Establishing The New Nuclear Taboo
By Rizwana Abbasi
26 May, 2010
Countercurrents.org
Today the world community is required to grapple a range of challenges. For example, first, nuclear proliferation by individuals (whether the proliferation of knowledge or materials). Second, after 9/11 terrorists’ attack in the US and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan there are increased risks of nuclear terrorism. A third challenge is the behaviour of newly emerging nuclear states seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability: the North Korean withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the aggressive Iranian behaviour in breach of non-proliferation norms both endanger the non-proliferation regime. Fourth, the nuclear black market in material and technologies, dual use technologies and loose export controls in the world remain of concern. Fifth, non-party states to the NPT and the ‘accidental’ use of nuclear weapons by new Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) are now endangering the nuclear taboo.
Proof revealed by the Guardian on 25 May that despite its policy of opacity, and non-signatory to the NPT, Israel appears to be extremely irresponsible state. Offering to sell nuclear weapons to South Africa is almost the worst thing Israel can practice. The step initiated to announce a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) free Middle East at the extension of the NPT treaty in 1995, the world yet failed to challenge Israel’s status. The revelation by the Guardian leaves a big question mark, in the very week when 189 states are discussing as to how address this threat in the NPT review conference, meeting in New York.
The argument presents that a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons is generally accepted as highlighted by Nina Tannenwald in her ‘Nuclear Taboo’ but that this is insufficient to make the world safer from the nuclear danger and that there is require now a new taboo. Instead there needs to be acceptance, which has not yet been achieved, of a second nuclear taboo, namely that nuclear proliferation too is unacceptable because of danger it poses (addressed in author’s forthcoming publication).
Over the last 35 years, the IAEA safeguards system under the NPT has played a vital role in detecting and curbing the diversion of civil uranium to military usage and verifying states’ nuclear facilities. However, these IAEA safeguards confront a number of challenges, such as detecting undeclared nuclear activities; risks from the states which have not joined the NPT; and states which have significant unsafeguarded activities. Additionally, in relation to multilateral export control regimes, the controls have not been sufficiently improved and cooperation and coordination among the Australia Group (AG), the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Wassenaar Arrangements (WA) appear ineffective to date, thus, leaving the regimes’ survival under threat. These multilateral regimes seek to operate a tight control on sensitive exports to some states such as Iran, North Korea and Libya but there is no equivalent for more developed states, particularly China. Harmonization of export controls appears low even among the advanced states such as the US, Japan and the European Union. Nevertheless, some of the states have made improvements in their national export control system since 1990s (such as Germany, Japan and certain other European states). Pakistan is one of those states which has improved its export controls but which still needs to be brought fully into line with improvements worldwide.
Because of the obloquy it suffered in 2003-4 at the time of the revelation of the A.Q. Khan proliferation activities, Pakistan has accepted in effect that there is a new, second nuclear taboo-against nuclear proliferation-and has implemented the measures to achieve this. After the revelation of Dr. A. Q. Khan’s proliferation activities, the changes in Pakistan’s nuclear behaviour appear highly significant. Pakistan has tightened security around its nuclear material and facilities and strengthened its export controls, seeking to align with international standards while remaining a non-NPT state. Pakistan is engaging with the international community to learn from their best practices and experiences. There is a need to formalize and institutionalise this interaction, for Pakistan to keep abreast and benefit from the experiences of the international export control regimes. These regimes, whose standards Pakistan has adopted, should make Pakistan a full partner. Pakistan is fully alive to the threat of nuclear terrorism. Consistent with its national security interest, Pakistan has put in place legislative and regulatory frameworks and an organizational infrastructure to deal with the threat. International efforts against nuclear terrorism should be backed by an international consensus and based on a non-discriminatory approach. No state would be immune from the devastating consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism anywhere in the world. The objective of enhancing nuclear security should therefore be pursued in an inclusive manner. There is a need to review the approach of any set of arrangements which seeks to exclude non-NPT nuclear weapons states and may result in a denial of dual-use technologies including safety and security related equipment. Pakistan should be made a full partner with the world community in the common endeavour against nuclear proliferation. Pakistan has achieved its contribution, in practice, towards establishing the new nuclear taboo against nuclear proliferation. Other states have done likewise. Not all have done so, however, and there still remain important gaps in the new counter-proliferation regime. The importance of an effective campaign against those states which remain in default, and other potential weaknesses in the regime (such as non-complaint companies and rogue individual proliferators) remain. The need is to focus the attention of the international community on all such cases with the same threat of international ‘pariah state’ status with which Pakistan was threatened in 2003-4 had it not fallen into line with the new nuclear taboo against nuclear proliferation. Fuller international awareness of the risks of proliferation and increased international recognition of the new taboo against nuclear proliferation are the essential first steps in strengthening the counter-proliferation regime which are deeply addressed in author’s forthcoming book.
The export control system and policies of several major suppliers and transit states including some key members of the multilateral export control regimes are not fully compatible with international standards. States outside the export control arrangements such as India and Singapore do not adhere to any current multilateral export control guidelines. China, Israel and Russia subscribe to some but not all of the existing guidelines. Many countries appear to lack the commitment to implement compatible controls effectively.
The non-proliferation challenges facing the world today require immediate attention for the strengthening of the NPT and the multilateral export control regimes. Improving the internal workings and coordination among the multilateral export control regimes alone will enhance global security. Unless the momentum behind the NPT is revived and export controls continue to be strengthened, a disaster for the non-proliferation arrangements is predictable.
It is in the world’s interest to take stronger action through existing institutions and agreements so as to lower the nuclear menace and drive the risk of catastrophe as close to zero as possible, as has been suggested by President Obama. President Obama’s speech at Prague conference in April 2009 and subsequent security summit of April 2010 represents the first step forward from his strategy of strengthening the role of international institutions and cooperation which could ensure the durability and productivity of the different partnership. President Obama’s strategy is very important which he initiated to secure nuclear weapons focusing at fundamental points: building the sense of urgency and commitment worldwide; introducing the rules and incentives right; taking partnership based approach; broadening the best practices exchanges and security culture efforts; establishing mechanism and building confidence in progress and building a multilayer’s defence; providing the required leadership planning and resources.
Nevertheless, there is an urgent need to adjust the non-proliferation regime to make it consistent with the current realities, that is, that there are eight or nine (if not more) – and not five – nuclear weapon states. Therefore, Israel revelation has proved that the nuclear arsenals of non-NPT states cannot be overlooked. This argument goes further to security summit and suggests there is need to initiate steps to address non-proliferation policies and regulations to change NWS, non-party states to the NPT and newly emerging states’ behaviour - through cooperation and thus strengthening the role of the NPT. If the role of the NPT is revived and strengthened, multilateral export control regimes and the IAEA’s role can also be reinforced and strengthened within the non-proliferation regime.
The writer is finishing her doctoral degree (June-Jul 2010) at the University of Leicester, UK. She is working on a book entitled “From Prohibition of use to Prohibition of Proliferation: Establishing the New Nuclear Taboo” which is due to be published in 2011
