Imperial Reach
By Michael T.
Klare
12 April, 2005
The
Nation
As
the Defense Department begins to look beyond the war in Iraq, a major
priority will be to commence a systematic realignment of US forces and
bases abroad. This massive undertaking will result in a substantial
reduction of American forces in Germany and South Korea, and the establishment
of new facilities in Eastern Europe, the Caspian Sea basin, Southeast
Asia and Africa. Tens of thousands of troops (and their dependents)
now stationed abroad will be redeployed to the United States, while
fresh contingents will be sent to areas that have never before housed
a permanent US military presence. These steps are largely justified
in terms of military effectiveness--to eliminate obsolete cold war facilities
and ease the transport of American troops to likely scenes of conflict.
Underlying the planning, however, is a new approach to combat and a
fresh calculus of the nation's geopolitical interests.
The first big steps
in the Pentagon's basing realignment were announced last summer by President
Bush during a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Cincinnati.
Up to 70,000 American combat troops will be redeployed from bases in
Germany, Japan and South Korea to bases in the United States or to US
territories abroad, including Guam. Most of these forces--approximately
40,000 troops from the First Armored Division and the First Infantry
Division--will be withdrawn from Germany. At the same time, however,
the Army will station one of its Stryker Brigades, built around the
Stryker light armored vehicle, at the Grafenwöhr training area
in what used to be East Germany. Bush also indicated that new basing
facilities will be acquired in other countries, in order to facilitate
the rapid movement of American troops to likely areas of combat. "We'll
move some of our troops and capabilities to new locations," Bush
explained, "so they can surge quickly to deal with unexpected threats."
In conjunction with
this announcement, the Defense Department disclosed that it is looking
at two new types of basing facilities in areas that at present do not
house permanent US military installations. The first type, designated
"forward operating sites" or "forward operating locations,"
will consist of logistical facilities (an airstrip or port complex)
plus weapons stockpiles; these installations will house a small permanent
crew of US military technicians but no large combat units. The second
type, termed "cooperative security locations," will be "bare
bones" facilities utilized at times of crisis only; such sites
will have no permanent US presence but will be maintained by military
contractors and host-country personnel.
In discussing these
new facilities, the Defense Department has gone out of its way to avoid
using the term "military base." A base, in the Pentagon's
lexicon, is a major facility with permanent barracks, armories, recreation
facilities, housing for dependents and so on. Such installations typically
have been in place for many years and are sanctioned by a formal security
partnership with the host country involved. The new types of facilities,
on the other hand, will contain no amenities, house no dependents and
not be tied to a formal security arrangement. This distinction is necessary,
the Pentagon explains, to avoid giving the impression that the United
States is seeking a permanent, colonial-like presence in the countries
it views as possible hosts for such installations.
"We have no
plans [for military bases] on a permanent basis in those areas,"
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld averred when speaking of Eastern Europe
and the Caspian Sea region. "We're trying to find the right phraseology.
We know the word 'base' is not right for what we do.... We have bases
in Germany and we will continue to. But we also have had things that
we call 'Forward Operating Locations' or sites that are not permanent
bases: they're not places where you have families; they are not places
where you have large numbers of US military on a permanent basis....
[They are places] where you'd locate people in and out or where you
use it for refueling--these types of things."
The Defense Department
has not publicly stated where it will establish these new, no-frills
installations, but Pentagon officials have inspected possible locations
in Eastern Europe, the Caspian Sea basin and Africa. Additional sites
have been mentioned in Congressional reports and news media. It is possible,
then, to identify many of the most likely sites.
The decommissioning
of older bases in Germany, Japan and South Korea and the acquisition
of new facilities in other areas has been described by the White House
as "the most comprehensive restructuring of US military forces
overseas since the end of the Korean War." In explaining these
moves, the Bush Administration emphasizes the issue of utility: Many
older installations eat up vast resources but contribute little to overall
combat effectiveness, and so should be closed; at the same time, new
facilities are needed in areas where few American bases currently exist.
But while it is certainly arguable that the closing of obsolete bases
in Europe and East Asia will free resources that might be better employed
somewhere else, it is also clear that a lot more is going on than mere
military utility. Indeed, a close look at Pentagon statements and policy
reports suggests that three other factors are at work: a new calculus
of America's geopolitical interests; a shift in US strategic orientation
from defensive to offensive operations; and concerns about the future
reliability of long-term allies, especially those in "Old Europe."
Most significant,
overall, is the revised calculation of America's geopolitical interests.
During the cold war, when "containment" was the overarching
strategic principle, the United States surrounded the Soviet bloc with
major bases. With the end of the cold war, however, this template no
longer made sense, and many of these bases lost their strategic rationale.
Meanwhile, other concerns--terrorism, the pursuit of foreign oil and
the rise of China--have come to preoccupy American strategists. It is
these concerns that are largely driving the realignment of US bases
and forces.
