Baglihar And Other Chestnuts
By Zafar Choudhary
26 February, 2007
Countercurrents.orgOn February 12, the Indian Water Resource Minister Saif-ud-Din Soz (a Kashmiri) was exceptionally joyful as equally was his Pakistani counterpart Liaqat Ali Khan Jatoi. Soz said it is a “win-win” situation for India while Jatoi described it as victory for Pakistan when World Bank appointed Neutral Expert Prof Raymond Lifette delivered his verdict on Baglihar hydro-electric project –a bone of contention between both countries.
The 450 MW run of the river project coming up on river Chenab in Doda district of Jammu and Kashmir, Baglihar ran into troubled waters two years back when Pakistan accused India of violating the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. At the time of independence, the boundary line between the two newly created independent countries i.e. Pakistan and India was drawn right across the Indus Basin, leaving Pakistan as the lower riparian. Moreover, two important irrigation head works, one at Madhopur on Ravi River and the other at Ferozepur on Sutlej River, on which the irrigation canal supplies in Punjab (Pakistan) had been completely dependent, were left in the Indian Territory. A dispute thus arose between two countries regarding the utilization of irrigation water from existing facilities. Negotiations held under the good offices of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), culminated in the signing of Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. The Treaty was signed at Karachi by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, the then President of Pakistan, Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister and. W.A.B. Ill if of the World Bank on 19th September, 1960. The Treaty however is effective from 1st April, 1960.
In 2004-05 Pakistan lodged severe protest against India for raising height of the dam, at Baglihar hydro-electric project, which it said violated the treaty that has weathered all storms between both countries over past 47 years. The matter came up for discussion at the Indus Water Commission (as provided under the treaty, India and Pakistan both have a special commission on Indus Water). During several rounds of meetings between the officials of Indus Water Commission from both countries in New Delhi, Islamabad and then site visit to Baglihar; Pakistan outrightly rejected what India had offered to resolve the dispute. Following, protests from Pakistan, which were already telling on the bilateral relations between both countries, India offered well thought out concessions which included: 1.5 meter reduction on the 4.5 meter freeboard –a safety device to prevent overtopping of the dam in event of surging of sudden storm. Pakistan did not agree. The matter was reported to the World Bank for arbitration. On January 15, 2005 Pakistan rushed to the World Bank with its Baglihar complaint. Subsequently after consulting the governments of India and Pakistan, the World Bank appointed Prof. Raymond Lafitte, Professor at the Federal Institute of Technology of Lausanne, Switzerland as the Neutral Expert (NE) on 10th May, 2005, to determine the claims.
Pakistan’s request made on 15th January, 2005 raised a number of Points of Difference for Expert Determination in respect of the design of the Project on the basis that certain features of the design did not confirm to criteria specified in the Treaty. Pakistan contended, inter alia, that conditions at the Baglihar site did not require a gated spillway; that the spillway gates were not at the highest level; Indian calculations of the design, flood and the height of the dam (Freeboard) were excessive; India’s calculation of the required Pondage of 37.5 Mm was also too high as the correct Pondage should be 6.22 Mm; and that the level of intakes for the Power Plant were not at the highest level as required by the Treaty”.
Third Party intervention
After two years of arbitration, meetings, spot survey, case studies and wastage of time, Prof Raymond Lifette has delivered almost nothing beyond what India had offered as concession to Pakistan. And interestingly, the Neutral Expert refused to entertain what Pakistan had demanded. India had offered Pakistan 1.5 meter reduction on the 4.5 meter freeboard –the only significant recommendation made by NE in his verdict. Pakistan had demanded reduction of Baglihar pondage from 37 million cu m to 6.22 million cu m to convert the project from peaking to constant load station –contention firmly rejected by Pakistan.
