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Scripturalist Islam In Kashmir
And The Possibilities For Dialogue

By Yoginder Sikand

26 September, 2006
Countercurrents.org

In media discourses and in the shrill rhetoric of some fringe radical Islamist spokesmen, Kashmiri Muslims are often presented in stereotypical terms: as allegedly wedded to a stern and strict version of Islam that is viscerally opposed to peaceful coexistence with other faiths and their adherents. Sometimes, although this is rare, the media does talk about other forms of Islam practiced in Kashmir, particularly the deep-rooted popular Sufi traditions. On the whole, however, media reporting on the Kashmiri Muslims in the context of their faith is almost inevitably in terms of the dramatic, the sensational and the violent. Radical Islamist outfits slaying innocent people in cold blood, insisting that Muslim women should don the veil on pain of death or declaring that voting in elections is 'un-Islamic' and so on constitutes much of what we hear in the media about Islam in contemporary Kashmir. In this way, these minor radical Islamist groups are presented as the spokesmen and representatives of all Kashmiri Muslims or as commanding such authority and power, based on intimidation and fear, that all Kashmiri Muslims are somehow forced to bow before their dictates.

This image of Islam in contemporary Kashmir is clearly limited, selective and highly sensationalized. While it is true that the radical Islamist fringe does exist in Kashmir, support for its ultimate agenda among most Kashmiris is limited. The lack of overt and vocal opposition to such radicals must not be taken as necessarily implying widespread support of their agenda of a state based on their peculiar version of Islam. In private conversations, many Kashmiris speak of their opposition to their hardliner form of Islam and their methods, but are unable to articulate this openly for fear of being attacked or killed. For many Kashmiris, support for such radicals is selective. While some might support their ability to engage militarily with the Indian Army, they might not necessarily agree with their ultimate goal of the sort of political dispensation that they aspire to impose. It is important to make this decision in order to avoid sweeping generalizations and to stress the diversity that characterizes the interpretation and practice of Islam in Kashmir.

In academic and media discussions about Islam in Kashmir, a distinction is sometimes made between scripturalist, shariah-centred Islam, on the one hand, and 'syncretistic', popular Sufi forms of Islam, on the other. The former is presented in monolithic terms, as somehow inherently opposed to peaceful co-existence with people of other faiths. The latter is projected as not really or properly 'Islamic', as a hotchpotch of Islam and Hinduism, and, therefore, as more accommodative of Hindus. This distinction is useful, but only in a limited sense. While the latter traditionally provided a matrix that helped develop a cultural universe in which Muslims and Pundits could participate together in a limited way, it is not that the former is by definition wholly opposed to peaceful co-existence.

Scriputralist, shariah-based forms of Islam have, for a variety of reasons, gained additional prominence in Kashmir over the last several decades, although they have been unable to eradicate the deeply rooted popular Sufi forms of the faith. It is true that some variants of the sternly scripturalist and literalist version of Islam are irreconcilable with genuine religious pluralism. But that does not merit generalizing for this form of Islam as a whole. There are numerous different ways in which this broad tradition is actually defined, interpreted and practiced, some of which can indeed be somewhat more accepting of people of other faiths even while rooted in the belief that Islam is the only way to salvation. In seeking to promote dialogue and a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir conflict, it is crucial to recognize the distinction between votaries of popular Sufism and shariah-centric, strictly scripturalist Islam. But, in addition, the different shades within the latter category, some of whose proponents are more amenable to dialogue than others, must also be recognised.

The version of shariah-centric Islam in Kashmir today that is most clearly opposed to people of other faiths is that articulated by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-i Tayyeba, which claims to be ideologically affiliated to the Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith, which is closely affiliated to Saudi-style Wahhabism. Lashkar literature is replete with negative references to other faiths, particularly to Hinduism. It defines Islam and Hinduism as polar opposites, and exhorts Muslims to engage in constant war, which it blesses as a jihad, against Hindus, whom it collectively brands as 'enemies of Islam'. Indeed, it goes so far as to call upon Muslims all over the world to engage in a global jihad, which, it insists, must carry on till Islamic rule is established till the ends of the world. India is a particular target for this sort of jihad, and Lashkar texts often quotes a tradition, attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, which describes him as having declared that those who participate in the 'war against India' ( ghazwa-i hind) would be spared the 'smells of the fire of hell'.

Thus, quite obviously, the Lashkaris are not the perfect partners for sensible dialogue on a political solution to the Kashmir conflict. But, it must be recognized, many Kashmiri adherents of scriputralist, shariah-centric Islam, who are often and mistakenly projected in the media as vehemently opposed to people of other faiths, would forcefully disagree with many of the Lashkar's claims. For instance, an Ahl-i Hadith scholar I met recently in Doda insisted that the alleged Prophetic tradition referred to above is possibly a concoction, fabricated after the death of the Prophet in order to justify Arab expansionism. There is a weak chain of narrators that have quoted this tradition and hence it cannot be taken as reliable, he informed me. He went on to complain how the Lashkar's claim that Hindus, by definition and as a community, are 'enemies of Islam', is, in his view, completely 'un-Islamic'. 'The Qur'an does not allow us to brand any community like this', he insisted. 'Instead, it talks about good people in every community and exhorts Muslims to build better relations with them, uniting with them on basic issues such as faith in God and in good works and in struggling for social justice'.

