Iraq
Is Not In Civil War (Yet) -
Iraq Is Under Occupation
By Laith Al-Sud
01 April, 2006
Counterpunch
The
inability to talk about Iraq in an appropriate context has been one
of the greatest setbacks to the anti-war movement here in the United
States of America, and to describe Iraq solely in terms of being in
civil war contributes to this problem. Iraq is under occupation and
the current rivalry between what are indeed Iraqi factions has to be
interpreted within this context. The possibility of civil war in Iraq
is not the result of mismanagement on the part of the Bush administration
or some inherent hostility in Iraqi society; civil war, rather, is and
has always been the favored alternative should the United States fail
to dominate Iraq politically. The pirates of both the Right and Left
side of the establishment agreed before hand that if they could not
steer the ship they would sink it.
As early as 2002 prominent
Americans made civil war part and parcel of the ideology leading up
to war in 2003. As the Bush administration prepared for war, figures
like the Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke, both former members of the Clinton administration, helped
establish "acceptable" possibilities for the war's outcome.
Both Albright and Holbrooke belabored the point that Iraq is an "artificial"
country, a product of British colonialism, and as soon as Saddam Hussein
was toppled, the US would face the sectarianism and racism supposedly
inherent in Iraq's composition (it must be noted that the assertion
of Iraq's artificiality is simplistic). Implicit and at times explicit
in Albright and Holbrooke's analysis is that when all was said and done
Iraq should be broken up into three parts. After the British (and French)
plan to divide the Muslim world into small dependent states after World
War One was going to be adjusted by the US's plan to divide Iraq into
even smaller and more dependent oil rich states, similar to the Gulf
states, an irony apparently lost on all. Or was it?
As soon it was clear that
the Bush administration was going to invade Iraq back in 2002, the voices
of the mainstream Left were busy insuring that the option to break up
Iraq was firmly embedded in American discourse rabout the war. The implication
that Iraq is an artificial country established the possibility that
it could be broken up if things were not to go as planned, i.e. if the
country could not be dominated easily. The breaking up of Iraq is useful
in several important ways: First, it is easier to dominate the oil of
smaller weaker states than larger ones and, secondly, Iraq has always
posed the greatest threat to Israel. The breaking up of Iraq would facilitate
many of the long-term visions of Israel, not to mention the most important
one, which is of course shared with the United States-the effort to
definitively eradicate the residues of Arab nationalism and put to an
end the emergence of Islamism.
Whatever the reader may think
of these two overlapping political trends, they share a common aspiration
for Arab independence from Western neo-imperialism and Iraq is the most
important Arab-Muslim country in this regard. Baghdad was seen, indeed
up to the war, as one of the cultural capitals of the Arab world, a
perennial home to Arab nationalism and an open minded Islamism. Whereas
the American Left was citing Iraq's diversity as a point of weakness,
it has traditionally been a matter of strength. Iraq is the only country
in the Muslim world that can speak to Sunnis and Shiites, Arabs and
non-Arabs alike. Whereas Saudi Arabia and Iran have produced little
more than sectarian ideologues, Iraq has always harbored a greater mosaic
of intellectuals. It is true of course that Saddam Hussein suppressed
intellectual freedom, but the predictable dictatorship of Saddam has
now been replaced by the capricious tyranny of mysterious government-backed
death squads and corrupt, US-backed, ministers. Imprinted on the rubble
of a ruined Iraq are the footprints of her intellectuals fleeing the
country-a brain drain of enormous magnitude. It is no accident that
one of the main targets of the death squads has been Iraq's professional
class, including scientists and professors. Iraq is not yet in civil
war; the violence we currently see in the country is, rather, an indication
that the option to destroy Iraq is constantly being cultivated for activation.
With the dismemberment of
Iraq's bureaucratic, economic and security infrastructures, the practical
experience of Iraqi civil society has been rendered inaccessible and
by extensions is brusquely being removed from civil consciousness. With
the infrastructures of Iraq absent, what once held up a sense of civic
society is now being replaced with of a sectarian nature. The average
Iraqi is no sectarian. What we have rather is the importation of sectarianism
along with ex-patriots, many of whom had not been in the country for
thirty years. Politicians such as Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, Ibrahim al-Jafaari
or even the secularist Ahmed Chalabi had little to do with Iraq when
they came in with the Americans, without possession of any practical
representative power they all took recourse in the realm of abstract
sectarianism.
As Mike Whitney has recently
pointed out in an excellent piece in Counterunch the discussion of civil
war in Iraq has been a "self-fulfilling prophecy." The American
backed members of the current Iraqi government have played a vital role
in this self-fulfillment. By continually emphasizing sect and ethnicity
these politicians have compensated for their lack of political experience
and, furthermore, sought to substantiate the political parties to which
they belong. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
had been operating outside of the country for decades. The longer it
remained in Iran, the more it ascended towards abstract sectarian ideological
polemic and the further away from the more complex reality of Iraq.
