Democracy
In The Line Of Fire
By Hassan N. Gardezi
26 June, 2007
Countercurrents.org
I started
with the biggest domestic challenge: having to steer the ship of the
state out of troubled waters before it sank. ... Things are moving well
now domestically despite external constraints being imposed on me by
the West in its demand for "democracy." - Musharraf
When Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s
memoir, In the Line of Fire appeared last year it was perhaps dismissed
too quickly by progressive readers and commentators as a military ruler's
attempt at self promotion.1 Yet, as Pakistan is about to celebrates
its 60th anniversary, once again under the rule of a military man, it
is worthwhile to revisit his book and try specifically to figure out
who this man is, how he rose to power, how his mind works as a military
politician, and how does his rule link up with previous military regimes
in shaping the kind of political system and the civil society we have
in Pakistan today.
Personal Background
After introducing the reader
to an exciting episode of attempt on his life in the Epilogue, Musharraf
proceeds to describe his early life in the first five chapters of the
book. The picture that emerges is that of a youngster growing up in
Karachi in the environment of a typical well off family belonging to
what sociologist Alavi has described as the educated Muslim "salariat
class"of the subcontinent, a large segment of which migrated from
India to Pakistan at the time of partition to take advantage of opportunities
opened up in the new country, particularly in the state bureaucracy.2
Musharraf’s father was educated at the famous Aligargh Muslim
University and was married to the daughter of a Khan Bahadur, the honorary
title conferred by the colonial government on some prominent and loyal
members of India’s Muslim gentry. So one has to be a bit skeptical
when he reminds his readers that "I was more of a commoner..."
(pp. 79-80).
As a child Musharraf was
sent to the old and well-regarded St. Patrick’s School of Karachi
run by Catholic missionaries and also spent some time in Turkey where
his father was posted as an accountant in the Pakistan Embassy in Ankara.
For college education he was sent to another private institution, the
Forman Christian (FC) College, in Lahore run by American missionaries,
which attracted "anglicized" and "modern" students
according to Musharraf. This college, we are told, is one of the three
in Lahore that "have produced many leaders for Pakistan in various
fields because they keep their students grounded in native culture and
history, quite unlike those boys who went to foreign universities, which
have mostly produced political leaders disconnected from Pakistan’s
culture and history, leaders who have damaged the country not only with
their corruption but also with their alien political and economic philosophies."
(pp. 31-32)
Aside from the rather contentious
logic of the above sentence, it is hard to imagine how much grounding
young Musharraf had in Pakistan’s culture and history as he just
"managed to get through" two years of education at FC College.
All told there is nothing academically noteworthy in Musharraf’s
educational background and he is frank enough to admit that: "If
from all this, you have concluded that I was not intensely focused on
my studies, you would not be far wrong." (P.34)
In 1961, at the age of 18
Musharraf entered the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA). where he did
well as a cadet, particularly in mastering the demanding routines of
physical training. Soon after graduating from the PMA, he saw action
in the 1965 war with India. As a young officer Musarraf proved his mettle
on the front lines and received an award for gallantry. In this war,
he writes, "Pakistan gave India a fright and a bloody nose,"
a common perception among patriotic Pakistanis.
Politician Bashing
Not much is said about the
1971 lost war with India, but in chapter 7 Musharraf for the first time
offers his views on "political developments in Pakistan."
These relate to the secession of East Pakistan for which most of the
blame is laid on the shoulders of "wily Bhutto." Other reasons
mentioned for the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 include, India’s
invasion, " with overt help" of the Soviet Union, lack of
intervention on behalf of Pakistan by the US "our longtime ally,"
and "incompetence" of the ruling generals of the time (Yahya
Khan and his associates). As for Musharraf himself he was all ready
in West Pakistan with his commando company "to seize a bridge about
twenty miles (thirty-two kilometers) inside the enemy territory,"
when to his dismay cease-fire was declared on December 17. (p.54)
Musharraf returns to Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto’s follies in the next chapter. He admits to having
"admired" the man once but changed his mind when told by his
civil servant brother that "Bhutto was no good and would ruin the
country." (p.58) In what appears to be Bhutto-mania in reverse,
Musharraf blames the late prime minister for a long list of wrongdoings.
He sought ‘raw power" by not reverting to the 1956 constitution
(abrogated with the imposition of 1958 martial law) and instead had
a new constitution enacted (1973) which curtailed the authority of the
president to fire the prime minister; he "ravaged" the economy
by "mindless nationalization;" he "destroyed" the
country’s institutions "under his brand of so-called Islamic
socialism;" and he acted like a "despotic dictator" and
was "really a fascist." In addition Bhutto is denounced for
throwing many of his opponents in prison and "being first to appease
the religious right." To conclude, says Musharraf, "Bhutto
was the worst thing that had yet happened to Pakistan," and that
he "did more damage to the country than anyone else, damage from
which we have still not fully recovered." (p.58)
Bhutto’s style of
governance and policy failures as a prime minister have been extensively
critiqued by astute political analysts. Musharraf’s intense dislike
of the man, once a popular politician, has more to do with his obsession
with discrediting civilian political leaders of the country en-block.
