Between
Insurrection And Reaction: Evo Morales' Pursuit Of
'Normal Capitalism
By James Petras
24 March, 2007
Countercurrents.org
Introduction
Many progressive overseas
academics, politicians, journalists and commentators have glowingly
characterized the Evo Morales regime as 'radical', 'revolutionary' and
part of an 'anti-imperialist bloc'. Academics as diverse as Noam Chomsky,
Ignacio Ramonet, Emir Sader, Heinz Dietrich, Marta Hanecker and Immanuel
Wallerstein have described Evo Morales as part of a new leftist wave
sweeping Latin America. What is striking about these academic celebrants
of President Morales, is the total absence of any empirical analysis
of his recent political trajectory and the socio-economic and public
policies implemented during his first 15 months in office.
A first approximation toward
an understanding of the Morales regime is to briefly recount the role
of Morales and his MAS Party in the period preceding his election and
the relationship between the dynamic social movements to socio-political
change…
This historical perspective
serves to provoke the basis for outlining the theoretical-practical
conceptions of Morales-Linera Garcia(Vice-President)which guides their
strategy and program of governance.
Once having established the
'general line' and strategic goals this provides the basis for analyzing
the specific policies pursued in important socio-economic sectors and
the tactical-political compromises and alliances, which the regime has
put in place.
Morales Regime in
Historical Perspective
Contrary to the mythology
of many progressive intellectuals, Morales did not play any role in
the three major uprisings between 2003-2005, which led to the overthrow
of two neoliberal client presidents: Sanchez de Losado and Carlos Mesa.
To me more specific, Morales opposed the February 2003 uprising, was
in Geneva, Switzerland attending an inter parliamentary conference during
the successful uprising(October 2003), which overthrew Sanchez de Losado
and did everything possible to undermine the mass general strike of
May-June 2005 that drove Carlos Mesa from power. A serious analysis
demonstrates that Morales threw all the weight of the MAS Party and
its social movements in support of Carlos Mesa's successful rise to
the Presidency, despite having served as Vice President to Sanchez de
Losado. Morales intervened again following Mesa's demise to back neo-liberal
Supreme Court Justice Rodriguez as Interim President in the run-up to
the Presidential election of December 2005. Subsequently Morales totally
transformed the substance of the social movements' demand for a constituent
assembly (CA) to 're-found the republic'. The social movements demanded
that the election of the CA take place by and through the mass popular
social movements. This would ensure that the CA reflected the interests
of the workers and peasants. Morales rejected this demand and came to
an agreement with the discredited oligarchic parties to organize the
CA elections based on territorial units in which the elite electoral
party machines would dominate the elections. The result was the almost
complete marginalization of the social movements from the CA. After
a year of procedural conflict in the CA, Morales agreed to give the
oligarchic parties a virtual veto over the new constitution by agreeing
to a two-thirds vote to approve all constitutional laws. Further evidence
of the divergence of the Morales regime from the demands of the insurrectionary
social movements was his appointments to the key economic posts in the
cabinet and their continuation of orthodox fiscal policies: emphasizing
balanced budget and tight monetary policies over public investment in
social programs and substantive anti-poverty programs, for example the
doubling of the minimum wage, substantial salary increase for teachers,
health workers and other low-paid public sector workers.
Theoretical Consideration
The decay of 'Marxist' social
thought is very much evident in the discussions of the political trajectory,
structure and policy of the Morales 'movement' (MAS and affiliated peasant-indian
movements and trade unions). The logic and theory propounded by 'left-theorists'
(LT) is deductive, post-modernist, ahistorical and anti-materialist.
Instead of examining the empirical class political practices of Morales
and the MAS in order to construct a theory, the LT begin by assuming
that being 'Indian', of popular origins and having led a popular movement,
ipso facto the regime was 'radical', 'revolutionary', and 'anti-imperialist'.
The deductive logic excludes the whole panoply of class accommodations
and class 're-locations' which accompanied the decisive shift from direct
action mass struggles to electoral parliamentary politics. Post-modernism
focuses exclusively on cultural and symbolical action and 'political
theater', over and against substantive class struggles, changes in property
and class relations. For the post-modernist Morales emphasis on 'indigenous,
identity, his participation in traditional events in native dress, and
his verbal assaults and threats to oligarchs and conspirators are expression
of a 'new revolutionary' way of doing politics. By focusing on 'identity'
the postmodernists ignore the enormous class differences between malnourished
landless and subsistence peasants and upwardly mobile middle class indigenous
politicians, leaders and power brokers.
