Russia
Retreats Into Repression
By Ignacio Ramonet
17 October,2004
Le Monde diplomatique
The
hostage stand-off in Beslan, North Ossetia, was called Russias
9/11 and the comparison is valid in an important way: Russia can now
see the world in terms of pre-Beslan and post-Beslan, just as the United
States divides time into pre-and post-9/11, 2001. The mass hostage-taking
on 3 September became a nightmare with at least 370 people dead, some
160 of them children. The world looked on mortified as this slaughter
of the innocents happened before its eyes; it was also horrified by
the Russian special forces brutal and blundering intervention.
Beslan marks a turning
point in the continuing wars of the Caucasus (see The Caucasian melting-pot
heats up). The hostage takers had a frightening capacity for violence,
but the security services failure to prevent the tragedy was equally
shocking. Beslan is the biggest crisis Vladimir Putin has faced since
becoming Russias president. It is not clear that he fully understands
why this is so. "We must admit that we had not grasped the complexity
and the severity of the processes under way in our own country and elsewhere
in the world," said Putin the day after the siege ended in disaster.
This statement was meant to reinforce the idea that Russia shares an
adversary in common with other nations - international terrorism, a
euphemism for radical Islam, or what some call the worldwide Islamic
jihad.
This is the same
tragic mistake that President George Bush made when he decided to attack
Iraq in March 2003 as a way to combat al-Qaida. Like the Bush administration,
Russias government is now declaring a war and talking about the
need for a strong state. This means sweeping and largely anti-democratic
changes to Russias political system (1), increased resources for
the armed forces and increased powers to deploy them in pre-emptive
strikes. "We will take all measures to liquidate terrorist bases
in any region of the world," said Colonel General Yuri Baluyevsky,
chief of the militarys general staff (2).
What Putin and his
government refuse to admit is that the rise of terrorism and radical
Islam in Russias territories in the Caucasus are both the symptoms
of discontent and means of expression for primarily nationalist concerns.
And history shows that nationalism is an exceptionally resilient and
powerful source of political energy, as the Palestinians have demonstrated.
Nationalism is probably
the single most important force in modern history: colonialism, imperialism
and totalitarianism failed to stamp it out. Nationalism makes any alliances
necessary to further its cause. We are seeing this now in Afghanistan
and Iraq, where nationalism and radical Islam are coming together in
national liberation struggles that have created horrible forms of terrorism.
The same thing is
happening in Chechnya. From the start the Chechens were the strongest
fighters against Russias conquest of the Caucasus. They bravely
resisted Russian occupation as early as 1918 and then declared independence
in 1991 as soon as the Soviet Union disintegrated. This led to the first
Russo-Chechen war, which ended in August 1996 with the Chechens victorious
- but Chechnya had been all but destroyed by the years of conflict.
The Russian army
invaded Chechnya again in 1999 after a wave of terrorist attacks. This
second war completed the destruction interrupted in 1996. Russia then
held local elections in Chechnya, making sure that all key positions
were filled by people who would obey the Moscow line. But the Chechen
resistance did not disarm. It continued to attack and the Russians continued
their policy of violent repression (3).
In the geopolitical
context there are no easy solutions to the Chechen problem. The Russian
authorities are less than pleased about the new economic and military
ties between the US and Georgia and Azerbaijan, two independent countries
just south of Chechnya. Moscow is beginning to feel like a superpower
under siege, given Bushs recent decision to move German-based
US forces closer to Russia - into Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Hungary.
Putins response
has been to maintain the Russian bases in Georgia and Azerbaijan, despite
the opposition of their governments, and to reinforce Russias
alliance with Armenia, which is still illegally occupying part of Azerbaijan.
He is also supporting separatist movements in the Georgian provinces
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Unable to defeat
the Chechen resistance on the ground, the Russians intend to prove their
continuing power in the greater Caucasus. They are haunted by their
humiliation in Afghanistan, but losing to Chechnyas radical Islamists
would be even more humiliating, since the total Chechen population is
less than a million. Moreover it could easily trigger a chain reaction
across the region, leading to further territorial losses for Russia.
This is why Moscow so bluntly refuses to negotiate or to recognise a
right to self-rule. But the brutal repression that goes with this policy
is creating terrorist monsters prepared to commit terrible crimes.
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