Bhutto comes in for special rebuke for putting the army establishment
in its place, although he did refurbish a very much discredited military
very quickly after its1971debacle. Bhutto "is said to have adopted
a mocking, belittling attitude toward his own appointee as army chief,
Gen. Zia ul-Haq," complains Musharraf. (p.60)
Gen. Zia ul-Haq’s
coup of 1977 and his decade long repressive regime is also given some
coverage, but unlike the downright and copious condemnation of Bhutto
not much is said about the far reaching social and political consequences
of Zia dictatorship. A few remarks do occur about his enforcement of
the "terrible" punishment of lashings, his alliance with the
"religious lobby" and banning of "music and entertainment"
from official functions. But little is said about his enduring legacy
of victimization of women and minorities through the ordination of so
called sharia laws and above all his major contribution to the entrenchment
of military’s hegemonic role in the affairs of Pakistani state
and society.
Corruption and Militarization
The militarization of the
state of Pakistan began in eanest when Gen. (later Field Marshall) Ayub
Khan took over in 1958, "as a last bid to save the country,"
from politicians, such as had survived the encroachment of bureaucrats
into high government offices during the first decade of independence.3
The process was interrupted by the events of 1970-71 and election of
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as the prime minister of territorially diminished
Pakistan, but revived again diligently when military rule was reestablished
by Gen. Zia who ousted Bhutto in 1977. Zia proceeded not only to tighten
the military’s grip on state power, it was also under his long
rule that the military made deep inroads into the spheres of national
politics and civil administration, as well as private industry and commerce.
Many serving and retired military officers were inducted into the state
bureaucracy and others appointed heads of public corporations, administrators
of institutions of higher education and board members of private enterprises.
The military establishment also began to enter directly into business
and production on a massive scale.4
Given this heavy influx
of army’s officer crops into the political, administrative and
economic spheres of society, it is no longer realistic to conceive of
Pakistan’s military establishment functioning by norms of conduct
unsullied by pervasive corruptions that every coup maker from Gen. Ayub
Khan to Gen. Pervez Musharraf has attributed to "politicians"and
other civilian functionaries.
Nevertheless, Musharraf
believes that: "The pattern in my country has been repetitive:
elected officials have been vulnerable to corruption and create conditions
that lead to an army takeover, ..." (p.71). While making this observation
he is certainly not speaking from the detached distance of his army
command posts. His own narrative that follows is a chronicle of how
both the military and civilian elite that rule Pakistan interact in
the same social and political milieu. They communicate with each other
officially and unofficially, share their political agendas, compete
for political power, discuss business, socialize at the wedding parties
of their offspring, harbor similar personal grudges and professional
rivalries, and also gossip about each other through their spouses. The
following excerpts indicate how readily the army GHQ becomes the hub
of political activity drawing the civil and military elite together
whenever conditions are ripe for a regime change:
"In 1995 I was promoted
to lieutenant general and posted to Mangla to command the elite strike
corps of the Pakistan Army. As a corps commander I was automatically
part of army’s highest decision-making body - the Corps Commanders’
Conference. I saw then how national personalities from all professions
- including opposition politicians - regularly visited the army chief
to encourage him to oppose the sitting government. I also came to know
of many peoples’ political agendas. Whenever a government was
performing poorly (unfortunately that was the norm in the "democratic"
decade of the 1990s) or was in political trouble, all roads led to the
army GHQ." (p.77)
Again we read on another
page:
"It is not unusual in
Pakistan for the general public and the intelligentsia to approach the
army chief and ask him to save the nation. In all crises, everyone sees
Pakistan’s army as the country’s savior. Whenever governments
have malfunctioned (as has frequently occurred), whenever there has
been a tussle between the president and the prime minister (especially
during the 1990s) all roads lead to the general headquarters of the
army. The army chief was regularly expected to put pressure on the prime
minister to perform - to avoid corruption, nepotism, and sometimes downright
criminality. The army chief was also dragged in to mediate all disputes
between the president and the prime minister." (p. 137)
These are supposedly insider
observations which the author makes in particular reference to what
he calls the "dreadful decade" of "sham democracy,"
the post-Zia interregnum of civilian rule between November 1988 and
October 1999. During this period Benazir Bhutto of the Pakistan Peoples
Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif of the Muslim League (MLN) each served
twice alternately as elected prime minister, and each was ousted twice
by presidential decree or intervention by the army chief without being
able to complete their full terms of office.