There is a remarkable
degree of convergence among these concerns, both in practical and geographic
terms. Oil and terrorism are linked because many of the most potent
terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, arose in part as a reaction to
the West's oil-inspired embrace of entrenched Arab governments, and
because the terrorists often attack oil facilities in order to weaken
the regimes they abhor. Similarly, oil and China are linked because
both Washington and Beijing seek influence in the major oil-producing
regions. And the major terrorist groups, the most promising sites of
new oil and the focal points of Sino-American energy competition are
all located in the same general neighborhoods: Central Asia and the
Caspian region, the greater Gulf area and the far reaches of the Sahara.
And the United States is establishing new basing facilities precisely
in these areas.
In combating the
threat posed by terrorist forces, the United States naturally seeks
an enhanced military presence where these groups first arose. Moreover,
as the older oilfields of the North are gradually exhausted, more and
more of the world's oil will have to come from producers in the Global
South--especially the Persian Gulf countries plus Africa and Latin America.
In 1990, according to the Energy Department, these countries produced
32 million barrels of oil per day, or 46 percent of total world output.
By 2025, however, they are expected to deliver 77 million barrels, or
61 percent of global output. Over this same thirty-five-year period,
the combined production of the United States, Canada, Mexico, Australia
and Europe will drop from 29 percent to 19 percent of total world output.
With America's domestic production in decline, an ever-increasing share
of its oil requirements will have to be satisfied by imports, meaning
greater US dependence on oil supplied by countries in the Middle East,
Africa and other non-Western areas.
These countries
show a high degree of instability, much of it induced by the legacies
of colonialism and a preponderance of unrepresentative political institutions.
Nigeria, for example, has experienced periodic outbreaks of ethnic disorder
in the Niger Delta region, the source of most of its petroleum; both
Angola and Azerbaijan harbor ethnic separatist movements; and Saudi
Arabia and Iraq have been the repeated targets of attacks on oil facilities
and related infrastructure. In none of these countries can the uninterrupted
extraction and export of oil be taken for granted, and so the American
economy is becoming increasingly exposed to supply disruptions in overseas
producing areas.
In the face of this
peril, American leaders have placed ever-increasing reliance on the
use of military force to protect the global production and transport
of oil. This trend began in 1980, when President Jimmy Carter vowed
that the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf would be assured "by
any means necessary, including military force." The same basic
premise was subsequently applied to the Caspian Sea basin by President
Clinton, and is now being extended by President Bush to other producing
areas, including Africa. All of this entails the increased involvement
of US military forces in these areas--and it is to facilitate such involvement
that the Defense Department seeks new bases and "operating locations."
Normally, Pentagon
officials are reluctant to ascribe US strategic moves to concern over
the safe delivery of energy supplies. Nevertheless, in their explanations
of the need for new facilities, the oil factor has begun to crop up.
"In the Caspian Sea you have large mineral [i.e., petroleum] reserves,"
observed General Charles Wald, deputy commander of the US European Command
(Eucom), in June 2003. "We want to be able to assure the long-term
viability of those resources." Wald has also spoken of the need
for bases to help protect oil reserves in Africa (which falls under
the purview of the EUCOM). "The estimate is [that] in the next
ten years, we will get 25 percent of our oil from there," he declared
in Air Force magazine. "I can see the United States potentially
having a forward operating location in São Tomé,"
or other sites in Africa.
Of the dozen or
so locations mentioned in Pentagon or media accounts of new basing locations,
a majority--including Algeria, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Gabon, Iraq, Kazakhstan,
Kuwait, Qatar, Romania, São Tomé and Príncipe,
Tunisia--either possess oil themselves or abut major pipelines and supply
routes. At the same time, many of these countries house terrorist groups
or have been used by them as staging areas. And, from the Pentagon's
perspective, the protection of oil and the war against terrorism often
amount to one and the same thing. Thus, when asked whether the United
States was prepared to help defend Nigeria's oilfields against ethnic
violence, General Wald replied, "Wherever there's evil, we want
to go there and fight it."
Equally strong geopolitical
considerations link the pursuit of foreign oil to American concern over
the rise of China. Like the United States, China needs to import vast
amounts of petroleum in order to satisfy skyrocketing demand at home.
In 2010, the Energy Department predicts, China will have to import 4
million barrels of oil per day; by 2025 it will be importing 9.4 million
barrels. China will also be dependent on major producers in the Middle
East and Africa, and so it has sought to curry favor with these countries
using the same methods long employed by the United States: by forging
military ties with friendly regimes, supplying them with weapons and
stationing military advisers in them. A conspicuous Chinese presence
has been established, for example, in Iran, Sudan and the Central Asian
republics. To counter these incursions, the United States has expanded
its own military ties with local powers--and this in turn has helped
spark the drive for new basing facilities in the Gulf and Caspian regions.
The search for new
bases is also being driven by the Pentagon's new strategic outlook.
