Shifting
American Strategy In The Gulf
By Yoginder Sikand
19 March, 2004
countercurrents.org
The
American invasion and occupation of Iraq has set the stage for a major
transformation in America's policy vis-à-vis the Gulf states,
particularly with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has consistently been a
major US ally in the region, and especially after the Iranian revolution
in 1979 it has worked closely with America on several fronts, most notably
to counter anti-monarchical and democratic forces in the region. Saudi
Arabia is the largest market for American products in the region, and
also enjoys the dubious distinction of being the largest importer of
American arms. American troops stationed in Saudi Arabia guard the country,
providing the Wahhabi regime with solid defence against both internal
as well as external opponents. In turn, America has access to Saudi
oil, said to account for a fourth of the world's known reserves.
That cosy relationship
between the Saudis and the Americans is now being seriously reconsidered
by policy makers in Washington. This is strikingly illustrated in a
recent report brought out by the Brookings Institute, a major American
think-tank. Titled 'The Approaching Turning Point: The Future of US
relations with the Gulf States', it is authored by F. Gregory Gause
III, director of the Middle East Studies Programme at the University
of Vermont.
Gause argues that
owing to numerous domestic and international factors American policy
in the Gulf is today in the midst of a 'sea change'. Within Saudi Arabia,
he notes, there is growing opposition to the presence of US troops stationed
in the country, which, in turn, has resulted in a major challenge to
the ruling family, a key American ally. On the American side, the events
of 11 September have led to a growing opposition to America's alliance
with the Wahhabi regime, which many have accused of sponsoring radical
Islamist groups abroad. Given these developments, he argues, America
must reconsider its close alliance with the Saudi regime, and look for
other partners in the region. This does not mean, however, that America
should consider the Saudi regime as an opponent, for that would not,
he says, be in America's own interests. 'It is simply not sensible for
the United States', Gause writes, 'to make an enemy of a government
which sits on 25 % of all the known oil reserves in the world, which
controls the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and which seeks
to cooperate with the United States on a number of key issues'. Hence,
while resisting the temptation of branding Saudi Arabia as an enemy,
he suggests that America should continue to cooperate with the Saudis
on issues of 'common interest', but at the same time must also realise
that the Saudi are not going to toe the American line on every issue
or even on every aspect of America's 'war on terrorism'. The Saudi-American
relationship must be restructured, Gause argues, to reflect the new
realisation that the interests of both countries 'overlap, but are not
identical'. Washington should aim for a 'normal' relationship with Riyadh
to take the place of the 'special' relationship of the recent past.
On issues such as oil and economic affairs the two should closely cooperate,
while America must no longer see Saudi Arabia as 'a useful base' for
American forces.
With America now
occupying Iraq and busy setting about installing a pro-American regime
in the country, the usefulness of American military bases in Saudi Arabia
is being seriously reconsidered in Washington. Removing American troops
from Saudi soil and relocating them elsewhere, Gause suggests, would
undermine anti-American forces in the region who have been using the
presence of American soldiers in Saudi Arabia to argue the case that
America is engaged in a war against Islam. At the same time, he says,
America must 'push' the Saudis to 'use their prestige and their networks
in the wider Muslim world to take a more active role in the "war
on terrorism"'. For this purpose he advises the US to get the Saudis
to clamp down on funding to Islamist groups, and to encourage the Saudi
regime to assume a greater role in 'the war of ideas', to promote 'more
tolerant and less "jihadist" interpretations of Islam' in
order to combat 'bin Ladinist ideas'.
At the same time
as America has justified its invasion and occupation of Iraq in 'democratic'
'liberationist' terms, as delivering 'democracy' to the Iraqis long
suffering under the rule of a ruthless dictator, it shows no signs of
being seriously concerned with promoting real democracy in countries
in the region that are closely allied with it, most of whom are ruled
by dictators or monarchs. Gause has an ingenious argument to counter
the call for democracy in these American client states. He insists that
the suggestion that the US must push the Saudis for substantial changes
in their political and social system is 'flawed', because it might provoke
domestic opposition, being seen as a western imposition. More importantly,
from the American point of view, is the obvious fact that real democracy
in Saudi Arabia would, at least in the short term, 'inevitably produce
a political system even more in thrall to the religious establishment,
and less open to American pressures, than the one that exists now'.