Soldiering Into Politics
What Musharraf does not
acknowledge here is that much more was going on behind the scenes during
this period besides the regular visits to the army GHQ by national personalities
and opposition politicians. The military high command, greatly enhanced
in its political and economic clout, was itself keeping the situation
under close watch while constantly interfering with the post-Zia democratic
transition in order to make sure that no elected government, not the
least one led by Bhutto’s PPP, will emerge strong enough to challenge
the military’s newfound sphere of power and privilege or undo
its policies put in place for internal governance and external relations.
Not only sitting governments were being deposed, the army’s most
insidious intelligence service known as ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence)
was actively manipulating election outcomes, engineering alliances among
political factions and supporting individual candidates acceptable to
the army GHQ.
General Zia’s unmitigated
military rule had left the 1973 parliamentary constitution deformed
beyond recognition through numerous amendments, especially the 8th one
which gave the president power to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve
the parliament. The army had been thoroughly politicized and its defacto
power over the affairs of the state vastly increased. In Musharraf’s
own words:
"During these eleven
years, every army chief - there were four of them - eventually clashed
with the prime minister. The head of the government invariably got on
the wrong side of the president and the army chief. Advice to Nawaz
Sharif and Benazir Bhutto fell on deaf ears, leading every time to confrontation."
(p. 78)
In other words by 1990s
the chiefs of Pakistan army had become accustomed to counseling the
elected prime ministers and requiring compliance to their advice, resistance
to which brought confrontations. Although this mode of intervention
by the army chief in the governance of the country is not sanctioned
by the constitution, even after all the amendments introduced into it
since 1977, it did put the elected prime ministers on the defensive
and drove them to function under constant fear of imminent reversion
to military rule.
When Nawaz Sharif was elected
prime minister for the second time in 1997 he had, in Musharraf’s
words, "a brute two-thirds majority in the National Assembly."
(p.162) He first used this majority to rescind Gen. Zia’s 8th
amendment to the constitution which had given the president power to
dismiss the prime minister and dissolve the parliament. In Musharraf’s
view this was a bad move because it " removed the safety valve
that could get rid of corrupt and inapt governments without the intervention
of the army." (p. 85) Secondly, Nawaz Sharif is said to have forced
the incumbent army chief of staff, Gen. Jahangir Karamat’s resignation,
allegedly for making a speech at the Naval Staff College criticizing
the government and suggesting the establishment of a national security
council.
Musharraf writes that he
was "shocked" at the "meek manner" in which the
army chief tendered his resignation. It also "caused great resentment
in the army, as soldiers and officers alike felt humiliated." (p.
84) But much more intriguing is the less than transparent manner in
which Musharraf himself was appointed to replace Gen. Karamat as the
army chief. He describes this episode with much relish and without any
qualms, the gist of which follows.
The Beginning of the End
On the night of October
7, 1998 while watching TV and unaware of Gen. Karamat’s resignation,
Musharraf received a surprise telephone call at his residence in Mangla
that Nawaz Sharif wished to see him and that he should come to Islamabad
immediately without letting Gen. Karamat know anything about his visit.
He "sensed that there was something abnormal afoot," but took
off for Islamabad with his military police escort. As his car was entering
Islamabad he received another call from an ISI brigadier and a friend
who congratulated him and told him that Gen Karamat had resigned and
"you are being made chief." On hearing this news, says Musharraf,
his "mind raced back" to several corps commanders’ meetings
at the GHQ a few months ago when a tussle was going on between prime
minister Nawaz Sharif and president Farooq Lagharai, and the chief of
the army had to decide what action to take in the matter. He recalled
how he had stood up for democracy and favored the prime minister who
was now in the position of appointing the army chief of staff. Another
lieutenant general, Ali Kuli Khan, who was higher in the seniority list,
strongly favored the president, a friend of his, who was then empowered
to appoint the army chief of staff. Musharraf also remembered at this
point how "color had drained from Lieutenant General Ali Kuli’s
face" when he learned that his friend, the president, had lost
his power to appoint the army chief with the annulment of the 8th amendment
to the constitution and how a desperate Ali Kuli had called for the
imposition of martial law in the country, a proposal rejected by the
army chief Gen. Karamat.
These thoughts still in
his mind Musharraf entered the office of the prime minister in Islamabad
and found him "sitting on a sofa and smiling a victorious smile."
(p.84) His entry was followed by a warm meeting between the two as Nawaz
Sharf appointed him the new army chief. After this exciting meeting,
says Musharraf, he "saluted the prime minister and left."
