential implications
of a Pax Americana are immense.
One is the effect on our
allies. Once we assert the unilateral right to act as the world's policeman,
our allies will quickly recede into the background. Eventually, we will
be forced to spend American wealth and American blood protecting the
peace while other nations redirect their wealth to such things as health
care for their citizenry.
Donald Kagan, a professor
of classical Greek history at Yale and an influential advocate of a
more aggressive foreign policy -- he served as co-chairman of the 2000
New Century project -- acknowledges that likelihood.
"If [our allies] want
a free ride, and they probably will, we can't stop that," he says.
But he also argues that the United States, given its unique position,
has no choice but to act anyway.
"You saw the movie 'High
Noon'? he asks. "We're Gary Cooper."
Accepting the Cooper role
would be an historic change in who we are as a nation, and in how we
operate in the international arena. Candidate Bush certainly did not
campaign on such a change. It is not something that he or others have
dared to discuss honestly with the American people. To the contrary,
in his foreign policy debate with Al Gore, Bush pointedly advocated
a more humble foreign policy, a position calculated to appeal to voters
leery of military intervention.
For the same reason, Kagan
and others shy away from terms such as empire, understanding its connotations.
But they also argue that it would be naive and dangerous to reject the
role that history has thrust upon us. Kagan, for example, willingly
embraces the idea that the United States would establish permanent military
bases in a post-war Iraq.
"I think that's highly
possible," he says. "We will probably need a major concentration
of forces in the Middle East over a long period of time. That will come
at a price, but think of the price of not having it. When we have economic
problems, it's been caused by disruptions in our oil supply. If we have
a force in Iraq, there will be no disruption in oil supplies."
Costly global commitment
Rumsfeld and Kagan believe
that a successful war against Iraq will produce other benefits, such
as serving an object lesson for nations such as Iran and Syria. Rumsfeld,
as befits his sensitive position, puts it rather gently. If a regime
change were to take place in Iraq, other nations pursuing weapons of
mass destruction "would get the message that having them . . .
is attracting attention that is not favorable and is not helpful,"
he says.
Kagan is more blunt."People
worry a lot about how the Arab street is going to react," he notes.
"Well, I see that the Arab street has gotten very, very quiet since
we started blowing things up."
The cost of such a global
commitment would be enormous. In 2000, we spent $281 billion on our
military, which was more than the next 11 nations combined. By 2003,
our expenditures will have risen to $378 billion. In other words, the
increase in our defense budget from 1999-2003 will be more than the
total amount spent annually by China, our next largest competitor.
The lure of empire is ancient
and powerful, and over the millennia it has driven men to commit terrible
crimes on its behalf. But with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance
of the Soviet Union, a global empire was essentially laid at the feet
of the United States. To the chagrin of some, we did not seize it at
the time, in large part because the American people have never been
comfortable with themselves as a New Rome.
Now, more than a decade later,
the events of Sept. 11 have given those advocates of empire a new opportunity
to press their case with a new president. So in debating whether to
invade Iraq, we are really debating the role that the United States
will play in the years and decades to come.
Are peace and security best
achieved by seeking strong alliances and international consensus, led
by the United States? Or is it necessary to take a more unilateral approach,
accepting and enhancing the global dominance that, according to some,
history has thrust upon us?
If we do decide to seize
empire, we should make that decision knowingly, as a democracy. The
price of maintaining an empire is always high. Kagan and others argue
that the price of rejecting it would be higher still.
That's what this is about.
"Rebuilding America's
Defenses," a 2000 report by the Project for the New American Century,
listed 27 people as having attended meetings or contributed papers in
preparation of the report. Among them are six who have since assumed
key defense and foreign policy positions in the Bush administration.
And the report seems to have become a blueprint for Bush's foreign and
defense policy.
Paul Wolfowitz
Political science doctorate
from University of Chicago and dean of the international relations program
at Johns Hopkins University during the 1990s. Served in the Reagan State
Department, moved to the Pentagon during the first Bush administration
as undersecretary of defense for policy. Sworn in as deputy defense
secretary in March 2001.
John Bolton
Yale Law grad who worked
in the Reagan administration as an assistant attorney general. Switched
to the State Department in the first Bush administration as assistant
secretary for international organization affairs. Sworn in as undersecretary
of state for arms control and international security, May 2001.
Eliot Cohen
Harvard doctorate in government
who taught at Harvard and at the Naval War College. Now directs strategic
studies at Johns Hopkins and is the author of several books on military
strategy. Was on the Defense Department's policy planning staff in the
first Bush administration and is now on Donald Rumsfeld's Defense Policy
Board.
I. Lewis Libby
Law degree from Columbia
(Yale undergrad). Held advisory positions in the Reagan State Department.
Was a partner in a Washington law firm in the late '80s before becoming
deputy undersecretary of defense for policy in the first Bush administration
(under Dick Cheney). Now is the vice president's chief of staff.
Dov Zakheim
Doctorate in economics and
politics from Oxford University. Worked on policy issues in the Reagan
Defense Department and went into private defense consulting during the
1990s. Was foreign policy adviser to the 2000 Bush campaign. Sworn in
as undersecretary of defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer
for the Pentagon, May 2001.
Stephen Cambone
Political science doctorate
from Claremont Graduate School. Was in charge of strategic defense policy
at the Defense Department in the first Bush administration. Now heads
the Office of Program, Analysis and Evaluation at the Defense Department.
(Bookman is the deputy editorial
page editor of The
Atlanta
Journal-Constitution)