Further, given the mounting anti-American wave among the Saudi people,
democratic elections, Gause argues, would obviously result in clear
victories of anti-American parties or candidates. As Guase clearly recognises,
such elections would 'not produce the kinds of changes that American
critics of Saudi Arabia would like to see'. Hence, keeping the present
Saudi rulers in power is, Gause says, in America's own interests, because,
he argues, the 'only group in a position to replace them' would then
be even more committed to Wahhabi radicalism than the ruling regime.
Put simply, Gause dismisses arguments for democracy in Saudi Arabia
as this would not be in America's own interests. So much, then, for
American rhetoric of democracy and human rights.
A major aspect of
America's changing relationship with Saudi Arabia concerns its military
presence in the region. Gause writes that as America's military links
with the Saudis contract its reliance on smaller Gulf monarchies must
expand. This, in fact, has already been underway for several years now.
Since 1991 America has developed an extensive network of military bases
in these countries, which Gause sees as taking on the role played by
American bases in Saudi Arabia. Kuwait today hosts American troops on
a regular basis, and nearly a third of the country has been declared
a closed military zone. The headquarters of the vastly expanded American
naval presence in the Gulf are now located in Bahrain. Qatar has recently
signed an agreement with the US to upgrade American facilities in the
country, which include a major airfield and control centre. Oman now
provides access to US forces at three bases on its territory, while
the UAE's port and airport facilities provide logistical support for
American forces in the region.
These small monarchical
states, none of which is a democracy in any sense, are now poised to
replace Saudi Arabia as the linchpin of American military policy in
the Gulf region. Gause presents this nexus as being in the interests
of both the Americans as well as the ruling regimes of these states.
America needs their oil as well as bases in their territories in order
to control access to oil reserves in the region. For their part, these
regimes are dependent on American troops to defend them from what they
see as external threats, particularly, Gause says, from Iran. Consequently,
they are said to consider 'their American security tie as their ultimate
insurance policy'. 'These governments', Gause writes, 'see a greater
and more immediate need for American protection than the Saudi government
does, and are willing to pay a greater price for it'.
Gause recognises
that while the ruling regimes of these states are heavily dependent
on America, large sections of their own people might be opposed to American
military presence in their countries. But where American interests are
paramount, democratic scruples must be thrown to the wind! Gause acknowledges
the growing anti-American feelings in these states, owing principally
to America's support for Israel and the way it has pursued its 'war
on terrorism'. Yet, he refuses to seriously engage with this question,
evading it by claiming that the people of these states are more likely
to accept an American military presence than in Saudi Arabia because
'[i]t was not so long ago that Great Britain had a formal protectorate
in these states, within the living memory of their elites'. Furthermore,
since foreign workers outnumber citizens in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE,
the sort of 'social disruptions' that an American military presence
would cause are 'not nearly as unusual' as they are in Saudi Arabia.
Equally importantly, since these states are relatively small in terms
of area and population, potential opposition, Gause suggests, can be
'mitigated' through 'rulers' patronage systems', 'personal connections'
and 'intelligence gathering'. Overall, then, these states are, from
the American point of view, 'simply easier to manage politically', and
hence 'better suited to sustain a long term American military presence'
as compared to Saudi Arabia. Given this, Gause says, the presence of
American forces in these countries is now being seen both by Washington
as well as the rulers of these states as 'permanent'.