On a recent trip to Kishtwar, a town in Doda district, I met a Hasan, a supporter of the Jamaat-i Islami, one of the leading Islamist groups active in Kashmir. I mentioned to him a statement I came across in a book by a well-known Jamaat ideologue to the effect that it is as difficult for a fish to live in a desert as it is for a Muslim to live in a Hindu environment. This ideologue also insists that the conflict in Kashmir is not about politics and national self-determination at all. Rather, he argues, it is a cosmic struggle between Islam and kufr or disbelief. In this way he effectively leaves out any room for compromise or serious dialogue on the question of the political status of Kashmir.

'If all Hindus were enemies of Islam and if Muslims simply cannot live with Hindus', Hasan replied, 'then how and why was it that numerous Sufi saints came to Kashmir and lived and preached here centuries ago, at a time when there were hardly any Muslims in the area?' 'It is wrong to say', he carried on, 'that it is virtually impossible for a Muslim to live in a Hindu society. If that were the case, then how are there more Muslims in India than in Pakistan? Are they in any way lesser Muslims than Pakistani Muslims? '.

'A principal duty of a Muslim', Hasan went on, 'is to engage in dawah or missionary work among non-Muslims. Islam, we believe, is the only way to salvation. If non-Muslims choose to accept Islam, it is good for them. If they decline, that's their business. But in either case Islam commands us to deal justly and kindly with those non-Muslims who do not oppose Islam and let Muslims practice their faith. And if it is argued that we cannot live with Hindus or befriend them, as some people who claim to be great Islamic scholars insist, then how can we fulfill our missionary duty?'.

Referring to blanket and negative generalizations about Hindus by some fringe radical Islamist outfits, Hasan argued, 'These groups claim to be Islamic, but by their anti-Hindu rhetoric and actions they are only further alienating Hindus from Islam, because of which many Hindus now mistakenly think that Islam preaches hatred and violence against them. These radical groups are only making the task of Islamic mission even more difficult, and so are doing a major disservice to Islam'. 'They are', Hasan concluded, 'simply using the name of Islam for their own or Pakistan's political designs, but in the process they are giving Islam a bad name'.

A variant of this argument is articulated by numerous Kashmiri activists of the Tablighi Jama'at, a preaching movement that has its roots in the Deobandi tradition. Although the Tablighis preach against many popular customary practices and beliefs that they see as 'Hinduistic' or 'un-Islamic', insisting that Muslims should abide strictly by what they see as the rules of the shariah, unlike hardliner Islamists they do not engage in active politics. Nor is the immediate setting up of an 'Islamic state' or Caliphate of obsessive concern for them.

The Tablighi interpretation of scripturalist Islam can be interpreted to promote better relations with adherents of other faiths. Masud, a Tablighi activist from Doda, tells me, 'Islam insists on cultivating good relations with others, provided they do not persecute Muslims'. Hence, he says, 'the anti-Hindu and essentialist rhetoric of fringe radical Islamists is actually quite un-Islamic'. 'The Tablighis preach Islam and the rules of the shariah to Muslims to make them more observant Muslims', he explains. 'We don't do direct missionary work among non-Muslims. Rather, we try to impress them with our personal example. So, if we behave decently and kindly with them, as Islam commands us to, they might attribute this to Islam and then might, if God so wills, be moved to accept Islam'. 'Hence', he argues, 'we should seek to cultivate good relations with Hindus and others, rather than alienate them'.

On the question of the Kashmir conflict being a jihad, too, opinion is divided among advocates of scripturalist, shariah-centred Islam. The Lashkar-i Tayyeba and some Kashmiri Jamaat- i Islami ideologues and activists see the Kashmir conflict as a jihad. Some of them insist that even in countries where Muslims are freely allowed to practice their faith, physical jihad can be declared and carried on till an 'Islamic state', which rules in accordance with their understanding of the shariah, is established. This, however, is the opinion of only a very small and extremist minority, and other advocates of scripturalist Islam and the 'Islamic state' would dispute this. Thus, several Jamaat-i islami activists I met in Doda recently insist that the Kashmir conflict is not about religion at all, dissenting from some Kashmiri Jamaat-i Islami ideologues, such as Sayyed Ali Gilani, who think otherwise. 'It is a political conflict, about the right to self-determination for the Kashmiris, and not a war between Islam and infidelity, as some make it out to be', a Jamaat-i Islami activist I met in Doda told me. Such a position offers more scope and hope for dialogue and compromise than one that sees the conflict in purely religious terms.

