The
SIMI Story
By Yoginder Sikand
15 July, 2006
Countercurrents.org
The
identity of those behind the bomb blasts that shook Mumbai recently
remains unclear. Some claim Hindutva terrorists were responsible, while
others suspect the Pakistan-based terrorist outfit Lashkar-i Tayyeba
or the banned Students Islamic Movement of India (SIM) or a combination
of both. In the meanwhile, scores of suspected SIMI activists have been
detained by the police.
Whether or not the SIMI was
behind the blasts will be known only after a fair and impartial investigation.
Yet, the fact remains that groups like the SIMI, although representing
a tiny fringe of the varied landscape of Islam in India, do pose a grave
threat not only to the country as a whole but, equally, to the Indian
Muslims as well. In a sense a response to growing Hindu fascism and
deadly anti-Muslim pogroms, SIMI-style radical Islamism helps feed Hindutva
forces, leading to further communal polarization, with all the consequences
that this has for the country's welfare and that of the Muslims themslves,
already a beleaguered and marginalized minority. In the wake of the
Mumbai blasts and the allegations of SIMI involvement, many Indian Muslims
are now wakening up to the need to denounce not just Hindutva chauvinism
but similar Muslim groups, such as the SIMI, as well that speak the
language of conflict, hatred, violence
and revenge.
Established in 1977 and banned
by the Government of India in 2001, the SIMI's vision of Islam derives
from the voluminous writings of the Islamist ideologue, Sayyed Abul
'Ala Maududi, founder of the Jama'at-i Islami. For Maududi, as for the
SIMI, the mission of the Prophet Muhammad is seen principally as having
been the struggle to establish true monotheism or tauhid. This is taken
to mean not just the worship of the one God but also, and equally importantly,
the rule of the one God. Political power, in other words, is seen as
central to the Islamic mission. All man-made systems of law are condemned
as 'false', even Satanic, and Muslims are reminded that unless they
actively struggle to be ruled in accordance with the shari'ah their
commitment to and faith in Islam is not complete and remains suspect.
Struggling to establish the Islamic state, the Caliphate or khilafah
seen as a duty binding on all Muslims, and one that the Muslims of India,
despite being in a minority, must abide by. Muslims who are 'comfortable
living under an un-Islamic order' are warned that they shall be consigned,
rather uncharitably, to Hell.
In the absence of the khilafah,
the SIMI believes that Muslims cannot lead their lives fully in accordance
with Islam. The khilafah is seen as a divinely ordained order and also
as the only solution to the many problems of not just the Muslims alone
but of all humankind. It is envisaged as a pan-Islamic polity, for all
Muslims are said to belong to the same nation (qaum, millat). Islam,
in the SIMI's interpretation, does not recognize any national differences,
and all Muslims are brothers to each other. Hence, they must be ruled
by a single khalifa. Nationalism is seen as a false 'idol', and one
devised by the non-Muslim 'enemies of the faith' to divide the Muslims
and thereby weaken them. National, as well as racial, regional, linguistic
and sectarian identities are seen as a sign of 'ignorance' (jahiliya),
which is vehemently opposed to Islam, and represent major hurdles in
the path of establishing the rule of a single khalifa over all Muslims.
In line with the general
Islamist understanding, the SIMI sees Islam as a 'complete programme',
providing detailed instructions on all matters, from the most intimately
personal to collective affairs such as the state and international relations.
Thus, secularism, even in the form of state neutrality vis-à-vis
religion or the separation of religion and state, is seen as inherently
anti-Islamic, for to choose not to be ruled by God's laws is a sign
of rebelliousness against Him. Likewise, democracy is also condemned,
for to be ruled by man-made laws instead of the shari'ah is tantamount
to the unforgivable sin of shirk or associating partners with God. All
ideologies and religions other than Islam are condemned as false and
sinful (taghuti) and their adherents as 'rebels against God'. All non-Muslims
are branded together as kafirs, and no distinction is made among them.
Muslims are exhorted to give up the ways of the 'unbelievers' and to
inculcate an unrelenting hostility to 'un-Islamic' culture and to fully
abide by the path of the Prophet. Because the 'enemies of God' are expected
to show stiff resistance to Islam, violent jihad is to be waged, if
need be, against those who put hurdles in the path of the struggle for
establishing the khilafah. Islam thus comes to be seen as a militaristic
political programme.
