Tribunals, Trials And Tribulations
In Lebanon?By Laurie King-Irani
01 June, 2007
Electronic LebanonFinally, an international tribunal will be tasked with investigating and prosecuting murder and mayhem in an Arab country. For human rights activists who have railed against continuing impunity for grave crimes in the Middle East, whether committed by Israelis or Arabs, whether orchestrated by states or non-state actors, this should be an occasion for unalloyed celebration, or at least relief. After all, mass murderers such as Ariel Sharon and Saddam Hussein escaped international justice for their crimes, the former avoiding prosecution in Belgium under that country's now-rescinded universal jurisdiction law, the latter being tried in an improvised court devoid of any international oversight that might have revealed past American support for Hussein back in the late 1989s, when he was gassing Kurdish villages with chemical weapons he probably obtained from the United States. The court that tried Saddam Hussein and other architects of the vicious crimes synonymous with his twisted regime was not so much a judicial chamber as it was an anteroom to the gallows. Not that Saddam didn't deserve the maximum punishment for his extensive and brutal crimes, but his trial made a mockery of criminal prosecution for human rights violations, and was less a matter of setting precedents than settling scores.
So now international justice has come to Lebanon, the venue of a long and devastating civil war, numerous massacres, 17,000 people disappeared and still missing, and assassinations of leaders from every sectarian community. The application of international humanitarian law (IHL) in this fractured and tormented country is certainly long overdue, and although the tribunal will not deal with any of the bulging files of the civil war years, imperfect justice may be better than no justice at all, especially in a country whose parliament, in its very first act after the end of the civil war, passed a general amnesty law granting immunity from prosecution to all the country's war lords, many of whom had become parliamentarians and ministers in the post-war government. Accountability has been "disappeared" in Lebanon for decades. Impunity has triumphed for too long.
The UN-mandated tribunal for Lebanon, however, will examine only the most recent crimes to have afflicted Lebanon: the February 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and nearly two dozen other people, who perished horrifically in a massive car bombing, a heinous act that preliminary investigations have tied to Syria. In addition, the tribunal will also address a slew of subsequent assassinations of former Communist Party head Georges Hawi, respected author Samir Qassir, An-Nahar newspaper's editor Jebran Tueni, and the attempted assassination and subsequent disfigurement of Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) television anchor Mai Shidiac.
The lead up to the pursuit of justice in these crimes has been torturous and dramatic. Soon after Hariri's murder, mass protests in Lebanon galvanized unprecedented and stirring sentiments of national unity, and also gave vent to popular exasperation with the post-war system and Syria's extensive involvement in all dimensions of Lebanese politics and economics. Within a month of Hariri's funeral, the Syrians, considered occupiers by at least half the population and allies by many others, were packing up and moving out.
Meanwhile, back in Washington, DC, Bush administration officials, Middle East "experts" and a wide variety of talking heads from the right, left and center celebrated these developments as proof that a new wave of democracy was sweeping the Middle East -- in other words, as evidence of the success of George W. Bush's efforts at regime change in Iraq. The Hariri assassination took the heat of media attention off of the expanding disaster in Iraq, and put the heat of political pressure on Syria and Hizbullah. For a week or so, it seemed quite possible that regime change would have be reprising in Damascus.
However, what happens in Beirut, unlike Las Vegas, does not stay in Beirut. The intersection of clashing interests, expectations, agenda, and grievances, as well as the long pent-up emotions of the war years, meant that the investigation of Hariri's murder would take on regional and international, as well as local, significance. Many took a jaundiced view of the investigations and finger-pointing at Syria. Loyal Arab Nationalists in particular interpreted the entire aftermath of the assassination and Syria's departure from Lebanon as a US/Israeli plot. Hizbullah consolidated its position in the Lebanese political domain, allying more closely with Syria but nonetheless not allowing itself to be completely absorbed into the Syrian orbit.
