Rushing After
A Mirage
By Hasan Abu
Nimah
02 September, 2005
The
Electronic Intifada
There
are striking similarities between Israel's departure from southern Lebanon
in May 2000 and the events in Gaza over the past two weeks. This is
no surprise, as events in the Arab-Israeli conflict have been seemingly
moving in circles for years.
The peace process
industry of EU, American and UN officials, donor agencies, government-funded
think tanks and NGOs, supported by the media, have created euphoria
and false optimism following the passing away of Palestinian leader
Yasser Arafat last November, which has done much to pollute the political
climate. Arafat's death supposedly opened a "window of opportunity"
because, as Israeli and American propaganda claimed, he was not a "partner"
and, alone, constituted the main "obstacle to peace".
Propaganda efforts
have also built up the Gaza "disengagement", surrounding it
with the same kind of euphoria, complete with the claims that there
is new "momentum" for restarting the dead peace process. All
this lofty talk is proceeding with few people looking back to see what
actually happened the previous time we were told that peace was knocking
at the door.
In the late 1990s,
resistance to Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon generated a clamour
within Israel for a withdrawal, because the price of maintaining the
occupation had become too high. Despite decades of trying to defeat
the resistance, each week Israeli troops were suffering losses to roadside
bombs which could be neither detected nor prevented, just as American
forces are discovering now in occupied Iraq.
In 1999, Israeli
prime minister Ehud Barak assumed office, promising to extract Israel
from the quagmire it had created. But the withdrawal did not take place
on Israel's terms. Israel wanted to leave months later than it did,
having first assured the survival of its local collaborator militia,
the South Lebanon Army (SLA), to continue the dirty work of occupation
without risk to precious Israeli lives. Once it became clear that Israel
was going to leave, the SLA collapsed and Israeli forces fled Lebanon
humiliated, sparking joyful celebrations throughout the country and
the region.
The debacle became
exactly what Israel had sought to avoid: proof that Israel was defeated
and had to flee in the face of determined armed resistance which Israel
and the United States call "terrorism". The Israelis sought,
instead, to shroud their withdrawal decision in Security Council Resolution
425, calling for their immediate and total departure from Lebanon, which
they had in fact been rejecting and defying for over two decades.
Following their
disorderly withdrawal, the Israelis focused their attention on disarming
Hizbollah and expanding the authority of the Lebanese state, and the
Lebanese army, over the entire south, to prevent any possibility of
continued Hizbollah harassment of northern Israel. Israel truly feared
that "Hizbollah-controlled territory" would become a haven
for "terrorists", and the only way to prevent that from happening
was to replace Hizbollah with an official Lebanese military and political
presence which would be subject to international pressure.
Five years on, the
argument is the same. Hizbollah was not disarmed because Lebanese governments
could not enforce such a move while some Lebanese territory was still
under occupation. Officially, Lebanon argued the resistance was legitimate
until all Lebanese soil was liberated. There have been serious practical
difficulties, and probably the only way out is the current process of
including Hizbollah in the Lebanese political system.
In 2005, and after
a lot of procrastination, the Israeli government realised that the stubborn
insistence to keep fewer than 8,000 of its settlers amongst 1.3 million
devastated, impoverished and mostly displaced Palestinians, in the most
densely populated area in the world, has become a huge burden. Israel
decided to withdraw the settlers and has now completed the move. As
was the case in Lebanon, Israel sought to present its decision as a
gesture for peace, rather than a security necessity, or, worse, rather
than have it be seen as a defeat imposed upon them by Hamas and the
other resistance factions.
Following the "disengagement"
(a term Israel invented in order to avoid the term "withdrawal"
and the obligations it implies has been mindlessly accepted by the entire
world), the focus turned to disarming Hamas and to spreading the authority
of the Palestinian Authority to the areas which Hamas may step forward
to control. And to avoid the possibility of Gaza becoming an uncontrollable
haven for "terrorists", Israel is insisting on keeping its
control on all land, sea and air borders, with Egyptian help. It does
not seem possible that the PA could disarm Hamas, and the argument in
favour of continued resistance remains valid as long as the rest of
the Palestinian territories -- the West Bank, including East Jerusalem
-- remain occupied.
It is hard for the
PA to deny for long that the resistance was a factor, if not the only
factor, in forcing Israel out. If Israel insists on keeping Gaza militarily
occupied from without after ending the occupation, it will inevitably
contribute to making the strip a base for intensified armed resistance.
The lesson of Lebanon
adds to the validity of the argument that the only safe option to follow
is to let a democratic process determine if Hamas and other resistance
factions should be included in a yet to emerge new political system
for Gaza.
The repeated promotion
of peace euphoria has become a tranquilliser which seems to be helping
the region live on false hopes in the absence of real ones. The post-Arafat
euphoria did not last long, for the very simple fact that he was not
the obstacle in the way of any peace. The bet that Abbas would be able
to do what his predecessor either declined or failed to do is equally
wrong and shortsighted. The Palestinian leadership has been begging
for any settlement and accepted whatever was offered, and later was
sabotaged by Israel. Now, in order to hide the failure of the peace
process, its sponsors, along with the PA, eagerly adopted Sharon's "Gaza
disengagement" plan, and the false promise it provided.
Many, for their
own purpose, jumped on the idea as a new window of opportunity. They
hastily attached it to the roadmap, in total disregard of Sharon government's
declarations that the disengagement plan was specifically intended to
kill the peace process and the roadmap, the Palestinian state-to-be
and any settlement of the historic conflict. Political convenience required
the contrary and the contrary became the rule.
The EU's well-travelled
foreign policy coordinator, Javier Solana, for example, rushed to be
the first on the scene after the "disengagement", to promote
the euphoria, while saying nothing to challenge Israel's tightening
grip on the West Bank. The EU cannot buy its way out of its obligations
to the Palestinians, and to international law, including the International
Court of Justice decision requiring dismantling of the apartheid wall,
by slapping Sharon on the back and throwing aid money at the PA.
How many months
or years will have to be wasted before the reality hits us right in
the face and we realise that the Gaza disengagement, if Israel continues
to control the Middle East agenda, is a recipe for more violence and
deadlock rather than an opening for peace, is hard to tell. It all depends
on how much tendency there remains to run after the mirage rather than
look for real water.
Ambassdor Hasan Abu Nimah is the former Permanent Representative of
Jordan at the United Nations.