First he called on Gen. Karamat at the Army House to express his regrets
at his resignation, and then called his wife and parents to convey the
good news of his promotion as army chief which they were thrilled to
hear. His only disappointment was that Lt. Gen. Ali Kuli Khan announced
his retirement from the army forthwith, rather than being "glad
that his friend was appointed chief." To all those in the army
who were full of resentment over the forced resignation of Gen. Karamat,
he offered the pragmatic advice "to stop brooding and ... get on
with the job."
Whatever this episode means
personally to Musharraf, it certainly does not appear to be a normal
procedure for the appointment of an army chief by an executive head
of the state. Nawaz Sharif in this case sets out to appoint the chief
of his armed forces in his capacity as prime minister. Normally, one
would think, it should be a matter of picking out the senior most military
officer for the job, in consultation with the outgoing chief of the
army, and issuing a government notification to that affect. But what
we find is that the incumbent army chief has been "forced"
to resign, in hushed up conditions, because of a speech he made offering
"suggestions about how to improve the governance of the country,"
which put him on the wrong side of the prime minister. The process of
his replacement that follows turns out to be even more enigmatic. The
secretive phone calls, the late night meeting, the victorious smile
on the face of Nawaz Sharif, are all suggestive of a devious political
game being played rather than a transparent executive decision being
made.
It is hard to believe that
the real significance of this staged act was lost on Musharraf. It is
quite obvious that Nawaz Sharif was trying to impress upon him that
he was being chosen for the job over Ali Kuli Khan as a special favor
which he must return by staying loyal to the prime minister and not
doing anything to subvert his government. In other words it was a political
appointment which, of course, is not unusual in Pakistan’s history.
All elected civilian prime ministers ever since Ayub Khan’s first
military coup have tried to chose an army chief who is not the most
senior or best qualified among the officer corps, but the one perceived
to be the most pliant and obsequious in character. Nawaz Sharif did
the same according to his wits and his style.
However, a relationship
which was founded on bonds of wishful personal loyalties rather than
objectively shared professional commitments and division of labor, soon
got mired in games of "he loves me, he loves me not," giving
rise to suspicions of betrayal and perfidy. In the beginning, says Musharraf,
my relationship with the prime minister was "perfectly good."
He writes that "I did my best to be cooperative as army chief."
But the very language used to describe such cooperation betrays the
fact that this army chief too was prone more to intrude into matters
of governing the country rather then doing his own job for which he
had been trained. For example, he says:
"I regularly asked Nawaz
Sharif how the army could help to improve his sagging government."
(p. 137)
"I had ventured to advise
him several times how to improve his government." (p. 137)
"In October 1999, the
nation was fast headed toward economic and political collapse. Under
these trying circumstances, I was working to shore up the prime minister
and help him perform better. It is unfortunate that he distrusted my
good intentions. ... His misplaced perception of my loyalty, coupled
with the suspicion that I was planning a coup, must have led to Nawaz
Sharif’s paranoia." (pp. 137-38)
Wherever the nation was
headed toward in October 1999, it is clear that Musharraf’s constant
intrusion into the sphere of prime minister’s duties was having
little effect other than breeding mutual distrust and suspicions. Their
relations had reached a point where each was afraid that the other was
planning to get rid of him. Some anecdotes narrated by Musharraf in
retrospect on this situation make quite an engaging reading:
"Mrs. Ziauddin, the
wife of the officer who was supposed to replace me , asked another officer’s
wife about the deportment expected of a chief’s spouse. In the
presence of the wife of a major general, one of Ziauddin’s relatives
asked about the difference in ranks worn by a full general compared
to a lieutenant general." (p. 109)
"I had already conveyed an indirect warning to the prime minister
through several intermediaries: "I am not Jahangir Karamat."
My predecessor had retired quietly ..." (p.110)
"Slowly but surely Nawaz
Sharif was being fed information to make him paranoid about me by people
who stood to gain from my exit. He was constantly being told that I
was going to remove him." (p. 110)
What one can conclude from
these extracts is that in the absence of an established professional
code of conduct, working relationship between the prime minister and
his army chief, as well as within the army high command, were being
shaped by gossip and hearsay. In the end Nawaz Sharif tried to appease
Musharraf by resorting to the same kind of personalized approach hat
he had used at the time of elevating him to the position of army chief.
He invited Musharraf and his wife to "accompany him and his wife
to Mecca for pilgrimage" and to have a family dinner with him before
departure for the holy land. At the dinner was also present Nawaz Sharif’s
brother Shahbaz Sharif, the chief minister of Punjab province, and the
event was presided over by their father, Abbaji. During the dinner Abbaji
is said to have made a long and uninterrupted speech narrating his life
experiences at the end of which he turned to Musharraf and said, "You
are also my son, and these two sons of mine dare not speak against you.