As we can see Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, the current leader of SCIRI, is one
of the most divisive figures in the country. Hizb'Dawa is a more complicated
case, begun in Iraq with the guidance of the great philosopher and theologian
Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr (an uncle to Muqtada as-Sadr), this party has
always been more inclusive of various legal schools; although largely
Shi'ite in composition, the Dawa party has boasted Kurdish and Sunni
members as well, including members who fought the Americans in Falluja.
The current split in the Dawa party can be traced along the historical
path of its members, the lower-level activists who remained and operated
in Iraq against Saddam Hussein continue to be staunchly opposed to the
US occupation and sectarianism. The higher levels of the party, personified
by figures like al-Jafaari (who fled to Iran), simply became more disconnected
from actual Iraqi society. Having little actual political resonance,
al-Jafaari, like al-Hakim, relies on sectarianism to carry forth his
supposed ability to represent a large segment of Iraqi society.
This dynamic is replicated
by the fighters coming in from across the Muslims world who relate to
the conflict in more purely ideological terms rather than the simple
instinct to defend one's land from foreign invasion, an instinct readily
evident amidst both Sunnis and Shiites of Iraq. The mainstream media
has focused on the closed circle of elites, who are linked by an affiliation
with the Americans, atop the current Iraqi government or more fantastic
figures like al-Zarqawi, a figure whose actual influence is highly in
doubt, at the expense of the many nationalistic figures opposed to the
occupation and who represent all facets of Iraqi society.
It is true that personal
attacks of a sectarian type are now beginning to emerge in the country,
however these in no way, at least as yet, represent a large scale social
trend. When we consider the political dynamic just described in conjunction
with the menacing insecurity introduced and perpetuated by the Americans
it is perfectly natural that the ideology of sectarianism will be affective,
and effective, to some extent. This does not mean, however, that it
is inevitable. What we have are two opposing ideological forces currently
in operation, on the one hand a government that depends on sectarianism
for its justification and on the other, non-Iraqi fighters who make
up only 2 to 5 per cent of the armed opposition anyway. In the middle
is actual Iraq personified by figures like al-Khalassi, as-Sadr, al-Dhari
and al-Kubaysi, all of whom command far greater respect amongst Iraqis,
staunchly defend Iraq's unity and are conveniently ignored by the media.
Opponents of the war must
be sensitive to what it means to say Iraq is in civil war. It means
that Iraqis are an enemy to themselves, not the occupational forces.
Until recently, every time the possibility of civil war in Iraq has
come up it has never been in conjunction with a discussion about an
American withdrawal, but rather as a reason for the Americans to remain.
So long as we describe Iraq in terms of civil war we miss the more fundamental
point that Iraq is under an illegal occupation. The civil war premise
can only elicit two possible political outcomes: First, the premise
asserts that the Iraqis are enemies of one another, thus the US occupation
must continue to keep the peace. This absurd suggestion not only fails
to acknowledge how we arrived at the current level of violence but also
actually absolves the Bush administration of its heinous crime of invading
Iraq in the first place. The occupation is presented as more of a peace
keeping mission that what it actually was, a blatant act of greed and
destruction. The other political outcome is to suggest that Iraq should
ultimately be broken up, an option that has persisted beneath the surface
of American policy and also seeks to satisfy imperial ambitions. Dividing
Iraq into three countries helps eliminate a potentially independent
Arab-Muslim state and, I would argue, the most important such state,
as greater economic independence in the Middle East and North Africa
could actually develop around it.
Iraq is not in civil war;
Iraq is under occupation. Some parties have acquiesced in American dominance
and cooperated with the American authorities in an effort to gain power,
others have not and have violently opposed Iraqis who have. What there
is in Iraq is a political spectrum where at one hand there are those
adamantly opposed to the occupation and at the other those who support
it, a tension that becomes more entrenched the longer troops remain.
With the increased emphasis on a "civil war" in Iraq the narrative
is taking a momentous turn and casting a shadow on the continued presence
of hundreds of thousands of occupying troops; meanwhile casting greater
light on the supposed tensions within Iraqi society. Equally shaded
by the new narrative of civil war are the ideologues and politicians,
lifted to power by the US, who have been imposing a sectarian framework
on the country from above since the beginning. The dichotomy between
continued occupation and civil war leaves the anti-war movement speechless
as neither alternative is desirable. It must be remembered, however,
that this dichotomy is as much a fiction as the many others that have
sought to justify the American occupation. It must be remembered that
the root of current developments in Iraq is the illegal invasion and
occupation of the country; the occupation must be eradicated if one
sincerely hopes to keep the peace in Iraq.
Laith Al-Saud is a college
lecturer in the social sciences.