The Strategic Dialogue Between Reluctant Allies:
The United States And Pakistan Today
By Dr Sohail Mahmood
17 April, 2010
Countercurrents.org
The first ministerial-level strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the United States took place on March 17-18, 2010 in Washington, D.C. It was chaired by United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi. A cautious optimism was expressed in the media on the outcome of the dialogue. It was said that the United States badly needed Pakistan for a victory in Afghanistan and therefore, Pakistan’s position was strong in the dialogue. However, the outcome of the two-day dialogue amounted to little of any meaningful substance.
Notwithstanding the official pronouncements, this outcome was very much expected though. The two allies had several misconceptions about each other there were fundamental differences between the United States and Pakistan on the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The level of distrust and suspicion was high on both sides. Just after the dialogue, an editorial entitled ‘Strategic edge’ in the News (March 24, 2010) seemed to have captured the Pakistani mind- set very appropriately. The editorial said: “Skepticism born of experience might be one way of characterizing how we perceive America in its relationship with ourselves over many years. All too often we have been nothing but a pawn in a larger game, and never truly a ‘players’ in our own right”. In a very recent report by Matthew Rosenberg and Peter Spiegel of the United States which was reprinted in the News on March 24, 2010) it was maintained that the American authorities had wanted the Inter- services Intelligence, Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, to stop a “negative campaign” against the United States. So much for the expressed friendship between the two countries. Clearly, the relationship between the United States and Pakistan had become problematic, to say the least. Why was there such level of distrust between two allies? Primarily because popular perceptions were divergent between the United States and Pakistan on the true nature of the GWOT and Pakistan’s expected role in it.
Perceptions matter. Sometimes perceptions shape reality.
Pakistan strongly perceived that the United States was reluctant to appreciate the sacrifices it had borne during the last eight years of the GWOT.
The GWOT had hit Pakistan very hard. The News reported on March 24, 2010 that during the period from 2002 to mid March 2010, a total of 7,739 terrorist incidents had occurred in Pakistan which had resulted in 8,875 deaths of both security personnel and civilians. Some three million people had been displaced because of the fighting inside Pakistan. The relief and rehabilitation of the internally displaced people had cost $600 million. The Pakistani economy had sustained a huge loss amounting to about $45 billion. The GWOT’s fallout had resulted in the loss of potential GDP (for 2008-2009) estimated at 7% which was equivalent to $11.7 billion.
Pakistan remembered the past too well to trust the United States on Afghanistan once again. It was a case of once bitten twice shy for Pakistan. Earlier, Pakistan had played a very significant role in the Afghan war during the 1980s. Recall Ronald Reagan’s crusade against the “evil empire” of the Soviet Union and the involvement of the American CIA in the long war. Undoubtedly, it was only Pakistan’s assistance to the Afghan Mujahedeen which had ultimately defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The United States very conveniently left the region when the war was won. Pakistan was left high and dry and had to face the drastic consequences of the Afghanistan war. Much had been written on the war and Pakistan has learnt its lessons well enough. How can Pakistan trust the United States will not do the same again in Afghanistan? How can Pakistan let the Americans walk out again and leave it to clear the mess? The United States had promised not to commit the same mistake again in Afghanistan and had promised not to abandon the country. The United States had also assured Pakistan that it was now a strategic priority. It was reported in Dawn on March 27, 2010 that the United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had noted, in a very recent testimony in the United States Senate, that: “In Pakistan, our efforts are vital for America’s success in Afghanistan, but also to our own American security…. We have made it a strategic priority to strengthen our partnership with the Pakistani people”. She also noted that the situation had changed drastically since last year and had credited Pakistan for measures against militants in Swat, South Waziristan, and other parts of the country.
In the dialogue the United States and Pakistan had pledged to boost and broaden ties between the two countries. The United States had also discussed Pakistani concerns about peace and stability in Afghanistan. The United States needed Pakistan for an honorable exist from Afghanistan and therefore had discussed a possible role for it in the Afghanistan reconciliation process, as reported by Dawn on March 27, 2010. The United States promised more financial assistance to Pakistan and supply of military hardware also. Since 9/11, the United States had given over $15 billion in assistance to Pakistan. Last year, the United States had announced $7.5 billion in aid to Pakistan. An out come of three projects, which included: $40 million for the construction of roads in NWFP, $51 million of upgrading three thermal plants, and $125 million for energy development. Given the on-going GWOT, the major portion of United States assistance was given to security and military. Pakistan had been continuously pressurized to do more in the GWOT. It was asked to vigorously combat the Taliban and its allies inside Pakistan. Earlier, Pakistan had been reluctant to take on the Taliban as a sort of safeguard measure in the eventuality of an American retreat from Afghanistan.
