Palestinians
Can Play
The Israeli Game
By Ahmad Samih
Khalidi
24 August, 2005
The
Guardian
Two
profound assumptions underlie Ariel Sharon's withdrawal from Gaza. The
first is that Israel's overriding value is the preservation of its Jewish
character and majority. The second is that the conflict with the Palestinians
is not amenable to a final agreed resolution, now or in the foreseeable
future.
The net product
is that Israel should unilaterally "disengage" from areas
of Palestinian population density and retrench behind a demographic
barrier (the wall). Withdrawal from Gaza represents a retreat from no
more than 6% of the territories occupied in 1967, but it reduces the
Palestinian "demographic threat" by about a third. Gaza will
now be enclosed in a triple fence, and with the completion of the "separation
wall" in the West Bank in mid-2006, Israel's 5 million or so Jews
will be insulated from the 3.8 million Palestinians in the occupied
territories - with tens of thousands of Arabs in East Jerusalem suspended
in a politico-legal limbo.
No Palestinian patriot
can fail to be moved by the Gazans' joy at deliverance from 38 years
of ugly occupation. But the withdrawal highlights two vital characteristics
of the coming phase in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. First, unilateralism
has replaced negotiation; second, conflict management has replaced conflict
resolution.
Unilateralism was Sharon's response to the need to act, maintain the
initiative and keep creating facts on the ground. There is little conviction
today on any side that a return to Camp David-style final negotiations
could lead to anything but failure. For the Palestinians there is no
self-evident paradigm to replace that of a comprehensive negotiated
settlement based on a two-state solution that involves a resolution
of outstanding issues, including a return to 1967 borders, more or less,
a capital in East Jerusalem, and a settlement of the refugee problem.
The prevailing winds
after Gaza will not be towards this classic two-state solution. The
international community has already effectively opted for a new interim
phase disguised under the rubric of a Palestinian state "with provisional
borders", as specified in the so-called road map. This posits a
test of Palestinian good governance as a precondition for progress to
a final settlement, and contemplates a deferral of vital issues such
as the future of refugees and the holy city of Jerusalem until some
unspecified date.
But no Palestinian
leadership can accept a state with provisional borders that defers these
two most emotive issues. Any leader who accepts this would be immediately
faced with strong and possibly violent opposition, not only from Islamist
and nationalist elements in Palestine itself, but from the refugee and
diaspora constituencies.
This leaves the
Palestinian Authority/PLO in a quandary. Final-status negotiations (even
if Israel agreed to them) are unlikely to produce a stable resolution.
But a new interim phase risks deep internal splits and jeopardises inalienable
Palestinian rights regarding Jerusalem and refugees.
There is one potential
alternative, and that is to adopt a policy of "parallel unilateralism".
This builds on Sharon's unilateral approach and turns it to the Palestinians'
advantage. If the essence of unilateralism is the ability to act free
from mutual constraints and obligations, then the Palestinians could
benefit from Israeli unilateral acts by absorbing whatever territories
are vacated, developing their means of self-rule and building up their
capabilities without the shackles of Israeli pre-conditions. This would
entail no concessions on vital rights or points of principle.
It is still very
unclear how any Israeli unilateral process will continue on the West
Bank and how "success" in Gaza will be judged on both sides.
But as the deep logic of Israel's demographic fears and the absence
of an agreed final settlement will continue to impress themselves on
both parties, parallel unilateralism may be the only temporary, if as
yet fuzzy, way out.
Barring unforeseen
circumstances, the West Bank separation wall will be completed. Israel
will have to decide what will go behind it and what will remain implanted
deep in Palestinian soil. The latter will be unsustainable and will
be withdrawn sooner or later. The Palestinians will be left with large
chunks of the West Bank and all of Gaza. From this perspective it would
be better not to accept a "state within provisional borders"
and maintain the PA as the governing authority as long as land is occupied
and the refugee issue and Jerusalem are left pending.
But the conflict
will not be resolved. The issues outstanding will fester and generate
constant friction. There will be new calls for armed struggle inside
Palestine and from the diaspora. Israel will respond in kind, and the
whole affair will be but a new page in the conflict. A cynic would argue
that this would be true to the existential nature of a struggle that
has already straddled three centuries.
· Ahmad Samih
Khalidi is a former Palestinian negotiator and senior associate member
of St Antony's College, Oxford
[email protected]