Guerrillas Hold Ace In Post-War Iraq
By Paul Buchanan
New Zealand Herald
28 June, 2003
Observing post-conquest Iraq, we should remember Mao's maxim that the population is the sea in which the guerrilla fish swim. Drained of sustenance, this sea becomes inhospitable to the schools of irregular combatants whose grievances, personal and political, unite them in violent cause.Without popular support, a militarily weak actor cannot defeat a stronger one. The odds change when insurgents have more sympathy among the population than their adversary.
Unconventional fighters blend with those not committed to arms, blurring the target for troops sent to quell rebellion. This invites sucker ploys whereby occupation forces are provoked into using lethal force against a population already disposed to resent them.
The disappearance of Saddam Hussein's most loyal followers in front of the American assault seems less to do with cowardice, bribery or resignation, and more likely a tactical retreat into guerrilla warfare.
Looting of national wealth after the fall of Baghdad was initially well-organized. Those who knew the score prepared accordingly, others followed, and the diversion allowed armed cadres to escape.
The strategy also gave them post-conquest leverage. Using "gray" networks between security agencies in the region, the organized thieves can cash in on the black market to fund the insurgent campaign, or hold stolen cultural treasure for political ransom once the occupier has withdrawn.
Coalition planners anticipated a military retreat but reckoned it would be towards strongholds where last-ditch stands would be made. Instead, Saddam's fedayeen and Special Republican Guards dispersed and regrouped while American forces were preoccupied with looting and other post-war peacekeeping preambles, and are now beginning a protracted struggle that is marshaled into three stages.
The first phase is the strategic defensive. It is a situation of cover and retrenchment, developing guerrilla cadres and stockpiling arms while engaging in sporadic, seemingly uncoordinated hit-and-run attacks on the opponent's conventional forces, command centers and infrastructure.
In the case of Saddam's loyalists, they not only had ample time to prepare for such a war but may have the deposed leader and some of his close advisers to lead the campaign, plus Arab solidarity fighters to bolster their ranks.
Strategic defensive approaches exploit military "asymmetry" to the advantage of the weaker actor by capitalizing on lack of popular support for occupation. Even if liberated from tyranny, people may resent cultural differences, disrespect, ignorance, or arrogance on the part of those who ostensibly freed them.
They may want to return to the daily routine but find their movements impeded by foreign troops. Unlike the deposed tyrant, these oppressors are close, strange-looking and odd-sounding, even to those who do not attempt to usurp their authority.
In such an environment, guerrillas find sustenance even as the lesser of evils, especially if they are on home soil, share ethnic or kindred ties, are prepared to fight, and are patient.
The best way to counter this is to fight unconventionally as well, using inducements for co-operation more than coercion. Special forces like the SAS are trained to that end. American and British special forces are specifically tasked with working with local sympathizers to win the hearts and minds of the population (or at least that of their leaders).
They were used to good effect against the Taleban, and were helpful in softening the loyalties of some Ba'ath Party and military commanders before the assault on Baghdad. But they have a secondary role in occupied Iraq.
The United States response to the emerging insurgency mixes armored presence with reactive deployment of infantry, airborne and air cavalry complements. This is reasonable on the face of it, since only large numbers of troops on the ground can effectively maintain an occupation. But in size there is a target-rich environment, to which can be added the burdens of relatively inflexible response to small-group tactics in a blurred context of popular hostility.
Thus, although formidable, these assets are ill-suited for the type of low-intensity conflict proposed by the fedayeen.
Intelligence gathering is a crucial part of the guerrillas' game, since local knowledge proves decisive in the timing and targeting of irregular strikes, avoidance of capture or destruction. US forces are at a disadvantage despite their technological superiority in eavesdropping, since they have few Arab linguists and specialized intelligence agents working on the ground without detection.
Real-time intelligence reporting is skewed in favor of the Iraqi guerrillas, since coercive interrogation results and volunteered information from the citizenry may not be reliable. Counter-insurgency operations are often conducted partly blind to the context, which increases the possibility of loss or counter-productive results.
Fighting unconventional forces with conventional force is a losing proposition unless decisive at the onset, because time is on the side of the former. The thrust of guerrilla strategy is to not stand up and fight. Instead, it confuses civilian grievance with armed demands about the future disposition of political control, making any status quo short of foreign domination more acceptable to the local population.
Without a viable exit strategy to counter that, the specter of mission-creep from liberation to occupation to counter-insurgency spells career-threatening trouble for US commanders, especially those who did participate in "shock and awe".
For US political authorities, the evolution of the mission away from large-scale offensive operations poses career hazards as well, at the ballot box.
The irregular conflict in Iraq displays hybrid characteristics. Because of the lack of physical cover, it combines elements of rural insurgency (dispersal, fluidity of movement) with those of urban insurgency (close-quarter attacks in villages and towns as well as Baghdad neighborhoods). It responds to a larger plan of strategic centralization and tactical decentralization, where guerrilla cadres, already briefed on the second phase of the war and operating from cached havens, engage in autonomous, independent raids responding to local conditions and opportunities.
This two-pronged approach is designed to keep US forces on the defensive, on guard and trigger-happy. It prevents the US from concentrating troops in a specific area, which spreads them thin and forces their constant redeployment to counter threats.
The guerrillas are thereby able to pin down a far larger number of opposing forces, increasing the logistical problems of the latter. It also prevents the process of reconstruction from moving forward at pace because infrastructure can be damaged in those areas where coalition forces are otherwise occupied. Political control then becomes contested.
With success in the first phase, guerrilla wars have two subsequent stages - the strategic stalemate and strategic (counter) offensive. The strategic stalemate combines irregular tactics with conventional assaults designed to seize occupied territory. The strategic (counter) offensive expands to large-scale conventional offence to secure political control.
The vulnerabilities in this plan are in the transition between phases. If that they ratchet up military maneuver and change tactics, guerrillas expose themselves, so operational doctrine cautions patience and certainty. The preferred option is to see the occupying force withdraw for political reasons as a result of the first two stages, thereby easing the way for the final assault. The fall of Saigon followed this pattern.
Without decisive victory in the months ahead, confronted by other domestic and international problems, the Bush Administration enters an election year hung with an albatross of a war that was started under dubious pretences and which shows signs of grim familiarity for those who remember the debacles of Indo-China.
It may not be the same, but it certainly seems Déjà vu.
Paul Buchanan lectures on international affairs at Auckland University.
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