"Rebuilding
America's Defenses" A Summary
Compiled by Bette Stockbauer
7 May, 2003
Full
text here
When the Bush administration
started lobbying for war with Iraq, they used as rationale a definition
of preemption (generally meaning anticipatory use of force in the face
of an imminent attack) that was broadened to allow for the waging of
a preventive war in which force may be used even without evidence of
an imminent attack. They also were able to convince much of the American
public that Saddam Hussein had something to do with the attacks of 9/11,
despite the fact that no evidence of a link has been uncovered. Consequently,
many people supported the war on the basis of 1) a policy that has no
legal basis in international law and 2) a totally unfounded claim of
Iraqi guilt.
What most people do not know,
however, is that certain high ranking officials in the Bush administration
have been working for regime change in Iraq for the past decade, long
before terrorism became an important issue for our country. In 1997
they formed an organization called the Project for the New American
Century (PNAC). They have sought the establishment of a much stronger
U.S. presence throughout the Mideast and Iraq's Saddam Hussein has been
their number one target for regime change. Members of this group drafted
and successfully passed through Congress the Iraqi Liberation Act, giving
legal sanctions for an invasion of the country, and funneled millions
of taxpayer dollars to Hussein opposition groups called the Iraqi National
Congress and The Committee for the Liberation of Iraq.
The PNAC philosophy was formed
in response to the ending of Cold War hostilities with Russia and the
emergence of America as the world's only preeminent superpower. Claiming
that this is a "strategic moment" that should not be squandered,
members of PNAC say that America should use its position to advance
its power and interests into all areas of the globe. They believe the
time is ripe for establishing democracies in regimes considered hostile
to U.S. interests and are not hesitant to advise the use of military
means to achieve those ends.
PNAC members on the Bush
team include Vice-President Dick Cheney and his top national security
assistant, I. Lewis Libby; Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; National Security Council member
Eliot Abrams; Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security
John Bolton; and former Chairman of the Defense Policy Board, Richard
Perle. Other PNAC members exerting influence on U.S. policy are the
President of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq Randy Scheunemann,
Republican Party leader Bruce Jackson and current PNAC chairman William
Kristol, conservative writer for the Weekly Standard. Jeb Bush, the
president's brother and governor of Florida, is also a member.
Their campaign to overthrow
Hussein was unsuccessful during the Clinton presidency and early days
of Bush's term, but on 9/11 they found the event they needed to push
for the overthrow of Hussein. Within 24 hours both Wolfowitz and Cheney
were calling for an invasion of Iraq, even before anyone knew who had
been responsible for the attacks.
Individuals who now belong
to PNAC have been influencing White House policy since the Reagan era,
calling for coups in Central America and claiming that a nuclear war
with Russia could be "winnable." Richard Perle is one of their
most prominent spokesmen. He and Michael Ledeen (of the American Enterprise
Institute), who is currently lobbying for war with Syria and Iran, have
adopted a stance that they call "total war" the ability
to wage multiple simultaneous wars around the globe to achieve American
ends. Recently Perle commented on America's war on terrorism: "No
stages," he said, "This is total war. We are fighting a variety
of enemies. There are lots of them out there. All this talk about first
we are going to do Afghanistan, then we will do Iraq . . . this is entirely
the wrong way to go about it. If we just let our vision of the world
go forth, and we embrace it entirely and we don't try to piece together
clever diplomacy, but just wage a total war . . . our children will
sing great songs about us years from now."
Members of PNAC are so self-assured
they are advancing America's best interests that they publish policy
papers specifically outlining their plans, plans that many fear may
be laying the groundwork for a third world war. Their ideas are peculiarly
atavistic, considering the friendly ties that have been forged between
most of the major nations during the past ten years.
Their central policy document
is entitled "Rebuilding America's Defenses (RAD)," published
on their website at http://newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf.
It outlines a plan for American hegemony in the coming years, pinpointing
"problem areas" of the world and suggesting regime change
of unfavorable governments so that eventually the whole world will be
unified under the banner of American democracy.
Already we are seeing evidence
of PNAC influence on U.S. policy. For instance, the concept of "Homeland
Defense" comes straight from "RAD." Iran, Iraq and North
Korea, nations that George Bush calls the "Axis of Evil",
are listed together in "RAD" several times as possible military
threats to the U.S. There is a suggestion that military spending be
increased to 3.8 percent of the GDP, exactly the amount (over and above
present expenses for the Iraqi campaign) Bush has proposed for next
year's budget. Its basic statement of policy bespeaks and advocates
the very essence of the idea of preemptive engagement.
Bush's National Security
Strategy of September 20, 2002, adopted PNAC ideas and emphasized a
broadened definition of preemption. Since we are already hearing accusations
against regimes in Iran and Syria, will they be slated next for invasion?
The document is written with
all of the single-mindedness, unilateralism and inattention to international
ramifications (with either friend or foe) that the Bush administration
displayed in its current build-up for war with Iraq. There is even assertion
of the necessity of American political leadership overriding that of
the U.N. (p. 11), a policy that was sadly played out when the U.S. invaded
Iraq without the approval of either the U.N. or the international community.
Rebuilding America's Defenses
I believe that "Rebuilding
America's Defenses" is a must-read for anyone concerned about the
future of our planet. Since the document is over 80 pages long I have
created a summary of its major ideas in order to make it more accessible.
Subject areas are arranged
under 4 categories: A. Pax Americana outlining the rationale
for global empire, B. Securing Global Hegemony pinpointing regions
that are considered trouble spots for U.S. policy, C. Rebuilding the
Military plans for expansion of U.S. military might, and D. Future
Wars of Pax Americana the "RAD" vision of complete
control of land, sea, air, space and cyberspace.
