Turkish Entry Into EU:
Some Ethical Questions
By Nikhil Shah
26 October, 2004
Countercurrents.orgThe European Union (EU) has recently embarked on a huge wave of expansion as it has accepted 10 new members.[1] Turkey, a NATO member and important strategic ally of the U.S, is not among them; but after intense diplomatic pressure from the U.S, it hopes to receive a date to begin negotiations on membership at the Danish summit.[2] The greatest obstacle to Turkish membership is that it has not fulfilled the EU’s important political criteria for membership: rule of law, respect for minorities, and human rights.[3] A report by the European Commission published in October 2001, said that Turkey was not even ready to start talks.[4] There has been recent progress in the area of human rights by Turkey which has abolished the death penalty, repealed some laws against minorities and drafted new legislation against torture.[5] Many see these measures as a genuine attempt by Turkey for membership in the EU and that the EU could help Turkish democracy, especially with respect to the Kurdish minority.[6]
Turkey should not be admitted to the European Union as it has failed to meet the basic EU political prerequisites pertaining to human rights because of the draconian treatment of its Kurdish minority (with respect to their identity) sanctioned by Turkish law.[7] In addition, the Turkish government has a long-term strategy to crush domestic resistance of Kurdish groups seeking greater autonomy or recognition of their rights in response to the persistent racism they face within Turkey.[8] This strategy by the Turkish government has included napalm bombings and forced evacuations of rural Kurdish areas which have resulted in over 35,000 deaths and the forced displacement of three million civilians.[9] Other results of the government’s war on the Kurdish minority have included the routine prosecution, torture, imprisonment, disappearances and assassinations of journalists, human rights activists, and innocent Kurdish civilians at the hands of Turkish military and paramilitary forces.[10]
Although the new Turkish laws have been portrayed as addressing these issues, they are ineffective as the Turkish government can still carry out atrocities in the name of anti-terrorism.[11] The new laws have also been inadequate to deal with basic issues of press freedom, prison conditions, rights of Kurdish refugees, or lack of cultural freedom for the Kurdish minority, even in comparison to other member states of the EU[12] Turkey’s inclusion into the EU would not help the situation of the Kurdish minority either as the Union currently lacks the mechanism to deal with such grave human rights abuses, especially in light of Turkey’s unfulfilled promises of reform and abrupt dismissals of such criticisms in the past.[13] The accession of Turkey into the EU would be a blow to the their efforts to expand in the area of greater human rights enforcement, especially since the Kurdish issue has become synonymous with the issue of human rights in Europe.[14]
Part II of this paper will give vital background information about European expansion and the Kurdish uprising and repression in the 80’s and 90’s. Part III of this article will discuss the prerequisites required to join the EU and show how Turkey does not satisfy the criteria. Part IV will analyze arguments pertaining to the improvement of Turkish democracy if they joined the EU and show how this would not be beneficial for the union as the status of the Kurdish minority would not improve. Part V will conclude by discussing the dangers of allowing Turkey to join the EU unless major reforms are made there.
II. Background
The 1963 Ankara (or Association) agreement gave associate membership of the EU to Turkey.[15] This status was granted mainly to improve Turkey’s economic performance and living standards.[16] The preamble and Article 28 of the Agreement stressed that this improvement should facilitate later EU membership, which would be considered once full implementation of the agreement indicated that Turkey was ready to take over the responsibilities emanating from the EU Treaty.[17] These agreements served as a precursor to entering the European Union as a full-fledged member. In 1980, following the military coup in Turkey, the Community froze relations with Turkey and blocked the Fourth Financial Protocol.[18] Relations were gradually normalized following the return of civilian government after 1983, but the financial protocol was not approved.[19]
In 1984, a Kurdish uprising, led by the leftist PKI (Kurdistan Workers Party) erupted in the southeastern region of Turkey.[20] The uprising was borne by economic deprivation, social injustice, and physical displacement of the Kurds at the hands of successive Turkish governments as well as growing ideas of ethnic identity among the Kurdish population.[21] The Turkish government responded to this uprising by labeling all the insurgents and their supporters “terrorists” and engaged in a widespread campaign of repression to destroy the PKI and any Kurdish rights advocates.[22] The extensive human rights abuses that resulted from this campaign led to the suspension of the Ankara agreement with Europe between 1982 and 1988.[23]
In 1987, Turkey formally applied for accession into the European Community but was told by the commission twenty months later that negotiations had to wait.[24] In 1989, the commission endorsed Turkey’s eligibility for membership, but deferred the assessment of its application.[25] Turkey’s tense relations with Greece as well as the continued brutal suppression of the Kurdish movement hindered further cooperation with the EU in the early and mid 1990’s.[26] A great sympathy for Kurds had arisen in Europe after it was disclosed that the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons against their Kurdish population in 1987 resulting in over five thousand deaths.[27] Sympathy among the European population continued to grow when the casualties of the Turkish war on the Kurds began to rise resulting in the death of tens of thousands of civilians as well as the displacement of millions more.[28]
Some of these concerns were addressed when the EU adopted specific conditions to be placed on countries considered for application into the Union at the 1993 Copenhagen Summit.[29] The guidelines stated that in order to become a member, candidates must guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for the protection of minorities as well as other economic criteria.[30]
