Manufacturing
Consensus For Collective Suicide
By
Himanshu Thakkar
Himal
Magazine
17 August, 2003
The current debate
in India on the governments river linking proposal is occurring
when the coalition in power at the centre is preparing to face general
elections next year. On the issue of water, agriculture, food and energy
resources development and management, the coalition government
led by the Bharatiya Janata Party could not have done much worse. The
clearest evidence of under-achievement comes from the way the coalition
managed the droughts of 2000 and again in 2002-3, and the way it is
managing floods this monsoon. There has been a comprehensive failure
to regulate releases from dams, to adequately forecast floods and to
provide timely flood warning and relief. The river linking proposal
is a way to divert attention away from real performance. The proposal
found support in the suggestion made by the Supreme Court on 31 October
2002 without really going into the merits of the project, following
rather an unscientific mention of the proposal by Indias scientist
President in his speech to the nation on 14 August 2002. The supporting
cast of the charade was made up of a gullible political opposition,
an uncritical section of the media and scientific community.
The events are unfolding
at a rapid pace. The megalomaniac water resources establishment in India
suddenly found a new reason to reassert its reason to exist. The emergence
of the World Banks new Water Resources Sector Strategy where it
has said that it is again time to back High Risk High Reward projects
like large dams and long distance water transfer projects was, we are
told, only coincidental. Suresh Prabhu, the former Power Minister from
Indias right wing Shiv Sena Party who had to leave the Power Ministry
last year following his party leaderships unhappiness with his
performance, got what he thinks to be a fitting new role as Chairman
of the Task Force for River Linking Proposal. His over confidence notwithstanding,
it must be a unique event in the history of development planning, when
all concerned authorities are swearing by the completion date of a project
whose feasibility, even they admit, is yet to be established. Come to
think of it, even the need and optimality of the proposal are yet to
be ascertained.
Proposals to the linking of watercourses are not new in the Subcontinent.
More than a century ago, Arthur Cotton of the British Government proposed
the linking of Indias rivers to provide navigation as an alternative
to the railways that were being planned. In more recent times, it was
in 1972 that K L Rao came forward with the Ganga Cauvery Link proposal,
which was dumped by the Ministry of Water Resources after the Central
Water Commission found it to be grossly under-estimated.
Earlier, Captain Dastur had proposed a garland of canals connecting
Himalayan rivers and the Peninsular rivers, which the Ministry declared
technically unsound and economically prohibitive.
The latest episode
in the run of river linking proposals started on 14 August 2002 when
Indias President A P J Kalam, in his speech to the nation on the
eve of Independence Day said, It is paradoxical to see floods
in one part of our country while some other parts face drought. This
drought - flood phenomenon is a recurring feature. Kalam went
on to recommend a water mission. One major part of the water
mission would be networking of our rivers. This seemingly rather
compelling logic of transferring water from flood affected
and surplus areas to drought affected and deficit
areas has been repeatedly used to justify river-linking proposals.
Unfortunately, the
President was not told that large parts of the very areas that seem
to have too much water in one season have too little of it in another.
Neither was he told that just because a river appears to be overflowing
and in flood does not mean that the river has too much water. Often,
it can mean silted riverbeds with reduced carrying capacity, caused
by the destructive embankment of rivers which keeps the silt from spreading
over the plain. Moreover, terms like surplus
and wasteful flow in rivers do not have any scientific basis.
At the other end
of the illogic, the apparent drought could be due to a number of man-made
reasons including the destruction of local water systems, the destruction
of forests in the catchment,the overexploitation of groundwater and
the diversion of water in the upstream areas. The solution would lie
in reversing the reasons at the roots of the crisis. Rejuvenation of
a number of rivers by the communities in large parts of Alwar and adjoining
districts in Rajasthan is proof that it is feasible to solve drought
related problems through local effort.