This understanding of Islam
and the SIMI's methods of realizing its vision of the Islamic polity
make no room for the particular context in which the SIMI operates,
where Muslims are a relatively small and insecure minority. It is as
if to contextualize the faith and that demands that it makes upon the
faithful would be tantamount to cowardice, hypocrisy or deviation from
Islam or even amount to apostasy. The fact that to actively and openly
struggle for the establishment of an Islamic polity in the Indian context
would certainly invite stiff opposition from other communities is recognized,
but the trials and tribulations that this would mean for Muslims are,
it is insisted, to be welcomed as a true test of their faith and commitment
and to have always been the lot of the true believers, from the Prophet's
time onwards. As Shahid Badr Falahi, President of the SIMI, once put
it, 'The Qur'an itself says that the kafirs will naturally oppose the
Muslims. If through any of our actions the kafirs are agitated this
itself is a proof that what we are doing is right [.] We have deliberately
adopted the policy of the Prophet in this regard. If this drives the
enemies of Islam to anger we cannot help it'. An unflagging commitment
to a combative and extreme understanding of the faith is thus seen as
a sign of faithfulness to the Prophet, and for activists of the SIMI
this is indeed a major source of the movement's appeal, faced as they
are with a sense of being completely besieged.
The SIMI was floated by the
Jama'at-i Islami Hind in the late 1970s. Although it was intended to
work among Muslim students to create among them what it saw as 'Islamic
consciousness' and to engage in peaceful missionary work among non-Muslim
students, a succession of events occurred immediately after the founding
of the organization that forced it to take an increasingly hard-line
position. The young SIMI activists seem to have relished controversy
and sensationalism, seeing it as an opportunity to present their vision
of Islam as the ideal 'solution'. Being free of the control of the more
moderate and experienced older leaders of the Jama'at, whom they saw
as effete and too moderate, the young leaders of the SIMI drifted in
the direction of a growing radicalism. In 1979, less than two years
after the SIMI was established, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan,
Ayatollah Khomeini toppled the Shah of Iran and in Pakistan, the military
dictator Zia ul-Haq set about imposing Islamic criminal laws by force.
The
SIMI voiced its opposition to the Soviet invasion, welcomed the Iranian
revolution, seeing it as the first step in the eventual global revival
of Islam, and wholeheartedly supported Zia's 'Islamization' policy.
Gradually, as a result of events abroad and the consciousness of Muslims
being an increasingly threatened community in India, the SIMI's rhetoric
grew combative and vitriolic, insisting that Islam alone was the 'solution'
to the problems of not just the Muslims of India but of all Indians
as such and, indeed, of the whole world.
This growing radicalization
of the SIMI was not looked upon favourably by top leaders of the Jama'at,
who had been working to present a moderate image of their organization,
seeking to dialogue with people of other faiths and to promote democracy
and secularism in the face of the rapid growth of militantly anti-Muslim
Hindu organizations. Jama'at leaders demanded that the SIMI work under
the Jama'at's over-all command, but the SIMI refused. Accordingly, in
1982, the SIMI separated from the Jama'at, which then revived its own
students' wing, the Students Islamic Organisation. Yet, both the Jama'at
as well as the SIMI continued to share a commitment to a common vision,
as developed by Maududi, differing only on the question of the precise
tactics and strategy needed in the Indian context to bring Maududi's
vision to fruition. Following its separation from the Jama'at, the SIMI
expanded considerably, setting up branches in various
parts of India. It published several periodicals in different languages
and formed its own publishing company to propagate its message of 'Islamic
Revolution'. By 2000, the SIMI had some 400 full-time workers or Ansars
and 20,000 sypmathizers or Ikhwans, in addition to a cell for young
children aged between 7 and 11, called the Shahin Force. It also established
a special wing to work among madrasa students and 'ulama, the Tahrik
Tulaba-i 'Arabia. Most of its activists and members belonged to lower-middle
and middle-class families living in towns and cities. It
appealed to a class of Muslim students that saw themselves as, in some
sense, deprived, for whom its message of the 'superiority' of Islam
over the 'decadent' and 'immoral' West and 'polytheist' Hindus struck
a welcome chord.
The SIMI's evolution from
the 1980s onwards was dictated almost entirely by events taking place
in India and in the wider world, these being interpreted as attacks
directed against Islam and Muslims by the 'enemies' of the faith. Inevitably,
then, the SIMI was driven to an increasing radicalism that won it support
among a small number Muslims in India who saw themselves as increasingly
beleaguered, victims of both Hindu chauvinism and the Indian state that
was seen as representing essentially 'upper' caste Hindu interests.
The SIMI organized protest demonstrations
against attacks on Muslims, both in India and elsewhere, which provided
it publicity as well as possibilities for new recruits. It sought to
intervene in and generate public support for its stand on other issues
of major concern to the Indian Muslims, such as efforts to do away with
the separate Muslim Personal Law, moves to dilute the Muslim character
of the Aligarh Muslim University, and the Hinduisation of textbooks
in government-run schools. Its activists were also involved in relief
work among Muslims affected in anti-Muslim violence, which helped bolster
the image of the organization as being seriously committed to the rights
of the Muslims. It also provided other services such as libraries and
free coaching classes for Muslim students from poor families.