The Turkish government continued to lobby the EU and after tense negotiations, a customs union between the EU and Turkey entered into force in 1996.[31] Turkey abolished duties on imports of industrial goods from EU nations, as other EU member states had already done.[32] During September 1996, however, the European Parliament slowed cooperation with Turkey, again prompted by human rights, by passing a resolution to block any EU appropriations to Turkey except those fostering democracy, human rights, and civil society.[33] It was primarily these concerns again which led to EU leaders declining candidate status to Turkey at the historic meeting at Luxembourg on December 13, 1997.[34] Ankara reacted angrily, effectively freezing relations and contracts.[35] Relations continued to deteriorate with Turkey in 1999 when leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Abdullah Ocalan, was convicted by Turkey of treason and separatism and sentenced to death.[36] Tensions eased at the EU summit in Helsinki in December 1999 where Turkey was recognized as an applicant country after it accepted various preconditions on human rights (though after much hesitation).[37]
In October 2001, Turkey overhauled much of its military-drafted constitution to fulfill EU political criteria.[38] This process of reform continued in 2002 when the Turkish parliament passed legislation abolishing the death penalty, eased bans on the Kurdish language and swept away constraints on free speech.[39] On December 11 2002, the Turkish parliament overwhelmingly approved a package of human rights reforms, including sanctions against torture, but stopped short of ratification pending technical procedures.[40] On December 12, at the EU summit at Copenhagen, Turkey was given a December 2004 date of review for its progress in fulfilling human rights criteria for EU membership.[41] A date for accession talks would occur if the outcome of the review would be positive.[42] Turkey once again reacted angrily to a denial of its application and accused the EU of prejudice and double standards towards it as it was a Muslim nation.[43]
III. Turkey’s failure to meet prerequisites of the EU despite reforms
A. Introduction
Turkey has been in outright violation of the Copenhagen political criteria with respect to the protection of minorities which would rightfully prevent it from being admitted into the EU.[44] The Turkish government has failed to recognize the basic rights of its Kurdish minority and has reacted disproportionately to its security concerns in attempting to crush the Kurdish rebellion with no regard for civilian life.[45] The casualties that have resulted from this war are also in violation of many principles of customary international law, which the EU holds in high regard.[46] Also, the recent reforms in Turkey do not adequately address the Kurdish question as many provisions can be circumvented through legislation dealing with terrorism and evidence of this can be found with continued concerns about human rights in recent years.[47] A genuine approach to addressing the Kurdish question is also unlikely due to severe authoritarian political traditions in Turkey dating back to the Ottoman Empire.[48]
B. The Copenhagen Guidelines
The 1993 Copenhagen Guidelines lay out specific conditions for Turkey pertaining to its Kurdish minority in order for it to become a member of the EU. It states that candidates must achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for the protection of minorities.[49] These principles had been elaborated on before in the Copenhagen document (set forth by the Organization for Security and Cooperation of Europe) which required participating states to extend to national minorities the right to use their native tongue, to establish their own educational, cultural, and religious organizations; to participate in activities for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identities, to establish local and autonomous administrations, and so on.[50]
The treaty of Amsterdam has also enshrined in Article 6 (ex Article F) a constitutional principle that the “Union is founded on principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.”[51] Accordingly, the Intergovernmental Conference and subsequently the Commission have decided that this formal statement enlarges the Copenhagen requirements to include all of the mentioned principles.[52] Commentators have explained that the prospective member state must exhibit a solid and proper democracy and a library of EU rules embedded in its own law, especially pertaining to minorities.[53] There must be an effective administration to implement the prerequisites and to administer the judicial system so that there are found to be independent.[54]
C. Turkey’s position on the EU Guidelines
Turkey claims that it meets the guidelines set forth in the Copenhagen criteria as it has a democratically elected parliament, has instituted major changes in the area of minority rights in the past two years and eliminated the death penalty and the emergency in the southeast region.[55] These reforms were so sweeping that one human rights activist described them as the “the most positive changes made during the whole history of the Turkish republic.”[56] The Turkish government has added thirty-four amendments to its constitution relating to freedom of thought and _expression, the prevention of torture, the strengthening of civilian authority, freedom of association and other aspects related to meeting the Copenhagen criteria.[57] The Turkish government has also held numerous courses to train judges, prosecutors, and judicial staff in EU law and human rights.[58]
Furthermore, the Turkish government views the Kurdish rebellion and autonomy movement as a terrorist separatist movement that seeks to undermine the entire nation-state.[59] The government has claimed that the PKK has committed widespread abuses as part of its terrorism against representatives of the state and innocent civilians.[60] The PKK has also been accused of committing random killings in places such as tourist areas and carrying out suicide bombings to intimidate the population.[61] It is because of this ‘extreme’ terrorism that Turkey has been forced to declare a state of emergency in its six southeast provinces and that it’s brutal response should be viewed in light of these circumstances.[62] Furthermore, Turkey sees a double standard as Christian members of the EU such as the United Kingdom, Spain and France have suffered from acts of terrorism by minority groups within their territory and are allowed to respond to it accordingly.[63]
D. Dubious claims by Turkish government of a threat and disproportionate responses
Turkish claims pertaining to the necessity to impose an emergency in response to the Kurdish uprising are very dubious. While there have been atrocities carried out by the PKK and other radical outfits, it was unnecessary for the Turkish military to take the drastic steps that they did. The uprising was not a new phenomenon as there have been twenty-eight major Kurdish uprisings in Turkey since 1923, which have been brutally suppressed by the government.[64]