Court intervention
Soon after President
Kalams speech, an intervention petition was filed in the Supreme
Court of India in the ongoing Yamuna Pollution Case. The Supreme Court
converted it into a public interest petition and issued notices to the
union and various state governments seeking responses to the river-linking
proposal. Only two responses were received, one from the Union Water
Resources Ministry and another from the Tamil Nadu government. It is
noteworthy that at least 25 states did not even bother to reply to the
Supreme Court. Oddly, the justices assumed that this meant the states
had no objections to the river linking idea, an assumption that has
subsequently been proven to be unfounded.
In its response
submitted to the apex court in September 2002, the Water Resources Ministry
said that the feasibility reports of the proposal were yet to be completed.
Only thereafter can Detailed Project Reports be taken up, after which
legal and policy issues of interstate water allocations outside basins
will have to be addressed, as well as availability of financial resources
and environmental issues. In any case, the government said that it would
take about 45 years to complete the links.
The only other response
received by the judges was from Tamil Nadu, which would be the recipient
basin from all directions and hence did not have any objection to the
project.
Rather than give
the other states more time to consider the matter, as would be normal,
the Supreme Court decided that the states had no objection: The
presumption therefore clearly is that they do not oppose the prayer
made in this writ petition. On 31 October 2002, a bench headed
by the then chief justice, BN Kirpal, made an order that many jurists
have criticised for having exceeding the mandate. That order suggested
that the government take up the river linking proposal expeditiously
and complete it in 10 years. That the bench did not dispose off the
case, choosing to oversee the further actions in the matter, was not
found as a convincing course of action by many jurists.
Justice Kirpal retired
the day after making the order. When a few weeks later he was asked
at a public meeting if the policy decisions were not the mandate of
the executive, he clarified that his order on river linking was indeed
only a suggestion. This clarification has had no impact
on the ongoing case in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court continues
to be seized of the matter and has fixed the next date of hearing in
November 2003.
The Supreme Court
assumed that lack of response from the states indicated consensus, but
paradoxically, the terms of reference of the task force for river-linking
set up by the union government following the court order changed it
to go into the modalities for bringing consensus among the states.
That presumption of consensus has already proven to be erroneous. So
far, the states that have opposed the river-linking proposition include
Kerala, Bihar, West Bengal, Assam, Punjab, Chhatisgarh and Goa. Others
such as Gujarat, Karna-taka, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Maharashtra
have shown only conditional agreement agreeing to links where
they would be recipients of water and opposing others where they would
be donors. Only Haryana and Tamil Nadu have unconditionally
supported the proposal, as they would be only receiving water from outside
the states.
How then will the
task force build consensus? The signs are ominous, for the body has
already missed an important deadline, namely to call a meeting of the
chief ministers of all the states to discuss river linking in May/June
2003. That meeting has not happened till the beginning of August, and
the task force has instead gone about dealing with the states individually,
and away from the public eye.
From the statements
emanating from the various states so far, the prospects for consensus
do not look bright. Water is an emotive issue, and politicians will
think hard before compromising the water rights of their state. Even
a supposedly water-surplus state like Assam has seen the banks of the
Manas river reverberating with shouts of tej dim pani nidiu (we will
give blood, not water) by activists of the All Assam Student Union protesting
the centres river-linking designs.
Consensus building,
arm twisting
While the job of
the Task Force looks difficult, however, past experience indicates that
the centre has not been above arm-twisting to get the states to fall
in line with projects against their self interest. This is clear from
the examples of the water treaty between Tamil Nadu and Kerala, the
Narmada agreement, Sutlej Yamuna Link Project, Mahadayi
Krishna Proposal and others, some of them described below.
One of the earliest
known attempts at river linking was the transferring of waters from
Periyar, Chalakudy and Bharathapuzha river basins of Kerala to the Bharathapuzha
basin and beyond in Tamil Nadu. There was opposition to this in Kerala,
yet with the help of the centre, Tamil Nadu was able to achieve what
many consider to be an unjust agreement. Papers presented at a July
2003 workshop at Thrissur on river-linking (organised by the Chalakudy
River Protection Committee and the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers
& People) showed that the centre made the approval of Idukki Hydroelectric
Project in Kerala conditional to it signing the Parambikulam Aliyar
Project (PAP) treaty with Tamil Nadu. The approval of Idukki and signing
of the PAP treaty which happened in quick succession in 1970, only substantiates
the possibility of this being a quid pro quo arrangement. The fact that
Tamil Nadu has not followed releases of water into Kerala as per the
PAP treaty should provide lessons for other state governments, but that
is another story.