The SIMI sought to propagate
its message through mass contact programmes, lectures, seminars and
rallies as well as through its abundant literature, mainly the writings
of Maududi himself. A regular feature was its special week-long campaigns
aimed at creating an awareness of the Islamic 'solution', in which,
inevitably, the intention was to 'prove' that Islam alone had the solution
to all problems afflicting humankind. Thus, for instance, in 1982, the
SIMI organized an 'Anti-Immorality' week, in the course of which 'social
evils and general immorality' were condemned and 'immoral' literature
was publicly burned. In 1983 the Kerala unit of the organization held
a special 'Anti-Capitalism' week, in which it was sought to be stressed
that the 'Islamic economic system' alone could provide genuine social
justice. In an effort to win the support of 'low' caste Dalits in its
attacks on Hinduism, in 1994 the SIMI organized the 'Anti-Varna Vyavastha'
week all over India, in the course of which, through public lectures
and the distribution of leaflets and posters, it was stressed that the
salvation of the Dalits lay in conversion to Islam, demanding, rather
simplistically, for an 'immediate end to the caste system'.
Although a forceful champion
of what it called 'Islamic Revolution' ever since its inception, the
SIMI witnessed a further radicalization of its rhetoric from the 1990s,
until, by 2000, the organization was proclaiming the need for Muslims
to engage in armed jihad in India. The radicalization of the SIMI since
the 1990s must be seen in the context of, and as a response to, the
growth of Hindu militancy, particularly in the north Indian states of
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh where the SIMI also had a noticeable presence.
The destruction of the Babri Mosque in 1992 and the subsequent massacres
of Muslims in various parts of India proved to be a major watershed
in the history of Hindu-Muslim relations in India. While some Muslims
now insisted that the only way forward for the Muslims was to work together
with Hindus to isolate both Hindu as well as Muslim militant groups,
some fringe others, such as the SIMI, stressed that the time had now
come for Muslims to wage jihad against the Indian state or the Hindus,
as, it argued, their lives and their faith were now under grave threat.
As Shahid Badr Falahi, the President of the SIMI, asserted, the Muslims
and Islam were now being targeted by Hindu militants in league with
agencies of the state. Hence, he declared, 'It is high time that Muslims
organize themselves and stand up to defend the community'.
By early 1991, the SIMI had
begun mobilizing Muslims to struggle against Hindu militants, censuring
Muslim leaders who advised restraint or dialogue. In February 1991 the
SIMI organized the 'Babri Masjid' day all over India, holding demonstrations
against the efforts of Hindu militants to destroy the disputed mosque
in Ayodhya. SIMI leaders issued appeals to the Muslims to 'stop thinking
in defensive terms' on the question of the mosque and the growing wave
of attacks on Muslims. Its rhetorical opposition to the campaign led
by Hindu groups to destroy the mosque made for an increasing popularity
of the SIMI, and indeed it was only after the SIMI took up the issue
of the mosque, organizing meetings in various parts of the country to
oppose the Hindu militants' campaign, that it really emerged as a significant
force to be reckoned with, albeit in small pockets, having hitherto
been restricted largely to a few towns of Uttar Pradesh. Carrying on
with its campaign to generate mass support for its position on the mosque,
in September 2001 it organized a large conference at Mumbai, attended
by some 25,000 students from various parts of India. At the conference
it was stressed that the time had now come for Muslims to 'turn to Allah',
to engage in 'missionary work' (da'wat) and to launch jihad.
Following the destruction
of the Babri mosque and the subsequent massacre of Muslims in large
parts of India, the SIMI concluded that there was no hope for Muslims
in seeking to dialogue with Hindus or the government because, in its
view, both had turned irrevocably hostile against them. In a letter
sent to various Muslim leaders and 'ulama, a top SIMI leader, 'Abdul
'Aziz Salafi, insisted that the Muslims should make it clear to the
government of India as well as to Hindu militants that the Muslims 'would
now refuse to sit low'. He insisted that Muslims could no longer trust
various 'secular' parties to guarantee their rights and that they should
now 'establish their own political identity'. Four years later, the
SIMI spelled out precisely what it had in mind. In a statement issued
in 1996 it declared that since democracy and secularism had failed to
protect the rights of the Muslims, there was no alternative left for
the Muslims but to struggle for the establishment of the khilafah. It
appealed to non-Muslims to recognize that nationalism and westernization
were not the solution to the manifold problems facing the country, the
only answer to which, it argued, was what it called the Islamic political
order. It insisted that with the establishment of the khilafah, all
racial, linguistic, caste and communal antagonisms would automatically
be resolved and true equality and justice established. The break from
the Jama'at's policy of gradualism was thus made irrevocable and complete.
