The
G8 Should Not Forget
The Congolese 60 Million
By James Waters
08 June, 2007
STWR.net
If they want to have any claim
of humanitarian concern for the world’s poor, the G8 leaders meeting
this week in Germany should not ignore the plight of the 60 million
people in Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Around four million have
died as a result of its recent war, and there are credible reports of
hundreds of thousands of rapes. The population has a life expectancy
of 44 years, and diseases such as plague and cholera still occur along
with the usual killers. Conflict within DR Congo is probably the most
important determinant of future conflict in Rwanda, and a significant
determinant of conflict in Burundi.
The DR Congo is close to
the major oil suppliers in Central West Africa, and its conflicts delay
the economic development of a large part of Africa, which is likely
to have a long-run effect of diminishing the economic power of its primary
intercontinental trading partner, Western Europe. The civil war in DR
Congo formally ended in 2003, but there continue to be a large number
of conflict related deaths and access to the east of the country is
limited for both the government in the capital Kinshasa and aid workers.
There remain many armed groups who engage in spasmodic violence against
civilians and each other. Some are groups who did not accept the peace
agreement. Others are foreign combatants including the Interahamwe,
the principal armed group behind the Rwandan genocide of 1994.
The social problems in DR
Congo are sometimes called intractable. The description is convenient
but practically meaningless. Foreign interventions in DR Congo can never
guarantee that conflict will certainly end or persist. They adjust the
chances that war will occur. If the G8 can change the chance of conflict
next year from three quarters down to a half, say, then it is performing
a major service to the Congolese people, even if subsequently conflict
does continue. Certainly, the G8 has limited room to operate. It cannot
influence features such as the ethnic identification of armed groups
or the presence of natural resources which fund them. These are factors
which ensure that in the next decade conflict will be a continuous menace.
In other ways, the G8 can
and does exert a major influence over the conflict. They have supported
the mandate and finances of the United Nations peacekeeping force in
the east of DR Congo. The force is far from perfect, too small to ensure
peace throughout the vast rainforest, and suffering from some of the
grave moral compromises which often affect armies operating outside
of their home territories. Its imperfections cannot be ignored, but
the wider effect of its presence should also be considered. War is sticky.
Once civil war has started, it is difficult to stop, and relapses are
common after ceasefires and truces. The UN peacekeepers increase the
frequency of breaks in conflict and delay the return to battle of armed
groups. It is reasonable to think that the armed groups’ military
structure and operational capability would deteriorate during those
periods, as well as providing some stability for the civilian population.
The population would benefit from continued G8 support for the peacekeepers.
Rapid economic growth clearly
reduces the chance of a return to conflict. As it is a challenging goal
for G8 governments even domestically, the G8 may consider economic growth
to be another feature of DR Congo over which they can exert limited
influence. The Congolese government itself may have modest influence
over growth. Human capital accumulation is a slow process and skilled
Congolese can be tempted to work abroad. Physical capital is vulnerable
in war, so companies prefer a rapid return on investment to long term
commitment, as offered by extractive industries. Even if the government
provides a perfect institutional environment for business, restraints
on human and physical capital accumulation drag back economic growth.
Although G8 governments can
exert limited influence on Congolese economic growth through the classical
drivers of accumulation, they can affect growth through more recently
understood factors. Unrestricted trading access for DR Congo’s
producers is a benefit generally awarded by developed countries which
can be maintained at no cost to the G8. Congolese companies, by virtue
of their specialisation and relatively small size, will present no threat
to their developed country rivals at any time soon.
The Congolese economy would
benefit substantially from sharing G8 technological expertise, both
in physical technology and productive expertise. The exact impact of
technological transfers on growth is not well understood, but is arguably
comparable to that of either physical capital or human capital accumulation
in explaining the rapid economic growth in the world’s newly industrialised
or “tiger” economies. If the G8 can manage some technological
transfer to DR Congo similar in magnitude to the transfers that would
be expected to be carried by foreign direct investment in the absence
of civil conflict, the country is likely to experience part of the spillover
and growth effects associated with normal technological transfers. The
organisation of the transfers would have to be addressed. Swamping the
Congolese market with inappropriately advanced technologies would bring
few benefits.
A possible mechanism for
economically efficient relay of technology would operate through the
Bretton Woods institutions or the United Nations, which already runs
some schemes of technological transfer at a smaller scale than envisioned
here. The idea is to create a subsidised market in technology for Congolese
companies. The technologies would be available for purchase at below
G8 research and development cost to them, but the charge would still
necessitate some efficient market operation and understanding of technology
on the part of local management. The adoption of technologies by companies
would bring competitive pressures in the internal market, and in many
ways reconstruct the circumstances in rapidly industrialising countries
where knowledge of new technologies is carried by foreign direct investment
or foreign educated students. For technologies associated with particular
G8 companies, there could be a restriction on usage to within Congolese
borders and the companies could retain proprietary rights for subsequent
innovations outside DR Congo.
The details of the technological
transfers could be discussed at greater length. It is only one proposal,
like the continued support of a peacekeeping force. If the G8 commits
its financial and mental muscle to DR Congo, it could find other proposals
which would measurably assist the country, show the lie of the inevitability
of conflict, and promote the G8’s own enlightened self-interest.
James Waters
is a research fellow at the Westminster Business School, University
of Wesminster
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