More importantly, Pakistan was rightly concerned about Indian influence in Afghanistan. This influence had been growing rapidly in the last few years. India and Pakistan were known bitter enemies who had fought three wars since their simultaneous independence from the British in 1947. India was supporting the insurgency in Pakistan, especially the one in Baluchistan province. The Baluch nationalists and their Baluch liberation Army was being sustained by India from Afghanistan. Pakistan had officially complained about this blatant interference to the United States. The United States had simply ignored Pakistan’s pleas as it did not wish to jeopardize its new friendship with India. Meanwhile, the United States had alleged that Pakistan was providing clandestine assistance to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan had assured the United States that this was not the case. Thus, the United States and Pakistan were reluctant allies as their national interests diverged more than they converged. The relationship between the two countries was going to be problematic because of this fundamental difference of national interests. The real problem in this relationship was India. Pakistan was increasingly concerned about the growing power and status of India. It was also very apprehensive of the new strategic relationship the United States had established with India. Previously, the United States and India had signed a landmark civil nuclear agreement which had given India a new respectability as a nuclear power. The United States- Indian strategic relationship had not come easily and had taken several years to develop. Pakistan now wanted a similar nuclear deal with the United States. Pakistan had badly desired the same acknowledgement from the United States as given to India. This was expecting too much from the United States and was imply not going to happen, however. There was no apparent development in this area during the strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the United States. It was well-known that the United States was very concerned about the A.Q. Khan network and nuclear proliferation.
According to a report in the New York Times on March 26, 2010, it had been alleged that Pakistan had a history of selling nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya. Therefore, a civil nuclear agreement similar to the one the United States had with India was “realistically” ten or fifteen years away. It was reported in Dawn on March27, 2010 that the United States had asked Pakistan to initiate steps that would “restore the confidence of the international community in its nuclear program”. Pakistan had agreed to do so. The suggested steps had also required the inspection or monitoring of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. More than anything else, Pakistan had clearly desired American assistance against India. The core issue which was the real bone of contention between India and Pakistan - Kashmir - remain unresolved as yet. Pakistan rightly expected the United States to take a meaningful role in solving the dispute. Ever since the November 2008 terror incident in Mumbai, the peace talks between India and Pakistan had stalled. It was only now that a thaw in the prickly relationship between India and Pakistan seemed remotely possible. The United States was reluctant to play a direct role in the India- Pakistan peace process because of the Indian stance on the issue. The United States prized India’s friendship and was very reluctant to antagonize the new power in Asia. This relationship had grown tremendously in the last decade or so. On Kashmir India was adamant that no outside power be allowed to mediate in any shape and form. The closer the Indian and American get, the more is the relationship between Pakistanis and Americans soured. Plus, misconceptions between the two run deeper than officially acknowledged. Pakistan, a United States ally, had even sought assurance from the United States that it would not stop Pakistan’s nuclear program. It was only very lately that Pakistan had gained United States official praise, as in the strategic dialogue, for its successes against the militants inside the country. Previously, it had been continuously pressurized to do more in combating the militants.
Today, Pakistan wanted to make a deal with the United States by promising a further and deeper crackdown on the Taliban, and its allied network, provided the United States acceded to its demands. The chief demand was now economic assistance. Pakistan’s economy was in bad shape, the state services were now mostly dysfunctional, and most importantly poverty was increasing in the country.
Given the precarious economic situation in Pakistan, the Zardari government was demanding immediate economic assistance and technical help, especially in the energy sector. The United States must deliver and fast.
Notwithstanding the urgency of the economic situation in Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute needed to be settled immediately. The people of South Asia had suffered enough because of the lingering dispute. Therefore, the much reluctance of the United States to play greater role was perplexing to the Pakistanis. Undoubtedly, the Kashmir dispute was the biggest obstacle to improved India-Pakistan relations. The insurgency in Kashmir had cost some 80,000 lives in the last decade or so. There had been no meaningful decrease in the brutality and the atrocities committed by Indian security forces in the province. The record of the Indian government in upholding human rights for the Kashmiri popular was appalling and was documented by international human right watchdog agencies like Human Rights Watch, and others. Without an honorable solution to the Kashmir dispute, the relations between Pakistan and India will remain bitter. That much was sure. Only the United States had the prestige, status and weight to make a difference in south Asia. Why was the United States not playing its historic role in this matter? Kashmir was perceived to be very significant to the Pakistanis. The country’s history provided ample testimony to the closeness of Kashmir to Pakistani state and society.
The United States was not helping Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Plus, the United States had not yet pulled out of Iraq and was intensifying its war in Afghanistan. The United States continued to support the military occupation of Palestine and the subjugation of the Palestinian people by the Israelis. This was not lost on the Pakistani popular imagination. The Pakistani public was bitterly anti-American as a result of these policies. Meanwhile, the Pakistani media continued to express suspicion about United States claims of a long–term commitment to Pakistan. Thus, the relationship between Pakistan and United States was going to remain problematic because of their perceived national interests. The divergence had a stronger pull than the convergence. The challenge to Pakistan was to become a real player in the forthcoming strategic dialogues. The challenge to the United States was to become a more meaningful and permanent player in the region. Notwithstanding the problems between Pakistan and the United States, it was hoped that the relations would improve with time. The two countries had so much in common also. Only time will tell how this relationship grows. It can also dwindle easily. The loss will be primarily borne by the hapless Pakistanis.
Dr Sohail Mahmood, Professor & Chair, IR Dept, NUML, Islamabad,