An interesting aspect
of the entire PAP episode was that the various dams that were used to
transfer the water from Kerala had been built much before the treaty
was actually signed in 1970. In the current river-linking plan, it is
proposed to transfer water from the Pampa and Achankovil rivers of Kerala
to Vaippar Basin in Tamil Nadu. As if history were repeating itself,
Tamil Nadu has already completed the Mekkara Dam, which is to be used
in the proposed link, even as Kerala is vociferously opposing any further
river-linking proposal, and claiming that there are is no surplus water
in the two basins in question. Suspecting Tamil Nadu to have already
diverted water, a Kerala Assembly committee has been asked to investigate
the matter.
An example of consensus
building comes from the Narmada Valley, where in the 1970s the
Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal was adjudicating a quarrel between the
riparian states. Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra were opposing Gujarats
plans for a high dam on the Narmada river. The Tribunal was also asked
to decide the claim of Raja-sthan, a non-riparian state as far as Narmada
River was concerned. Both Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh opposed the
claim of Rajasthan. However, Gujarat supported Rajasthans claim
as it would allow for a bigger dam.
The Tribunal, in
one of its interim orders decided against Rajasthan, but on appeal the
Supreme Court stayed the Tribunals proceedings in 1972. An agreement
signed under the good offices of the then Prime Minister in July 1974
between the Chief Ministers of the four concerned states, stated among
other things that Rajasthan would be allotted 0.5 million acre feet
of water annually from the Narmada River. How an agreement was arrived
at when two of the three concerned states were not in agreement, remains
unanswered. Pressure tactics were clearly used by the centre against
the states, a reason why we should not be surprised if agreements are
also obtained through non-transparent means with regard to the river-linking
proposal.
Agreement sans due
process
The Sutlej-Yamuna Link Canal was part of the Rajiv Longowal accord signed
in 1986, when many of the constitutional institutions were not in any
position to be effective in Punjab. The project sought to transfer water
from the Sutlej in Punjab for the irrigation of southern Haryana, which
lies in the Yamuna basin. Punjab subsequently became reluctant to share
the water, and Haryana went to the Supreme Court. The court, in January
2001, ordered that the Link Canal be completed in one year again,
a peremptory deadline not unlike the ten year stipulation handed down
by the bench headed by Justice Kirpal. It is six months since the one-year
deadline has expired and there is no sign of the Sutlej water for the
South Haryana as yet, even as the Supreme Court is hearing the contempt
petition by Haryana. In this instance, there was agreement
without due process: though there was no consensus, one was assumed
in the absence of proper working of the constitutional machinery at
the state level in Punjab.
Consensus
can also be achieved through manipulation, as was seen recently when
Karnataka wanted to divert water from Mahadayi to the Krishna basin.
Goa was opposed to this move, contending that the Mahadayi does not
have surplus water. In early 2002, the Central Water Commission (CWC)
in Delhi was asked to decide on whether the river had surplus water
for diverting to the Krishna basin. Even as the commission was seized
of the matter, the then Union Water Resources Secretary, BN Navala-wala,
issued a letter to Karnataka, saying that Karnataka could divert 7.56
Thousand Million Cubic Feet of water. Goas chief minister was
angry enough to charge Navalawala of corruption and to demand from the
Prime Minister that Navalawala be removed from his post. The Karnataka-Goa
spat shows yet another instance where consensus can be attempted and
surpluses manufactured through the help of friendly institutions.
It was only the pro active stance of Goa that subverted this attempt
and in fact Navalawala had to lose his post, and the letter saying Mahadayi
had surplus water was withdrawn.