If they do, they will be answerable to me." (p.113)
Musharraf writes that he
was only "embarrassed," by all this which he thought "was
quite a charade." At the same time he was enforcing his own code
of personal loyalties within the army high command. He suspected Lt.
Gen. Tariq Pervez of being the source of leaked information that the
army chief was planning to carry out a coup. Sometime after the dinner
with Abbaji, the prime minister’s brother, Shahbaz, came to see
him and in Musharraf’s words, "I told him to tell his brother
two things. One, I would not agree to give up my present position of
chief of army staff ... Two, I was recommending the retirement of the
corps commander in Quetta, Lieutenant General Tariq Pervez. He was ill
disciplined, and I suspected him of plotting against me. The problem
was that TP, as he was known in the army, was brother-in-law of one
of Nawaz Sharif’s ministers and was using his influence ..."
(p.112)
Whatever Nawaz Sharif’s covert intentions may have been in his
dealings with Musharraf, in the open he was ready to go to any extent
to please him. When presented with papers from the army chief’s
office to retire PT, he simply signed them. This would appear to be
a gross violation of fair play and due process, the cardinal principles
of better governance so ardently advocated by Musharraf. If the army
chief was there to make the prime minister "perform better,"
who was there to check the performance of the army chief,? one wonders.
The Kargil Crisis
Ironically, it was Nawaz
Sharif who found himself in the midst of an international crisis for
not being able or willing to keep his army chief’s activities
under check. Musharaff writes that it was the Kargil conflict which
initially "soured" his relations with the prime minister.
He devotes a whole chapter in his book on this issue in order to vindicate
himself and shift all the blame for the Kargil crisis onto Nawaz Sharif.
Kargil, a small town on
the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC) is located in the frigid
high mountains of northern Kashmir. According to Musharraf’s narrative,
in early 1999 "Kashmiri freedom fighting mujahideen occupied the
Kargil heights that the Indian army had vacated for the winter."
When Indian soldiers returned to their posts in early summer, Musharraf
had already moved several battalions of troops belonging to Northern
Light Infantry (NLI), a paramilitary force not fully integrated in the
Pakistan army, in "support" of the mujahideen. As he puts
it, "Our field commanders were fully engaged in supporting them
in the face of growing momentum of the Indian operations." In practical
terms, this "growing momentum of the Indian operations" amounted
to a massive Indian air and ground attack by "more than four divisions"
of the Indian army to expel "five battalions" of Pakistan’s
NLI troops from their side of LOC. They "also started crossing
over and bombarding positions of the Pakistan army," says Musharraf.
Outnumbered and outgunned the mujahideen and the supporting soldiers
from Pakistan were being picked one by one by the Indian fire. Nevertheless,
Musharaf remained convinced that his fighters will be able to repel
the "disproportionate" Indian assault. He insists that by
July 4, the day cease-fire was declared, the Indians "did achieve
some success, which I would consider insignificant. Our troops were
fully prepared to hold our dominating positions ahead of the watershed."
(p.93)
In the meantime, the world leaders were getting very alarmed by this
bloody flare-up which they feared could lead to a nuclear war between
the two South Asian rivals. There was "intense international pressure"
on Nawaz Sharif, according to Musharraf’s own admission, and there
was talk about Pakistan army being a "rogue army." (p. 95)
On July 3, Nawaz Sharif
flew to Washington to address President Clinton’s concerns about
the situation, but not before asking his army chief one more time: "Should
we accept a cease-fire and a withdrawal?" Musharraf writes that
his " answer was the same: the military situation is favourable;
the political decision has to be his own." (p. 97)
In Washington on July 4,
as one can recall, President Clinton confronted Nawaz Sharif with satellite
surveillance pictures showing a massive buildup of Indian war machine
on Pakistan’s international borders and the prime minister, no
less a "patriot" than Musharraf one would assume, realized
that withdrawal was the only alternative to another devastating all-out
war with India. He agreed to cease-fire and withdrawal from the Kargil
heights. But Musharraf in his book protests: "He went off and decided
on a cease-fire. It remains a mystery to me why he was in such a hurry."(p.
97)
Yet, Nawaz Sharif’s
going off to Washinton and negotiating a cease-fire was no more of a
mystery than Field Marshall Ayub Khan’s taking off to Tashkent
to negotiate the end of 1965 war with India. The problem is that in
launching the Kargil operation Musharraf, and a few of his commanders
he had taken into confidence, had learned nothing from the past mistakes.