As much as possible I have
used direct quotations followed by page numbers so that the reader can
consult the original. My personal comments are in italics.
For further reading about
the PNAC, see the following articles:
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article1665.htm
(Information Clearing House has many excellent articles about the
PNAC.)
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article2326.htm
(this article is followed by a long list of links to published articles
about the plans of the Bush Administration influenced by the PNAC.)
http://www.mailarchive.com/[email protected]/msg12730.html
http://pilger.carlton.com/print/124759
A. Pax Americana
"It is not a choice
between preeminence today and preeminence tomorrow. Global leadership
is not something exercised at our leisure, when the mood strikes us
or when our core national security interests are directly threatened;
then it is already too late. Rather, it is a choice whether or not to
maintain American military preeminence, to secure American geopolitical
leadership, and to preserve the American peace" (p. 76).
The building of Pax Americana
has become possible, claims "RAD," because the fall of the
Soviet Union has given the U.S. status as the world's singular superpower.
It must now work hard not only to maintain that position, but to spread
its influence into geographic areas that are ideologically opposed to
our influence. Decrying reductions in defense spending during the Clinton
years "RAD" propounds the theory that the only way to preserve
peace in the coming era will be to increase military forces for the
purpose of waging multiple wars to subdue countries which may stand
in the way of U.S. global preeminence.
Their flaws in logic are
obvious to people of conscience, namely, 1) a combative posture on our
part will not secure peace, but will rather engender fear throughout
the world and begin anew the arms race, only this time with far more
contenders, and 2) democracy, by its very definition, cannot be imposed
by force.
Following is the preamble
to the document:
"As the 20th century
draws to a close, the United States stands as the worlds most
preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America
faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the
vision to build upon the achievement of past decades? Does the United
States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American
principles and interests?
"[What we require is]
a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future
challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American
principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States
global responsibilities.
"Of course, the United
States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot
safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs
that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining
peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk
our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests.
The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important
to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before
they become dire. The history of the past century should have taught
us to embrace the cause of American leadership" (from the Projects
Statement of Principles).
Four Vital Missions
PNAC members believe that
there are four vital missions "demanded by U. S. global leadership,"
but claim that "current American armed forces are ill-prepared
to execute" these missions.
Homeland Defense.
America must defend its homeland.
During the Cold War, nuclear
deterrence was the key element in homeland defense; it remains essential.
But the new century has brought with it new challenges. While reconfiguring
its nuclear force, the United States also must counteract the effects
of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction
that may soon allow lesser states to deter U.S. military action by threatening
U.S. allies and the American homeland itself. Of all the new and current
missions for U.S. armed forces, this must have priority.
"Large Wars.Second,
the United States must retain sufficient forces able to rapidly deploy
and win multiple simultaneous large-scale wars and also to be able to
respond to unanticipated contingencies in regions where it does not
maintain forward-based forces. This resembles the 'two-war' standard
that has been the basis of U.S. force planning over the past decade.
Yet this standard needs to be updated to account for new realities and
potential new conflicts.
"Constabulary Duties.
Third, the Pentagon must retain forces to preserve the current peace
in ways that fall short of conduction major theater campaigns. A decades
experience and the policies of two administrations have shown that such
forces must be expanded to meet the needs of the new, long-term NATO
mission in the Balkans, the continuing no-fly-zone and other missions
in Southwest Asia, and other presence missions in vital regions of East
Asia. These duties are todays most frequent missions, requiring
forces configured for combat but capable of long-term, independent constabulary
operations.
"Transform U.S. Armed
Forces. Finally, the Pentagon must begin now to exploit the so-called
'revolution in military affairs,' sparked by the introduction of advanced
technologies into military systems; this must be regarded as a separate
and critical mission worthy of a share of force structure and defense
budgets" (p. 6).
"In conclusion, it should
be clear that these four essential missions for maintaining American
military preeminence are quite separate and distinct from one another
none should be considered a 'lesser included case' of another,
even though they are closely related and may, in some cases, require
similar sorts of forces. Conversely, the failure to provide sufficient
forces to execute these four missions must result in problems for American
strategy. The failure to build missile defenses will put America and
her allies at grave risk and compromise the exercise of American power
abroad. Conventional forces that are insufficient to fight multiple
theater wars simultaneously cannot protect American global interests
and allies. Neglect or withdrawal from constabulary missions will increase
the likelihood of larger wars breaking out and encourage petty tyrants
to defy American interests and ideals. And the failure to prepare for
tomorrows challenges will ensure that the current Pax Americana
comes to an early end" (p. 13).
On Usurping the Power
of the UN
"Further, these constabulary
missions are far more complex and likely to generate violence than traditional
'peacekeeping' missions. For one, they demand American political leadership
rather than that of the United Nations, as the failure of the UN mission
in the Balkans and the relative success of NATO operations there attests.
"Nor can the United
States assume a UN-like stance of neutrality; the preponderance of American
power is so great and its global interests so wide that it cannot pretend
to be indifferent to the political outcome in the Balkans, the Persian
Gulf or even when it deploys forces in Africa. Finally, these missions
demand forces basically configured for combat. While they also demand
personnel with special language, logistics and other support skills,
the first order of business in missions such as in the Balkans is to
establish security, stability and order. American troops, in particular,
must be regarded as part of an overwhelmingly powerful force" (p.
11).
On Preserving American
Preeminence
"Since todays
peace is the unique product of American preeminence, a failure to preserve
that preeminence allows others an opportunity to shape the world in
ways antithetical to American interests and principles. The price of
American preeminence is that, just as it was actively obtained, it must
be actively maintained" (p. 73).
"The fourth element
in American force posture and certainly the one which holds the
key to any longer-term hopes to extend the current Pax Americana
is the mission to transform U.S. military forces to meet new geopolitical
and technological challenges" (p. 11).