Already, the current
river-linking project has seen an about-turn by one key player. At first,
Bihar strongman and husband of the current chief minister, Laloo Prasad
Yadav, declared that not a drop of water would be allowed to be taken
away from the Ganga basin. Just because Bihar had not been able to make
adequate use of the Ganga waters, he said, did not imply that the river
had a surplus. A person who is hungry today because he lacks
purchasing power does not mean that he would have no use for food in
future, said Yadav with his characteristic flair. Next, he warned that
not a glass of water will be allowed to be diverted from the Ganga basin.
A few more days, however, and the de facto ruler of Bihar declared that
water was like oil if the right price was offered, he may be
ready to sell. What went on between Yadav and Suresh Prabhu of the Task
Force to deliver the formers about-turn is not clear. What is
apparent is that such a transition is possible and consensus
can be arrived at even if Bihar remains a state that has been deprived
of adequate use of the Ganga waters.
Another way that
Prabhu is seeking to achieve consensus for the river-linking project
is by expanding the scope of the proposals. For example, when Maha-rashtra,
his home state, said it did not find anything beneficial in the scheme
and hence would oppose the proposal, Prabhu asked the state to prepare
schemes that would benefit it. Now, Maharashtra has set up its own committee
to explore the river linking proposals within the state, but could also
be involving inter state rivers, that would benefit it. Karnataka has
also now set up a committee to give such a report in three months. Something
similar could be done with other states, including all-important Gujarat.
Common to all the
examples of consensus building on river-linking projects of the past
described above, is that in no case have the people been asked. In the
river-linking project currently on the table, as well, people have been
kept out. This is glaringly visible from the fact that after more than
two decades in existence, the National Water Development Agency which
functions under the central Water Resources Ministry has not been able
to release any of its studies and reports to the public. These include
all the pre-feasibility and feasibility studies related to the river-linking
proposals. The task force under the media savvy Prabhu has yet to place
any document, including pre-feasibility or feasibility reports, on the
table for public scrutiny. And it is already eight months since its
formation.
The only option
left in the hands of the public therefore is to question the projects,
demand information and oppose the projects till it is proved in a participatory
way to be in public interest. If such information is not forthcoming,
the only option is to oppose the linking of rivers where they will be
affected. As has been done by the people of Bundelkhand in the Uttar
Pradesh-Madhya Pradesh border region, for example. There, at a Jal Sansad
(Water Parliament) on 23 July 2003, they rejected the Ken Betwa link
being proposed as one of the first undertakings of the river-linking
project. Similarly, earlier in the month, at Thrissur, the Pampa Achan-kovil
Proposal was rejected almost unanimously, including by representatives
of the Kerala government.
Prabhus
partners
As the opposition
among the public begins to gather steam, Prabhu is seeking to bring
in other players on his side. He has already had a number of meetings
with the World Bank officials, including one on 27 March 2003 with the
objective, according to the Water Resources Ministry, of requesting
them to share their expertise and experience on mega projects
implemented elsewhere in the world. The Bank has not been lacking
in enthusiasm, and an advisor to the Bank president, during a meeting
in early March in Washington DC, spoke highly of Indias river-linking
proposals. The fact that the Bank is supporting open-ended water resources
projects (these are sector wide projects in which potentially anything
in water sector in the state can be included) in a number of states
(including Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa,
Tamil Nadu and also a forthcoming project in Madhya Pradesh) would give
it extra leverage to help out Prabhu. Meanwhile, the Asian Development
Bank and the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation are other possible
collaborators, going by their interests and past record. While on a
trip to Germany recently, Prabhu requested support from his hosts and
it is reported that help is on the way.
Not to neglect the
in-country players, Prabhu has also been wooing big-business represented
in the Confederation of Indian Industry and the Federation of Indian
Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The meetings he has held with them
have raised obvious questions (and worries) about private sector involvement
in the river-linking agenda. Prabhus numerous statements saying
that private funds would be invited for river linking projects have
only added strength to these suspicions. However, the Task Force Chairmans
attempt to bring over the non-governmental sector over to his side has
thus far failed to achieve credible results.
