The
Real Problem With
The Arab Initiative
By Hasan Abu Nimah
03 May, 2007
The
Electronic Intifada
Hopes were building up in the
run up to the last Arab summit that positive moves would revive the
stalled Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, finally.
Those who saw it that way
counted a number of signals: the powerful speech of His Majesty King
Abdullah to the US Congress, where he represented a common Arab view,
stressing the significance of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict as
prerequisite to dealing with other major world problems; the Mecca agreement
and reconciliation between the Palestinian factions which consequently
facilitated the formation of a national unity government, supposedly
united on a one political programme; Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's
remarks praising some aspects of the Beirut Arab summit peace initiative
of 2003; Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's repeated visits to the
region, accompanied by her expressed interest that moves ahead should
occur, and that was coupled with the spreading belief that US policy
setbacks mainly in Iraq needed achievement elsewhere to enable President
George W. Bush to leave a compatible legacy behind; and finally the
activity of the Arab moderates to create a favourable political environment
for encouraging Israel to seize the new opportunity.
This last point was clearly
emphasised at the late March Arab summit, which relaunched the peace
initiative, as planned, on behalf of all Arabs, not only the moderates.
It may still be early to
pass judgement, but since evidence to the contrary is fast emerging,
it may equally be naive to wait for any change; the situation seems
to be as deadlocked as ever. One can count indications in this direction
too.
When Rice was last in the
region, Haaretz referred to Olmert's indifference, due to the fact that
he had Bush's green light not to pay much attention to her diplomatic
efforts. Olmert had, at the time, informed his guest that he would not
deal with any substantial final status issues in his subsequent meetings
with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and that was exactly the case.
And this had its instant negative impact.
After his last meeting with
Olmert, on April 15, Abbas was strongly criticised by one of his closest
supporters, Deputy Prime Minister Azzam Al Ahmad, as well as by Information
Minister Mustafa Barghouthi for coming out of the meeting empty handed.
They both thought that it was completely pointless to repeat such meetings.
I also learned from an involved
American visitor to Amman recently that Bush gave Rice the authority
to act in any manner she deemed appropriate with respect to her Middle
East efforts, but he made it clear to her that he would not be in any
position to put Israel under any pressure. Nothing can be more reassuring
to Israel to continue with its old ways than such a promise.
Is it not obvious that Washington's
deep entanglement in Iraq along with the current situation on the Hill
have deprived it of any means to deal with a thorny issue such as the
Arab-Israeli conflict? In the absence of a meaningful American involvement,
any other components of the "promising" formula lose much
of their effectiveness. But that assumes they were effective. In fact
they were not.
On the Palestinian side,
the national unity government has so far been unable to function. The
security situation remains so grave that the interior minister offered
his resignation. The international boycott continues. The daily Israeli
incursions, killings and arrests of Palestinians have led to the inevitable
collapse of the fragile unofficial "state of pacification".
Neither Olmert nor Abbas is in a position to take drastic decisions,
with the former fighting for his political life in the face of the conclusions
of the Winograd report and the poor evaluation the report has given
to Olmert's Lebanon war management (in addition of course to his domestic
problems), and the latter rushing between Arab and European capitals,
seeking to replenish his depleted authority and bankrupt diplomacy after
almost two years of sterile movement.
Last to dwindle is the relaunched
Arab Peace Initiative, which was, once more, rejected by Israel even
before the Arab summit had concluded.
Much of the emphasis was
on explaining its meaning to the world and to the Israelis. This is
entirely wrong. The problem was never related to understanding or missing
explanation. The Israelis knew and they now know exactly what the initiative
means, probably more than many Arabs believe it involves. They rejected
it precisely because they understand its full meaning and implications,
not the opposite.
We, and the often misled
world opinion, are the ones who need to understand that it is not the
haggling over the exaggerated issue of the refugees that is the obstacle.
The greater obstacle, rather, are the borders, for Israel is not willing
under the current circumstances to negotiate on the basis of evacuating
the land occupied in the 1967 war on all Arab fronts, as the Arab initiative
requires. Overstating the refugee issue has been a deliberate distraction
from the territorial problems which, once implemented in full, would
require the removal of all Israeli settlements built on occupied Arab
land after June 1967.
Could it be possible that
the omission meant that this was less of an issue than the right of
return? We have all been misled into believing that once the "right
of return" is out of the equation, everything else will fall in
place. The truth is that Israel would only bring up the border issue
after finishing with the refugees -- the other step-by-step approach.
The real problem with the
Arab initiative is the absence of Arab political weight behind it. The
initiative has been offered from a position of weakness and inability
to do better. The Arabs were trying to improve their image in the West,
posing as a peace-loving nation that made "peace its strategic
choice", rather than taking an effective step towards a decent
settlement.
When Israel can consolidate
all its war gains without risking anything, why should it be tempted
by a lesser offer, from an "enemy" which has long been fully
taken by granted, an enemy which does not pose any threat.
It is the vast imbalance
of power that is the strategic impediment, according to a recent, and
indeed an excellent, diagnosis of the situation offered by Hussein Agha
and Robert Malley (The New York Review of Books, May 10).
"Israel's power,"
the authors wrote, "provides it with self-confidence, but also
lures it away from the necessary compromise.
"Without the threat,"
they add, "there is little pressure, and without the pressure,
there is scant incentive to [take] political or military risks for the
sake of an uncertain and an ill-defined peace."
The basic problem with the
Arab Peace Initiative is in its "begging approach" which surrenders
completely to the charitable whims of the aggressor. The victim continues
to make gestures and offers without any hint as to what would happen
if such offers are dismissed.
The power of the law, international
law in particular, is not in the voluntary observance, it is in the
code of punishment of those who break it and commit crimes. Without
enforcing international law, it will be foolish to expect change. Pleading
has never been an instrument of policy. It encourages opposite results.
Once more hopes are being
dashed. Unfortunately, in the absence of any improvement, the only other
alternative is for the situation to worsen.
How far can that go?
EI contributor Hasan Abu
Nimah is the former permanent representative of Jordan at the United
Nations. This article first appeared in The Jordan Times.
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