Both countries have agreed to a verdict which was already under discussion. Save for the mutual mistrust between India and Pakistan, the issue could have been resolved two years back when India had offered to Pakistan what now Prof Raymond Lafitte has suggested. Prof Raymond Lafitte was appointed as Neutral Expert by the World Bank which is a signatory to the Indus Water Treaty and not the guarantor. The settlement described by India and Pakistan in their battle term phraseology of “win-win and victory” has been arrived at by a third party intervention. The countries made their people think that they had little choice but to accept ruling made by a third party –though neutral.
Baglihar is not the only water dispute between India and Pakistan and also water is not the only point of conflict between two neighbours divided at birth for a mutual animosity ever after. There is politics, there is territorial conflict. The rejoice in New Delhi and Islamabad over the Baglihar verdict has made the peacenicks to think beyond the water disputes about the possibility of a third party brokering. The verdict has thrown some questions: is this unprecedented agreement between India and Pakistan to agree on a third party verdict an indication of a mutual will between both countries on moving from conflict management to conflict resolution. Does this change in approach points a way to setting a maritime boundary in Sir Creek by the international cut off date; Can India and Pakistan accept a UN monitored peace zone in Siachen glacier –the world’s coldest, highest, bloodiest and costliest battlefield. Though India has always been suspicious about motives of the West but has shown amenability to Baglihar; it has to be seen keenly if Pakistan uses Baglihar to make a way for third party intervention on Kashmir.
The Verdict
During the 18 months of study Prof Lafitte had five meetings-in Paris, Geneva, London, and Washington and a visit to the Baglihar site and its hydraulic model at Roorkee. The Parties made written and oral submissions during the course of the Expert Determination. The NE upheld the overall design of Baglihar Dam who also recognized India’s right to utilize waters of western rivers more effectively within ambit of Indus Water Treaty for Power generation.
The NE after a detailed analysis of a data base of about 13000 dams from the International Commission on Large Dams’ world Register of Dams to analyse the type of spillway, gated or ungated, and a historical review of construction of large orifice outlets as well as a consideration of International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) guidelines, held that the site conditions at Baglihar require a gated spillway, and also held that in view of the high flood discharges and heavy silt loads, India’s design of gated spillways-both chute (surface) spillway and sluice spillways, as well as the number, size and location of their gates for the Baglihar dam complies with the design criteria set out in Annexure D of the Indus Water Treaty.
This important element in the NE’s Determination will deeply influence all future interpretations of the Indus Water Treaty. The NE has observed that the present day state of scientific and technical knowledge with advances in technology in dam design, not known or developed in 1960, can and should be utilized in dealing with problems such as those posed by heavy sediment which shorten the effective life of a plant. He is of the view that the reference in the Treaty to conceptual notions such as the need to ensure “satisfactory construction and operation”, “sound and economical design” and “customary and accepted practice of design” clearly not only permit but require use of latest technology. The NE has adopted the principle of effective interpretation which gives full effect to the rights and obligations provided by the Treaty, taking into account its object and purpose set out in the Preamble which is “attaining the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus System of rivers”.
The NE accepts and regards as prudent India’s calculation of the design flood of 16,500 cumec (as against Pakistan’s figure of 14,900 cumec). After observing that for such possibilities India has developed all possible methods of analysis specially climatological and geo-morphological analysis.The NE observes that the designer of a spillway is not only faced with the problem of flood control but also with that of sediment control and cites the “ICOLD” to note that the state of the art is today that “Bottom outlets may be used for under sluicing of floods, emptying of reservoirs, slucicing of sediments and preventing sediment from entering intakes etc”.