The uprisings have occurred due to the oppressive economic, political and cultural conditions that the Kurdish minority has faced since the founding of the modern Turkish Republic.[65] Since the 1920’s the official ideology of the Turkish government has been to deny the existence of Kurdish people in its country and to eradicate all aspects of Kurdish culture.[66] In addition to the mentioned inequalities, this stance took on absurd dimensions when Kurds were not allowed to speak their language in any official settings, were banned from giving their children Kurdish names, had their associations closed, had cassettes with Kurdish songs confisticated by the police, and were detained and arrested when they sung Kurdish songs at wedding ceremonies.[67] Despite these grievances, a Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce survey revealed that two-thirds of Kurds surveyed desired equal rights and self-administration within the republic and barely 11 percent favored succession (despite Turkish claims to the contrary).[68]
The Turkish government, on the other hand, has refused to even acknowledge any of these severe disparities and responded with an extreme type of paranoia towards anything minutely sympathetic to the Kurdish ordeal.[69] The Turkish government views the Kurdish quest for autonomy as a challenge to its elite secular rule and prefers not to deal with the problems in a democratic way.[70] It was these hard line policies against the Kurds by the Turkish government and unwillingness to deal with the problem democratically that led to the eradication of the center ground of Kurdish politics in the 1980’s.[71] The Kurds in the troubled areas of Turkey were forced to face a stark choice of either supporting a repressive state or a militant body committed to armed struggle to bring about change.[72]
Subsequent peace offers by high-ranking leaders of the PKK were dismissed abruptly by Turkish officials who were determined to militarily destroy the movement without compromise.[73] Turkey dismissed these proposals despite genuine indication from PKK officials that they were willing to accept a democratic federal association with Turkey.[74] The government even attempted to blame the PKK for atrocities that it has itself committed in Kurdish areas.[75] Also, renewed peaceful democratic attempts by Kurds in the 1990’s to win a place in the Turkish political life through forming democratic parties have been undermined again through the constitutional court and other state mechanisms there.[76]
E. Turkish atrocities, the Copenhagen Criteria and International Humanitarian Law
Turkey’s human rights record, especially as it pertains to its Kurdish minority since the outbreak of the 1984 rebellion, has been far from what is required of it by the Copenhagen Guidelines. Turkey has only paid lip service to democracy while carrying out the most extreme and violent forms of repression against the Kurdish population.[77] The European Commission, the European Court of Human Rights, the United Nations, the U.S. Department of State, and numerous advocacy groups have fiercely criticized Turkey’s human rights record.[78] The Council of Europe has monitored the situation with the Kurds since 1996 and hundreds of cases have been brought before the European Human Rights Commission and many before the European Court of Human Rights pertaining to this matter.[79] The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has found that Turkey has violated its provisions in 127 cases.[80]
The situation of the Turkish government differs from other member states of the EU such as Britain or Spain in that they are involved in a strategy to commit ethnocide against the Kurdish minority to force them to renounce their identity and to prevent them from ever rising up and challenging the Turkish state again.[81] Part of this strategy includes the napalm bombing of rural Kurdish areas and ‘evacuation’ of any villages to “preempt the villagers from supporting the PKK” according to Algan Hacaloglu, the state minister responsible for human rights in Turkey.[82] The evacuation strategy also includes torching village homes, destroying crops and machine-gunning livestock.[83] This strategy has led to the destruction of over 3000 villages, claimed more than 35,000 lives and resulted in the displacement of up to three million people.[84] Despite the severity of the conflict, Turkey refuses access by the International Red Cross or any human rights workers to the stricken regions.[85] The European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Akdivar v. Turkey found that the government of Turkey has carried out burning and other destruction of Kurdish villages and property in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Protocol No. 1.[86] Those villagers in the region who refuse orders to become guards for the Turkish military have faced torture and death.[87] The Turkish government has also carried out blockades of food and medicine for Kurdish areas for most of the war, which has been condemned by international NGO’s.[88]
The Turkish security forces acting with full sanction of the government have also engaged in widespread torture, disappearances and extra judicial killings.[89] There are cases where the police and security forces used beatings and electric shocks, hosed victims with iced water, and sexually abused and tortured detainees.[90] In the words of one peasant, “I was ready to confess that I had killed one hundred men, because they brought my wife and sister, stripped and threatened to rape them right there.[91] The victims have not been confined to peasants as human rights lawyers and other professionals have also been tortured and killed.[92] The military has also shot at unarmed and non-violent demonstrators and have failed to investigate brutal assassinations by counter-guerrillas recruited from Turkey’s ultra-nationalist movement who supposedly operate without the sanction of the state, but in reality actively collaborate with it.[93]
The broad and ambiguous provisions of the 1991 terrorist act in Turkey have also been used to indiscriminately arrest and mistreat Kurdish civilians.[94] This act has been used in conjunction with Criminal Code Article 312, which punishes indictment to racial or ethnic enmity, and Article 159, which prohibits insults to the army or other organs of the state.[95] The State Security Courts are the ones responsible for trying ‘terrorist’ cases and those that ‘threaten’ the unity of the country.[96] The special rules of criminal procedure afford less human rights protection in that hearings may be closed, counsel denied, and detention may be twice as long as normal investigations.[97] The courts do not act as independent bodies but work as an extension of the military.[98]
These special courts and repressive legislation have created a legal paranoia where any speech, writing or peaceful demonstration that is deemed to be sympathetic to Kurdish rights raises the antennas of the prosecutors. [99] As a result, journalists, authors and even members of parliament are indicted for their statements critical of the official policy.[100] In the year 1995 alone over 2,861 people had been convicted under the anti-terrorism law.[101] According to the Committee to protect journalists, Turkey imprisoned more journalists for their work than any other country for the years 1993-1998.[102] The laws were used in such a bizarre way that one international news journalist introduced her news report with the recitation: “A politician is in jail for reciting a poem. Trade unionists are detained on their way to the court to identify policemen accused of torturing them. A human rights advocate is sent to prison while his would-be assassins roam free.”[103]
