After Nepal's Royal Coup
By Praful Bidwai
18 February, 2005
The Praful Bidwai ColumnRecent developments have put paid to the slender hope that Nepal's King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev would substantially relax the draconian restrictions he imposed on the freedoms of expression, political activity and movement on February 1, when he dismissed Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and assumed absolute power. The executive monarch has banned criticism of the security forces "made directly or indirectly", prohibited political activities by "public servants", and threatened to seize people's property whenever "necessary". Telephone connections in Nepal remain under tight surveillance and protest rallies are broken up even as political leaders escape to India to evade detention.
Evidently, strong criticism of the royal coup by the international community, including the United Nations, major Western Powers and India, hasn't yet had much impact. This might appear strange considering that Nepal's monarch rules-uncertainly and shakily-over one of the world's 10 poorest countries, which badly depends on foreign aid, and that his writ doesn't run in two-thirds of Nepal's 75 districts, where Maoists rule.
King Gyandendra has probably had tacit or covert support from a major Power. Or else, he wouldn't have ignored repeated warnings by the US, Britain and India against dismissing Mr Deuba. Nor would he have reportedly misled New Delhi by sending an emissary only a couple of days before the dismissal, who delivered the opposite message.
In all likelihood, the power backing the King is China. On January 21, he closed down two offices of the Dalai Lama, active in Nepal for 45 years. Beijing lavished praise on him for this. China refused to deplore the coup despite its grave implications for the entire Himalayan region, and described it as Nepal's "internal matter". The King is probably playing "the China Card". (Nepal also plays the "India Card" when that suits it.)
This is a high-risk gamble. It's unlikely that Chinese support alone would see King Gyanendra through all the troubles he'll face. Under international pressure, Beijing could dump him as easily as it backed him. This happened in the early 1990s, when Nepal became a democracy. China is unlikely to forgo dividends from improved relations with India for dubious short-term influence within Nepal.
The King has risked an even more reckless gamble by taking a purely personal decision to grab absolute power and declare a state of emergency for three long years. He has removed the buffer between himself and an increasingly restive population and thus put the Palace in the line of fire. From now on, he won't have the luxury of blaming political parties-for whom he publiclyexpresses disdain-for the nation's growing problems. His actions will probably further aggravate Nepal's multiple crises of governability and erode his own authority and credibility. The Nepali economy, already in deep trouble, could face a virtual collapse.
The King's takeover is now spurring Nepal's parliamentary parties and the Maoists into a joint opposition to demand a lifting of the emergency and restoration of democratic freedoms. The longer the King resists this, the greater and more coherent the opposition will become. Indeed, a well-focused demand to restore civil liberties will energise the crisis-ridden parties. Since the King's dismissal of the first Deuba government in 2002, more and more political leaders belonging to the mainstream have veered around to demanding a quasi-republican Constitution, to be written by a new Constituent Assembly. They include leaders from the Koirala and Deuba factions of the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party (United Marxist-Leninist), the Ekta Mashal Group, and the Terai-based Sadbhavana Party. Maoist ideologue Baburam Bhattarai named them on January 19 in Kantipur daily.
The King has committed a grave blunder by usurping power. The Nepali people, who have tasted freedom for 15 years, prefer multi-party democracy to monarchy. An August-September 2003 survey by Tribhuvan University social scientists shows that 62 percent of Nepalis say "democracy is always preferable to any other form of government." (Only 10 percent say authoritarianism is acceptable, while 28 percent are indifferent.) Seventyeight percent favour either a limited monarchy or its abolition-far more numerous than the 22 percent who want an executive monarchy. The King's rule by proxy since October 2002 has produced poor results and fresh antagonisms. Ninetyone percent of all
Nepalis want either a new constitution or amendments to the existing constitution.Given this, the Maoists' demand for a round-table conference, an interim government and a Constituent Assembly is likely to gather popular support. Many hitherto-hesitant leaders will embrace it. In that case, the future of the Shah dynasty could itself be in jeopardy.
