Ripples In The
Middle East?
By Mahir Ali
08 March, 2005
Znet
It
is not hard to discern the equivalent of a spring in the step in the
recent output of the commentators and analysts who either supported
the American aggression against Iraq, or criticized it desultorily only
after they saw it developing into a what looked like an unmitigated
disaster. Through the nearly two years of bomb blasts and bloodshed,
many of them kept their eyes trained on the unrelieved gloom of the
clouds overhead. Their motivated patience has lately been rewarded:
they have espied a silver lining.
Many of them were
never quite convinced by the argument (even while offering it themselves)
that the removal of Saddam Husseins regime - which was undeniably
brutal but possessed no weapons of mass destruction, had no links with
Osama bin Ladens outfit, and posed no military threat even to
its neighbours let alone to any Western power - was sufficient justification
for a war that claimed casualties in the hundreds of thousands and destroyed
what remained of Iraqs infrastructure. The war of attrition that
followed the invasion, the indiscriminate assaults on population centres
such as Najaf and Fallujah, the sordid tales of what went on at Abu
Ghraib and so many other detention centres, inclined some of them towards
questioning their own enthusiasm for the new centurys first major
conflict.
Lately, however,
a seemingly propitious set of circumstances has persuaded them to renew
their faith in the foresight of the neo-conservatives who accompanied
George W. Bush into power in 2001, and whose influence in Washington
has grown with the advent of his second administration. After all, didnt
these neo-cons claim that all they wanted was to spread democracy (never
mind the fact that the in the documents they produced, they seldom bothered
to disguise their hegemonistic intent)? And arent there signs
that a wave of democracy is about to crash through the Middle East,
from Saudi Arabia to Egypt and beyond, taking its cue from the elections
in Iraq?
So, even if the
attack on Iraq violated international law and the elaborate excuses
offered for it were largely fictitious, hasnt some good come of
it after all?
Well, there can
be little question that the Middle East could do with a lot more democracy
- provided the dispensation translates into high levels of popular participation
and representation, rather than ersatz electoral exercises designed
to replace one set of oligarchs with another, chiefly on the basis that
the latter are expected to be more sensitive to Washingtons whims.
One doesnt
have to be embedded in a conservative American think tank to recognize
that the region is awash with mediocre despots, and that large numbers
of Arabs are hungry for change. Almost none of them, however, would
be willing to countenance a fraction of the price paid by Iraqis for
the privilege of regime change. Besides, the fate of Iraq isnt
the only reason for being wary of US motives and designs. Even a perfunctory
glance at 20th-century Middle Eastern history serves as a reminder that
some of the least defensible Arab regimes have owed their longevity,
if not their very existence, to crutches made in the USA.
Let bygones be bygones,
argue some of the apologists; Washingtons record in the region
is indeed murky, but now behold the new, improved United States, the
harbinger of democracy and liberal virtues.
Even if this illusion
had some basis in fact, there would be cause to question the American
method of exporting these ideals. But the fact is that liberal values
are under attack in the US itself - a phenomenon witnessed under every
recent Republican administration, although this time around it has adopted
a more virulent form than during the Nixon or Reagan years. And democracy
has suffered setbacks across many of the nations involved in the assault
on Iraq, where governments either symbolically or more substantially
contributed to the neo-con project in the face of overwhelming popular
disapproval.
Whats more,
double standards are still rife in the Middle East. Theres Israel,
of course - a systematic violator of human rights that ignores UN resolutions
with impunity, sanctions terrorist attacks on foreign soil and almost
certainly harbours arsenals of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons,
yet rarely attracts anything other than love letters (and unlimited
largesse) from Washington. But even if Israel is left out of the equation,
it would be impossible to claim with an iota of credibility that the
US is even-handed in its regional approach. To take but one instance,
Iran and Syria have been branded outposts of tyranny. However, even
those inclined to accept that description, perhaps with a quibble here
and a tiny reservation there, are left wondering why the most repressive
and regressive state in the region is conspicuously spared such epithets,
while a paltry degree of participation in virtually meaningless Saudi
municipal polls is hailed as a symbolically significant concession.