Those eager to see occupation of all sorts in Lebanon -- Israeli or Syrian -- finally end and a new era of accountability dawn soon realized that their discourses and views were being translated into a stilted Neo-con dialect of English in the United States. The opposition to Syria soon became known, in the mainstream Western press, as "The Pro-Western Lebanese Government." Hizbullah and the followers of General Michel Aoun, as strange a set of bedfellows Lebanon has seen in many years, had overlapping and mutual interests in opposing the opposition, which most people viewed (often incorrectly) as signaling their unequivocal and automatic support for and reliance on Syria or Iran.
Mass protests and sit-ins in the heart of Beirut, termed intifadat al-istiqlaal (the Independence Uprising) were quickly repackaged under a new brand name -- the "Cedar Revolution" -- in Washington, DC. The departure of the Syrian Army and overlords left the political field wide open for Lebanese and movements long marginalized and politicians long ignored. Given a well-entrenched Lebanese penchant for nurturing external patrons, American, Iranian, and French interests came into increasing contact and conflict in all matters focused on the question "What to do about Lebanon?"
Last summer, the US gave the green light to the Israelis to crush Hizbullah, in hopes that this would remove the main opponent of the putative "Pro-Western Lebanese Government." Oddly, for a President so enamored of newly resurgent democratic and reformist forces in Lebanon, George W. Bush had no qualms about giving the Israeli army and air force a wide berth for bombing entire Beiruti neighborhoods as well as roads, bridges, infrastructure, and villages throughout Lebanon back to the civil war era.
If US and Israel leaders had lain awake nights, in that deluxe political bed they have shared so cozily for decades, devising a plan to strengthen Hizbullah and weaken the Government of Fouad Siniora and Saad Hariri, they could not have done a better job.
Post Syria, post-Hariri, post Summer War of 2006 Lebanon is hanging by a thread. Regional tensions (many of them manufactured) between Sunnis and Shi'is, secular and religious, are now echoing ominously throughout much of Lebanon. Last month's sudden and seemingly inexplicable outbreak of violence, led by a shadowy new Sunni Islamist group comprised of individuals from a number of countries (not all of them Arab) and allegedly aligned with "Al-Qaida," has devastated much of the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp near Tripoli in the North and sent shock waves through the Palestinian refugee community in Lebanon. Political pressure points -- old and new -- are being tweaked and pushed by various parties and interests -- not all of them Lebanese -- and rumors of war, conspiracy, and chaos hang thick in Lebanon's sun-splashed spring air.
Theoretically, the application of IHL to any dimension of the protracted and lethal conflicts that have afflicted Lebanese and Palestinian civilians for generations is to be welcomed. In practice, however, the new tribunal may lead to increased political confrontations, and thus, more human rights violations. This will not necessarily happen, but before building up hopes that the UN-appointed tribunal will calm Lebanon's roiling political waters, restore comity and harmony between the country's 18 distinct ethno-confessional minorities, or lessen tensions between Lebanese and Palestinians or Sunni and Shi'a, we should attend to some worrying and problematic aspects of this unprecedented legal initiative in the Middle East.
1. Applying and enforcing international legal prosecution from above and outside, though arguably necessitated by the current amorphous and fraught political situation in Lebanon, may only weaken the Lebanese body politic and hinder the grassroots campaign against impunity for the myriad other crimes of the past 35 years. Lebanon is in dire need of developing the political will, the moral commitment, and the institutional infrastructure to police their own past. The deficiencies of the Lebanese judiciary will not be ameliorated by the establishment of the new tribunal -- at least not in the short run. Serious and sustained efforts at institution building, genuine public participation, and the deconfessionalization of Lebanon's political system will certainly be challenging and time-consuming, but there are no short cuts to building a real, functioning, democratic polity based on equality and the rule of law after the devastation of a civil war and foreign occupation. Democracy is an "inside job" (which one would think the international community would have figured out by now, given the debacle in Iraq). Justice and the cessation of impunity for humanitarian crimes, on the other hand, is a job that requires both top down pressures from the UN and the international legal system, as well as bottom-up efforts and participation by all Lebanese. The tribunal is not likely to foster such bottom-up efforts, and may well enable Lebanon to remain passively uninvolved in the international humanitarian legal system. Just as Lebanon outsources its manual and physical labor to Syrians, Sri Lankis, and Filipinos, it may now be outsourcing its legal labor, i.e., its responsibility to assess accountability and end impunity, to the Security Council. Lebanon (like all of its neighbors except Jordan) is not a signatory to the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court. Had Lebanon been a signatory, it would not need its very own tribunal, which, in its tailored specificity and external design, is quite open to accusations of interference, meddling, and political ulterior motives, of which there are, alas, plenty.