"Americas armed
forces, it seemed, could either prepare for the future by retreating
from its role as the essential defender of todays global security
order, or it could take care of current business but be unprepared for
tomorrows threats and tomorrows battlefields" (p. i).
"Moreover, America stands
at the head of a system of alliances which includes the worlds
other leading democratic powers. At present the United States faces
no global rival. Americas grand strategy should aim to preserve
and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible.
There are, however, potentially powerful states dissatisfied with the
current situation and eager to change it, if they can, in directions
that endanger the relatively peaceful, prosperous and free condition
the world enjoys today. Up to now, they have been deterred from doing
so by the capability and global presence of American military power.
But, as that power declines, relatively and absolutely, the happy conditions
that follow from it will be inevitably undermined" (p. i).
B. Securing Global Hegemony
"In a larger sense,
the new president will choose whether todays 'unipolar moment,'
to use columnist Charles Krauthammers phrase for Americas
current geopolitical preeminence, will be extended along with the peace
and prosperity that it provides" (p. 4).
"RAD" takes
the posture that only the U.S. should manipulate international relations
and points out "trouble spots" that may cause future problems,
like Iraq, Iran, Korea and all of East Asia. There is concern that several
nations might come together to challenge U.S. interests. Consequently
any nation that produces nuclear weapons or engages in significant arms
build-up will be viewed as a potential threat.
"Americas global
leadership, and its role as the guarantor of the current great-power
peace, relies upon the safety of the American homeland; the preservation
of a favorable balance of power in Europe, the Middle East and surrounding
energy-producing region, and East Asia; and the general stability of
the international system of nation-states relative to terrorists, organized
crime, and other 'non-state actors.' The relative importance of these
elements, and the threats to U.S. interests, may rise and fall over
time. Europe, for example, is now extraordinarily peaceful and stable,
despite the turmoil in the Balkans. Conversely, East Asia appears to
be entering a period with increased potential for instability and competition.
In the Gulf, American power and presence has achieved relative external
security for U.S. allies, but the longer-term prospects are murkier.
Generally, American strategy for the coming decades should seek to consolidate
the great victories won in the 20th century which have made Germany
and Japan into stable democracies, for example maintain stability
in the Middle East, while setting the conditions for 21st century successes,
especially in East Asia.
"A retreat from any
one of these requirements would call Americas status as the worlds
leading power into question. As we have seen, even a small failure like
that in Somalia or a halting and incomplete triumph as in the Balkans
can cast doubt on American credibility. The failure to define a coherent
global security and military strategy during the post-Cold War period
has invited challenges; states seeking to establish regional hegemony
continue to probe for the limits of the American security perimeter"
(p. 5).
Iraq and the Persian Gulf
"After eight years of
no-fly-zone operations, there is little reason to anticipate that the
U.S. air presence in the region should diminish significantly as long
as Saddam Hussein remains in power. Although Saudi domestic sensibilities
demand that the forces based in the Kingdom nominally remain rotational
forces, it has become apparent that this is now a semi-permanent mission.
From an American perspective, the value of such bases would endure even
should Saddam pass from the scene. Over the long term, Iran may well
prove as large a threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf as Iraq has. And
even should U.S.-Iranian relations improve, retaining forward-based
forces in the region would still be an essential element in U.S. security
strategy given the longstanding American interests in the region"
(p. 17).
"In the Persian Gulf
region, the presence of American forces, along with British and French
units, has become a semi-permanent fact of life. Though the immediate
mission of those forces is to enforce the no-fly zones over northern
and southern Iraq, they represent the long-term commitment of the United
States and its major allies to a region of vital importance. Indeed,
the United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role
in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides
the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force
presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein"
(p. 14).
"Although the no-fly-zone
air operations over northern and southern Iraq have continued without
pause for almost a decade, they remain an essential element in U.S.
strategy and force posture in the Persian Gulf region. Ending these
operations would hand Saddam Hussein an important victory, something
any American leader would be loath to do. Likewise, withdrawing from
the Balkans would place American leadership in Europe indeed,
the viability of NATO in question. While none of these operations
involves a mortal threat, they do engage U.S. national security interests
directly, as well as engaging American moral interests" (p. 11).
"In Europe, the Persian
Gulf and East Asia, enduring U.S. security interests argue forcefully
for an enduring American military presence" (p. 74).
"The Air Force presence
in the Gulf region is a vital one for U.S. military strategy, and the
United States should consider it a de facto permanent presence, even
as it seeks ways to lessen Saudi, Kuwaiti and regional concerns about
U.S. presence" (p. 35).
Axis of Evil
"It is now commonly
understood that information and other new technologies as well
as widespread technological and weapons proliferation are creating
a dynamic that may threaten Americas ability to exercise its dominant
military power. Potential rivals such as China are anxious to exploit
these transformational technologies broadly, while adversaries like
Iran, Iraq and North Korea are rushing to develop ballistic missiles
and nuclear weapons as a deterrent to American intervention in regions
they seek to dominate" (p. 4).
"The current American
peace will be short-lived if the United States becomes vulnerable to
rogue powers with small, inexpensive arsenals of ballistic missiles
and nuclear warheads or other weapons of mass destruction. We cannot
allow North Korea, Iran, Iraq or similar states to undermine American
leadership, intimidate American allies or threaten the American homeland
itself. The blessings of the American peace, purchased at fearful cost
and a century of effort, should not be so trivially squandered"
(p. 75).
East Asia
"Reflecting the gradual
shift in the focus of American strategic concerns toward East Asia,
a majority of the U.S. fleet, including two thirds of all carrier battle
groups, should be concentrated in the Pacific. A new, permanent forward
base should be established in Southeast Asia (p. 39).