This isnt
the only strand of hypocrisy. And there is particular cause for alarm
when it finds expression unwittingly. When George W. Bush declared last
week, I dont think you can have fair elections [in Lebanon]
with Syrian troops there, what are the chances that he paused
even momentarily to wonder why that should be so, given that in his
view its clearly possible to hold fair, free and groundbreaking
elections in Iraq amid a vastly larger US military presence?
But then, perhaps
thats an unfair question. If Bush were capable of sorting such
matters out in his head, chances are he wouldnt have revelled
in his role as chief recruitment officer for all manner of Islamists
terrorists. It is nonetheless somewhat strange to hear the strongest
demands for Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon coming from the only two
countries with occupation forces on Arab lands: the US and Israel.
However, notwithstanding
this shameless display of pharisaism, conditions within Lebanon appear
to suggest that if a Syrian military role in that country was ever necessary
or desirable, that is no longer the case. Locally, the movement for
a withdrawal gained momentum following the unfortunate assassination
of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri in Beirut on February
14th. The US and Israel immediately pointed their fingers at Damascus,
and large numbers of Lebanese appeared to concur, despite the absence
of any evidence implicating Syria in the crime.
Although Hariri
resigned as head of government last October in protest against Syrian
interference and may have been instrumental in instigating the much-cited
UN Security Council resolution calling for a withdrawal (albeit without
naming Syria), he wasnt on exceptionally bad terms with the government
of Bashar Al Assad. At the same time, it is hard to believe anyone in
Damascus could have been in any doubt about what such a spectacular
hit on the streets of Beirut would portend for Syria.
It is not inconceivable,
of course, that some wing of Syrian military intelligence hatched the
plot without referring it to the government - and, if so, it has done
its nation a monumental disservice. But there are other suspects who
may have had a clearer motive not so much for targeting Hariri in particular,
but for sparking unrest in Lebanon and, perhaps, destabilising Syria.
It has been suggested that Iraqi insurgents may have hoped to widen
the war by embroiling Syria. Again, thats not impossible, but
it seems a bit far-fetched; besides, the operation required a sophistication
of which such perpetrators are unlikely to be capable. It is equally
unlikely that any US agency would risk direct involvement in such a
deed. Israel, on the other hand, had even more to gain than the US from
an event that would inexorably increase pressure on its Syrian foe,
and in the longer term may even lead to a loss of sponsorship for the
Hizbollah militia - the only Arab force to have inflicted defeat on
the Israeli army. And Mossad has considerable experience in targeted
assassinations.
But that doesnt
add up to proof of culpability: its only speculation, and it must
be hoped that an independent international investigation will nail the
culprits.
Despite having presided
over a deeply flawed administration, Hariri is associated in the popular
view with Lebanons reconstruction, however lopsided, following
the dastardly 1975-90 civil war. His death, it is said, could lead to
a more profound Lebanese rebirth. Last week the protests in Beirut forced
the resignation of Omar Karamis pro-Syrian government. At the
weekend, Assad announced the pullback of Syrias 14,000 troops;
although the US State Department reacted with characteristic impetuosity,
almost everyone else heaved a sigh of relief.
Assad has invariably
gone out of his way to placate American concerns, while at the same
time trying not to antagonize the so-called hardliners in his government,
whose mindset probably harks back to the days of a more radical Syria.
Like almost every other Arab state, the country cries out for reform
and rejuvenation. But the consequences of external coercion could prove
unpalatable for everyone. The impetus for change must come from within,
and Syrians alone must decide the shape it takes.
That holds true
also for all other countries in the region, from Iran to Sudan. And
although it must be hoped that democratisation will gather momentum,
on present evidence - a passing nod to pluralism from Hosni Mubarak,
limited franchise local polls in Saudi Arabia, minor concessions in
other Gulf states, the inconclusive cedar revolution in
Lebanon - the region is experiencing ripples of change rather than a
tsunami. One could argue endlessly over the precise correlation between
each ripple and developments in Baghdad, but even the wholesale relegation
of despotism within the next few years wouldnt add up to post
hoc justification of Iraqs devastation. Nothing can change the
fact that the war was a criminal act. And wishful thinking alone cannot
transform a silver lining into a rainbow.