Doomed To Fail
By Scott Ritter
23 February, 2005
Baltimore Sun
North
Korea's dramatic public revelation that it possesses nuclear weapons
represents a stark challenge for the Bush administration.
The North Korean
claim, if true, underscores the failure of President Bush's nonproliferation
policies that since the beginning of his first term had been subordinated
to a grander vision of regime change. That policy was intended to transform
strategically vital regions of the world into Western-style democracies
supportive of the United States and the Bush administration's vision
of American global dominance.
The intermingling
of nonproliferation and regime change policies was doomed to fail. One
requires skillful multilateral diplomacy based on the principles of
uniform application of international law, the other bold application
of a unilateral doctrine of aggressive liberation rhetoric backed by
the real threat of military power. When blended, as the Bush administration
did, unilateralism trumps multilateralism every time. North Korea's
announced accession to the nuclear club represents the inevitable result.
The end of America's
meaningful role as a promoter of global nonproliferation can be traced
to decisions made in the 1990s regarding regime change in Saddam Hussein's
Iraq. The United Nations had embarked on a bold effort to roll back
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through disarmament
and, despite some initial difficulties, scored a dramatic success.
It is now clear
that Iraq, under pressure from U.N. weapons inspectors, was disarmed
of its WMD by 1991 and had dismantled and destroyed the last vestiges
of its weapons programs by 1996. But the United States had, since 1991,
committed to a policy of regime change in Iraq, which required economic
sanctions-based containment linked to a continued finding of Iraqi noncompliance
with its disarmament obligation.
Rather than embracing
weapons inspections, three successive U.S. administrations denigrated
and subverted the work of the inspectors in order to keep the primary
policy objective of regime change in Iraq on track. The nail in the
coffin of U.S. nonproliferation efforts came when the Bush administration
willfully misstated the extent of the Iraqi WMD programs in order to
justify its invasion of Iraq.
North Korea and
Iran concluded from events leading to the U.S. invasion of Iraq that
the Bush administration did not regard nonproliferation as an endgame
but a tool designed to weaken a target state to the point that it could
succumb to the grander U.S. policy objective of regime change.
Mr. Bush had stated
that the world would be a better place with the regimes in Pyongyang
and Tehran removed. Therefore, all diplomatic efforts - whether the
six-party framework with North Korea or the European Union-brokered
negotiations with Iran - were regarded as disingenuous fronts intended
not to facilitate nonproliferation and stability but rather instability
and regime change.
With Iraq a model
of the reality of America's unilateral militaristic approach toward
bringing about regime change, North Korea and Iran have embarked on
the only path available to either of them - acquisition of an independent
nuclear deterrent intended to forestall what they perceive as irresponsible
U.S. aggression.
The Bush administration
has come face to face with the reality of the failure of its policies.
Rather than curtailing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the administration's
crusade against global tyranny has served as an accelerant in placing
the most dangerous weapons known to man in the hands of xenophobic regimes
that have been backed into a corner.
But the situation
in North Korea and Iran could still be resolved in a way that promotes
global nonproliferation objectives.
Real and meaningful
economic incentives, backed by U.S. and allied willingness to permit
North Korea and Iran to possess civilian nuclear programs operated under
stringent international monitoring, could succeed in rolling back North
Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and provide incentive for Iran
to cease and desist in its own program.
But the key to any
such salvation lies with the willingness of the Bush administration
to unlink nonproliferation efforts from regime change. This is highly
unlikely, given the reality of the ideological composition of those
at the senior decision-making levels of the Bush national security team
and the huge political investment Mr. Bush has made in support of his
global crusade against tyranny.
"Freedom is
on the march," Mr. Bush has said. Unfortunately for the United
States, North Korea and Iran don't see it that way. And if America keeps
marching, it could very well be in the direction of a nuclear apocalypse.
Scott Ritter, a former intelligence officer and U.N. weapons inspector
in Iraq, is author of the forthcoming Iraq Confidential: The Untold
Story of America's Intelligence Conspiracy.
Copyright ©
2005, The Baltimore Sun