Equatorial
Guinea: 40 Years Of independence
By Agustin Velloso
07 October, 2007
Countercurrents.org
1. One decade of enormous economic growth.
Equatorial Guinea, a very
small country (28.000 sq km and population around 550.000) situated
in the Gulf of Guinea, in Western Africa, has remained almost unnoticed
for the rest of the world until the last years of the last century and
the beginning of the 21st.
In recent reports made public
by international observers, the country is mainly associated to “the
spectacular abundance of oil revenues” and consequently with the
“the world’s highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth
between 1995 and 2001”. The comparison of the economic data either
with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa nowadays, or with Equatorial Guinea
before the oil era, is revealing. Concerning GDP, the average annual
growth between 1984 and 1994 was 3.0, while between 1994 and 2004 it
reached 21.6. Besides, concerning GDP per capita, the average annual
growth between 1984 and 1994 was 0.5, while between 1994 and 2004 was
18.4. At the same time, GDP was 10.0 and GDP per capita 7.4 in 2004
for Sub-Saharan Africa. The average annual growth in the industry (1994-2004)
was 43.1 for Equatorial Guinea, while it was 25.5 for in 2003 for Sub-Saharan
Africa. (1)
2. Mismatch between economic
development and human development.
Has economic development
been translated into human development? The OECD is rather sparing in
its assessment: “Oil revenues are considerable and have deeply
transformed the economic structure of the country; however they have
not yet greatly benefited the whole of its small population.”
The European Union states:
“this increase in resources has not yet been matched in the social
sphere by a similar improvement in the living conditions of the population,
which still show worrying indicators. Equatorial Guinea is currently
in position 110 (out of 162) in the Human Development Index (HDI) of
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)”.
The United States Department
of State is sententious in its description: “The majority of the
population lives by subsistence agriculture, supplemented by hunting
and fishing. (…) There is little evidence that the country’s
oil wealth is being devoted to the public good.” (2)
3. Management of oil wealth:
economic success and social failure.
While sources coincide in
their description of Equatorial Guinea’s economic success, together
with the lack of a similar social progress, they differ in their judgement
of the reasons behind the mismatch.
The OECD stresses the “inadequacy of the institutional environment
of Equatorial Guinea. (…) Basic infrastructure is one of the major
bottlenecks for the development of Equatorial Guinea. (…) Other
serious concerns arise from the weak separation of power between judiciary,
executive and legislative.”
For the European Union, the
lack of social progress “is mainly due to a paralysed and very
inefficient administration, which curbs the country’s development.”
It further stresses lack of awareness about the ‘public service’
idea, power centralization and lack of knowledge of procedures and laws
as negative factors.
The United States Department
of State has another explanation: “Corruption and a dysfunctional
judicial system disrupt the development of Equatorial Guinea’s
economy and society. (…) The government budget still does not
include all revenues and expenditures. (…) Application of the
laws remains selective. Corruption among officials is widespread, and
many business deals are concluded under nontransparent circumstances.”
(3)
Poor infrastructure, lack
of inefficiency, or simply corruption? In 2004 the United States Senate
released a report on money laundering focusing in Equatorial Guinea.
The senators consider the president and his family responsible in several
cases of grave wrongdoing: “Riggs Bank managed more than 60 accounts
and certificates of deposit for Equatorial Guinea, its officials, and
their family members, with little or no attention to the bank’s
anti-money laundering obligations”. Oil is at the core of this:
“Oil companies operating in Equatorial Guinea may have contributed
to corrupt practices in that country by making substantial payments
to, or entering into formal business ventures with, individual E.G.
officials, their family members, or entities they control, with minimal
public disclosure of their actions.” (4)
4. Politics and human development
in Equatorial Guinea
Equatorial Guinea’s
recent history shows the country had three solid foundations on which
the government could have based the country’s development. During
the twenty nine years of continuous Obiang’s presidency, Equatorial
Guinea has signed or ratified all major international instruments in
every sphere of the political realm and has become a party to almost
any major international convention. Besides, during this period, major
powers, plus the former colonial power, Spain, have been trading with
Equatorial Guinea and cooperating in its development. Moreover, the
oil boom of the last ten years has provided the funds to finance development
projects.
