Musharraf’s Resignation: Causes, Significance And Implications
By Taj Hashmi
21 August,
2008
Countercurrents.org
Apparently, there is nothing so unusual about the capitulation of another military dictator in Pakistan, to “the will of the people”. However, unlike the departure of Ayub, Yahya and Zia, Musharraf’s exit was dramatic, significant and most humiliating for himself. As one Pakistani analyst elucidates, “he took this decision not because it was the graceful and generous thing to do but because political necessity dictated it after he lost the support of America and the Army.”
His projecting himself as the antidote to Taliban-al-Qaeda terror, sacking of non-compliant judges, and above all, not having any qualms about violating the Constitution once again (after 1999’s takeover) last year by getting himself “elected” as the President without doffing off the general’s uniform did not rhyme with his dramatic surrender to the civilian authorities. What is unprecedented is the overthrow of the quasi-military ruler (although tamed and contained during the last six months of his tenure) by the concerted efforts of two of his former victims-cum-adversaries – Sharif and Zardari – jailed, persecuted and exiled by the dictator. In short, his antagonizing almost every section of the population – rural-urban, rich-poor, religious-secular – for excessive interventions or for not doing much in eradicating poverty, terrorism and lawlessness became his nemesis.
It is tragic that despite his taking over the country to the detriment of democracy (which never existed in Pakistan), his economic achievements up to early 2007, his reserving thirty percent seats for women in the national and regional assemblies and doing away with the “separate electorate system” that divided the voters on religious grounds, failed to alleviate poverty, contain inflation and create more jobs. His “enlightened moderation” and promised transition to civilian rule remained ever elusive and phony; the military remained preponderant almost at every level of the polity. In view of these contradictions one may cite an analyst who considers him “an enigma”, posing the questions: “Was he a hawk disguised in a liberal cloak, or a moderate and progressive man whose military training had in the past turned him into a trigger-happy leader? Was he really sincere about the progress of this country, or were his policies only targeted at perpetuating his rule?”
One does not have the answers to these questions as one is not sure as to what led to the proposed impeachment process which led to his resignation. It is too early to comment on the “conspiracy theory” propounded by a Western analyst that “fundamentalist military elements - always strong in the ISI - together with fundamentalist opposition members of parliament, forced the prime minister and the rest of the civilian political establishment to make the move.” We can neither buttress the hypothesis that army chief General Kayani “launched a plan to return Pakistan to democracy”.
On the other hand, it is too trite an assumption that Musharraf’s “granting” freedom to the media, except during the short span of the Emergency, led to his ultimate departure. We think Prime Minister Gilani’s success in convincing President Bush about Musharraf’s uselessness as an ally during his last meeting with the President in July was the catalyst. Ambassador Haqqani, an old beneficiary and confidante of Benazir Bhutto, is said to have played a very important role in this regard.
One needs to understand as to why despite Musharraf’s laudable role in accelerating the growth and development engine, empowering women, containing Islamist terror by taking great risks to his own life, he remained so unpopular among the vast majority of his people. Most Pakistanis, excepting businessmen, demanded his resignation and more than 65 percent are now demanding his public trial for his “misdeeds”, especially for fighting “America’s war” against fellow Muslims in Pakistan and Afghanistan, killing hundreds at the Red Mosque in Islamabad, killing Nawab Akbar Bugti in Baluchistan and not being able to save Benazir Bhutto from suicide bombers. There has been some finger-pointing at him, implicating him in the killing of Bhutto.
Finally, he lost credibility by humiliating leaders of the two major political parties – Bhutto’s PPP and Sharif’s Muslim League – and not being able to float a viable alternative to them after the transition to his semi-civilian rule. A military ruler rules with the military; and a civilian ruler needs a strong political party and mass support for sustenance. Musharraf had none. Meanwhile, the spate of suicide bombings in major cities and in and around garrisons resulting in hundreds of civilian and military casualties also alienated the armed forces from him. The withdrawal of the military’s support from Musharraf and his unpopular “war on terror” was the last straw.
Where do we go from here? How is Musharraf’s departure going to impact Pakistan’s role in the “war on terror”, the nature and extent of Islamist terror both within and in the adjoining border regions in Afghanistan, India and Kashmir need to be answered.
As expected, globally analysts, experts and laymen have come up with their appraisals, after-thoughts and even doomsday predictions about Pakistan in general and about its “bound to deteriorate” relations with the US vis-à-vis the long-drawn “war on terror” in particular soon after the not-so-unexpected resignation of Pervez Musharraf . The New York Times in its headlines on August 19th, “In Musharraf’s Wake, US Faces Political Disarray”, has predicted that the ruling coalition in Pakistan, which is “unwilling” to fight the Taliban and ally with the US will be creating problems for the latter.
Since Musharraf’s exit definitely signals changes in Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policies, one is not sure if these changes will be for the better or the country will be further divided on sectarian and ideological lines. Unfortunately, the prognoses are not that promising in regard to controlling rising inflation, bridging the widening gap between the rich and poor, bringing the feuding parties to a peaceful resolution, and most importantly, eliminating Islamist terror, sectarianism and separatism in the near future. The future of US-Pakistan relationship does not seem to be that encouraging either, let alone the prospect for further collaboration in the arena of “war on terror” between the two countries. Both Sharif and Zardari are least enthusiastic about supporting the US in its “war on terror”. There are ominous signs of Pakistan’s renewal of support for insurgents in Indian occupied Kashmir, and possibly in Afghanistan. Unlike Musharraf, the new government is least interested in normalizing relationship with India.
Meanwhile, there have been signs of mutual acrimony, mistrust and rivalry within the Coalition, which is just a marriage of convenience between “Islam-loving”, and pro-Saudi Nawaz Sharif and Asif Zardari, Bhutto’s inexperienced widower, also tainted for corruption. Sharif and Zardari have already publicly disagreed over the restoration of the sacked judges and the next President.
Consequently the combination of disorganized and corrupt political parties, faltering economy and the ever-present terrorists everywhere does not bode well for the country. Accordingly, it does not matter who becomes the next President; Ms Fehmida Mirza, the speaker of the National Assembly, Asif Zardari, his sister Faryal Talpur, or someone else from Baluchistan or the Frontier, stability in Pakistan will depend on the continuation of democracy, accountability and the preponderance of the civil administration. Prime Minister Gilani’s attempt to bring the powerful ISI under civilian control has already been a failure; he managed to keep ISI under civil administration just for a day. If there is any credence in the allegation that the ISI has surreptitious links with the Taliban and al Qaeda – if not for ideological but strategic considerations – Pakistan is not likely to become a haven of peace in the near future.
Nevertheless, since the US has started backing the elected government of Pakistan; and as it has learnt from its Iraq experience that the “war on terror” cannot be won simply by military means, there is likely to be an improvement in the Pak-US relationship, in the long run. As Pakistanis know it quite well from their own experience that it is one thing to use the Islamists for geo-political reasons; it is well-nigh impossible to contain them once they start calling the shots. Since Musharraf’s self-serving opportunism almost destroyed democratic institutions, unwittingly making the Islamists a formidable force to reckon with, his departure, let us hope, will signal a new beginning for democracy, peace and stability in the region. Then again, we must not expect miracles and overnight transformation of the country in the wake of Musharraf’s resignation.
Taj Hashmi is a Professor of Security Studies Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii
