Chinas
Anti-Secession Law
By John Chan
17 March 2005
World
Socialist Web
At
the final session of Chinas National Peoples Congress (NPC) on
Monday, the handpicked delegates assembled in the Great Hall of the
People passed an anti-secession law that outlaws any declaration
of independence by Taiwan. The legislation formalises Chinas longstanding
threat to use military force in the event of any Taiwanese breakaway.
The law calls for
the building of a peaceful framework across Taiwan Strait,
including through negotiation, to end the current military standoff
and give Taiwan an appropriate status. But it also provides
for the Chinese government to use non-peaceful means to
prevent a split by Taiwan from China in any form.
Clause No. 8 authorises the launching of war without prior consultation
with the NPC.
Despite Beijings
denials, the law will compound tensions in North East Asia. Taiwanese
President Chen Shui-bian immediately denounced the law and called for
a rally of one million on March 26 to oppose it. While Chen has backed
away from promises to hold a referendum on the status of the island,
his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is based on the demand for full
independence for Taiwan.
Playing down the
threat of war, the Chinese government declared the law was not an order
of war mobilisation and stressed that the use of force is the
last resort when peaceful means are completely exhausted.
The legislation is nevertheless a real threat not only against Taiwan,
but a warning to other Chinese regions where there are separatist movements.
President Hu Jintao,
who took over Chinas top military post at the NPC, told a gathering
of army representatives: We shall step up preparations for possible
military struggle and enhance our capabilities to cope with crises,
safeguard peace, prevent wars and win the wars if any. In their
comments to the media, delegates from the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)
bluntly declared strong support for such a law to crush
Taiwans secession.
These warnings have
been made before. China, which regards Taiwan as a renegade province,
calls for its integration with the mainland along the lines of Hong
Kongon the basis of one country, two systems. Taiwan
became the refuge for defeated Kuomintang (KMT) forces after the 1949
revolution. Its military regime lost international recognition after
Washingtons rapprochement with Beijing in 1972.
Taiwans present
international status is ambiguous: the US, along with other major powers,
accepts that the island is part of One China, but under
the Taiwan Relations Act it is committed to defending Taiwan against
external attack. Sharp divisions exist in Taipei over the direction
Taiwan is to follow: sections of the ruling elite favour a push for
full independence despite the threat of Chinese attack; their opponents
seek an accommodation with Beijing.
While the international
media has focussed on the potential for conflict between China and Taiwan,
little has been said about why Beijing passed a specific law against
Taiwanese independence. The existing National Defence Law already authorises
the use of the military against any secessionist movement in China.
As far as the state-controlled
media was concerned, the anti-secession law was simply the
will of people. China Daily, for example, rhetorically declared:
[W]hat is surprising if a law on a Chinese issue is to be made
by the Chinese? Who might be better suited for the job? Taiwan is part
of China and Chinese lawmakers are making a law for it. Nothing less
and nothing more.
Behind this nationalist
bombast lies a more fundamental reason. In the aftermath of the 1949
revolution, Beijing did not consider it necessary to legislate for military
action against the KMT dictatorship on Taiwan. It regarded the
liberation of Taiwan as a continuation of Chinese revolution that
had overthrown the KMTs corrupt capitalist regime on the mainland.
The Stalinist bureaucracy
in Beijing, which was based on the seizure of power by peasant-based
armies, was never socialist or communist. From the outset, Mao Zedong
sought an accommodation with sections of the bourgeoisiea process
that culminated in the opening up of China and the pro-market policies
of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s.
Dengs embrace
of capitalism was summed up in the policy he elaborated towards Taiwan,
as well as Hong Kong and Macao. Under his formula one country,
two systems, the capitalist economy and the existing state apparatus
would remain in place, as long as these areas became part of China and
the local ruling elites transferred their political allegiance to Beijing.
Even as he was implementing
market restructuring, Deng cynically argued that the mainlands
socialist system would eventually prove superior and be
embraced in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. Two decades on, Beijings
capitalist trajectory has undermined any claim to be building socialism
in China and thus any justification for a revolutionary war
to reunite Taiwan with China.
Beijing no longer
even speaks of liberating Taiwan. Just as the crime
of counterrevolution has become subversion, so the
liberation of Taiwan has been replaced with a law based
on Chinese nationalism against secession.
The terminological
shift underscores the ideological dependence of Beijing on nationalism
to shore up a base of support. Its economic policies have had a devastating
impact on broad layers of workers and the peasantry. Unable to offer
social policies to even ameliorate widespread unemployment and poverty,
the regime relies on whipping up Chinese nationalism, particularly among
layers of the new middle class, as a means of diverting growing social
tensions. The unification of Taiwan is a key element of this campaign.
Beijing is obviously
concerned that military conflict with Taiwan would immediately involve
the US. At the same time, however, it cannot afford to allow Taiwan
to make an open break for fear of triggering a chain reaction of secessionist
movements elsewhere in China. Beijings heavy-handed methods continue
to fuel separatist sentiment in Tibet and the western oil-rich province
of Xinjiang, and opposition in Hong Kong.
While critical of
the new anti-secession law, Washingtons response to
the NPC vote on Monday was rather muted. White House spokesman Scott
McClellan described the adoption of the legislation as unfortunate,
saying that it ran counter to recent progress in cross-strait
relations. He said the US opposed any attempt to unilaterally
change the status quoa veiled message to Taipei not to take
any steps toward declaring independence.
Bush campaigned
in the 2000 election for a more aggressive US policy towards China,
branding it as a strategic competitor. Once in office, the
Bush administration toned down its rhetoricin part in response
to sections of the US corporate elite that have billions of dollars
invested in China. After September 11, 2001, Washington has been preoccupied
with first the invasion of Afghanistan and then of Iraq. For its part,
Beijing has seized on the global war on terrorism to head
off any confrontation with the US by accommodating to the Bush administration.
Any heightening
of tension over Taiwan, however, would lead to a cooling of relations
between Beijing and Washington and a return to the confrontationist
stance enunciated in 2000.