With the smaller
Gulf states replacing Saudi Arabia as hosts of American forces in the
region, Gause warns that America should be circumspect about demands
for democracy in these countries. He suggests that greater democratisation
in these countries is likely to strengthen anti-American forces, given
the widespread anti-American sentiment among the local population. '[G]reater
political openness', he stresses, 'will not necessarily make the conduct
of American foreign policy in these states any easier'. Elections in
the Gulf states, he notes, would, at least in the short term, 'yield
parliaments composed of groups who are less likely to be supportive
of American foreign policy objectives in the region that the ruling
regimes are now'. Hence, he implicitly critiques the demand for real
democracy in these states by suggesting that 'Washington should be modest
and realistic about what electoral openings in the smaller Gulf States
will mean', and must not 'hinge its policy toward those states on demands
for fully democratic elections'. Put in plain words what Gause seems
to argue is that democracy in the Gulf region should be clearly subordinated
to American interests. If democracy is likely to produce regimes that
interfere with America's hegemonic designs, he appears to be saying,
it must be effectively countered or at least not be allowed to flourish.
The shift in America's
imperialist strategy in the Gulf seems in many respects a return to
the British model of control over the states in the region in the late
colonial period. Gause himself admits that 'Washington increasingly
finds itself in a position in the Gulf that bears many similarities
to that of Great Britain, the previous "keeper of the peace"
in the region'. He writes that Britain sought to maintain its dominance
in the region by supporting 'friendly' local rulers while avoiding military
action further inland in Arabia. He sees the shift in America's military
policy as today moving in that direction, 'more closely mimic[ing] the
British strategy'. He suggests that America could 'learn much' from
the British colonial policy in the region of ruling through local elites
and doing 'little to try to reform local political systems in their
own image'. This policy is said to have 'mitigated the inevitable friction
between the British and the local populations', thus ensuring overall
British hegemony. In other words, he appears to argue, America must
not seek to promote genuine democracy in the region but, instead, serve
as 'the guarantor of the particular political order there'. He cautions
that America should resist the 'temptation' of getting involved in the
domestic affairs of these states. Such 'temptations' that must be carefully
guarded against could even be for the 'best of reasons', such as promoting
'reform, democratisation, human rights, etc.'. Rather than directly
intervening in these countries' affairs, he advises that America should
support 'those reform efforts that emerge from the ruling elites themselves'.
Needless to say, the ruling elites in these countries are fiercely opposed
to genuine democracy, and hence, Gause's recommendations appear to amount
simply to a plea for the preservation of the status quo.
The Palestinian
issue is central to the way America is perceived in the Arab world,
and anti-American feelings in the region owe much to America's support
for Israel. Gause, however, has no suggestions at all to make for a
reconsideration of American stance on the question, and conveniently
glosses over the issue. This, as well as his implicit opposition to
genuine democratisation in the region, clearly show the hollowness of
American rhetoric of promoting 'democracy', which is used only very
selectively in order to pursue American designs in the area, as in the
case of Iraq today. Likewise, Gause offers no critique whatsoever of
America's use in the past of Saudi-style Wahhabism as a tool to promote
its interests to counter secular, leftist, nationalist and democratic
forces in the Muslim world. Indeed, echoing the views of other influential
American policy makers, his opposition to Wahhabism is far from consistent,
and is guided simply by a narrow conception of American interests. Thus,
while he acknowledges that the official Saudi Wahhabi brand of Islam
'undoubtedly encourages intolerance' towards other Muslim groups, particularly
but not only the Shias, he argues that 'as long as official "Wahhabism"
is not a direct source of terrorism against the United States, this
is an issue that must be left for Saudis themselves'.
Reflecting the voices
of an influential section of America's policy making elite, Gause's
report promises little to those who had hoped for the emergence of a
genuine dialogue between America and the Muslim world. In the wake of
the events of 11 September 2001 many had expected that the American
establishment would recognise the crucial need for genuine democracy
in the region and a solution to the Palestinian issue as essential in
order to undermine the influence of radical Islamists. However, as Gause's
report suggests, there appears to be no significant shift in American
policy in this regard. The military solution that America is now pursuing,
and which Gause himself appears to support, can only promise to further
complicate the situation, and do nothing at all to remedy the root causes
of instability in the Gulf.
Yoginder
Sikand is the editor of Qalandar