"As stressed several
times above, the United States should seek to establish or reestablish
a more robust naval presence in Southeast Asia, marked by a long-term,
semi-permanent home port in the region, perhaps in the Philippines,
Australia, or both" (p. 44).
"In Southeast Asia,
American forces are too sparse to adequately address rising security
requirements
.Except for routine patrols by naval and Marine forces,
the security of this strategically significant and increasingly tumultuous
region has suffered from American neglect
..Southeast Asia region
has long been an area of great interest to China, which clearly seeks
to regain influence in the region. In recent years, China has gradually
increased its presence and operations in the region.
"Raising U.S. military
strength in East Asia is the key to coping with the rise of China to
great-power status. For this to proceed peacefully, U.S. armed forces
must retain their military preeminence and thereby reassure our regional
allies. In Northeast Asia, the United States must maintain and tighten
its ties with the Republic of Korea and Japan. In Southeast Asia, only
the United States can reach out to regional powers like Australia, Indonesia
and Malaysia and others. This will be a difficult task requiring sensitivity
to diverse national sentiments, but it is made all the more compelling
by the emergence of new democratic governments in the region. By guaranteeing
the security of our current allies and newly democratic nations in East
Asia, the United States can help ensure that the rise of China is a
peaceful one. Indeed, in time, American and allied power in the region
may provide a spur to the process of democratization inside China itself
.A
heightened U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia would be a strong
spur to regional security cooperation, providing the core around which
a de facto coalition could jell" (pp. 18-19).
"The prospect is that
East Asia will become an increasingly important region, marked by the
rise of Chinese power
.A similar rationale argues in favor of retaining
substantial forces in Japan. In recent years, the stationing of large
forces in Okinawa has become increasingly controversial in Japanese
domestic politics, and while efforts to accommodate local sensibilities
are warranted, it is essential to retain the capabilities U.S. forces
in Okinawa represent. If the United States is to remain the guarantor
of security in Northeast Asia, and to hold together a de facto alliance
whose other main pillars are Korea and Japan maintaining forward-based
U.S. forces is essential" (p. 18).
Europe
"As discussed above,
the focus of American security strategy for the coming century is likely
to shift to East Asia. This reflects the success of American strategy
in the 20th century, and particularly the success of the NATO alliance
through the Cold War, which has created what appears to be a generally
stable and enduring peace in Europe. The pressing new problem of European
security instability in Southeastern Europe will be best
addressed by the continued stability operations in the Balkans by U.S.
and NATO ground forces supported by land-based air forces. Likewise,
the new opportunity for greater European stability offered by further
NATO expansion will make demands first of all on ground and land-based
air forces. As the American security perimeter in Europe is removed
eastward, this pattern will endure, although naval forces will play
an important role in the Baltic Sea, eastern Mediterranean and Black
Sea, and will continue to support U.S. and NATO operations ashore"
(pp. 43-44).
"The Balkans, and southeastern
Europe more generally, present the major hurdle toward the creation
of a Europe 'whole and free' from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The delay
in bringing security and stability to southeastern Europe has not only
prevented the consolidation of the victory in the Cold War, it has created
a zone of violence and conflict and introduced uncertainty about Americas
role in Europe" (pp. 15-16).
"Despite the shifting
focus of conflict in Europe, a requirement to station U.S. forces in
northern and central Europe remains. The region is stable, but a continued
American presence helps to assure the major European powers, especially
Germany, that the United States retains its longstanding security interest
in the continent. This is especially important in light of the nascent
European moves toward an independent defense 'identity' and policy;
it is important that NATO not be replaced by the European Union, leaving
the United States without a voice in European security affairs"
(p. 16).
"Although U.S. Navy
and Marine forces generally operate on a regular cycle of deployments
to European waters, they rely on a network of permanent bases in the
region, especially in the Mediterranean. These should be retained, and
consideration given to establishing a more robust presence in the Black
Sea" (p. 17).
Regime Change
Several statements advocating
the possible necessity of removing hostile regimes can be found in the
document.
"American military preeminence
will continue to rest in significant part on the ability to maintain
sufficient land forces to achieve political goals such as removing a
dangerous and
hostile regime when necessary"
(p. 61).
"The need to respond
with decisive force in the event of a major theater war in Europe, the
Persian Gulf or East Asia will remain the principal factor in determining
Army force structure for U.S.-based units. However one judges the likelihood
of such wars occurring, it is essential to retain sufficient capabilities
to bring them to a satisfactory conclusion, including the possibility
of a decisive victory that results in long-term political or regime
change" (p. 25).
"Americas adversaries
will continue to resist the building of the American peace; when they
see an opportunity as Saddam Hussein did in 1990, they will employ their
most powerful armed forces to win on the battle-field what they could
not win in peaceful competition; and American armed forces will remain
the core of efforts to deter, defeat, or remove from power regional
aggressors" (p. 10).
C. Rebuilding the Military
"If an American peace
is to be maintained, and expanded, it must have a secure foundation
on unquestioned U.S. military preeminence" (p. 4).
One stated objective of
"RAD" is "to outline the large, 'full-spectrum' forces
that are necessary to conduct the varied tasks demanded by a strategy
of American preeminence for today and tomorrow" (p. 5). Much of
the document is an elucidation of those missions and includes specific
recommendations about weaponry, deployment patterns, increased personnel
and defense spending.
"In sum, the 1990s have
been a 'decade of defense neglect'. This leaves the next president of
the United States with an enormous challenge: he must increase military
spending to preserve American geopolitical leadership, or he must pull
back from the security commitments that are the measure of Americas
position as the worlds sole superpower and the final guarantee
of security, democratic freedoms and individual political rights"
(p. 4).
"Preserving the desirable
strategic situation in which the United States now finds itself requires
a globally preeminent military capability both today and in the future.