He claims that the operation he initiated "on the snow clad peaks
and in the boulder ridden valleys of the Northern Areas" was "a
tactical marvel of military professionalism." What he does not
realize is that this "marvel" was merely a thoughtless repetition
of the same old and failed strategy the venerable Field Marshall had
employed in Kashmir in the August of 1965, touching off an all-out war
with India. It was the same old story of reliance on volunteer militant
fighters, now available ready-made in all shapes and forms of mujahideen
zealots, to cross the LOC in Kashmir, followed by deployment of regular
troops, followed by denials when the other side turned the heat on,
and the whole operation undertaken without a full and sober assessment
of its military, political and international-diplomatic consequences.
Why did Musharraf not oppose
the cease-fire at the time it was negotiated, if he was so sure that
it was a bad idea, and left the "political decision" to the
prime minister? Here is a rather implausible explanation:
"As the chief of the
army staff, I found myself in a very difficult position. I wanted to
explain the military situation, to demonstrate how successful we had
been and point out political mishandling that had caused so much despair.
But that would have been disloyal, and very unsettling for the political
leaders." (p. 95)
Coming from a self-assured
politician-bashing general, it certainly is an odd statement. What seems
closer to truth is that the reckless Kargil operation, undertaken secretively
in disregard of its grave political and security consequences for Pakistan
and the region, had raised a storm of criticism in both the domestic
and foreign media, as is also evident from Musharraf’s own complaint
that: "All kinds of carefully placed articles had appeared, including
a one page advertisement in a newspaper in the United States, maligning
the army and creating a divide between it and the government."
(p.137) Any attempt to justify what he had done would have prolonged
the questioning of his judgement and his competence as chief of the
army. That seems to be the real reason which kept him quiet in the immediate
aftermath of the Kargil crisis.
While writing in retrospect,
from his secure presidential perch, Musharraf can afford to be himself
again, a military general with overflowing confidence. And that is what
is really important for a proper assessment of what his rule, or military
rule in general, means for Pakistan. Quoting Richard Nixon, Musharraf
says that a leader must never "suffer paralysis through analysis."
(p. 131) This is surely not a very reassuring precept coming from someone
who leads a modern state.
The Case of Balochistan
A specific example of this
narrow militaristic approach to complex domestic issues is also encountered
in Musharraf’s thinking on the current political unrest in Balochistan
and methods adopted by his regime to contain that unrest. He writes:
"Balochistan is Pakistan’s
largest province in area but smallest in population. It is also the
most backward. ... Ninety-five percent of Balochistan is administratively
a "B area," where the government does not exercise total authority
and the local sirdar or chief plays an important role. Only 5 percent
is an "A area," which comes under the regular government.
A few of the sirdars in B area have been manipulating and blackmailing
every Pakistani government for decades, using militant mercenaries that
they maintain as their local militia forces. They have also kept their
own tribes suppressed under their iron grip through indiscriminate use
of force. I have taken upon myself to convert all the B areas into A
areas and establish the government writ there." (p.59)
This is indeed a stark depiction
of a complex political and social problem. Shorn of its colonial and
historical accretions, the persistent Baloch demand for political autonomy
and control over their natural resources is simply reduced to the problem
of enforcing the government’s writ. And as is common knowledge,
that enforcement is being accomplished through a massive military and
para-military operation, third of its kind in Balochistan since independence
and perhaps the most brutal. On top of it innumerable complaints are
being voiced about human rights violations and "disappearances."
All this is bound to be counterproductive, as past experiences with
domestic military operations have shown. If the problem was just to
convert B areas into A areas, that objective could have been achieved
more peacefully and effectively by extending to all the people of Balochistan
their entitlements to full citizenship, such as adequate means of livelihood,
education, health care, electricity, communication and transportation
services, thereby raising their sense of identification with the nation
and the national government. Unfortunately, today there are more military
and paramilitary soldiers posted in Balochistan than there are teachers
at all levels of educational institutions.
In fact, what is happening
in Balochistan today is part of a continuous process of building the
Pakistani state into a highly centralized, unitary and authoritarian
political structure in which the army establishment has come to play
a decisive role. Such a political structure remains impervious to the
basic needs of people, operates in a neo-colonial framework and is inimical
to pluralistic democracy.
Who Rules Pakistan?
There is an interesting
chapter in Musharraf’s book in which the author picks up the question
of why democracy has "eluded Pakistan since its birth in 1947."
He starts out by defining democracy with textbook precision as "rule
by the people." This is followed by an undisputable observation
that: "What we in Pakistan have consciously created instead is
rule by a small elite - never democratic, often autocratic, usually
plutocratic, and lately kleptocratic - all working with a tribal- feudal
mind-set, ..." (p.154) But then he makes a strategic omission in
his next statement: "This small elite comprises feudal barons,
tribal warlords, and politicians of all hues." Missing conspicuously
from this statement are the army generals who have ruled Pakistan directly
and indirectly over most of its history. They could, of course, be included
with some justification, in any of the categories of feudal barons,
warlords, or politicians of all hues, but that is not what is intended.
