Home

Crowdfunding Countercurrents

CC Archive

Submission Policy

Popularise CC

Join News Letter

Defend Indian Constitution

#SaveVizhinjam

CounterSolutions

CounterImages

CounterVideos

CC Youtube Channel

Editor's Picks

Feed Burner

Read CC In Your
Own Language

Bradley Manning

India Burning

Mumbai Terror

Financial Crisis

Iraq

AfPak War

Peak Oil

Globalisation

Localism

Alternative Energy

Climate Change

US Imperialism

US Elections

Palestine

Latin America

Communalism

Gender/Feminism

Dalit

Humanrights

Economy

India-pakistan

Kashmir

Environment

Book Review

Gujarat Pogrom

Kandhamal Violence

Arts/Culture

India Elections

Archives

Links

About Us

Disclaimer

Fair Use Notice

Contact Us

Subscribe To Our
News Letter

Name


E-mail:



Search Our Archive



Our Site

Web

 

 

 

 

Quality Of Components In Koodankulam Nuclear Power Plant In India -
Case Study Of The Defective And Prematurely Aged Polar Cranes

By VT Padmanabhan

12 February, 2016
Countercurrents.org

During the two and a half years of its operation, the first reactor at the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP-1), built jointly by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) and the Russian company Atomstroyexport (ASE) has not reported any serious accident. This first and only operating pressurized water reactor (VVER-1000) belonging to Generation-III is advertised as the safest reactor in the world. There are plans to build four more reactors of similar vintage at the same site located on the coast of the Bay of Bengal in the Tamil Nadu state of India.

During the 840 days of its grid connection (on 22 October 2013), the reactor worked for 372 days, tripped (forced outage) for 20 times and was off-grid for 468 days and its capacity factor has been less than 25%. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) attributes these as teething problems due to novelties in the design. The issue of sub-standard and counterfeit components and equipment used at Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) has been under discussion for the past four years. In the light of the dismal performances of the first unit (KKNPP-1) which has been grid connected in October 2013, Dr A Gopalakrishnan, the former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) reiterated that KKNPP-1 “was one of (the) dangerous reactors in the country, the components that went into the construction of the unit at Kudankulam were not checked properly for quality, n there was no proper quality check on the components used for the reactor, and no one knows which part of the KKNPP is going to breakdown and on which day.”[1]

The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) claimed that ‘unflinching commitment to quality and safety are the hallmarks of Indian nuclear power plants”. Quote from the letter No NPCIL/CP&CC/2016/M dated Feb 03 2016:

This case study of the polar cranes installed in KKNPP reactor buildings is a live testimony of the quality assurance programme of NPCIL and the role of AERB in ensuring this.

The Polar Crane

The polar crane of KKNPP weighs 600 tons and according to the Russian manufacturer, its nominal and maximum hoisting force is 350 tons and 450 tons respectively. The first use of the polar crane is for the erection of nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) equipment such as the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), pressurizer and steam generators (SG). It will be also used for repairs of equipments and transportation of hazardous loads such as spent fuel.[2] This is a safety grade component which moves on a circular rail above the reactor shaft to perform transportation and hoisting operations anywhere in the reactor building. Safety grade means that it has a role in prevention and mitigation of accident, besides the role in normal operation.

The Crane according to AERB in 2008

The ship carrying the first crane reached the Kudankulam mini port in January 2005 and on 25 October 2005, the NPCIL said that erection of the "polar crane and other equipment were under way"[3] The AERB annual report for 2007-08[4] recorded that its “Advisory Committee for Project Safety Review (ACPSR) held four meetings and reviewed the problems observed in polar crane erection and implementation of corrective measures.” (page 8) The narration of the problems and their remedial actions given on pages 12-13 of the same report: "As per the joint protocol between the Site (NPCIL) and the Russians", it was decided “to temporarily limit the maximum load capacity of the polar crane up to 332 Tons due to tilting of the main hoist fork under a load of 350 Tons. The polar crane was then released for the erection of steam generator (SG), reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and pressurizer for unit-1. Suitable modifications were incorporated to eliminate the problem subsequently” (pages 12-13). (Italics ours)

AERB and NPCIL about the crane in 2015

So in 2008, the maximum load capacity of the crane was 332 tons against its nameplate capacity of 450 tons. Seven years later, in 2015, the AERB and the NPCIL gracefully replied to the queries about the capacity of the polar cranes of the two reactors at KKNPP and excerpts from their replies are given below:

The AERB’s letter dated 20 November 2015 said: “as the activity at that time (in 2008) was only limited to handling of SG, RPV and pressurizer, all of which have weight <332 t, hence temporarily AERB agreed to restrict the safe working load (SWL) of polar crane upto 332 T” and “subsequently, site installed permanent stoppers for eliminating the problem of inadmissible tilt of main hoist and then polar crane was permanently re-rated back to 350 T capacity. This was checked during regulatory inspections.”[5]

The NPCIL letter dated 11 December 2015, “informed that the hoisting capacity of the polar cranes at KKNPP-1 and 2 is 320 tones.”[6]

The capacity of the cranes in 2008 was 332 tons. Seven years later it increased to 350 tons according to the regulator and decreased to 320 tons according to the operator. The regulator gives the credit for increasing the capacity to the remedial action by the NPCIL, while the latter is totally unaware of this and says that the hoisting capacity has actually been reduced by 12 tons.

Manufacturing history

According to the manufacturer “it is the first time that cranes meeting such stringent requirements are manufactured in Russia.”[7] Media reports from Russia show that the NPCIL’s quality assurance (QA) experts posted in Russia had done their QA job with textbook precision. A report dated 26 March 2004 states that “on March 19, 2003, they visited the UHMEW for auditing the manufacturing capabilities and signed the protocol.”[8] Fifteen months later, www.nuclear.ru reported that an “an acceptance-transfer test on 17 August 2004 showed that the first polar crane "complies with stringent technical requirements,”[9] and it was shipped to India on 17 December 2004.[10]

During 2005-11, UHMEW manufactured 125 small and large cranes, of which, 57 were supplied to Kudankulam. The polar cranes supplied to KKNPP are not mentioned in the list of cranes manufactured by it. UHMEW did not manufacture a polar crane for any other NPP either.[11] But they are still ready to make them for India as this February 2015 website entry affirms: “it has delivered for the Indian NPP two circle (polar) cranes with lifting capacity of 350+190/32 tons” and the “references obtained will allow us to have advantages when participating in tenders for manufacturing equipment for the third and the fourth power generating units for the Indian station.”[12]

The Russia-India joint protocol for Quality Assurance

The AERB annual report mentions about the ‘the joint protocol between the Site (NPCIL) and the Russians’ in which the issue of polar crane was resolved. The exact agenda, date and venue of this protocol is not known. But there are some details about a VVIP conclave at Kudankulam, two months before the commissioning of the polar crane. On 23 January 2007, The Hindu reported that the Russian Minister for Atomic Energy (currently the chief of Rosatom, the Russian civil nuclear manufacturing conglomerate) Sergie Kirienko visited Kudankulam two days before the Delhi visit of the President of the Russian Federation. He held “discussions with Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Anil Kakodkar and top officials of the NPCIL including its CMD S.K. Jain, Director (Projects) S.K. Agrawal and Project Director (KKNPP) K.C. Purohit after inspecting “the RPV installed in the first reactor”.[13] Inspection of equipment is done by specialists; Kirienko is a bureaucrat turned politician turned businessman. The polar crane of KKNPP-1 was commissioned in April 2007, two months after this conclave.

Here, two brand new cranes with a name-plate capacity of 450 tons could lift only 332 tons. About the crane for the second reactor, AERB says that “some base metal defects and weld defects were observed at site for polar crane for unit-2, which were not observed in the manufacturing plant" and "these defects were rectified at site.”[14](Ref 46 pp 12-13) We will revert to the quality culture of DAE and NPCIL after a brief description of what two other regulators say about the safety significance of the polar crane.

The Safety significance of the polar crane

The Finnish regulator, STUK says that “there are tens of cranes in use at the nuclear power plant, but only the (polar) cranes used in the transfer of nuclear fuel or in other safety significant lifting operations are under its special control."[15] No wonder the Indian regulator held four advisory meetings on the issue.