For management on
the environment side, the Task Force has roped in what may be termed
the usual suspects, including the Central Pollution Control Board (a
government agency and hence compromised ab initio), The Energy Research
Institute (TERI - formerly the Tata Energy Research Institute) and the
National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI), both
of which are outside of government but lack requisite credibility. Among
other things, TERI has earned a bad name after an episode regarding
the plagiarising of an environmental impact assessment for the Dandeli
Hydro Project on the Kali river in Karnataka. NEERIs performance
has been strongly criticised when its own environmental impact assessment
for the proposed Karcham Wangtoo Hydro Project on the Sutlej river in
Himachal Pradesh was found by a number of environmentalists and even
local people to be biased, incomplete and shoddy. Earlier NEERI had
faced public criticism in relation to its reports on pollution of the
Taj Mahal and Delhis polluting industries. Another agency that
Prabhu has sought to rope in is the National Council for Applied Economic
Research, an organisation whose performance in socio-economic research
with respect to the Rajghat Dam on the Betwa river on Uttar Pradesh-Madhya
Pradesh border, as well as in the case of the proposed Tipaimukh Dam
in Manipur, was found by independent commentators to be biased and inadequate.
Cost
of inaction
Many proponents
of the river-linking plan are fond of confronting sceptics with the
question, What is the cost of not taking up the project?
The reference is to opportunity lost. It may be worthwhile asking the
proponents some relevant questions in turn, as long as the subject is
costs.
What is the
cost of neglecting rainwater harvesting potential in the river basins
of India, including groundwater recharging?
What is the cost of not assessing and realising the benefits
of watershed development in any of the river basins in India? (While
watershed development is happening at a number of places across the
country, comprehensive and participatory planning and implementation
at a river basin level is not happening in any river basin.)
What is the cost of not maintaining and rejuvenating the existing
local water systems (including tanks, ponds, wetlands and so on) in
any of the river basins in India? (This is not the same as rainwater
harvesting or watershed development. India has a large number of local
water systems, which are in bad shape due to neglect over the decades.)
What is the cost of not arresting the siltation in existing reservoirs,
which are filling up at much higher rates than the design assumptions?
What is the cost of not getting optimum results from the existing
irrigation infrastructure in India, the largest in the world but performing
far from its optimum levels?
What is the cost of not creating and maintaining drainage systems
in irrigation command areas and other agricultural areas?
What is the cost of not arresting the pollution of Indias
freshwater systems?
What is the cost of not assessing and realising demand-side management
options in water and energy systems?
What is the cost of not arresting the transmission and distribution
losses from our water and energy supply systems, stopping thefts and
making the elites pay for the services they use?
What is the cost of not stopping implied export of water with
huge subsidies that India is indulging in at the moment in terms of
sugar and foodgrains export? The attitude of robbing the poor to subsidise
supplies abroad is most clearly exemplified by the case of Maharashtra.
Maharashtra is the state in India with the highest number of dams, highest
production in sugar, lowest irrigated area in proportion to its cultivable
area and also the dismal distinction of having the highest number of
villages supplied water by tankers almost every summer. In stead of
using the scarce water for cultivation of water guzzling crops like
sugarcane, and then subsidising export of sugar so produced, that water
can be more appropriately used to fulfil the basic needs of drinking
water and protective irrigation at many places. Instead, now the state
is looking for long distance water transfers.
What is the cost of not managing peak power demands, not charging
higher tariff during peak periods and not using the existing hydro capacities
for peak power supply?
What is the cost of not allowing adequate freshwater flows in
the rivers downstream of dams and consumptive cities and also destroying
the navigation potential in the process?
If the measures
listed above can take care of needs for years to come, as has also been
concluded by the report (1999) of the Governmentt of India appointed
National Commission for Integrated Water Resources Development Plan
and others, why is there any need for projects like river linking with
all its huge social, environmental, economic and financial costs?
Which prabhu will answer these questions?