However, Teodoro Obiang,
who became the country’s president through a coup against his
uncle Macías in 1979, has sought above all to perpetuate himself
in power and reap all benefits. This has been possible through a mix
of a) marred elections; b) political repression; c) control of the state
powers: judicial, legislative and governmental; d) control of the country’s
resources; and e) international political and economic support.
a) Municipal, parliamentary
and presidential elections are held and political parties other than
the -ever winning- president’s Partido Democrático de Guinea
Ecuatorial (PDGE) are allowed to participate in the elections. However,
as it happens with any other political activity and the exercise of
the political, social, economic and cultural rights, what exists in
theory does not exist in reality. “In early January 1996 Obiang
called for presidential elections. International observers agreed that
the campaign was marred by fraud. (…) In April 2004, parliamentary
and municipal elections took place. President Obiang’s party and
allied parties won 98 of 100 seats in parliament and all but seven of
244 municipal posts. International observers criticized both the election
and its results.” (5)
b) The regime’s human
rights record is very poor. This has been documented in several reports
by the United Nations Human Rights Commission Special Representative,
who has described torture as a “normal means of investigation”.
The representative has also pointed at beatings and abuse of suspects,
prisoners and opposition politicians as well as lack of food and medical
care for detainees.
c) The current constitution
-in force since 1982- gives the president extensive powers, amongst
them: naming and dismissing members of the cabinet, making laws by decree,
and dissolving the Chamber of Representatives. He also appoints the
governors of the seven provinces. At the top of the judicial system
is the president himself and his judicial advisers. Besides he retains
his role as commander in chief of the armed forces. Most of the highest
government positions are occupied by the president’s close relatives
(brothers, sons, half-brothers and uncles), by members of his clan (Esangui)
and by people chosen from his hometown (Mongomo). On the other hand,
the law does not provide for access to government information.
d) Control by Equatorial
Guinea’s elite of the state resources has already been shown above.
Suffice it to underline that besides the most important industries,
oil and timber, almost any other economic sector –except for subsistence
activities- is also under its control.
e) There are a number of
individual countries and international state bodies cooperating with
Equatorial Guinea. On the one hand, cooperation laws and principles
require that assistance must contribute to the improvement of the social
and economic situation of the population. Moreover, aid has to be linked
to the implementation of democratic policies by the recipient government.
On the other, in practice, cooperation is carried out with disregard
to political conditions. While some non government organisations (NGOs)
have terminated projects in Equatorial Guinea because of those, individual
countries and international agencies maintain aid programmes and political
links.
Conclusion: Understanding
poor human development in a rich country.
Equatorial Guinea’s
recent history shows that its sudden and easily acquired wealth has
proved unable to make the country go noticeably up the scale of human
development. On the other hand, the country’s economic and political
integration in the international community has not helped either.
According to the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) rank, Equatorial
Guinea is close to the bottom of the medium human development group
and it is placed in position 121 of 177 countries. The country has experienced
some improvement in the last years, during the oil period: In 1999 it
was placed in position 131 of 174, closer to the bottom of the same
group. However, GDP per capita (PPP$) was 1.817 in 1999, while it is
19.780 in 2005. There is not a single country in this group with a similar
GDP per capita. The closest is Oman with 13.584, placed in position
71, near to the top of the same group. On the other hand, life expectancy
at birth is 74.1 in Oman and 43.3 in Equatorial Guinea.
In other words: almost forty
years after the country achieved independence (October 12, 1968) and
more than ten years after the start of the oil industry, Equatorial
Guinea’s position in the HDI is quite far from what is expected
for a country with the world’s highest GDP growth in 1995-2001.
This challenges explanations
about lack of progress that point to administration inefficiency, poor
infrastructure and, of course, cultural and natural reasons. Equatorial
Guinea’s example shows that misappropriation and mismanagement
of wealth by the elite is the main cause behind the lack of human development.
At the same time, this casts serious doubts about aid policies by Western
powers towards Third World countries.
(1) OECD/AfDB (2002) African Economic Outlook. Equatorial Guinea, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/1/1824667.pdf,
accessed 14/5/2007; Cooperación Guinea Ecuatorial – Comunidad
Europea (2002) Estrategia de la Cooperación y Programa Indicativo
2002-2007, Malabo, http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/
body/csp_rsp/print/gq_csp-pt.pdf, accessed 14/5/2007.
(2) United States Department of State (2003) Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, USDS, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2002/18181pf.htm, accessed 14/5/2007.
(3) United States Department of State (2005) Background Note: Equatorial
Guinea, USDS, Bureau of African Affairs, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/7221.htm,
accessed 14/5/2007.
(4) United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2004)
Money Laundering and Foreign corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness
of the Patriot Act. Case Study Involving Riggs Bank, http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/ACF5F8.pdf,
accessed 14/5/2007.
(5) United States Department
of State (2005).
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