Socio-Cultural
Empowerment Of
Indian Muslims
By Yoginder Sikand
19 June, 2007
Countercurrents.org
(Paper presented at a
conference on the Sachar Committee Report in Kochi, 16th-17th June,
2007 organised by the Al-Ameen Educational Trust and the Forum for Faith
and Fraternity)
I
have been asked to speak on the subject of the social and cultural empowerment
of Muslims in India. This is, of course, a very broad topic and one
cannot do justice to it in the course of a short presentation. Rather
than explore the reasons of Muslim disempowerment, about which much
has already been written, I think it would be more useful to focus on
certain practical measures that could be undertaken in this regard.
I will deliberately refer to the crucial question of political empowerment
only in passing as this is beyond the scope of this presentation.
An important point to consider
in discussing the question of Muslim social and cultural empowerment
is that of the internal diversity among Muslims, which makes it difficult
to make any but the most broad generalizations. These diversities are
of various types-class caste, sect, language, region, ethnicity, gender
and so on. Often, discussions about Muslim social empowerment miss out,
whether deliberately or otherwise, these internal differences and variations,
based on a misleading and untenable assumption of a pan-Indian Muslim
monolith. It is striking to note how this notion of a Muslim monolith
(like that of the equally misleading notion of a Hindu monolith) informs
the discourse of both Hindu and Muslim right-wing forces and of the
state. It was this same misplaced notion of Hindus and Muslims being
two separate, monolithic and undifferentiated communities that paved
the way for the Partition of India, which benefited the ruling elites
of India and Pakistan, but made matters much worse for the masses, Hindu
as well as Muslim. It must be noted that demands for resources or empowerment
based on this notion of a Hindu or Muslim monolith works essentially
to promote the interests of the elites, the so-called high caste, upper
class Hindus and Muslims. Thus, for instance, the demand by some Muslim
elites for reservations for all Muslims, based on this untenable assumption
of a single Muslim monolith, can be seen as reflecting the interests
of these elites, for it is obvious that such reservation would benefit
essentially them, leaving out in the cold the vast majority of the Muslim
community. This is similar in its implications to the case of Hindutva
discourse, where the equally untenable myth of a Hindu monolith is used
as a means to protect and promote the interests of so-called high caste
and high class Hindus, and to deny other Hindus-the vast majority-their
rights. Hence, in discussing the issue of the empowerment of the Muslim
community, one must desist from speaking in terms of a Muslim monolith,
and focus particularly on the question of the empowerment of the marginalized
sections within the Muslim community, who, in many parts of India, happen
to form the vast majority of the community, most of them being of indigenous
so-called low caste background.
It is a striking comment
on the existing Muslim leadership that often their demands are couched
in terms of a Muslim monolith, rarely referring to the specific problems
of these marginalized sections, in whose marginalization, historically
as well as now, Muslim elites, in addition of course to Hindu elites
and the state, have had a crucial role to play. Muslim politics, particularly
in north India, has been largely the politics of symbolism, with political
elites raising such issues as the question of Urdu, the Muslim Personal
Law, the Aligarh Muslim University, the Babri Masjid and so on. One
can perhaps speak of some sort of complicity here with right-wing Hindu
political elites, with both having a vested interest in focusing on
such communally divisive issues to boost their own political fortunes.
These issues are not unimportant in themselves. The point, however,
is that because these issues have overwhelmed north Indian Muslim politics,
the massive and growing social, educational and economic problems of
the Muslim masses have been ignored, deliberately or otherwise.
This calls for the need for
a new sort of grass-root based community leadership from among the marginalized
sections of the Muslims, which can go beyond the symbolic politics that
only further promote communal polarization. This new leadership would
focus on bread-and-butter issues that affect these sections as well
as other similarly marginalized sections among other communities, such
as Dalits, Backward Castes and Adivasis. Efforts at uniting these groups
are underway, although, Hindu and Muslim elites do not regard this with
any enthusiasm, for obviously it undermines their claims to be authoritative
spokesmen and leaders of their communities. This means that the empowerment
of the marginalized sections of the Muslims demands a dual process of
democratization: gaining their rightful share within the larger Indian
society as well as within the Muslim community itself.