But years of cuts in defense spending have eroded the American militarys
combat readiness, and put in jeopardy the Pentagons plans for
maintaining military superiority in the years ahead. Increasingly, the
U.S. military has found itself undermanned, inadequately equipped and
trained, straining to handle contingency operations, and ill-prepared
to adapt itself to the revolution in military affairs" (p. i).
The four core missions
of PNAC referred to below were outlined in section A. Pax Americana.
"To carry out these
core missions, we need to provide sufficient force and budgetary allocations.
In particular, the United States must:
MAINTAIN NUCLEAR STRATEGIC
SUPERIORITY, basing the U.S. nuclear deterrent upon a global, nuclear
net assessment that weighs the full range of current and emerging threats,
not merely the U.S.-Russia balance.
RESTORE THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH
of todays force to roughly the levels anticipated in the 'Base
Force' outlined by the Bush Administration, an increase in active-duty
strength from 1.4 million to 1.6 million.
REPOSITION U.S. FORCES to
respond to 21st century strategic realities by shifting permanently
based forces to Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia, and by changing
naval deployment patterns to reflect growing U.S. strategic concerns
in East Asia.
MODERNIZE CURRENT U.S. FORCES
SELECTIVELY, proceeding with the F-22 program while increasing purchases
of lift, electronic support and other aircraft; expanding submarine
and surface combatant fleets; purchasing Comanche helicopters and medium-weight
ground vehicles for the Army, and the V-22 Osprey 'tilt-rotor' aircraft
for the Marine Corps.
CANCEL 'ROADBLOCK' PROGRAMS
such as the Joint Strike Fighter, CVX aircraft carrier, and Crusader
howitzer system that would absorb exorbitant amounts of Pentagon funding
while providing limited improvements to current capabilities. Savings
from these canceled programs should be used to spur the process of military
transformation.
DEVELOP AND DEPLOY GLOBAL
MISSILE DEFENSES to defend the American homeland and American allies,
and to provide a secure basis for U.S. power projection around the world.
CONTROL THE NEW 'INTERNATIONAL
COMMONS' OF SPACE AND 'CYBERSPACE,' and pave the way for the creation
of a new military service U.S. Space Forces with the mission
of space control.
EXPLOIT THE 'REVOLUTION IN
MILITARY AFFAIRS' to ensure the long-term superiority of U.S. conventional
forces. Establish a two-stage transformation process which
?maximizes the value
of current weapons systems through the application of advanced technologies,
and,
?produces more profound
improvements in military capabilities, encourages competition between
single services and joint-service experimentation efforts.
INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING
gradually to a minimum level of 3.5 to 3.8 percent of gross domestic
product, adding $15 billion to $20 billion to total defense spending
annually" (p. v).
"In general terms, it
seems likely that the process of transformation will take several decades
and that U.S. forces will continue to operate many, if not most, of
todays weapons systems for a decade or more. Thus, it can be foreseen
that the process of transformation will in fact be a two-stage process:
first of transition, then of more thoroughgoing transformation. The
break-point will come when a preponderance of new weapons systems begins
to enter service, perhaps when, for example, unmanned aerial vehicles
begin to be as numerous as manned aircraft. In this regard, the Pentagon
should be very wary of making large investments in new programs
tanks, planes, aircraft carriers, for example that would commit
U.S. forces to current paradigms of warfare for many decades to come"
(p. 13).
Army
List of recommendations
for modernizing the Army (see p. 23).
"American landpower
remains the essential link in the chain that translates U.S. military
supremacy into American geopolitical preeminence. Even as the means
for delivering firepower on the battlefield shift strike aircraft
have realized all but the wildest dreams of air power enthusiasts, unmanned
aerial vehicles promise to extend strike power in the near future, and
the ability to conduct strikes from space appears on the not-too-distant
horizon the need for ground maneuvers to achieve decisive political
results endures. Regimes are difficult to change based upon punishment
alone. If land forces are to survive and retain their unique strategic
purpose in a world where it is increasingly easy to deliver firepower
precisely at long ranges, they must change as well, becoming more stealthy,
mobile, deployable and able to operate in a dispersed fashion. The U.S.
Army, and American land forces more generally, must increasingly complement
the strike capabilities of the other services. Conversely, an American
military force that lacks the ability to employ ground forces that can
survive and maneuver rapidly on future battlefields will deprive U.S.
political leaders of a decisive tool of diplomacy" (p. 30).
Air Force Toward
a Global First-Strike Force
List of recommendations
for modernizing the Air Force (See p. 31).
"Although air power
remains the most flexible and responsive element of U.S. military power,
the Air Force needs to be restructured, repositioned, revitalized and
enlarged to assure continued 'global reach, global power'" (p.
31).
"Because of its inherent
mobility and flexibility, the Air Force will be the first U.S. military
force to arrive in a theater during times of crisis; as such, the Air
Force must retain its ability to deploy and sustain sufficient numbers
of aircraft to deter wars and shape any conflict in its earliest stages.
Indeed, it is the Air Force, along with the Army, that remains the core
of Americas ability to apply decisive military power when its
pleases. To dissipate this ability to deliver a rapid hammer blow is
to lose the key component of American military preeminence" (p.
37).
"A gradual increase
in Air Force spending back to a $110 billion to $115 billion level is
required to increase service personnel strength; build new units, especially
the composite wings required to perform the 'air constabulary missions'
such as no-fly zones; add the support capabilities necessary to complement
the fleet of tactical aircraft; reinvest in space capabilities and begin
the process of transformation" (p. 37).