Not only is this long-term strategy by the Turkish government of ‘ethnocide’ in fragrant violation of the Copenhagen criteria, but it is also in violation of numerous international covenants and treaties. International Treaties such as the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and Elimination on All Forms of Racial Discrimination provide basic safeguards such as cultural and linguistic rights to ethnic minorities such as the Kurds even though it does not sanction succession.[104] Turkey’s repression against the civilian population is also in fragrant violation of the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.[105]
It could also be argued that looking at the totality of Turkey’s policy towards the Kurds would qualify it for the formal definition of genocide under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.[106] The convention defines genocide as any act “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”[107] This has been interpreted as meaning “a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant number, relative to the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group such as its leadership.”[108] Arguably Turkey’s lack of recognition of basic Kurdish rights since its inception mixed with the violent repression it has inflicted on the population to ensure that a single Turkish identity would prevail would qualify under this definition as genocide.[109] Although Turkey has failed to sign or to ratify many of these international conventions, they are obliged not to disregard them fragrantly as they are part of customary international law.[110]
F. Turkey’s political reforms in light of their long-term strategy with the Kurds
Although Turkey’s recent political reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria are significant, they are still insufficient in light of its strategy of repression as the EU Council has rightfully acknowledged.[111] The Council has stated that Turkey’s short terms goals should further include a need to 1) strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of _expression in line with Article 10 of the ECHR; 2) aligning legal procedures concerning pre-trial detention with the provisions of the ECHR; 3) improving the functioning and efficiency of the judiciary, including the State Security Courts, in line with international standards; 4) removing any legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother tongue in TV/radio broadcasting; and 5) overturning laws allowing for capital punishment.[112]
Some of the long-term goals deemed important include: 1) adjusting detention conditions in prisons to bring them in line with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and other international norms; 2) lifting the state of emergency completely in the southeastern regions of Turkey; and 3) ensuring cultural diversity and guaranteeing cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of their origin.[113] While these conditions seem harsh, they are necessary with regard to Turkey’s history with the Kurds.
While Turkey has abolished the death penalty and repealed some laws against minorities, the laws can be circumvented through terrorist legislation and the State Security Courts.[114] This has led the Commission to continue to urge Turkey to abolish the death penalty completely and to further control the State Security Courts.[115] There is also concern about insufficient implementing legislation to match the reforms that Turkey has proposed which are necessary for a practical improvement in exercising fundamental freedoms.[116] Many of the reforms giving Kurds linguistic and cultural rights have failed to be implemented.[117] Also, laws against torture and detention have still not been enforced in Turkey because of fear of reprimand from the armed forces.[118] Despite the formal lifting of the state of emergency in 2000 by the Turkish government, the southeast region is “yet to feel the difference” according to a Kurdish peasant.[119] Over 70,000 troops have been dispatched to the region again during the recent war in Iraq to intimidate the population and keep them politically complacent.[120]
Even when laws respecting human rights have been enforced, they have primarily benefited private actors who seek to silence journalists and human rights activists who question the activities of the state with respect to Kurds.[121] There has been no attempt to account for the numerous assassinations and disappearances that occurred in the past two decades or to deal with the rights of the Kurdish refugees both within and outside Turkey.[122] The Turkish government has continued to restrict freedom of _expression in trivial matters as was seen when they banned a change of street name in southeast Turkey to ‘Mahatma Gandhi Street’ as Gandhi’s name was associated with passive resistance and “glorified revolt” according to officials.[123] Streets with the name ‘Democracy Avenue’ and ‘Human Rights Boulevard’ were also banned.[124]
Even the limited reforms passed to protect the Kurdish minority have been very hard to swallow by the political parties in Turkey.[125] There has been great political fallout from these reforms and many Turkish nationalists view them as undermining the country and seek to halt them.[126] Even the opposition Islamic movement in Turkey has not been very supportive of Kurdish rights and has joined the national consensus on issues pertaining to Kurdish identity.[127]
It appears that only a thorough overhaul of the Turkey’s authoritarian traditions and military-inspired constitution can any meaningful change occur in relation to the Kurdish population.[128] The Turkish state and its political rulers have inherited a long and authoritarian statist tradition from the Ottoman Empire and it is questionable whether they will solve the Kurdish question by democratic means in the near future.[129] Neither the country’s elites, with their generally corrupt, inefficient, personalized and ineffective system of political parties, nor the masses have moved far from the authoritarian traditions of the Ottoman Empire and its weak civil society.[130] The government’s influence on the security apparatus is very limited, and the military still functions as a quasi-autonomous entity.[131] The military apparatus uses real or supposed ‘separatist’ or Islamic threats to legitimatize is hold of power in Turkey.[132]
With the slow pace of reforms to address important issues of minority rights it could take generations before Turkey’s civil and political culture could follow the same path as found in the EU’s core.[133] But major constitutional reforms, the diffusion of military power from politics and genuine attempts at enhancements of democratic rights could meet the concerns of the Kurdish minority and fulfill the Copenhagen criteria.[134]
