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The G8 Should Not Forget
The Congolese 60 Million

By James Waters

08 June, 2007
STWR.net


If they want to have any claim of humanitarian concern for the world’s poor, the G8 leaders meeting this week in Germany should not ignore the plight of the 60 million people in Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Around four million have died as a result of its recent war, and there are credible reports of hundreds of thousands of rapes. The population has a life expectancy of 44 years, and diseases such as plague and cholera still occur along with the usual killers. Conflict within DR Congo is probably the most important determinant of future conflict in Rwanda, and a significant determinant of conflict in Burundi.

The DR Congo is close to the major oil suppliers in Central West Africa, and its conflicts delay the economic development of a large part of Africa, which is likely to have a long-run effect of diminishing the economic power of its primary intercontinental trading partner, Western Europe. The civil war in DR Congo formally ended in 2003, but there continue to be a large number of conflict related deaths and access to the east of the country is limited for both the government in the capital Kinshasa and aid workers. There remain many armed groups who engage in spasmodic violence against civilians and each other. Some are groups who did not accept the peace agreement. Others are foreign combatants including the Interahamwe, the principal armed group behind the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

The social problems in DR Congo are sometimes called intractable. The description is convenient but practically meaningless. Foreign interventions in DR Congo can never guarantee that conflict will certainly end or persist. They adjust the chances that war will occur. If the G8 can change the chance of conflict next year from three quarters down to a half, say, then it is performing a major service to the Congolese people, even if subsequently conflict does continue. Certainly, the G8 has limited room to operate. It cannot influence features such as the ethnic identification of armed groups or the presence of natural resources which fund them. These are factors which ensure that in the next decade conflict will be a continuous menace.

In other ways, the G8 can and does exert a major influence over the conflict. They have supported the mandate and finances of the United Nations peacekeeping force in the east of DR Congo. The force is far from perfect, too small to ensure peace throughout the vast rainforest, and suffering from some of the grave moral compromises which often affect armies operating outside of their home territories. Its imperfections cannot be ignored, but the wider effect of its presence should also be considered. War is sticky. Once civil war has started, it is difficult to stop, and relapses are common after ceasefires and truces. The UN peacekeepers increase the frequency of breaks in conflict and delay the return to battle of armed groups. It is reasonable to think that the armed groups’ military structure and operational capability would deteriorate during those periods, as well as providing some stability for the civilian population. The population would benefit from continued G8 support for the peacekeepers.

Rapid economic growth clearly reduces the chance of a return to conflict. As it is a challenging goal for G8 governments even domestically, the G8 may consider economic growth to be another feature of DR Congo over which they can exert limited influence. The Congolese government itself may have modest influence over growth. Human capital accumulation is a slow process and skilled Congolese can be tempted to work abroad. Physical capital is vulnerable in war, so companies prefer a rapid return on investment to long term commitment, as offered by extractive industries. Even if the government provides a perfect institutional environment for business, restraints on human and physical capital accumulation drag back economic growth.

Although G8 governments can exert limited influence on Congolese economic growth through the classical drivers of accumulation, they can affect growth through more recently understood factors. Unrestricted trading access for DR Congo’s producers is a benefit generally awarded by developed countries which can be maintained at no cost to the G8. Congolese companies, by virtue of their specialisation and relatively small size, will present no threat to their developed country rivals at any time soon.

The Congolese economy would benefit substantially from sharing G8 technological expertise, both in physical technology and productive expertise. The exact impact of technological transfers on growth is not well understood, but is arguably comparable to that of either physical capital or human capital accumulation in explaining the rapid economic growth in the world’s newly industrialised or “tiger” economies. If the G8 can manage some technological transfer to DR Congo similar in magnitude to the transfers that would be expected to be carried by foreign direct investment in the absence of civil conflict, the country is likely to experience part of the spillover and growth effects associated with normal technological transfers. The organisation of the transfers would have to be addressed. Swamping the Congolese market with inappropriately advanced technologies would bring few benefits.

A possible mechanism for economically efficient relay of technology would operate through the Bretton Woods institutions or the United Nations, which already runs some schemes of technological transfer at a smaller scale than envisioned here. The idea is to create a subsidised market in technology for Congolese companies. The technologies would be available for purchase at below G8 research and development cost to them, but the charge would still necessitate some efficient market operation and understanding of technology on the part of local management. The adoption of technologies by companies would bring competitive pressures in the internal market, and in many ways reconstruct the circumstances in rapidly industrialising countries where knowledge of new technologies is carried by foreign direct investment or foreign educated students. For technologies associated with particular G8 companies, there could be a restriction on usage to within Congolese borders and the companies could retain proprietary rights for subsequent innovations outside DR Congo.

The details of the technological transfers could be discussed at greater length. It is only one proposal, like the continued support of a peacekeeping force. If the G8 commits its financial and mental muscle to DR Congo, it could find other proposals which would measurably assist the country, show the lie of the inevitability of conflict, and promote the G8’s own enlightened self-interest.

James Waters is a research fellow at the Westminster Business School, University of Wesminster

© Copyright 2007 Share The World's Resources (www.stwr.net)



 

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