"The ability to have
access to, operate in, and dominate the aerospace environment has become
the key to military success in modern, high-technology warfare. Indeed,
as will be discussed below, space dominance may become so essential
to the preservation of American military preeminence that it may require
a separate service. How well the Air Force rises to the many challenges
it faces even should it receive increased budgets will
go far toward determining whether U.S. military forces retain the combat
edge they now enjoy" (pp. 38-39).
"A recent study done
for the Air Force indicates that a worldwide network of forward operating
bases
.might cost $5 billion to $10 billion through 2010. The study
speculates that some of the cost might be paid for by host nations anxious
to cement ties with the United States, or, in Europe, be considered
as common NATO assets and charged to the NATO common fund" (p.
20).
Navy/Marine Corps
List of recommendations
for modernizing the Navy (See pp. 39-40).
List of recommendations
for modernizing the Marines (See pp. 47-48).
"The end of the Cold
War leaves the U.S. Navy in a position of unchallenged supremacy on
the high seas, a dominance surpassing that even of the British Navy
in the 19th and early parts of the 20th century. With the remains of
the Soviet fleet now largely rusting in port, the open oceans are Americas,
and the lines of communication open from the coasts of the United States
to Europe, the Persian Gulf and East Asia. Yet this very success calls
the need for the current force structure into question. Further, the
advance of precision-strike technology may mean that naval surface combatants,
and especially the large-deck aircraft carriers that are the Navys
capital ships, may not survive in the high-technology wars of the coming
decades. Finally, the nature and pattern of Navy presence missions may
be out of synch with emerging strategic realities. In sum, though it
stands without peer today, the Navy faces major challenges to its traditional
and, in the past, highly successful methods of operation" (p. 39).
"Thus, while naval presence,
including carrier presence, in the western Pacific should be increased,
the Navy should begin to conduct many of its presence missions with
other kinds of battle groups based around cruisers, destroyers and other
surface combatants as well as submarines. Indeed, the Navy needs to
better understand the requirement to have substantial numbers of cruise-missile
platforms at sea and in close proximity to regional hot spots, using
carriers and naval aviation as reinforcing elements" (p. 46).
"The Navys force
of attack submarines also should be expanded. It is unclear that the
current and planned generations of attack submarines (to say nothing
of new ballistic missile submarines) will be flexible enough to meet
future demands. The Navy should reassess its submarine requirements
not merely in light of current missions but with an expansive view of
possible future missions as well" (p. 46).
"The Navy must begin
to transition away from its heavy dependence on carrier operations
..
Design and research on a future CVX carrier should continue, but should
aim at a radical design change to accommodate an air wing based primarily
on unmanned aerial vehicles" (p. 40).
"To offset the reduced
role of carriers, the Navy should slightly increase its fleets of current-generation
surface combatants and submarines for improved strike capabilities in
littoral waters and to conduct an increasing proportion of naval presence
missions with surface action groups. Additional investments in counter-mine
warfare are needed, as well" (p. 40).
"In particular, the
Marine Corps, like the Navy, must turn its focus on the requirements
for operations in East Asia, including Southeast Asia. In many ways,
this will be a 'back to the future' mission for the Corps, recalling
the innovative thinking done during the period between the two world
wars and which established the Marines expertise in amphibious
landings and operations" (p. 47).
Overseas Bases
"As a supplement to
forces stationed abroad under long-term basing arrangements, the United
States should seek to establish a network of 'deployment bases' or 'forward
operating bases' to increase the reach of current and future forces.
Not only will such an approach improve the ability to project force
to outlying regions, it will help circumvent the political, practical
and financial constraints on expanding the network of American bases
overseas" (p. 19).
"There should be a strong
strategic synergy between U.S. forces overseas and in a reinforcing
posture: units operating abroad are an indication of American geopolitical
interests and leadership, provide significant military power to shape
events and, in wartime, create the conditions for victory when reinforced.
Conversely, maintaining the ability to deliver an unquestioned 'knockout
punch' through the rapid introduction of stateside units will increase
the shaping power of forces operating overseas and the vitality of our
alliances. In sum, we see an enduring need for large-scale American
forces" (p. 74).
"Further, improvements
should be made to existing air bases in new and potential NATO countries
to allow for rapid deployments, contingency exercises, and extended
initial operations in times of crisis. These preparations should include
modernized air traffic control, fuel, and weapons storage facilities,
and perhaps small stocks of prepositioned munitions, as well as sufficient
ramp space to accommodate surges in operations. Improvements also should
be made to existing facilities in England to allow forward operation
of B-2 bombers in times of crisis, to increase sortie rates if needed"
(p. 34).
"The Air Force should
be redeployed to reflect the shifts in international politics. Independent,
expeditionary air wings containing a broad mix of aircraft, including
electronic warfare, airborne command and control, and other support
aircraft, should be based in Italy, Southeastern Europe, central and
perhaps eastern Turkey, the Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia"
(p. 31).
Nuclear Expansion
"
significant reductions
in U.S. nuclear forces might well have unforeseen consequences that
lessen rather than enhance the security of the United States and its
allies" (p. 8).
"Over the past decade,
efforts to design and build effective missile defenses have been ill-conceived
and underfunded, and the Clinton Administration has proposed deep reductions
in U.S. nuclear forces without sufficient analysis of the changing global
nuclear balance of forces" (p. 6).
"Rather than maintain
and improve Americas nuclear deterrent, the Clinton Administration
has put its faith in new arms control measures, most notably by signing
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The treaty proposed a new
multilateral regime, consisting of some 150 states, whose principal
effect would be to constrain America's unique role in providing the
global nuclear umbrella that helps to keep states like Japan and South
Korea from developing the weapons that are well within their scientific
capability, while doing little to stem nuclear weapons proliferation.