As Hindu militancy increased
in stridency, taking an ever-increasing toll of Muslim lives, the SIMI
adopted an even more hard-line position, calling for Muslims to avenge
the death of their co-religionists by following in the footsteps of
the eleventh century Mahmud Ghaznavi, who led several attacks into India
and is said to have destroyed many Hindu temples. SIMI activists put
up posters in several towns appealing to God to send down another Mahmud
to take revenge for attacks on Muslims and their places of worship.
In 1993, the arrest of a Sikh militant is said, at least so Indian sources
claimed, to have revealed a 'Pakistani conspiracy' to unite Sikh and
Kashmiri Muslim activists along with SIMI members to allegedly 'create
disorder in India'. By this time the SIMI was alleged to have developed
links with Islamist militants in Kashmir. It is said to have distributed
posters and audio cassettes extolling the militants, and exhorting the
Indian Muslims to follow in their path. In 2000 the arrest of a Chinese
Muslim from Xinjiang and his SIMI accomplice at the border between West
Bengal and Bangladesh is said to have provided the Indian police vital
information on the SIMI's contacts with Islamist groups in western China
struggling for independence. Indian authorities also alleged that the
SIMI had established links with Osama bin Laden. In the wake of the
attack on the World Trade Centre in New York in September, 2001, SIMI
activists organised demonstrations at several places in India, castigating
America as an 'enemy of Islam' and 'an agent of Satan', and lionizing
Osama as a 'true mujahid' and a 'hero fighting the non-believers'. Posters
hailing Osama and supporting the Taliban, including extolling the Taliban's
destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, were put up in several towns, and
Muslims were exhorted to 'trample over infidels'.
Shortly after the attacks
on the World Trade Centre, and emboldened by the Western concern about
Islamist militancy, on 27 September, 2001 the Government of India declared
the SIMI a banned organization under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act 1967. In the wake of the ban, the government arrested most of the
top leaders of the SIMI, along with scores of its activists, closed
all its offices, froze its banks accounts and seized all its assets.
The two-year ban was notified by the Union Home Ministry after the governments
of the states of Uttar Pradesh,
Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh pushed for its proscription in the wake
of allegations of theorganization's involvement in incidents of inter-communal
strife. The ban was sought to be justified on four counts. Firstly,
the SIMI's alleged links with militant Islamist groups in Jammu and
Kashmir and the Pakistani secret services agency, the Inter-Services
Intelligence. Secondly, its alleged links with pan-Islamist militant
organizations and its agenda of working for the establishment of a 'global
Islamic order'. Thirdly, its role in promoting inter-communal rivalry,
hurting the religious sentiments of people of other faiths and allegations
of its involvement in violent incidents.
Lastly, its involvement in
allegedly working to destabilise the country, promoting secessionism
and denying the basis of the Indian Constitution through its virulent
opposition to nationalism, democracy and secularism. SIMI leaders rebutted
all these charges, insisting that they had always abided by peaceful
and democratic methods and that their work had all along been limited
only to 'character building'. Its President, Shahid Badr Falahi, insisted
that the SIMI was totally opposed to 'any violent or terrorist activities'.
Muslim and even some secular and leftist organizations were quick to
protest the government decision,branding it as partisan and blatantly
anti-Muslim. It was pointed out that the government had no firm evidence
of the SIMI's involvement in violent incidents. The ban was said to
be yet further confirmation of the government's anti-Muslim policy and
it was argued that if the government were really serious about tackling
terrorism it should have also banned Hindu terrorist groups, which have
a long history of involvement in anti-Muslim and anti-Christian violence.
It was alleged that the government's move was motivated by political
compulsions, in order to present itself as defender of the Hindus. That
the government chose to ignore these criticisms was a clear indication
that in the war against terrorism a consistent policy of double standards
would be adopted. The message that was conveyed was that the government
had different yardsticks to deal with Hindu and Muslim militants, the
former treated as nationalists' and ardent patriots and the latter as
'enemies of the nation.
For Muslim organizations
this came as little surprise, and although feeble protests were made,
it was realized, as never before, that the aggressive confrontationist
stance of groups like the SIMI could hardly serve the community. Rather,
it had only made their situation as a beleaguered minority even more
precarious. As to whether or not the SIMI was actually behind the recent
Mumbai blasts it is too early to say. In the absence of clear evidence
it would be unwise to rush to any conclusion. Yet, what is obvious is
that the radicalism of Islamist groups like the SIMI, on the one hand,
and Hindu fascist groups, on the other, feed on each other, both speaking
the language of hatred. A consistent mass struggle against both forms
of terrorism, Muslim and Hindu, and insisting that the state take vigorous
action against both, is the only way to ensure that the recent events
in Mumbai are not repeated.