A US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Survey of Crane Operating Experience at NPPs during 1968-2002 shows an increase in “load drop events involving overhead cranes during 1992-2002.”[16] KKNPP-1 polar crane started shivering -an ageing effect- even before the erection. According to another NRC study “the principal safety concerns related to heavy load handling, involve load drops that damage either the spent fuel storage facilities, the fuel in RPV, or the residual heat removal capability while the plant is shut down with fuel in the reactor vessel. If a floor breach were to occur during a load drop, safety-related components located on the lower floors could be adversely affected. A load drop that penetrates the operating floor in certain areas could simultaneously initiate an accident and disable the equipment necessary to mitigate the accident”.[17]

The Role of AERB in Quality Assurance

The AERB has been involved in literature survey on quality assurance in nuclear plants since at least 1993 and it has so far published 10 guidelines on this topic. The AERB’s QA Guidelines (2009 revision) assigns only a minor insignificant role for the regulator, as the ultimate authority on QA of nuclear installations in India is the responsible organization (RO). “The RO is the “organization having overall responsibility for siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of a facility”. By this definition, QA is the responsibility of the NPCIL. While in other countries, safety significant components are manufactured under the supervision of the regulator, the AERB does not mix up with the contractors. For instance, 2003 the AERB wanted to know the elemental balance sheet of the steel that was used for the fabrication of the KKNPP reactor pressure vessel. The NPCIL replied only years after the arrival of the RPV. All what the AERB does in the field of quality assurance is the regulatory inspections at the construction sites. During 5 years between 2004-08, components weighing about 50,000 tons were received from Russia and the AERB conducted 15 regulatory inspections KKNPP-1.

What happens if substandard components are detected? The product or process that does not conform to the “specified requirements shall be identified, segregated, controlled, recorded and reported to an appropriate level of management within the organisation” and “the impact of non-conformances shall be evaluated and non conforming products or processes shall be either (a) rejected, (b) repaired, (c) reworked, (d) accepted with modifications, or (e) accepted as is.”[18]

This evaluation has to be done by the NPCIL and that is what happened in the case of polar cranes. The AERB detected the defects, held four advisory committee meetings and informed the NPCIL accordingly. The NPCIL evaluated the defects, held a high level joint protocol between the DAE/NPCIL and the Rosatom and accepted the cranes as they were. There it ends. One does not need more evidences for assessing the quality assurance culture of NPCIL. There are a couple of other instances too, as the polar crane is not the only junk piece of equipment installed at KKNPP.

The quality-safety conscious scientists of AERB committee succeeded in holding back the underperforming crane for two years. That was their self-imposed limit as per AERB’s own Safety Guideline. They also recorded their findings and experiences for posterity, so that they will not be blamed if the unthinkable happens. Those 50 odd words speak volumes on the quality and safety culture of the Department of Atomic Energy. In spite of the absence of autonomy and whistle-blower protection, the AERB scientists have done their best, and kept the KKNPP safety debate alive with their cryptic comments in so few words.

DAE’s Quality Control in the Courts

The issue of safety of the components at KKNPP was raised in the writs and appeals in the Madras High Court and the Supreme Court of India. The Hon'ble Mr.Justice P.Jyothimani and the Hon’ble Mr.Justice M.Duraiswamy wrote in their judgment dated, 31.8.2012 in W.P.Nos.24770 etc in the Madras High Court:

“It is seen that at various stages of commissioning of the plant, the AERB acts as a continuous supervisor, being an expert body, and at every point starting from the initiation of the nuclear power plant, apart from other plants like heavy water plants; Uranium/Thorium processing and fuel fabrication plants; mining and processing of radioactive ores and minerals; the Code contemplates various stages of consenting process, namely siting, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning.”[19]

The affidavit submitted by Soumen Sinha, scientific officer of the AERB in the Special leave petition (Civil) No 36179 of 2013 in the Supreme Court of India, contains a copy of the AERB Safety Code No AERB/NPP/SC/QA (pages 45 to 82). If the Honourable Judges had read this 37 page document, would they have painted a larger than life image of the AERB ‘as a continuous supervisor’ and dismissed the concerns of poor quality control at KKNPP? Incidentally, the details of the polar cranes and other obsolete equipment at KKNPP were available in the public domain during the hearings.[20]

Conclusion

NPCIL’s reply to the query under the Right to Information Act shows that the hoisting capacity of the cranes has decreased by 12 tons (from 332 tons to 320 tons) during seven years post-erection. The AERB says that some of the equipment inside the RB weigh 330 tons. This means, KKNPP does not have a functional polar crane. Is it safe to run this reactor? Time for another joint protocol between the DAE and the RF?

The aged and shivering polar crane will not initiate an accident in the immediate future as it has no role to play in the day-to-day operation of the plant. Nevertheless, the DAE/NPCIL/AERB may consider responding to this specific safety issue, point by point. Quotes from textbooks on QA are good for kids writing their term papers.