2. The cynicism and dishonesty of the United States and the United Kingdom in citing UN Charter Chapter 7 as a firm basis for establishing this tribunal is stunning. These are the same Security Council members who perverted Chapter 7 by invading Iraq illegally, setting up an occupation of dubious integrity, strong-arming allies into supporting their folly, and then eviscerating the Geneva Conventions and the Convention on the Prevention of Torture -- key pillars of the post-World War II international humanitarian legal framework. US and UK actions in Iraq, not to mention US, EU, UK and others' neglect of the worsening situation in Palestine and the stubborn refusal of the international community to apply UN resolutions, international law, or human rights conventions to Israeli war criminals are (figuratively speaking) powerful incendiary explosive devices (IEDs) wreaking havoc on the political, psychological, and administrative landscapes of the Arab world. Partial, biased, or limited justice may please some people in Lebanon, France, and Washington, DC, but it is likely to have very deleterious effects on Lebanon and Palestine, who are quite justified in decrying double standards when it comes to the international community's concern for IHL in the Middle East. For instance, the US reaction to the July 2004 International Court of Justice ruling that Israel's Apartheid Wall was a grave violation of the Geneva Conventions was derision.
3. Ironically, Syria, a country with an atrocious human rights record, as well as a long history of exploiting Lebanon's conflicts (and resources) to its own advantage, gets to position itself (or be positioned by others in the region and the West) as an aggrieved victim of Western interference and imperialism. Striking the pose of the defender of the Arab cause is a favorite past-time in Syria. Unfortunately, the historical record shows that Syria has been ever willing and always ready to fight Israel -- on Lebanese soil and with Lebanese and Palestinian cannon fodder and civilian lives by the thousands.
4. Arguments that the tribunal is a violation of Lebanese sovereignty would be much more convincing if Lebanon had any sovereignty as a centralized modern state to begin with. Lebanon is neither a nation nor a state at present, and has not been for a long time. The real issue in Lebanon is not "Who killed Hariri?" but rather, "Who Governs Lebanon?". That cannot be -- must not be -- answered by outsiders or decided by imposed political, legal, or military means.
Cobbling together the moral vision and political will to seek out the killers of Hariri and other victims of assassinations and attempted assassinations over the last two years, as well as ending the impunity for those who orchestrated the Sabra and Shatila massacre, the War of the Mountain, numerous mass killings, rape, and looting; the disappearance of 17,000 people (now all presumed dead), and the devastation of the Lebanese economy would be a better means than a UN sponsored tribunal to rebuild Lebanon's framework of law, order, justice and equality.
The real opposition in Lebanon is the one that has yet to emerge: Opposition to impunity. If the new tribunal turns out to be a midwife to the birth of this long-overdue opposition, this human rights activist and Lebanese citizen will be the first to celebrate. But if it does not, no one who has attended closely to the strange absence of international humanitarian law, and the subsequent suffering of Lebanese Palestinian, Syrian and Israeli civilians, should be surprised.
Laurie King-Irani is a co-founder of Electronic Lebanon. She teaches social anthropology and Middle East Studies in Washington, DC. Her blog is Zinjabeelah.
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