As for the 'Islamic state', this Jamaat activist dissents from the position adopted by the Lashkar and argues that it cannot be forcibly established against people's will. 'We have to use peaceful methods of persuasion for this, or else people will start opposing the state once it is established, giving rise to hypocrisy, fear, discontent and opposition, which is not what Islam wants. The Quran says there is no compulsion in religion, so how can people, Muslims or others, be forced to live under any sort of political dispensation, Islamic or otherwise, against their will?'.

In the same breath, however, this man ardently advocates the cause of an 'Islamic state' in Kashmir, which is central to the political agenda of the Jamaat. 'It will be an ideal state even for non-Muslims', he retorts when I ask him if the imposition of such a political dispensation would not cause the non-Muslim minority in Jammu and Kashmir to revolt or flee. 'The non-Muslims of Medina in the Prophet's time had their rights protected and that will Inshallah also be the case in the Islamic state we hope to set up', he argues. 'Since Islam insists that the rights of non-Muslims must be upheld, rather than non-Muslims from here fleeing elsewhere, non-Muslims from other parts of India would throng here', he claims, summarily dismissing my doubts and differences with him on this score, which I make no effort to conceal and which his assurances do not serve to diminish.

A similar approach to the notion of an 'Islamic state' in Kashmir is articulated by many Tablighi Jamaat activists, offering a pointed counter to those who insist that the ongoing struggle in Kashmir must aim at establishing an 'Islamic state' in the region. While they do not deny the centrality of such a state in their understanding of Islam, they do not hanker after it as an immediate goal. This, again, leaves space for the possibility of dialogue and compromise on a political solution of the Kashmir issue.

'If we cannot abide by the shariah in our own personal lives properly', says Nadeem, a Tablighi activist from Bhadarwah teh sil, 'how can we demand an Islamic state to impose shariah laws in other spheres?'. The establishment of an 'Islamic state', as Nadeem and his fellow Tablighis see it, is a gradual process, which is effectively postponed into the indefinite future. 'When individuals and society at large begin to faithfully abide by the shariah', Nadeem tells me, 'we can then talk of an Islamic state. Till then we can live under un-Islamic rule provided Muslims are free to practice their faith, as is the case in India today'. 'And', he hurriedly adds, 'political power is not something to be sought. It is a gift that Allah gives to whom He wills'.

While the Lashkar-i Tayyeba insists the conflict is a jihad because Kashmir is a Muslim-majority territory, in which all Muslims must participate, in different capacities, opinion is divided among other advocates of scipturalist Islam as to the conditions under which such a jihad can be waged. 'Islam says that armed jihad can be declared only by the head of an Islamic state, not by an individual or an outfit. Physical jihad cannot be an undeclared, proxy war, because that is tantamount to hypocrisy, which Islam forbids', says a Deobandi maulvi I met in Jammu. He further adds, 'Jihad can be declared when Muslims are forbidden to practice their religion, but that is not the case in India'. 'Furthermore', he says, 'the ongoing conflict in Kashmir is making the position of Indian Muslims even more vulnerable, giving added strength to the fascist Hindu right. The welfare of the 140 million Muslims in India is thus probably more important than that of the 10 million Muslims in Kashmir. But some radical groups do not bother about what the implications of their actions and rhetoric have for the Indian Muslims, while at the same time claiming to be champions of Islam and the Muslim ummah. If the conflict in Kashmir is making things worse for the Indian Muslims, then we ought to take that into account'. 'In effect', he concludes, 'these groups, like the Indian and Pakistani states, appear more interested in political power, not true religiosity, and do not hesitate to twist religion to suit their ends'.

The crux of the argument is this: Islam, like any other religion, is interpreted diversely and is not the monolith that it is often presented in media discourses and in the rhetoric of radical Islamists. Often, mutually contradictory positions are articulated on the same issue, using arguments that each claim to be legitimately 'Islamic'. Recognising this can have crucial implications for the possibility of engaging with diverse Islamic groups on issues such as peace-building, conflict-resolution and promoting inter-community dialogue and solidarity. This point is underscored in the distinction that is often made between upholders of the 'syncretistic' popular Sufi traditions of Kashmir (votaries of what is sometimes called 'Kashmiriyat), on the one hand, and advocates of a more literalist, shariah-centric and scripturalist form of Islam, on the other. Yet, even within the latter category there are fine shades of difference between different groups that constitute it. Acknowledging this is crucial from the point of view of exploring possible partners who might be willing to engage in dialogue for resolving the Kashmir conflict and promoting peaceful coexistence between the different religious communities in the region. Although rooted in a firm conviction that Islam alone is the way to salvation, the scripturalist Islamic tradition is sufficiently internally diverse to include some variants that offer interpretations of the faith that are somewhat more open to dialogue and peaceful coexistence than others. This fact must be recognized and built upon as a theological resource for a possible peaceful resolution to the Kashmir conflict.

The author works with the Centre for Jawaharlal Nehru Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia. He moderates an online

discussion group called South Asian Leftists Dialoguing With Religion, which can be accessed on http://groups.yahoo.com/group/saldwr/

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