IV. INCLUSION INTO THE EU AND TURKISH DEMOCRACY
A. Introduction
The inclusion of Turkey into the EU would not help the Kurdish situation improve substantially as the EU currently lacks the legal mechanisms to deal with a problem as grave as the human rights abuses in Turkey.[135] Turkey has dismissed criticisms and sanctions for its human rights abuses in the past and will likely be able to do so in the EU as well through lobbying efforts of its ally, the U.S.[136] The admission of Turkey to the EU would be a major blow to the greater emphasis on human rights enforcement and would cause the EU to be drawn into tensions and conflicts which they would rather not be a part of.[137]
B. The EU and the protection of minority rights
The EU does not have a formal written Bill of Rights, is not a contracting party to the ECHR, nor has the ECHR formally incorporated into the EU legal system.[138] The ECJ in the decision Nold v. Commission stated that the protection of human rights in the EU derives from other sources such as constitutional traditions common to member states and international treaties for the protection of human rights.[139] The treaties establishing the European Union do not make any exact references to specific fundamental rights. The clearest EU statement regarding fundamental human rights is found in Article 6 (2) (ex article F) which states that the EU shall respect the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR as well as those mentioned in Nold.[140] Such reference, however, does not provide that European citizens shall have the right to invoke these rights against a state or institution for their violation, nor does it provide penalties for the violation of such rights or establish minimum standards for the EU to follow.[141]
Since the 1970’s, the EU institutions have increasingly focused on the importance of protecting human rights.[142] The EU institutions issued a Joint Declaration noting EU commitment to the protection of minority rights but this was not judicially binding.[143] The nature of EU law doesn’t allow the ECJ to review the legislative process of member states for compliance with ECHR provisions, and it lacks the power to review legislation concerning areas that fall within the jurisdiction of national legislation, even if that legislation violates human rights.[144] Member state national courts, therefore, have great leeway in determining human rights protections of their citizens.[145] This is because compliance with EU law only requires that laws comply with a vague standard of respect for fundamental rights.[146] Overall, the EU practice concerning the implementation of a policy of human rights conditionality is fundamentally based on economic and political rather than legal and judicial criteria.[147] But, this is not an adequate substitute for a policy focused in minority rights.[148]
C. The position that the EU could help Turkish democracy
There is great speculation that by Turkey’s inclusion into the EU that both ordinary Kurds and Turks would enjoy greater human rights as the EU is major organization that is dedicated to democracy.[149] A lot of liberals have argued that organizations such as the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have a reasonably good record in promoting democracy.[150] They have said that the EU has a rigorous membership criterion which has gotten Turkey to make reforms and given the former a considerable leverage over Turkish politics.[151] Formal membership, according to the argument, would help to further quell the authoritarian traditions in Turkey.[152]
D. Turkish inclusion into the EU and the Kurds
Turkey’s inclusion into the EU will not provide a viable solution to the problems of its Kurdish minority. As has been discussed, the EU’s judicial system, in its present state lacks the tools to deal with a crisis of a large scale as the situation of the Kurds in Turkey.[153] The EU has been unable to adequately deal with the human rights violations in North Ireland which parallels the Kurdish situation to a lesser extent with the emergency regime imposed there from time to time and the resulting atrocities that take place there.[154] Also, in view of Turkey’s authoritarian past, it is unlikely that they would incorporate the ECHR into their national laws as other member states have done (but not required to do) and would likely work against these principles.[155]
It is also unlikely that any national courts in Turkey, given their history would refer any matter pertaining to the Kurdish minority to the ECJ as is required.[156] During the past half-century the Turkish constitutional courts have banned over 30 democratic political parties and have actively collaborated with the state in repressive political actions in the name of “protecting Turkish democracy.”[157] Another problem with the current system of the EU is that a lot of matters pertaining to the Kurdish minority could fall within the jurisdiction of national legislation and Turkey may circumvent them with other laws about terrorism or separation to continue repression against Kurds.[158]
Even if Turkey is cited for a specific human rights violation, the mechanisms set up to ensure state compliance by the EU are unclear.[159] Turkey has been very dismissive of criticisms in this area and brushed aside pronouncements of the European Parliament in the past and it is likely to do so again.[160] For fifty years, Turkey’s membership in NATO has failed to democratize it, despite NATO’s calling itself a defender of democracy.[161] Despite NATO’s admonishments, Turkey has carried out human rights violations and invaded Cypress.[162]
One of the reasons Turkey has been able to be so dismissive on these issues is because of its strong alliance with the US.[163] The U.S. views Turkey as a strategic partner and is the biggest provider of arms to Turkish military who has used them against the Kurdish population.[164] The U.S is less concerned with human rights violations against the Kurds than most European countries as it also views the PKK and its sympathizers as extreme terrorists.[165] It is likely that this status as a strong US ally will encourage Turkey to take whatever action it deems necessary to deal with the Kurdish problem in the future.[166] This was evident in the recent war against Iraq where Turkey wanted to enter Kurdish areas in Northern Iraq and crush the movement but was prevented from doing so for strategic reasons by the U.S.[167]