The King, then, faces a serious challenge. No wonder he's making awkward overtures to the Maoists by inviting them to talks. The government cites the Maoists' past statements that they would prefer talking to the King directly rather than his toothless surrogates. The Maoists will reject this offer especially after the February 8 helicopter raids on them. They now regard the King as an absolutist and feudal "national betrayer," who wants to take Nepal back to the 15th century!
A precondition for meaningful talks between the Palace and any representatives of the Nepali people is release of political leaders, and restoration of civil liberties. The King must be firmly told this by the whole world, in particular, India, which has a special relationship with Nepal. This derives from the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, and a lot else. India and Nepal have innumerable family links and an open border permitting the free movement of people with duty-free access to goods. Nepalis can join India's armed forces-where over 30,000 of them serve-and rise to the highest levels. They can also join India's civil services. Their two currencies are tied. Many Nepalis would feel let down if India doesn't pressure the King to restore a modicum of freedom.
However, New Delhi must be sensitive to Nepali concerns and sensibilities about India's overwhelming presence and occasional high-handedness. The Nepalis resent India's perceived political "interference", and its proposals for the construction of dams on common rivers, as well as India's blockade of their landlocked country in 1988-89, which imposed great hardship upon them. While stressing commonalities and a shared culture, Nepalis are also careful to keep their clocks 15 minutes apart from Indian Standard Time-a sign of independence! India must respect this.
What should India do apart from deploring the coup, which will accelerate the collapse of the Nepali state-right on the shared porous border? India must translate its words into actions while expressing solidarity with the Nepali people's democratic aspirations. The best way to do so would be to stop supplying arms to the Royal Nepal Army and direct aid to the government (as distant from NGOs and group delivering services to the people). This is the recommendation of the International Commission of Jurists, which too has expressed serious concern, like many civil liberties organisations, about Nepal's systematic abuse of human rights, including arbitrary detention and beating of civilian suspects.
In recent years, India supplied Rs 375 crores worth of arms to Nepal, including helicopters, landmines, riot-control gear, etc. which are liable to be used against domestic insurgents and peaceful civilians. One reason for this is New Delhi's preoccupation with viewing the Maoists as a "common security challenge" and its fear that they would forge strong links with Indian Naxalites. This preoccupation was especially strong under the Vajpayee-Advani dispensation. (RSS organs Panchajanya and Organiser support the King's coup.) Therefore, India didn't adequately differentiate itself from the US position which encouraged the King to use armed force against the Maoists. (The European Union advocated ceasefire and talks to address the root-causes of the insurgency).
New Delhi was wrong to cancel the Dhaka Summit of SAARC to register its annoyance with the King. SAARC shouldn't be held a hostage to bilateral differences between member-states. Dr Manmohan Singh should have attended the Summit and delivered a strong rebuke to the King. India must change stance. It must oppose a military solution to the crisis posed by the Maoist insurgency. The 78,000-strong RNA has proved incapable of militarily combating it despite its disproportionate armed advantage. The Maoists only have an estimated 3,000 modern guns. They use questionable, indeed deplorable, methods. But they are not terrorists. They have support in the countryside, which is a cesspool of unaddressed grievances and unredeemed injustices.
It's this that has allowed the Maoists to wield growing influence and win legitimacy. These and grievances can only be addressed through land reform, popular empowerment and minimum needs programmes in health and education, and a sweeping drive against corruption. India must encourage this, not a military approach.
In this, India shouldn't expect much help from the US. The US sabotaged talks with the Maoists in the past by putting them on the "terrorist" list (April 2003). Earlier too, its "tough" post-9/11 militarist posture had a negative impact in Nepal and derailed talks. The US has recently encouraged the RNA by training its personnel and supplying M-16 rifles: However, India can count on the support of many other states-and above all, large numbers of Nepalis.