The generals are said to be the monitors of good government who occasionally
stage military coups to "save the nation."
In reality, however, the
generals have not only ruled Pakistan for extended periods of time,
they have shown a great appetite for politics and political engineering
of "what we in Pakistan have consciously created. ..." It
was General Ayub Khan, who first swept aside whatever the civilian politicians
had accomplished in the first decade of independence and started out
afresh "to establish political institutions and stable instruments
of government."5 Even before he took over the reigns of government,
he was obsessed with thoughts of doing something with the political
"problem" in the country. On a sleepless night in October
1954, he sat up in a hotel room in London and wrote a document on how
the people of Pakistan shall be governed.6 The document was later incorporated
in the constitution of Pakistan when he took over, putting the country
on the road to "controlled democracy" and a powerful unitary
state.
Each subsequent military ruler has made his own contribution to enhancing
the power of the central state over its citizens and its constituent
units. When Musharraf took over as head of the state he too set himself
a political agenda with two major priorities laid out in his book, first,
to "instutionalize" the army establishment’s defacto
role and power in conducting the affairs of the state, and secondly
to centralize state power in the federal government on the pattern of
militaristic hierarchy of control and command.
In support of his first
project, he starts out by asserting that there are "three power
brokers" in Pakistan’s political system, the army, the president
and the prime minister, and affirms that: "Imposing checks and
balances on the three power brokers of the country was always high on
my agenda." (p.170) Although the power of all the three is to be
checked and balanced, his argument revolves mainly on the need to check
the prime minister’s power in order to make him "govern better."
Referring to the interregnum of civilian democracy between 1988-1999,
he writes:
"It almost invariably
happened that the prime minister would refuse to listen, and this refusal
would lead to intense acrimony between him and the president or even
the army chief. This invariably resulted either in dissolution of the
assembly by the president or, once the power of the president to dissolve
the Assembly was removed, the danger of the imposition of martial law
by the army chief." (p.170)
In order for the country to escape that "danger"in future,
Musharraf proposed and got enacted, by a simple majority vote of the
National Assembly, the establishment of a National Security Council
(NSC), on which are represented " four men in uniform," the
three army, navy, air force chiefs and chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Committee . The Council is to meet regularly and keep pressure
on the prime minister to "perform," which will help "sustain
democracy and avoid martial law." Musharraf also argues that there
will be no need for the army chief to remove the prime minister and
take over "because he has an institution available to voice his
concerns (and the concerns of a worried people) to the prime minister
and can then allow the constitution and the political process to take
its course." (p.171) Some consolation indeed, for the future prime
ministers.
The reader is also assured
that the NSC is to be a "consultative body" only. However,
one cannot help but note that the raison d’etre behind the NSC
is army’s monopoly over the coercive power of the state which
it has used in the past to overthrow elected civilian governments, not
withstanding the after-the-fact rationalizations (the imminent destruction
of the country, the doctrine of necessity and its various versions).
On the other hand, the president and the prime minister derive their
power and its limits from the constitution which Gen. Zia once dubbed
as a mere "piece of paper." One can take Musharraf’s
word for it, but the "consultative" role of the NSC with four
men in uniform on it can indeed be quite formidable and intimidating,
to say the least.
Musharraf’s second
political project of centralizing power in the federal state appears
aspoint 2 of his seven point political agenda, announced shortly after
his 1999 coup, which states: ‘Strengthen the federation, remove
interprovincial disharmony and restore national cohesion. (p.149) However,
there is no proposal in his book specifically aimed at structural changes
in the existing relations of power between the center and the federating
units, highly centralized as they already are. What we have is a plan
to "devolve power to the grass roots," which seeks to forge
direct links between the central government and the local level administrations,
bypassing the provincial governments. According to Musharraf, "Pakistan
has had a central (federal) government and large regional(provincial)
governments, but the local affairs have been either unregulated or managed
by the provincial governments." (p.172)
His Local Government Ordinance,
2000 creates a three tier administrative structure of elected bodies
, the District Council, the sub-district or tehsil Council and a multi-village
Union Council, each headed by a nazim or administrator. The delivery
of services and public goods are transferred from the provincial governments
to the district administrations, and direct budgetary allocations can
be made to the district and lower level bodies by both the central and
provincial governments.
