Kosovo Since 1999
By Am Johal
02 March, 2006
Countercurrents.org1. What would you describe as the major themes in Kosovo since 1999?
After the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the withdrawal of Serbia paramilitary and military troops, the main big issue was establishing a temporary peace framework basis that would lead to long-term stabilization prospects. The establishment of UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) through the 1244 UNSC resolution was the social and political answer of the international community to meet the after-war challenges whereas peace and security was meant to be preserved by KFOR (Kosovo Force). Demilitarization of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) and its transformation into a civilian organization and it also its involvement of its political wing in Kosovo politics is another segment that arose from the outcome of post-99 constellation. The detachment from Belgrade politics imposed the need of establishing interim administrative institutions that would organize the political, economical and social spheres of life in Kosovo together with the International Community until the resolution of the status of Kosovo. The establishment of the provisional governmental institutions through fair and democratic elections in 2001 marked the beginning of a new political era in Kosovo. However, social discontent, economical backwardness and political instability has caused from time to time tensions which have managed to be used by radicals to attain an ethnical dimension. Above all, the issue on the final status of Kosovo significantly has reflected the post-99 political life in Kosovo.
2. How is the Serb minority in Kosovo being treated today? What is the Kosovar view of the leadership in Belgrade?
In the institutional governance practice, minority rights have taken a very specific part and it is the matter of specific ethnic groups that these rights haven't been collectively attained and exercised within their communities. The interim constitutional framework has positively discriminated all the minorities, whereas they received extra seats in the Kosovo assembly as well. However, the events of the 17 march of 2004, inflicted mainly by the social discontent and the status-quo have shadowed some of the positive developments in this respect. I must also say that the Serb minority throughout the time was instrumentalized (used as a tool) and used by Belgrade for the latter to hinder the efforts of the international community and the provisional governmental institutions of Kosovo to provide for a functional multi-ethnical society and in this way to "prove the inability of the later to achieve it". The boycott and non-participation in the assembly of Kosovo is one the barriers for the Serb community in Kosovo to have had the voice being heard so far. Anyway, in the sense of the ethnical political composition of the assembly it would have been rather hard for them to have had the cooperation approach from the big parties, however at least their concerns and demands would have taken the legitimate path. The leadership in Belgrade was of course seen as an obstacle to arrange for a multi-ethnical society in Kosovo, just for the reason I have made above. However, in the internal and external political and economical matters there was no cohesion whatsoever of Prishtina and Belgrade in the post 99.
3. What is current relationship between Kosovo and the international community?
The international community has been of a major incentive to the overall late developments in Kosovo. It has provided for security, humanitarian, economical, technical, capacity building assistance to the Kosovo people and Kosovo institutions. In this context, I would say that the Kosovars and the Kosovo institutions praise the good cooperation they have with the International Community. However, there have been from time to time critiques addressed especially to UNMIK from the Kosovo politicians to attain more responsibilities as only in that way they would confirm to the world that they are able to govern themselves and for all the people of Kosovo.
4. How would you describe the political leadership in Kosovo today? Has the Kosovo Liberation Army successfully moved into the political mainstream and renounced violence?
I think the political scene in Kosovo has been well established and it has provided for some elements of seriousness and moderate running of the political life in Kosovo, especially if we take into account the problems Kosovo faced after 1999. Though, the political scene is constructed mainly out of the peaceful resistance movement of the 90-ies and the former KLA mainstream, the background policy orientation doesn't differ as much, also taking the specific political climate in Kosovo, where we have a twofold chain of responsibility conductance, with UNMIK and the local governmental institutions. However, this twofold chain of responsibilities had enabled more space for deference of what they should in reality were supposed to do. Therefore still one can recognize that the political leadership lacks on quality, persistence to terminate successfully their obligations towards the citizens of Kosovo and also from time to time it is overshadowed by corruption and illicit uses of power. Nevertheless, taking the very short existence of the political scene being run in somewhat peaceful and more democratic circumstances then before, I judge that it has been functional and provided for solid results, although there is an immediate need for inner party reformation. The former KLA has managed to produce the transformation of both of its wings quite successfully. After the transformation of the KLA, the political wing did pursue the chance to get involved in the political life in Kosovo, and now it is represented by the PDK of former KLA leader, Hashim Thaci and AAK of the former KLA commander, Ramush Haradinaj. The two aforementioned parties and the major party of the late president of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, LDK, were cohabiting within the same governing coalition in the last term, whereas this term it's a power share between the LDK and AAK. I think they tent to be very moderate and violence is not their agenda to propel politically and this also if we take into account the "command and control" method of the international community.
5. What do you view as the implications of upcoming decision on Kosovo?
Well, the negotiation talks started just last week in Vienna, under mediation of the UN envoy Marti Ahtisari, and it is generally assumed that they will end by the end of 2006. However, in the late diplomatic encounters that dealt with the future status of Kosovo, presumably it is considered that Kosovo will attain "conditional" independence, meaning that some sovereignty will be "owned" by the international community that will oversee the protection of the minorities, especially of the Serb minority in Kosovo. The position of the Kosovar delegation is that it accepts nothing less then independence, though with some guarantees that the "conditional" independence in a certain short time period will resolve in what they are aiming at, it will accept it. Belgrade stand-point is very vague in front of what is brought forward in the latest meetings and opinions on the future status of Kosovo. But, I believe that just as in Bosnia, the stick and carrot will do the job for Serbia again.
6. What are the stakes if Kosovo doesn't achieve independence?
In this worst case scenario for the Kosovars, I think there is much at stake. There is great fear that extreme voices in Kosovo can gain political ground and make their platforms approachable and popular for the citizens of Kosovo whereas this can have a regional effect as well, especially in Macedonia; the relationship with the International Community can receive a blow, endangering here all the positive development achieved jointly and also creation of antagonist views towards the International Community, and also the further friction between the communities in Kosovo, especially the Albanian majority and the Serb minority. However, I don't believe that whatever other solution would resolve more stability and would be seen as more pragmatic then the conditional independence with short-term prospect for full independence.
7. How do you view Kosovo's relationship to Albania and Macedonia in the coming years?
Of course, there are fears of greater Albania, but it's not the real picture that one can withdraw from the situation. The "hardliners" or those who promote the idea of the great Albania, are not the ruling political party mainstream in neither of the three places, and they represent a very small minority. The political mainstream, especially in Kosovo and the Albanian political parties, was subject to international pressure on not using nationalistic agenda and pursue illegitimate means to advance politically. The standpoint of Macedonia on the issue of Kosovo has been pragmatic during the last seven years. Having been traditionally "aligned" with Serbia's position, recently they "have taken the coat and they started wearing it on the other side". Macedonian officials now say that it will accept whatever solution on Kosovo that Prishtina and Belgrade agree upon. The latter view signals that Macedonia is starting to approach Kosovo realistically.
Kosovo politicians view Macedonia and Albania as two good neighbors with whom they want to generate friendly and serious cooperation, and I think the prospects of regional cooperation and EU integrative processes will promote the kind of relationship that would prevent any sort of tensions between Kosovo and the other countries of the region.