Now, leaving aside the complex world of politics, a few practical suggestions
with regard to the issue of cultural empowerment. In this regard, it
is crucial to note that Muslims in India are not a cultural monolith,
although they share a common commitment to Islam, but even here one
needs to take into account the diverse interpretations and expressions
of Islam, as reflected, for instance, in the number of different maslaks,
many of which define themselves in opposition to each other. There has
been a tendency among Muslim elites in north India to seek to impose
their so-called ashraf feudal culture and the Urdu language on the rest
of the Indian Muslim population. Even in north India itself, highly
Persianised Urdu, which is sought to be presented as the standard form
of Urdu, has always been an elitist language, historically the language
of some north Indian Muslim and Hindu elites. It was never the language
of the Muslim or Hindu
masses, who spoke and continue to speak in various regional dialects,
incorrectly incorporated as Urdu or Hindi. The elitist strategy of projecting
north Indian ashraf culture as the culture of all Indian Muslims is,
in fact, no different from similar efforts on the part of north Indian
Hindu elites to impose Brahmincial culture and a highly Sanskritised
Hindi on the rest of the Hindu population, or what the Pakistani establishment
sought to do in the erstwhile East Pakistan with disastrous consequences.
Even the state has sought to present Urdu as a particularly Muslim language,
which is not the case. Efforts to preserve and promote Urdu are surely
welcome, but it must be remembered that it cannot and must not be treated
as a Muslim language or as the language of all the Muslims of India.
This will only further reduce the chances of survival of the language.
It would also keep Muslims confined to their ghettos, unable to compete
in the job market because of lack of competence in other languages.
It would also further fortify barriers between Muslims and others, which
can only further strengthen the deep-rooted stereotypes that others
have about Muslims and Islam.
In this regard, the emergence
of a number of Muslim publications in languages other than Urdu is a
welcome development. This can help promote communication with other
communities, which, even from the point of view of explaining Islam
to others, is a crucial requirement. It can also help strengthen regional
identities and cultures, in which Muslims, Hindus and others can participate
together, thus making for greater and more positive inter-community
interaction. North Indian Muslims have much to learn from their counterparts
in Kerala in this regard, where Muslims, Hindus, Christian, Dalits and
others all share a common linguistic and cultural heritage, which has
helped in fostering fairly cordial inter-community relations.
The democratic revolution
demands that the cultures of marginalized communities be celebrated
and promoted. These often contain rich symbolic resources that reflect
the pains and anguish of the oppressed and their quest for emancipation,
as well as a symbolic critique of the culture of elites that is used
to legitimize their oppression. The retrieval of the cultures of the
oppressed or subalterns is happening today in the case of the Dalits
and Adivasis. In the Muslim case, this is less marked, for various reasons,
but is reflected in some recent efforts by so-called low caste Muslim
groups, particularly in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, to celebrate their
histories and heroes, commemorating the liberative spirit of Islam,
which, they argue, has been sought to be watered down by Muslim elites.
The tradition of numerous Sufi saints who bitterly critiqued political
and religious elites for their oppression of the poor, and whose understanding
of Islam was ecumenical and broad, reflecting a concern for all of God's
creatures, and not just Muslims alone, was also a part of this broader
subaltern tradition. This crucial social aspect of India's rich and
varied Sufi traditions, of the non-elite variety in particular, needs
to be highlighted, in order to evolve a popular culture that celebrates
religious pluralism and at the same time speaks out against oppression
and hegemony, be it of the state, or of Hindu and Muslim elites, and
so on. This can play a vita role in the socio-cultural empowerment of
the marginalized, Muslims as well as others. In this regard, it is pertinent
to note how this tradition has been considerably bruised by the ritualisation
of popular Sufism, with the transformation of Sufi shrines from centres
of instruction and provision for the needy to centres of mediation,
being controlled by a class of elites who claim to be religious intermediaries.
Indian Muslim history, as
is taught in schools and madrasas, and as is reflected in books on the
subject by both Muslim and other scholars, continues to be highly elitist,
and, incidentally, rather north Indian centric. This, too, is an issue
that needs to be addressed in the process of promoting the cultural
empowerment of the marginalized sections of the Muslims. Books on the
subject of Indian Muslim history inevitably focus almost entirely on
Muslim rulers, Sufis and ulema, almost all of whom were from the so-called
higher castes-Sayyeds, Shaikhs, Mughals and Pathans, who form only a
relatively small minority of the Indian Muslim population. There are
hardly any books available on the literally hundreds of indigenous Muslim
communities, mainly those of so-called low caste background. This, too,
must change, if we are serious about a promoting democratic culture
that is biased in favour of the oppressed. This democratization of Muslim
historiography is as necessary as the democratization of the official
Hindu historical canon, which, like its Muslim counterpart, is sternly
elitist. Democratising Indian Muslim history writing would also serve
a very necessary political purpose-to highlight the fact that the so-called
period of 'Muslim rule' in India, which is routinely talked about both
by Muslim and Hindu elites, was hardly that. It was actually the rule
of Muslim elites, almost entirely of foreign extraction, in collaboration
with sections of the Hindu elites. The vast majority of the Muslims,
of indigenous extraction, were as marginalized and oppressed by these
elites as their Hindu counterparts from the so-called low castes were.