Any such dismissals by Turkey of EU legislation would be a major blow to the EU and their desire to expand the scope of human rights enforcement. There has been a great sympathy growing for Kurdish movement in Europe since the 1980’s caused by the large refugee population that was forced to migrate there due to the displacement by the Turkish military.[168] Since the Kurds constitute the largest stateless minority in the world, the Kurdish question is expected to continue to reflect the struggle for not only cultural, human and minority rights, but also for national rights.[169] This may be of great concern to the EU as the international community has been paying close attention to the role that the EU has played in shaping policies which may best serve, in that part of the continent effective human rights protection and long-term inter-state peaceful relations.[170]
Also, by allowing Turkey to become a member, the EU would risk being drawn into tensions and conflicts where it would be better for it to not get involved.[171] The issue of the Kurds is related to Turkey’s foreign policy with Greece and Syria and could erupt in military confrontation with the countries.[172] Turkey has frequently pursued Kurds in the territory of other nation-states such as Iraq and has entangled other countries in its conflict that have a large Kurdish population.[173] By accepting a member that is ready to go to war to deal with its Kurdish ‘problem,’ the EU might risk being associated with such endeavors.[174]
V. CONCLUSION
My argument is that Turkey should not be admitted to the EU as it has failed to meet the prerequisites of the Copenhagen criteria due to the ethnic cleansing it has been carrying out in the Kurdish territories and has consequently failed to made adequate changes to its political system to qualify as a member.[175] Furthermore, Turkey’s inclusion into the EU would not help the plight of its Kurdish population unless the later passes more concrete human rights legislation that is binding on the community as a whole.[176]
As the Kurdish issue has become synonymous with human rights, allowing Turkey to become a member of the EU would cause a great amount of disillusionment among the population in Europe. This move would lead to a speculation of whether the EU is only about markets rather than a community of political and social rights as well.[177] The EU would be viewed as an entity that just wishes to impose neo-liberal, anti-social economic policies in the name of Europe in disregard of democratic rights.[178]
Also, with the recent outrage at the US attack on Iraq, the population in Europe would wonder if the EU is an extension of U.S. foreign policy where membership is granted in return for international cooperation regardless of human rights concerns.[179] The population would view this as the abandonment of the EU’s efforts to take control and define itself and its evolving human rights and foreign policy, especially with the entry of other pro-American countries from central and Eastern Europe.[180] This would be the very antithesis of the idea of community that had been evoked by the EU at its inception and could very well contribute to its disintegration.[181]
In order to avoid this disaster, the EU must continue to put pressure on Turkey to abandon its strategy of repressing the Kurds and made significant constitutional changes to distance itself from its authoritarian traditions.[182] A Kurdish peasant who had lived through the worse Turkish repression offered the following insight: “The Kurds have been oppressed all over the world…But in Turkey they have had the hardest time. We don’t want an independent Kurdish state; what we want is a federation. This is the dream we are living with.”[183] The EU should use its pressure of membership to ensure that this dream comes true.
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* The focus of this paper is on Turkish membership in the EU with respect to the treatment of its Kurdish minority. While this is an important factor in the consideration for EU membership, it is not the only one. There are other human rights concerns within Turkey and external concerns such as with Greece and Cypress as well as issues with Turkey being a Muslim majority country. The scope of this paper is only on the Kurdish question.
[1] Ian Black, “EU embraces 10 new members and opens the door to Turkey,” The Guardian, December 14, 2002. “A more powerful Europe,” Los Angeles Times, April 17, 2003, pg. B 14.
[2] Ian Black, “EU dashes Anglo-US hopes for early talks on Turkish entry,” The Guardian, December 13, 2002.
[3] Copenhagen European Council meeting in June 1993.
[4] 2001 Regular Report by the Commission, Chapter 24-Cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, part B.3.1.
[5] Jonny Dymond, “Turkey turns liberal with an eye on the EU,” The Observer, August 4, 2002.
[6] Jonathan Steele, “the EU can help Turkish democracy,” The Guardian, December 12, 2002.
[7] See supra note 4; Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the future of Turkey 19-20 (New York: St. Martins Press).
[8] David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds 439-41 (New York: I.B.Tauris Publishers, 2000).
[9] Id; See supra note 5.
[10] Amnesty International, Human Rights and U.S. Security (New York: Amnesty International, 1995), pg. 48-50; Amnesty International, “Turkey: A policy of Denial,” Feb. 1995; Amnesty International, “Turkey: Human Rights Defenders at Risk,” Sept. 1994; and Amnesty International, “Turkey: Dissident Voices Jailed again,” June 1994.
[11] See supra note 4.
[12] Id; Human Rights watch report.
[13] Lord Eric Aveburry, Practical Obstacles to Kurdish Self-Determination, in The Kurdish Question and International Law 84 (Mohammed M.A. Ahmed and Michael M. Gunter eds., Virginia: Ahmed Foundation For Kurdish Studies, Inc.); Gateano Pentassuglia, The EU and the Protection of Minorities: The Case of Eastern Europe, 8 EIJL 3, 22-24 (2001); Tara C. Stever, Protecting Human Rights in the European Union: An Argument for Treaty Reform, 20 Fordham Int’l L.J. 919, 958-971.
[14] Philip Robbins, More Apparent than Real? The Impact of the Kurdish Issue on Euro-Turkish Relations in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990’s 129 (Robert Olson ed., Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky Press).
[15] EC-Turkey Association Agreement, Council Decision No. 64/372, O.J. 217 at 3987 (1964).
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Directorate General 1, European Commission, Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession, (Nov. 4, 1998) at A(b) available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/rep (last visited 3/5/03).
[19] Id.
[20] See supra note 8 at 418.
[21] Id. at 402.
[22] Meltem Muftuler-Bec, Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe 60-63, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).
[23] Id.
[24] See supra note 18 at 5. This was due to the Kurdish problem as well as Turkey’s confrontation with Greece.
[25] See supra note 18.
[26] Briol Yesilada, The Mediterranean Challenge in The Expanding European Union 181 (Redmond and Resenthal eds. 1998).
[27] See supra note 14 at 115.
[28] See supra note 9.
[29] European Commission, Agenda 2000, For a stronger and wider Union in E.U. Bull., no. 12.97, 56 (Supplement 5/97), also in http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/9712/i2001.htm#anch0048 (last visited 3/24/03).