Although the Senate refused to ratify the treaty, the administration
continues to abide by its basic strictures. And while it may make sense
to continue the current moratorium on nuclear testing for the moment
since it would take a number of years to refurbish the neglected
testing infrastructure in any case ultimately this is an untenable
situation. If the United States is to have a nuclear deterrent that
is both effective and safe, it will need to test." (pp. 7-8).
"
of all the elements
of U.S. military force posture, perhaps none is more in need of reevaluation
than Americas nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons remain a critical
component of American military power but it is unclear whether the current
U.S. nuclear arsenal is well-suited to the emerging post-Cold War world.
Todays strategic calculus encompasses more factors than just the
balance of terror between the United States and Russia. U.S. nuclear
force planning and related arms control policies must take account of
a larger set of variables than in the past, including the growing number
of small nuclear arsenals from North Korea to Pakistan to, perhaps
soon, Iran and Iraq and a modernized and expanded Chinese nuclear
force. Moreover, there is a question about the role nuclear weapons
should play in deterring the use of other kinds of weapons of mass destruction,
such as chemical and biological, with the U.S. having foresworn those
weapons development and use. It addition, there may be a need
to develop a new family of nuclear weapons designed to address new sets
of military requirements, such as would be required in targeting the
very deep under-ground, hardened bunkers that are being built by many
of our potential adversaries" (p. 8).
"But what should finally
drive the size and character of our nuclear forces is not numerical
parity with Russian capabilities but maintaining American strategic
superiority and, with that superiority, a capability to deter
possible hostile coalitions of nuclear powers. U.S. nuclear superiority
is nothing to be ashamed of; rather, it will be an essential element
in preserving American leadership in a more complex and chaotic world"
(p. 8).
D. Future Wars of Pax
Americana
"Until the process of
transformation is treated as an enduring military mission worthy
of a constant allocation of dollars and forces it will remain
stillborn" (p. 60).
"RAD" envisions
a future in which the United States is in complete control of land,
sea, air, space and cyberspace of planet Earth. It finds objectionable
the limitations imposed by the ABM treaty and urges a newer rendition
of Reagan's 'Star Wars' defense shield program. Three missions are seen
as crucial.
1. Global Missile Defenses
"A network against limited strikes, capable of protecting
the United States, its allies and forward-deployed forces, must be constructed.
This must be a layered system of land, sea, air and space-based components"
(p. 51).
"The first element in
any missile defense network should be a galaxy of surveillance satellites
with sensors capable of acquiring enemy ballistic missiles immediately
upon launch" (p. 52).
"At the same time, the
administrations devotion to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty with the Soviet Union has frustrated development of useful ballistic
missile defenses. This is reflected in deep budget cuts planned
spending on missile defenses for the late 1990s has been more than halved,
halting work on space-based interceptors, cutting funds for a national
missile defense system by 80 percent and theater defenses by 30 percent.
Further, the administration has cut funding just at the crucial moments
when individual programs begin to show promise. Only upgrades of currently
existing systems like the Patriot missile originally designed
primarily for air defense against jet fighters, not missile defense
have proceeded generally on course.
"Most damaging of all
was the decision in 1993 to terminate the 'Brilliant Pebbles' project.
This legacy of the original Reagan-era 'Star Wars' effort had matured
to the point where it was becoming feasible to develop a space-based
interceptor capable of destroying ballistic missiles in the early or
middle portion of their flight far preferable than attempting
to hit individual warheads surrounded by clusters of decoys on their
final course toward their targets. But since a space-based system would
violate the ABM Treaty, the administration killed the 'Brilliant Pebbles'
program, choosing instead to proceed with a ground-based interceptor
and radar system one that will be costly without being especially
effective" (p. 52).
2. Control of Space
"RAD" advises instituting a new "Space Service"
thereby escalating U.S. military preparedness "from the theatre
level to the global level" in order to achieve worldwide dominance,
both militarily and commercially.
"Yet to truly transform
itself for the coming century, the Air Force must accelerate its efforts
to create the new systems and, to repeat, the space-based systems
that are necessary to shift the scope of air operations from
the theater level to the global level" (p. 64).
"
control of space
defined by Space Command as 'the ability to assure access to
space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability
to deny others the use of space' must be an essential element
of our military strategy" (p. 55).
"Much as control of
the high seas and the protection of international commerce
defined global powers in the past, so will control of the new 'international
commons' be a key to world power in the future. An America incapable
of protecting its interests or that of its allies in space or the 'infosphere'
will find it difficult to exert global political leadership" (p.
51).
"The proliferation of
technologies for delivering highly accurate fires over increasingly
great distances poses a great challenge for both the Army and the Marine
Corps, but rather than attempting to compete in the game of applying
long-range fires, both services would be better off attempting to complement
the vastly improved strike capabilities of the Navy and Air Force, and
indeed in linking decisive maneuvers to future space capabilities as
well" (p. 68).
"Target significant
new investments toward creating capabilities for operating in space,
including inexpensive launch vehicles, new satellites and transatmospheric
vehicles, in preparation for a decision as to whether space warfare
is sufficiently different from combat within earths atmosphere
so as to require a separate 'space service'. Such a transformation would
in fact better realize the Air Forces stated goal of becoming
a service with true global reach and global strike capabilities"
(p. 64).
"Given the advantages
U.S. armed forces enjoy as a result of this unrestricted use of space,
it is shortsighted to expect potential adversaries to refrain from attempting
to disable or offset U.S. space capabilities. And with the proliferation
of space know-how and related technology around the world, our adversaries
will inevitably seek to enjoy many of the same space advantages in the
future. Moreover, 'space commerce' is a growing part of the global economy.
In 1996, commercial United States, and commercial revenues exceeded
government expenditures on space. Today, more than 1,100 commercial
companies across more than 50 countries are developing, building, and
operating space systems.