Making this point in today's context of communal rivalry is extremely
significant in order to counter the political projects of Hindu as well
as Muslim right-wing forces.
In north India, as some surveys
have shown, Muslims from so-called low caste background do not have
adequate representation in various Muslim organizations. This is an
issue that needs to be seriously addressed. Demands for their adequate
representation are sometimes dismissed as
'conspiracies' to divide the Muslims on the basis of caste, which is
said to be an un-Islamic institution, but I believe this argument is
untenable, reflecting a desire to preserve the status quo. In actual
fact, genuine and lasting unity can only be promoted if such organizations,
particularly at their leadership level, are more socially inclusive
in terms of class and caste. Keeping certain social groups out or not
providing them adequate representation, whether consciously or unconsciously,
can only further reinforce Muslim disunity.
In this regard, the Muslim
media has a very crucial role to play and it would be interesting to
do a survey on what space they devote to the bread-and-butter issues
of the Muslim poor. I do not suppose think the conclusions of such a
survey would be very heartening. Related to this is the lack of serious
empirical research on the marginalized sections of the Muslim community.
This, too, reflects a certain lack of concern or indifference on the
part of large sections of the Muslim elite towards the crucial social
and economic problems of the Muslim masses. There is, to my mind, just
one institution in the whole of India, the Institute of Objective Studies
in New Delhi, that sponsors such research, although the quality of its
research output leaves much to be desired. Why, one must ask, did we
have to wait for the government-appointed Sachar Committee to produce
a detailed report on the social and economic marginalization of Muslims?
Why have Muslim organizations not been doing this sort of research,
although this is crucial for planning for practical intervention as
well as for lobbying with the state and working with NGOs? It is striking
that while there are literally thousands of institutions in India for
Islamic Studies, there is hardly any institution focusing on Indian
Muslim Studies, on the social, educational and economic conditions of
Muslims. This reflects the way in which Muslim elites view the priorities
of the community and their relative neglect of the manifold problems
of the Muslim masses.
Promoting empirical research
on marginalized sections of the Muslim community, and awareness-building,
mobilisation and lobbying based on this, is essential in empowering
them socially as well as culturally. I think the notion that an ideal
career is that of a doctor, a lawyer or an engineer, or, now, a computer
scientist or a business manager, needs to be challenged, and more Muslim
youth need to go in for higher studies and careers in journalism, the
liberal arts, humanities and the social sciences, to focus in their
work particularly on marginalized sections of the community. There is
a pressing need for the setting up of voluntary agencies to work among
the Muslim poor. While there are literally thousands of madrasas in
India, and crores of rupees are spent on fancy mosques, the number of
Muslim NGOs which are really doing sincere and constructive work for
the educational and social empowerment of the marginalized sections
of the Muslims is relatively meagre. Muslim organizations must make
demands on the state for adequate state investment in Muslim areas.
In addition, however, efforts must be made to mobilize the internal
resources of the community for the empowerment of the marginalized.
In this regard, there needs to be rethinking of the best possible use
of zakat funds, most of which now go to madrasas. The standard charity-based
approach has to give way to seeking to seeking to empower the poor.
There is also a serious need for working on the issue of waqfs and dargahs
and exploring possibilities for increasing their revenues and using
these for the poor. This also calls for democratic management of the
waqf boards and dargah committees.
Another important issue in
the context of the empowerment of the marginalised sections among the
Muslims is that of madrasa reforms. The vast majority of madrasa students
come from these sections of Muslim society. The on-going debate on madrasa
curricular reforms needs to be taken further and efforts to include
'modern' subjects need to be expanded. In addition, students must be
familiarized with the world around them and with contemporary affairs.
This will enable them to play a more constructive and socially engaged
role in their capacity of would-be religious specialists. This will
also help widen their career options and facilitate their joining colleges
and universities after they graduate.
The rigid dualism that characterizes
Muslim education, between the ulema and 'modern' educated Muslims, must
be narrowed down and efforts need to be made to promote greater dialogue
and interaction between the two to help in the process of the empowerment
of the marginalized sections of the Muslim community. In this regard,
I would like to cite the instance of a group of Muslim activists, mainly
retired government officers, in Bangalore which I recently came across.