[30] Id.
[31] Turkey: A Country Study 6-28 (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1996).
[32] Id.
[33] See supra note 29.
[34] Kinzer, “Turkey, Rejected, Will Freeze Ties to European Union,” N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1997, at A3; Barry James, “Turkey Is Rejected for EU Membership,” Int'l Herald Trib., Dec. 15, 1997, at 1.
[35] Id.
[36] Ian Traynor, “Death Sentence Provokes Anger Across Europe,” The Guardian, June 30, 1999.
[37] Ian Black, “Turkey Embroiled in EU membership crisis,” The Guardian, December 11, 1999.
[38] See supra note 5.
[39] Id.
[40] Elaine Sciolino, “European Union turns down Turkey’s bid for membership,” New York Times, December 13, 2002 at Section A pg. 16 column 1.
[41] Ian Black, “EU dashes Anglo-US hopes for early talks on Turkish entry,” The Guardian, December 13, 2002.
[42] Id.
[43] “Turkey accuses EU of prejudice,” The Guardian, December 13, 2002.
[44] See supra note 4.
[45] See supra note 8 at 439-41, 446.
[46] Michael Gunter, The Kurdish Question and International Law 32-34 and Judge Ralph Fertig, International and U.S. Laws and the Kurdish Question 76 in The Kurdish Question and International Law (Mohammed M.A. Ahmed and Michael Gunter eds.).
[47]See supra note 4.
[48] Barry Bruzan and Thomas Diez, The European Union and Turkey, Survival, vol. 41, no. 1, 41, 50; (Spring 1999); Paul Magnerella, The Legal, Political and Cultural Structures of Human Rights Protections and Abuses in Turkey, 3 D.C.L.J. Int’l L. & Practice 439, 441-42 (1994).
[49] See supra note 3.
[50] Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Copenhagen, 5-29 June, 1990.
[51] Treaty on European Union in European Union Law: Selected Documents 144 (Bermann, Goebel, Davey, Fox eds, St Paul, MN: West Group, 2002).
[52] See supra note 29.
[53] Bernhard Schloh, Implications of Widening the European Union, 18 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1251, 1251-52 (1995).
[54] Helen E. Hartnell, Subregional Coalescence in European Regional Integration, 16 Wis. Int'l L.J. 115, 167-68 (1997).
[55] See supra notes 39 and 40 and accompanying text.
[56] See supra note 5.
[57] Commission of the European Communities, 2001 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, SEC (2001) 1756, 28 page 14 available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/tu_en.pdf (last visited March 13, 2003).
[58] Id. at 17.
[59] Oren Gross, “Once More unto the Breach”: The Systemic Failure of Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 Yale J. Int’l L. 437, 486.
[60] U.S. Dep’t of State, “Turkey Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998” 1-46 (last visited Apr. 29, 2003).
[61] Id.
[62] See supra note 59.
[63] See supra note 14 at 119.
[64] Edip Yuskel, Yes I am a Kurd, 7 D.C.L.J. Int’l L. & Prac. 359, 374-75.
[65] See supra note 8 at 402.
[66] See Gunter supra note 7 at 4. See also Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds of Turkey: a political dilemma 43 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990).
[67] Testimony of Lois Whitman, Deputy Director of Helsinki Watch, and Human Rights in Turkey: Briefing of the [U.S] Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 20 (April 5, 1993). Many of these anti-Kurdish biases were formalized in Turkish law. See supra note 63 at 366.
[68] See supra note 8 at 446.
[69]Id.
[70] Id.
[71] See supra note 14 at 116.
[72] Id.
[73] Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo 52-53 (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1999); Owen Bowcott, “Kurdish separatist group declares peace with Turkey,” The Guardian, February 10, 2000.
[74] Id; see Gunter supra note 7 at 133; Supra note 8 at 430.
[75] Gunter supra note 7 at 82.
[76] Wendy Kristiansen, “Between the Generals and the Islamists: Secular Turks Search for Reform,” Le Monde Diplomatique, February 1999.
[77] See Avebury supra note 13 at 86.
[78] See supra note 10; Aisling Reidy et al., Gross Violations of Human Rights: Invoking the European Convention on Human Rights in the Case of Turkey, 15 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 161, 162 (1997); U.S. Dep’t of State, Turkey County Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997 1(g) (visited Apr. 5, 2003); Commission on Human Rights Starts Debate on Civil and Political Rights, Press Release HR/CN/904 at http://www.un.org/plweb-cgi (last visited 4/20/03).
[79] See Magnarella supra note 48 at 465; Elizabeth Olson, :Europe Human Rights Court Challenged by Turkish Cases,” Int’l Herald Trib., July 22, 1999 at 4.
[80] See supra note 56 at 19.
[81]Karen Parker, The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey in Light of International Humanitarian Law in The Kurdish Question and International Law 62, F63 (Mohammed M.A. Ahmed and Michael M. Gunter eds., Virginia: Ahmed Foundation For Kurdish Studies, Inc). Turkey has been responsible for similar behavior in the past as was seen when they killed more than a million Armenians between 1915 and 1918.
[82]“Hacaloglu on Conditions of Kurds in Southeast,” Turkish Daily News, July 24, 1995, pg. 27; See supra note 63 at 372. The author states, “The wealth of the Kurdish lands are transformed into bombs, biological weapons, and poisonous gases which are showered on top of their villages.”
[83] Helena Smith, “Fearful of the Future,” The Guardian, March 27, 2003. Azimet Koyluoglu, Hacaloglu’s predecessor as Turkish Human Rights Minister called the governments ‘evacuation’ strategies “state terrorism” in Human Rights Watch Helsinki, “Turkey: Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey,” October 1994, pg. 3.