As mentioned earlier, there are other safety grade components whose defects were revealed since the first failed attempt of fuel-loading of the reactor in September 2012. Most of them were fabricated in the Soviet Union during the 1980’s and were rendered surplus due to the post-Chernobyl cancellation of over two dozens of VVER-1000 reactors. A very important item in the primary coolant was ‘maked’ in India by poorly qualified welders with no certification in nuclear-grade welding. Some of the items were damaged and replaced by the manufacturers. We will continue our gossips about the safest, Generation-III reactor in the world. In the mean time, please remember that the warranty period of the KKNPP-1, reactor which has already expired on 30 December 2015, has been extended for another three months. Let us pray that the operators of the reactor will not be unduly pressurized to deliver, as they are dealing with the confined spaces with high pressure, containing toxins that can inflict unacceptable and unimaginable sufferings to millions of people.

VT Padmanabhan, a member of the Nuclear Consultancy Group (NCG) has been writing on nuclear safety and health effects (genetic and somatic) of ionizing radiation. All his reports on the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant have been published in the Countercurrents.org Most of his published works are available at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Padmanabhan_VT.

Email : [email protected]

[1] The Hindu, January 31, 2016. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/kudankulam- plant-not-safe-without- proper-quality-checks/article8173932.ece
[2] IAEA, 2013, Status report 107 - VVER-1200 (V-392M) (VVER-1200 (V-392M)) http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/aris/2013/35.VVER-1200%28V-392M%29.pdf
[3] The Hindu, 25 October 2005. http://www.hindu.com/2005/10/25/stories/2005102506040500.htm
[4] AERB Annual Report 2007-2008. p 8, www.aerb.gov.in/T/annrpt/2007/annrpt2k7.pdf
[5] AERB letter No AERB/RSD/RTI/Appl. No 646/2015/6530 dated 20 Nov 2015, addressed to VT Padmanabhan
[6] SK Shrivastava, 2015, NPCIL letter No MPCIL/CPIO/MUMBAI-HQ/685/2015/1572/711 dated 11 Dec 2015 addressed to VT Padmanabhan
[7] Tests of the second polar crane manufactured by Uralmashplant are successfully completed at Kudankulam NPP in India, 14.12.2007. http://www.uralmash.ru/eng/presscentre/news/aboutnews.htm?news=37
[8] Uralmashzavod manufacturing capabilities for NPP Kudankulam equipment were inspected .21.03.2003. http://www.nuclear.ru/eng/press/other_news/1800136/
[9] Polar crane for Kudankulam NPP accepted. 17.08.2004. http://www.nuclear.ru/eng/press/other_news/1800949/
[10] http://www.nuclear.ru/eng/press/other_news/1801140/
[11] United Heavy machinery , 2011, Precise Solutions For The Heavy Industry http://www.omz.ru/media/press-center/OMZ_2011_eng.pdf
[12] http://www.omz.ru/en/news?id=511
[13] http://www.hindu.com/2007/01/23/stories/2007012316701200.htm
[14] AERB Annual Report 2007-2008. pp 12-13 www.aerb.gov.in/T/annrpt/2007/annrpt2k7.pdf
[15] http://www.stuk.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/2006/en_GB/news_419/_files/89665450803012526/def ault/investigationreport.pdf
[16] Lloyd, RL, 2003, A Survey of Crane Operating Experience at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants from 1968 through 2002. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1774/sr1774.pdf
[17] US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2005, NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-25: Clarification of NRC guidelines for control of Heavy Loads. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/reg-issues/2005/ri200525.pdf
[18] AERB Safety Code No. AERB/NPP/Sc/Qa (Rev. 1) Quality Assurance In Nuclear Power Plants Approved by the Board on January 16, 2009 http://www.aerb.gov.in/AERBPortal/pages/English/t/publications/CODESGUIDES/SC-QA1.pdf
[19] The Hon'ble Mr.Justice P.Jyothimani and The Honourable Mr.Justice M.Duraiswamy, 31.8.2012 W.P.Nos.24770 and connected Miscellaneous Petitions in Madras High Court
[20] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237087081_Counterfeitobsolete_Equipment_and_
Nuclear_Safety_issues_of_VVER-1000_Reactors_at_Kudankulam_India



 



 

Share on Tumblr

 

 


Comments are moderated