The Emergency And The Sangh
By Arvind
Rajagopal
The Hindu
13 June, 2003
The Emergency rendered the
Jana Sangh, the BJP's predecessor, respectable, and paved the way for
it to enter the mainstream of Indian politics.
AS THE 28th anniversary of
the Emergency arrives, we can expect the BJP and its allies to reminisce
about the loss of civil liberties under Indira Gandhi, and compliment
themselves on overthrowing her despotic rule. It is ironic that a party
with a deplorable record of human rights violations gets this annual
opportunity to boast about its involvement in a nationwide struggle
for democracy. But it should be remembered that the RSS was marginal
at best during the anti-colonial struggle. The main focus of the Sangh
was on "organising Hindu society" - against Muslims, Christians
and communists, but not against the British Raj. Hence, the Emergency
is its better-late-than-never event, and its substitute for the independence
movement.
Indeed, the RSS literature
describes the Emergency as the "second freedom struggle",
with the Sangh at the head of it. The struggle of others in opposing
the Emergency, in this account, was a mere indulgence on the part of
the Sangh; it was the RSS that saved democracy. The role of peoples'
movements is erased here; the Sangh itself is the people, instead. This
claim deserves attention.
The Emergency is a frequently-invoked,
but little-examined period of Indian history. Most discussions of it
centre on Indira Gandhi's
authoritarian personality and the damage to democratic institutions
at that time. Of course, the Congress was voted out of office in 1977,
and this is rightly taken as proof that voters will not
tolerate prolonged abuse of power. But the RSS now declares that it
was responsible for this democratic upsurge. The Emergency, in fact,
rendered the Jana Sangh, the BJP's predecessor, respectable, and paved
the way for it to enter the mainstream of Indian politics. In L.K. Advani's
words, it changed what he called the "untouchable" status
of the Jana Sangh in politics.
What changed? It is helpful
briefly to recollect the immediate events that led to the Emergency.
On June 12, 1975, the Allahabad High Court ruled in favour of Raj Narain
and against Indira Gandhi, declaring her 1971 parliamentary election
in Rae Bareilly null and void because of electoral malpractice. Meanwhile,
the ABVP-led Nav Nirman movement
in Gujarat and the Sampoorna Kranti agitation led by Jayaprakash Narayan
(J.P.) in Bihar had made an impact in those States. Indira Gandhi appealed
to the Supreme Courtfor an absolute stay order against the High Court
judgment. On June 24, the Supreme Court granted her a conditional stay,
depriving her of voting rights in the Lok Sabha, but allowing her to
continue as Prime Minister. On June 25, J.P. and other Opposition leaders,
including Morarji Desai, held a public rally at the Ram Lila grounds
in Delhi where they declared that Indira Gandhi should resign; they
urged the people to join them in a non-cooperation movement. The following
morning, Indira Gandhi announced a national Emergency assumed in view
of "threats to national security". The Nav Nirman and the
J.P. movements were
described as among the threats to national stability, though these
movements might, in fact, have already peaked by April or May 1975.
Opposition leaders were arrested, censorship was imposed, and a ban
was soon announced on grassroots organisations, including the RSS and
13 of its cover organisations.
In the propaganda accompanying
the Emergency, secularism and
socialism were the watchwords of Indira Gandhi's Government. It was
at this time that India came to be declared as a sovereign,
socialist, secular, democratic republic, with `socialist' and
`secular' being added by her. Campaigns for discipline and
productivity were instituted, including Indira Gandhi's 20-point
programme, but what became most controversial was Sanjay Gandhi's five-point
programme. Two of those five points were mainly pursued, namely, sterilisation
campaigns, aimed disproportionately at Muslims, and urban "beautification"
drives beginning at settlements in the Jama Masjid area in Delhi. The
backlash against these campaigns was widespread. Not surprisingly, after
the Emergency, both ruling and opposition parties increasingly came
to distance themselves from using the word `secularism,' regardless
of who was in power. Indira Gandhi herself, when she returned to power
in 1980, began to cultivate the Hindu vote. She herself accepted the
invitation to launch the VHP's `Ekatmata Yatra', also called the `Ganga
jal yatra', in 1983; this was the VHP's first mass contact programme,
and confirmed that Hindu ritual and symbolism could be effectively utilised
for popular mobilisation. It was following the success of this campaign
that the VHP launched the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation.
The importance of the Emergency
in the growth of the RSS needs to be emphasised because it helps place
Hindutva in a wider historical process rather than in a timeless world
of fanaticism. With the Opposition leaders in jail (and a section of
the parliamentary Left supporting the Emergency), the RSS was, besides
the CPI (M), one of the major grassroots organisations with a national
reach. Among other things, it played a significant role in the production
and distribution of underground literature. An all-India weekly news
bulletin, Lok Sangharsh, in English and Hindi, and another local bulletin,
Jana Vani, began to be produced in mid-July 1975. It was duplicated
in ten centres in Delhi and distributed in the thousands in adjoining
States. Opposition members' speeches in the emergency session of Parliament
in July 1975 were printed in Hindi and English, as well as pamphlets
about the RSS' role in the Opposition. The Delhi
News Bulletin, started by the RSS a few months after the Emergency,
was sent to all State capitals, and this process was repeated at the
district levels.
Complicating this elaborate
documentation of the RSS'
counter-propaganda work, however, was the abject attitude of the RSS
chief, Balasaheb Deoras, in his letters to Indira Gandhi from
Yeravada Jail. Deoras promised that his organisation would be at the
disposal of the Government "for national uplift" if the ban
on the RSS were lifted and its members freed from jail. How is it that
the leader of the "second freedom struggle" seemed prepared
to betray the people for so small a price as his release? Again, the
RSS literature makes it clear that it did not even want to ask for lifting
of the ban because "it could put off Indira (and) make her refuse
all other demands as well, thus closing all avenues to a solution".
Is it possible to imagine such an organisation at the head of a democratic
struggle?
In the RSS' own account of
the Emergency, Apatkaleen Mein Sangharsh Gatha (1978), translated into
English in 1991, although there are numerous anecdotes about covert
encounters between underground activists, and literature circulated,
there is a striking paucity of signs of a movement in conventional terms
- large gatherings, collective action, clashes with police, specific
advances made, etc. As per existing records, RSS activists spent the
time of the Emergency networking with each other and with other activists,
and publishing counter-propaganda. This is now taken as representing
the nation itself, in a "second freedom struggle". We have
nothing approaching a comprehensive history of the Emergency, but what
the above suggests is that the RSS is trying to fabricate an account
of democratic struggle that exists mainly in its own records. But as
a matter of its own orientation, the impact on the RSS was considerable.
From being a deeply self-absorbed organisation focussed mainly on `shakha'
and character-building, the RSS began to realise that popular mobilisation
was a short-cut to political power. Among other things, this reflected
the reality after independence: with the
taint of the Gandhi assassination, the RSS was truly a political
outcaste. But after the Emergency, acquiring political power came within
reach. The rest, as they say, is history.
(The writer teaches anthropology
at the New York University.)