Accordingly, India’s design of sluice spillway at Baglihar with five outlets is regarded as appropriate and permissible under the Treaty for sediment control of the reservoir and evacuation of a large part of the design flood and being in conformity with the international practice and the state of the art. This decision will help India to deal more effectively with the problems of sedimentation in its future projects as the NE has confirmed India’s design of large bottom outlets (sluice spillway) as the most important technique to be employed in managing the high volumes of sediment which characterise the Himalayan Rivers. Incidentally, this had been an element of strenous objection and India, in the course of the Expert Determination, constantly maintained that India’s design to deal with sedimentation problems by modern methods does not in any way interfere with the flow of waters of Chenab River into Pakistan as required by the Treaty Based on the guidelines of ICOLD, the NE considers that the freeboard could be reduced by 1.5 metres. In this context, it is to be noted that India, in the spirit of good neighbourly relations, had offered possible reduction of freeboard to Pakistan even before the process of Expert Determination had started.According to the NE, the first objective of “Pondage” is to regulate the flow of the river to meet the consumer demand. He considers that “Pondage” volume should be calculated taking into account only the variations in the load thus confirming the methodology adopted by India for calculation of Pondage. He disagrees with Pakistan’s method of determination of “Pondage” i.e. with the objective of operating the plant at constant power and regulating the fluctuations in the river flow. The NE has recognized the uncertainties in projecting future load variations. The NE has arrived at a slightly lower value of 32.56 Million Cubic Metre (MCM) of maximum permissible “Pondage” as against India’s design of 37.50 MCM. NE arrived at the lower value as he adopted a daily pattern of power generation which is slightly different from that adopted by India. As a result, there will be a minor change in the schedule of peak power generation. However, the number of hours of power generation per week would remain at about 49 hours as designed by India. According to Pakistan’s calculations, the maximum “Pondage” allowed was 6.22 MCM.
Another point of difference raised by Pakistan was regarding the elevation of Intakes for the Turbines for the Plant. The Treaty requires these to be located at the highest level, consistent with satisfactory and economical construction and operation of the Plant and with customary and accepted practice of design for the designated range of the Plant’s operation. Pakistan had suggested that provision of anti-vortex devices could raise the intake levels by about 7 metres from that designed by India. According to the NE, the normal practice is to go for an appropriate arrangement of the intake structure. In particular cases where this is not possible for technical or economic reasons, then resourse could be taken to anti-vortex devices. The NE has also observed that the intakes should be so located as to avoid asymmetrical flow of water towards them. From his application of well know semi-empirical formulae, the NE considers that it is necessary to raise the power intakes by 2 metres and an additional 1 metre to allow for the slight reduction in “Pondage”. While the Indian designers of the project do not agree with the NE’s approach, as it reduces the water seal by 2 metres, no difficulty is expected in incorporating this change in the design of the Baglihar Plant.
The three elements of design which require marginal changes, i.e. reductions in freeboard and Pondage and increase in the height of the intakes all arise from calculations and not from basic principles.
The NE’s Final Determination confirms that India’s design has been compliant with the basic principles of the Indus Waters Treaty.
The Project
One of the most prestigious hydro-electric projects coming up in Jammu and Kashmir, Baglihar’s problems run beyond the conflict with Pakistan which though have been sorted out. The 450 MW project conceived long back was contracted out in anticipation of financial closure to two contractors –Jayprakash Industries Limited and Siemens for Civil and Electro Mechanical works respectively in the year 1999. The initial deadline for project completion was set for 60 months –which means project should have been operational by ending December 2004.
Two years have already passed by; project has overrun its estimated cost by several hundred millions of rupees. It is still nowhere near completion. The Construction companied and the government both have announced another deadline of December 2007, but a cursory project assessment suggests that this deadline too is not realistic.
The project was appraised by IDBI led consortium at a cost of Rs.3810 crores, but the financial closure could not be achieved upto the year 2003. Owing to non achievement of financial closure, delay in land acquisition, difficult Geological strata and labour problems the project could not be completed by the due date, says Jammu and Kashmir’s Minister for Power Nawang Rigzin Jora. Meanwhile the expenditure on project in anticipation of the financial closure was met from Bonds of Rs.1054 crores raised from financial market and annual plan outlays of the state.