During the cold war era, most overseas US troop deployments were defensive--intended
to deter Soviet expansionism in Europe and Asia and to provide the means
for effective resistance should deterrence fail. True, some of these
bases were also used to support covert operations against pro-Soviet
regimes in the Third World and to promote other US interests, but for
the most part their role was static and defensive--and it is this passivity
that Rumsfeld and his associates seek to do away with. Instead, the
Bush Administration and its neocon allies seek to fashion a more assertive,
usable combat force. This new outlook is encapsulated in The National
Defense Strategy of the United States of America, a report just released
by the Defense Department: "Our role in the world depends on effectively
projecting and sustaining our forces in distant environments where adversaries
may seek to deny US access," the document says. The military doctrine
forged by the Bush Administration also envisions pre-emptive military
action or, more accurately, preventive strikes intended to cripple an
enemy's combat capability before it can be developed to the point of
actually posing a threat to American interests.
Being able to strike
first against all conceivable future adversaries translates into two
types of military capabilities: a capacity to move forces into combat
quickly and seize the battlefield initiative; and an ability to deliver
combat power to any corner of the globe, no matter how distant or inhospitable.
These necessitate a whole new constellation of overseas bases. Because
speed and agility require installations that are geared to logistical
efficiency rather than defensive might, older bastions must be replaced
by new facilities geared to transiting offensive forces; and because
new adversaries could arise in areas far removed from existing US bases,
new facilities are needed in any potential site of conflict. Hence the
desire for new logistical hubs and "bare bones" facilities
in every region of the world.
Finally, the Pentagon's
search for new basing facilities is being driven by the altered political
landscape of the post-cold war era. The installations acquired in Germany,
Japan and South Korea during the cold war were primarily intended for
the defense of those and neighboring countries, and so were largely
welcomed by the governments involved. In most cases, these bases were
embedded in an alliance relationship and reflected a shared strategic
vision. "The cold war provided an overarching framework,"
John Hamre of the Center for Strategic and International Studies told
the Congressional Overseas Basing Commission in November. "The
important factor in that strategic framework is that it incorporated
the national interests of host nations, not just the United States.
Our military presence in a given country protected them from invasion
or hostile action by others--the host country and the United States
shared the same risks and the same enemy."
Today, save for
South Korea, such facilities are no longer intended to buttress the
common defense but rather for use as steppingstones for the deployment
of American forces to other areas of the world--often in operations
that do not have the support of the host nation, such as the war in
Iraq. And the South Koreans have begun to express strong differences
with the United States over how best to deal with Pyongyang--with many
favoring a strategy of reconciliation instead of confrontation. Even
Turkey, a long-term US ally, refused to allow the Pentagon to use its
territory as a launching pad for the invasion of Iraq. All of this has
led to considerable anxiety at the Pentagon over the possibility that
more restrictions will be placed on the use of bases in these countries
for what are called "out of area" operations.
In the face of this
challenge there is "a purposeful effort to possibly leave places
where they may not want us or they are snubbing us," a senior military
official told Esther Schrader of the Los Angeles Times in May 2003.
"The Eastern Bloc countries have reached out to us.... They are
looking for a partnership." These more welcoming states, presumably
including Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, are
not as concerned as some of our older allies over the use of their territory
to facilitate US military operations in other countries. And their acquiescence
is a major factor in the base-realignment plan.
It is not clear
exactly when the Defense Department will complete the reassessment of
its overseas basing requirements and complete the actual redeployment
of American forces. Some of the initiatives described above have already
begun, while others remain on the drawing board. There is no doubt,
however, that a major realignment of American power is under way that
entails a seismic shift in the center of gravity of American military
capabilities from the western and eastern fringes of Eurasia to its
central and southern reaches, and to adjacent areas of Africa and the
Middle East. This is certain to involve the United States more deeply
in the tangled internal politics of these regions, and to invite resistance
from local forces--and there are many of them--that object to current
US policies and will resent a conspicuous American military presence
in their midst. Far from leading to a reduction in terrorism, as advertised,
these moves are certain to provoke more of it.
Finally, the American
power shift from outer Eurasia to its troubled interior is certain to
arouse concern and antipathy in Russia, China, India and other established
or rising powers in the region. Already, Russian leaders have expressed
dismay at the presence of American bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan--territories
that were once part of the Soviet Union. The recent political upheaval
in Kyrgyzstan and the ouster of President Askar Akayev--long considered
friendly to Moscow--is certain to exacerbate their concerns. At the
same time, Chinese officials have begun to complain about what they
view as the "encirclement" of their country. Although reluctant
to take on the Americans directly, leaders of Russia and China have
talked of a "strategic partnership" between their two countries
and have collaborated in the establishment of a new regional security
organ, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. None of this is likely
to lead soon to the outbreak of hostilities, but the foundation is being
set for a great-power geopolitical contest akin to the European rivalries
that preceded World Wars I and II.
Copyright ©
2005 The Nation