It has been a usual practice
for Pakistan’s military rulers to fall back on projects of local
level democracy after overthrowing the elected national governments
in order to claim popular legitimacy for their rule, Yahya Khan’s
short lived rule being an exception. Ayub Khan crafted "Basic Democracy"
as a truly indigenous form of Pakistani democracy. Zia ul-Haq relied
on the holding of party-less local bodies’ elections to shore
up his democratic credentials and Musharraf points to his Local Government
Ordinance (LGO) to project himself as a true democrat. All have a record
restricting the jurisdiction of provincial governments, and suppressing
movements of provincial autonomy with military force. Ayub conducted
such army opperations in Balochistan, Yahya in East Bengal when it was
part of Pakistan, Zia in Sindh, and now Musharraf again in Balochistan.
While Musharraf takes much
credit for having introduced grass roots democracy with his LGO the
implementation of which he calls a "silent revolution" on
the authority of World Bank (p. 151), he is also compulsively attracted
to a militaristic, hierarchal power structure in governing the country.
He contends that Pakistan was in "dire need of unity of command,"
by which he means a "single authority," not only in the political
system but also over above the bureaucracy and the military. (p. 177)
Interestingly enough he considers his military uniform as the symbol
of that unity of command and single authority. He admits quite candidly
that he had given "verbal commitment to retire from the army and
remove my uniform by December 2004," but realizing the gravity
of the domestic and international situation, particularly "the
war against terror,"he came to realize that "removing my uniform
would dilute my authority and command at a time when both were required
most." (pp. 176-177) Referring to the concerns abroad about military’s
involvement in politics, he says: "I am still struggling to convince
the West that Pakistan is more democratic today than it ever was. Ironically,
to become so it needed me in uniform." (p.333)
Overview
Musharraf is fourth in the
line of army chiefs of Pakistan who have ruled the country directly
as heads of the state. His memoir can be read as the summation of how
these men have charted the direction in which Pakistan’s political
system has evolved, with the army located at the center of its structure
of power and privilege.
It is claimed by this president
in uniform that the army is "the last institution of stability
left in Pakistan."(p. 149) Perhaps no one will dispute that army
has emerged as the only institution in Pakistan that can claim stability,
and has established its defacto power in the political economy of Pakistan
. The question is how did the army achieve that kind of exclusive stability
and power, and whether it is conducive to the long term survival of
Pakistan as a democratic state? According to Musharraf’ narrative,
corruption of the politicians who are elected to exercise legislative
and executive power lies at the root of military’s ascendency.
At some point when the political and financial corruption of the politicians
gets out of hand, the military as an honest broker springs to action,
removes the incumbent government, and "saves the nation."
But corruption is by no
means the exclusive endowment of the Pakistani politician. Political
and financial corruption in inherent in the political economy of capitalism,
although it can be more blatant and visible in countries like Pakistan
where property relations of capitalism are underdeveloped.
To check or contain the
ubiquitous problem of corruption, stable capitalist democracies provide
for an independent and constitutionally empowered judiciary as one of
the three branches of the state, the other two being the executive and
the legislative. The concept of Checks and balances applies to these
three branched of the state, not to the so called "three power
brokers" as conceived by Musharraf. Army is only part of the executive
branch of the state whose job is to take orders from the incumbent government
and defend the territorial borders of the state.
So long as Pakistan’s
military high command continues to cross the boundaries of its constitutionally
allocated role and preempts the judiciary from performing its functions,
setting itself up as the "savior of the nation," so long as
the army chief does not learn to accept orders from the constitutionally
recognized executive head of the state and instead tries to impose his
counsel on him or takes military action to displace him, and so long
as the army establishment continues to spread its tentacles into the
political sphere and manipulate the process of elections to the legislature,
the army will indeed be "the only institution of stability left
in Pakistan. The rest of the instititutions, the foundations of a modern
democratic stare - an exacutive that rules by consent and not commamd,
a legislature that represents all the people and a judiciary that understands
and upholds the rule of law - will either wither away or exist in a
crippled and corrupt form. Unfortunately, in that case, there will also
be no end to the crisis of governance in Pakistan.
End Notes:
1. Pervez Musharraf, In the
Line of Fire, London, Simon and Shuster, 2006
2. Hamza Alawi, "Ethnicity,
Muslin Society and Pakistan Ideology," in Anita Weiss, (ed), Islamic
Reassertion in Pakistan, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1986.
3. Muhammad Ayub Khan, Friends
Not Masters: A Political Autoiography, Karachi, Oxford University Press,
1967, p. 70.
4. Ayesha Siddiqa, MilitaryInc:
Inside Pakistan's Military Economy, Karachi, Oxford University Press,
2007.
5. Muhammad Ayub Khan, Frienda
Not Masters, p. vii.
Ibid, pp. 186-192.
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