Another consortium, led by PFC, was approached in the year 2003 for the financial closure of the project and PFC appraised the project at a revised cost of Rs.4000 crores and financial closure was achieved in the year 2004. Revised date of completion of the project was fixed for December 2006. That too could not be achieved.A loan amount of Rs.1131 crores has been lifted so far and an expenditure of Rs.3274 crores excluding financing costs of Bonds of Rs.508 crores have been spent till December 2006 on the project. In July-August 2005, heavy and sustained flood discharge in the River Chenab followed by sudden draw down triggered heavy slides on the up stream sloops of diversion tunnel inlet faces which blocked the diversion tunnels causing the river to over flow the dam blocks and eventually leading to scouring of the right bank on down stream of dam side and damaging the trail track.
Later, after series of deliberations between Jammu and Kashmir State Power Development Corporation, Foreign Consultants Lahmeir International, Contractor and CWC, the strategies to tackle these damages were decided and the new date of completion of the project was determined as December 2007.
The Other Chestnuts
Baglihar is not a case in isolation, there are at least 27 power projects being built or already operational on Indian side which have been objected to by Pakistan. Quite often, Pakistan uses its logic of objections on these projects, under the ambit of Indus Water Treaty, to halt progress on Kashmir issue resolution.Pressing with its objects hard and linking up with the political issues, Pakistan has already made India suffer tremendously. Over two decades back, Pakistan made serious objections over the 480 MW Salal projects, on river Chenab in Jammu province. Pakistan contended that storage of water in dams on this project could dry the rivers and canals downstream and can also later be used for flooding of the lower riparian states. India budged to the pressure and made design change in the dam. The project now faces siltage.
Actually a flood retardation scheme, Tulbul Navigation Project too has been under severe resentment from Pakistan. This project is actually about retaining water of the river Jhelum, as a natural rise, and then releasing it after October in a regulated manner. This is used for impounding water from Uri hydro-electric project and for navigational purposes. But Pakistan insists that it is a dam –which actually is not. Following objections from Pakistan laced with too much of politics, construction on the project had to be stopped in 1987. No significant development after that.
Another serious bone of contention between India and Pakistan is the Kishanganga project –a tributary based project on river Jhelum.
The Kishanganga project has to dam the Kishanganga (Neelum) River. The proposed 103-metre high reservoir could submerge almost the entire Gurez valley. From this reservoir, water will flow through a channel and a 27-kilometre tunnel dug south through the North Kashmir mountain range. The channel will change the course of Neelum River by around 100 kilometres, which will finally join the Wullar Lake and Jhelum River near the northern township of Bandipur. Presently, the Neelam and Jhelum rivers join each other at Muzaffarabad (in Pakistan administered Kashmir) at a point called Domail. Through the proposed Wullar barrage project, India plans to maintain constant yearly flow in Jhelum. Pakistan has serious objections on this project. As a consequence of this 100- kilometre diversion of the Neelum River, Pakistan's Neelum Valley could dry up and become a desert.
India has made a significant headway on resolving dispute over Kishanganga project but Pakistan is yet to agree to the proposed design change. In a bid to end a long-standing dispute over the Kishanganga project, India has now proposed to Pakistan modifications in the 330 mw hydro-electric power plant to convert it into a run-of-the-river project instead of generating electricity from water stored in a dam.
The decision was taken by the Union Cabinet on April 18, 2006, to convert the project into a run-of-the-river scheme comes in the wake of Pakistan`s objection of storage of 220 million cubic metres of Indus River water in a reservoir and produce power.
This has been done to end objections raised by Pakistan that India could not store water (under annexure E of the Indus Water Treaty). Now the project is sought to be covered under Annexure D of the treaty. While New Delhi continues to contend that it has the right to construct reservoirs on tributaries of Indus and has not violated the treaty, the cabinet decision was actually aimed at ending the dispute over the project, which was originally proposed in 1994.
The author is Editor-in-Chief, Epilogue, monthly magazine and news portal www.epilogue.in on Jammu and Kashmir. He can be reached at [email protected]
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