This group goes every Friday to various mosques in the city and, after
the imam reads the Arabic khutba, they deliver sermons on the importance
of education and also on the salience of the findings of the Sachar
Committee report. After the prayer gets over, there is a question and
answer session, where people ask questions and advice is given on how
to form local groups, solve local problems and access various government
schemes. Another such interesting example is that of a group of ulema
in Bangalore, who are now doing a course in English, Computer Applications
and Social Sciences. They have got together to prepare and publish Friday
khutbas in Urdu that relate religious prescriptions to the need for
education, health provision and other forms of social service.
Further in this regard, it
would be useful if arrangements can be made for madrasa managers and
ulema, particularly from the younger generation, to visit Christian
seminaries and learn from their example. There, would-be Christian priests
learn not only about their own religion, but also about other religions,
as well as about social work and social activism. Perhaps these subjects
and skills could be included in the madrasa curriculum as well. I also
think that there is much that madrasas and other Muslim organisations
in the rest of India can learn from the Kerala example, where Muslim
organizations are much better organized and socially engaged. It would
serve a valuable purpose if arrangements could be made for Muslim social
activists and younger ulema from other parts of India, who wish to work
for the empowering the Muslim poor, to visit various Muslim institutions
in Kerala to see the very interesting and creative work that they are
doing and to learn from their example. The somehow deeply-rooted notion
that north India must lead and south India must follow is completely
mistaken and there is much that the south Indian example holds for north
Indian Muslims to learn from.
Linked to this is the need
for developing alternate understandings of Islamic theology and jurisprudence
that are rooted in and creatively responsive to the Indian situation
of religious pluralism, caste, class and gender oppression and the fact
of Muslims being a minority in India. This needs to be reflected in
the madrasa curriculum as well. Such progressive understandings of religion
can play a crucial role in addressing the lived realities and concerns
of the marginalized, irrespective of community. Clearly, understandings
of religion, no matter what religion, that are exclusivist and insensitive
to the local context, particularly that of oppression, betray the genuine
core of true spirituality.
My last point relates to
intra-community and inter-community relations. It is obvious that the
empowerment of the marginalized sections among the Muslims requires
an atmosphere of harmonious intra- and inter-community relations. It
is striking to note in this regard the sharp inter-maslak divisions
and strife that are promoted by certain Muslim institutions, publishing
houses, ulema groups and madrasas. It is equally striking to note the
absence of any organized dialogue work to bring together ulema of different
maslaks to enable them to work together in a spirit of ecumenism. I
think this is a serious issues that urgently needs to be addressed.
On the inter-community relations
front, obviously Hindu-Muslim strife hurts the marginalized sections
of the Muslims the most and so for their progress and empowerment communal
harmony is indispensable. In this regard, the state and Hindu organizations
and activists have a crucial role to play. But so do Muslims. The ulema
need to be sensitized to the issue and need of inter-faith dialogue
and undertake suitable efforts in this regard. There is an urgent need
to promote inter-religious dialogue, and in this regard to go beyond
the present limited form of dialogue at the level of religious doctrines
between religious specialists-ulema and pundits-which, although important,
is clearly inadequate. Often, such dialogue is promoted simply by missionary
motives or in order to defend one's beliefs against those of others.
Generally, such dialogue at the level of theology stumbles after a point
because each religion, as interpreted by its religious orthodoxy, has
certain non-negotiable fundamentals. Hence, dialogue efforts must go
beyond simply theological exchange, which remains limited to a small
religious elite . Dialogue needs to be extended beyond the narrow sphere
of religious specialists to become more democratic and socially inclusive,
include people from different walks of life, particularly social activists
and media persons from different religious backgrounds.
Inter-community dialogue
should go beyond talking about one's religion to focus on the possibilities
of joint efforts to work for social issues of common concern. This is
the dialogue of social action, which moves beyond mere theological exchange
and polemics. There is an urgent need for many more Muslims to be involved
in social movements on issues that are not limited just to the Muslim
community, but, rather, are of much wider concern, such as the environmental
movement or the struggle against so-called globalization and against
caste, class and gender oppression. The obsession with issues only concerning
the Muslims is, I feel, very stifling and also counter-productive from
the point of view of the Muslim masses. So, too, is the tendency to
be self-righteous, to ignore the serious need for introspection, to
blame others for all one's ills and to remain silent when, in some situations,
non-Muslims suffer at the hands of Muslims.
Of course there are several
other things that must be done for the empowerment of the marginalized
sections of the Muslim community, including, particularly, women. I
will not go into this because much has already been said and written
about this, including in the recommendations of the Sachar Committee
Report. What I have presented here are some stray and rather disjointed
thoughts for your consideration and I only hope that this would enthuse
at least some people here to seriously think of working on these issues.
Yoginder Sikand works with the Centre for Jawaharlal
Nehru Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. He can nbe contacted
on [email protected]
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