"The complexity of space
control will only grow as commercial activity increases. American and
other allied investments in space systems will create a requirement
to secure and protect these space assets; they are already an important
measure of American power. Yet it will not merely be enough to protect
friendly commercial uses of space.
"As Space Command also
recognizes, the United States must also have the capability to deny
America's adversaries the use of commercial space platforms for military
purposes in times of crises and conflicts. Indeed, space is likely to
become the new 'international commons', where commercial and security
interests are intertwined and related. Just as Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote
about 'sea-power' at the beginning of the 20th century in this sense,
American strategists will be forced to regard 'space-power' in the 21st"
(pp. 54-55).
"In short, the unequivocal
supremacy in space enjoyed by the United States today will be increasingly
at risk" (p. 55).
"As Colin Gray and John
Sheldon have written, 'Space control is not an avoidable issue. It is
not an optional extra.' For U.S. armed forces to continue to assert
military preeminence, control of space defined by Space Command
as 'the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within
the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space'
must be an essential element of our military strategy. If America cannot
maintain that control, its ability to conduct global military operations
will be severely complicated, far more costly, and potentially fatally
compromised" (p. 55).
"But, over the longer
term, maintaining control of space will inevitably require the application
of force both in space and from space, including but not limited to
anti-missile defenses and defensive systems capable of protecting U.S.
and allied satellites; space control cannot be sustained in any other
fashion, with conventional land, sea, or airforce, or by electronic
warfare. This eventuality is already recognized by official U.S. national
space policy, which states that the 'Department of Defense shall maintain
a capability to execute the mission areas of space support, force enhancement,
space control and force application.' (Emphasis added.)" (p. 56).
3. Control of Cyberspace
"Although many concepts of 'cyber-war' have elements of
science fiction about them, and the role of the Defense Department in
establishing 'control,' or even what 'security' on the Internet means,
requires a consideration of a host of legal, moral and political issues,
there nonetheless will remain an imperative to be able to deny America
and its allies' enemies the ability to disrupt or paralyze either the
military's or the commercial sector's computer networks.
"Conversely, an offensive
capability could offer America's military and political leaders an invaluable
tool in disabling an adversary in a decisive manner. Taken together,
the prospects for space war or 'cyberspace war' represent the truly
revolutionary potential inherent in the notion of military transformation.
These future forms of warfare are technologically immature, to be sure.
But, it is also clear that for the U.S. armed forces to remain preeminent
and avoid an Achilles Heel in the exercise of its power they must be
sure that these potential future forms of warfare favor America just
as todays air, land and sea warfare reflect United States military
dominance" (p. 57).
Strategy for Transforming
Conventional Forces
Read below notions of how
conventional warfare will be conducted in the future, including the
use of microbes and "advanced forms of biological warfare that
can 'target' specific genotypes."
"In exploiting the 'revolution
in military affairs,' the Pentagon must be driven by the enduring missions
for U.S. forces. This process will have two stages: transition, featuring
a mix of current and new systems; and true transformation, featuring
new systems, organizations and operational concepts. This process must
take a competitive approach, with services and joint-service operations
competing for new roles and missions. Any successful process of transformation
must be linked to the services, which are the institutions within the
Defense Department with the ability and the responsibility for linking
budgets and resources to specific missions" (p. 51).
"Although it may take
several decades for the process of transformation to unfold, in time,
the art of warfare on air, land, and sea will be vastly different than
it is today, and 'combat' likely will take place in new dimensions:
in space, 'cyber-space,' and perhaps the world of microbes. Air warfare
may no longer be fought by pilots manning tactical fighter aircraft
sweeping the skies of opposing fighters, but a regime dominated by long-range,
stealthy unmanned craft. On land, the clash of massive, combined-arms
armored forces may be replaced by the dashes of much lighter, stealthier
and information-intensive forces, augmented by fleets of robots, some
small enough to fit in soldiers pockets. Control of the sea could
be largely determined not by fleets of surface combatants and aircraft
carriers, but from land- and space-based systems, forcing navies to
maneuver and fight underwater. Space itself will become a theater of
war, as nations gain access to space capabilities and come to rely on
them; further, the distinction between military and commercial space
systems combatants and noncombatants will become blurred.
Information systems will become an important focus of attack, particularly
for U.S. enemies seeking to short-circuit sophisticated American forces.
And advanced forms of biological warfare that can target specific genotypes
may transform biological warfare from the realm of terror to a politically
useful tool" (p. 60).
Changes in Naval Warfare:
"Beyond immediate opportunities such as conversion of Trident submarines,
consideration should be given to employing a deactivated carrier to
better understand the possibilities of operating large fleets of UAVs
at sea. Likewise, submerged 'missile pods,' either permanently deployed
or laid covertly by submarines in times of crisis, could increase strike
capabilities without risking surface vessels in littoral waters. In
general, if the Navy is moving toward 'network-centric' warfare, it
should explore ways of increasing the number of 'nodes on the net'"
(p. 67).
Army of the Future: "Consider
just the potential changes that might effect the infantryman. Future
soldiers may operate in encapsulated, climate-controlled, powered fighting
suits, laced with sensors, and boasting chameleon-like 'active' camouflage.
'Skin-patch' pharmaceuticals help regulate fears, focus concentration
and enhance endurance and strength. A display mounted on a soldiers
helmet permits a comprehensive view of the battlefield in effect
to look around corners and over hills and allows the soldier
to access the entire combat information and intelligence system while
filtering incoming data to prevent overload. Individual weapons are
more lethal, and a soldiers ability to call for highly precise
and reliable indirect fires not only from Army systems but those
of other services allows each individual to have great influence
over huge spaces. Under the 'Land Warrior' program, some Army experts
envision a 'squad' of seven soldiers able to dominate an area the size
of the Gettysburg battlefield where, in 1863, some 165,000 men
fought" (p. 62).