[84] See supra note 63 at 374.
[85] Id.
[86] Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996); Slip op. (99/1995/605/693) at para 13.
[87]See Stever supra note 13 at 973.
[88] See supra note 81 at 63.
[89] Id.
[90] See Magnarella supra note 48 at 461.
[91] See supra note 8 at 425.
[92] Stephen Kinzer, “Assassination Attempt Taints Turkish Politics,” N.Y. Times, June 11, 1998 at A14.
[93] See Gunter supra note 4 at 83.
[94] See Magnarella supra note 48 at 454.
[95] U.S. Dep't of State, Turkey Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 2 (last visited March 29, 2003) http://www.state.gov/www/global/human rights/1998 hrp report/Turkeyhtml
[96] See Magnarella supra note 48 at 454.
[97] Id. at 454-56.
[98] Id.
[99] Id. at 455-56.
[100] Id.
[101] See Gunter, supra note 4 at 13.
[102] Report available at http://www.cpi.org/Briefings/Turkeyreport.html (last visited 3/10/03).
[103] Leyla Boulton, “Turkey Grapples with Opportunity To Clean up Image on Human Rights,” Fin. Times, May 3, 1999, at 2.
[104] See Gunter supra note 46 at 32.
[105] Id. at 33.
[106] 12 January 1951, 78 U.N.T.S., 277.
[107] Id.
[108] Benjamin Whitaker, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, study prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6, 2 July 1985, pg. 16 para. 29.
[109] Id.
[110] See Gunter supra note 46 at 32.
[111] Council decision 2001/235/EC, Annex, 2000 O.J. (L85) 15.
[112] Id. at 16-17.
[113] Id. at 19.
[114] See supra note 57 at 21-22, 24.
[115] Id.
[116] Id. at 20.
[117] See Smith supra note 83.
[118] “Why are we waiting,” The Economist, June 8, 2000.
[119] See Smith supra note 83.
[120] Id.
[121] Id.
[122] Id; Chris Alden, “Turkey and Europe,” The Guardian, Thursday December 12, 2002.
[123] Simon Tisdall, “Whats in a name? Too much for Turkey,” The Guardian, January 25, 2001.
[124] Id.
[125] Chirs Morris, “Turkish leaders find EU reforms hard to swallow,” The Guardian, July 5, 2000.
[126] James Helicke, “Turkish nationalists aim to halt reforms,” The Guardian, August 5, 2002; Simon Tisdall, “Political fallout over reform threatens to bury chances of joining EU,” The Guardian, February 23, 2001.
[127] See supra note 76.
[128] See supra note 118.
[129] See Magnarella supra note 48 at 441-442.
[130] See Bruzan supra note 48 at 50.
[131] Id.
[132] Id.
[133] Id.
[134] See Avebury supra note 13 at 87.
[135] See supra note 13.
[136] Id.
[137] See supra note 14 and Buzan supra note 48 at 42.
[138] See Silver supra note 14 at 958.
[139] Case 4/7, (1974) ECR 491, para. 13. The ECJ summarized this doctrine in Case C-299/95, Freidrich Kremzow v. Austrian State (1997) ECR I-2405, paras 14-15.
[140] See supra note 51 at 145.
[141] See Silver supra note 14 at 960-61.
[142] See Pentassuglia supra note 13 at 6.
[143] The Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, Apr. 5, 1979, O.J. C 103/1 (1979).
[144] Nicholas Stewart, The Relationship Between the European Court of Justice and the Courts of the Member States of the European Communities, 5 Aut Int’l L. Practicum 41, 42 (1992).
[145]See Silver supra note 14 at 964.
[146] Id.
[147] See Pentassuglia supra note 13 at 22.
[148] Id. at 35.
[149] See Alden supra note 122.
[150] Jonathan Steele, “The EU can help Turkish democracy,” The Guardian, December 12, 2002.
[151] See Buzan supra note 48 at 52.
[152] See supra note 150.
[153] See supra note 144 and Silver supra note 14 at 919-20.
[154] See Silver supra note 14 at 970-71.
[155] Id. at 958.
[156] Article 234. See supra note 51 at 97. Also see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
[157] Edip Yuksel, Cannibal Democracies: Human Rights and Democracy in Turkey, 7 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 423 (1999).
[158] See supra notes 114 and 144 and accompanying texts.
[159] See Pentassuglia supra note 13 at 24.
[160] See supra note 14 at 128-29.
[161] See supra note 150.
[162] Id.
[163] See Buzan supra note 48 at 46.
[164] See Fertig, supra note 46 at 79-80; Noam Chomsky Middle East Illusions 204-06 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
[165] Id.
[166] See Buzan supra note 48 at 46.
[167] See Smith supra note 83.
[168] See supra notes 14 and 27.
[169] Mohammed M.A Ahmed, The Origin of the Kurdish Question in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990’s 15 (Robert Olson ed., Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky Press).
[170] See Pentassuglia supra note 13 at 5.
[171] Buzan supra note 48 at 42.
[172] Id. at 51.
[173] Id.
[174] Id. at 52.
[175] See Part III.
[176] See Part IV.
[177] Bernard Cassen, “Europe: Market not Community,” Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2002.
[178] Id.
[179] Bernard Cassen, “The United States of Europe,” Le Monde Diplomatique, January 2003.
[180] Id.
[181] Id.
[182] Buzan supra note 48 at 50.
[183] See Smith supra note 83.