The post-modernists ignore
the overt economic collaborations between Morales regime and wealthy
'white' agro-export elites, the European and US petroleum companies
and the Indian millionaires of the Mutun iron mine complex. The post-modernist
obsession with the 'rhetoric' or 'text' of Morales presentations before
mass audiences in which he engages in demagogic linguistic acrobatics
blinds them to the actual class and national content of his policy.
Hence his 'revolutionary nationalization' of petrol and gas was little
more than a tax increase on the rate paid by the multi-nationals (MNC)
to the state. Not a single MNC was expropriated. Even the price of gas
of $5usd per million cubic feet to Argentina was 40% below the world
price – and Brazil's payment, one year after 'nationalization'
was still the same $4 dollar—in some instances as low as 1.9 usd---
as during the Sanchez de Losado-Mesa period. Theater, textual readings
and rhetoric are entertaining and occasionally provide some insight
into the style but not the material substance – the political
economy of a regime.
The theoretical point of
departure to a comprehensive understanding of political regimes starts
from a historical-empirical understanding of political action and the
constant changing class orientation of political actors as they re-locate
in the class structure over time. Historical empirical Marxism examines
political-economy – the structural relations between ruling classes
and the state and elected regimes and their electoral base.
This 'materialistic' approach
de-mystifies the real meaning of 'cultural politics'. For it is well
known historically how reactionary and reformist politicians have combined
pro imperialist, pro-MNC economic policies with traditional cultural
practices.
In Africa, Senghor in Senegal
and Mobutu in Zaire emphasized 'negritude' as a cultural policy while
opening the door to European and US pillage of their economies. Duvalier
in Haiti, Haya del la Torre in Peru, Ferdinand Marcos is the Philippines
and a number of other rulers combined traditional ethnic and religious
identities with reactionary pro-imperialist policies. The fundamental
question is what is the political economic property and class relations
which frame the recovery of traditional cultural ethnic practices. Too
often ethnic rulers manipulate traditional cultural symbolism to distract
attention from class collaboration, to maintain or expand imperial domination
of the economy and the concentration of land ownership.
I suggest that (Andean Indian)
'cultural revival' is an ideological weapon manipulated by Morales and
Garcia Linera to create peasant-indian cohesion and support for socio
economic policies which favor MNC, agro-exporters, bankers and business
elite. In contrast some theorists engage in a historical-comparative
classification scheme which places the Morales regime in the nationalist-populist
framework of Arbenz of Guatemala (1946-1953), Peron of Argentina (1946-
1955) and Vargas of Brazil. This method of historical analogy has its
usefulness up to a point, but it overlooks major divergences. Arbenz
expropriated large sections of land from US owned United Fruit Company
and distributed it to landless Indians and peasants. Morales has promised
repeatedly to defend large agro-business plantations. Peron expropriated
petroleum interests and the railroads, funded an extensive social welfare
system, doubled the minimum wage and backed the wage demands of labor.
Morales has pursued orthodox fiscal and monetary policies. Vargas created
a large independent industrial sector, converting iron into steerl..
Morales sold off to the Indian MNC Jindal the vast Mutun iron and manganese
mine on the most shameful and ridiculous terms and under conditions
of minimum industrialization.
Contemporary positive comparison
of Morales' to Chavez' 'nationalism' is also misplaced. Chavez has expropriated
large landed estates and resettled over 100,000 families, expropriated
major US power and electrical companies, engaged in massive social spending
and created new forms of direct citizen participation. Morales has co-opted
social movement leaders and attempted to subordinate the movements they
lead to his party-parliamentary politics. He rejects expropriation of
privately-owned estates of the 100 biggest landowners and he maintains
an austerity budget despite having the highest returns on energy and
mining exports in history because of favorable international prices.
Without a clear theoretical framework, it is impossible to proceed to
a comprehensive and deep understanding of the current and future direction
of the Morales regime.
Morales-Garcia Linera
(M-GL) Theorizing on Bolivian Capitalism
M-GL theorizing on Bolivian capitalism revolves around several axes:
1. a stage theory of political-economic
change
2. a critique of neo-liberal
capitalism embodied in the Sanchez de Losada model
3. an alternative conception
of 'normal capitalism' or 'Andean-Amazonian capitalism' (MNC + State/Agro-Business
Cooperation)
4. a strategic 'productionist'
alliance with MNCs and Agro-Export elites and the 'national bourgeoisie'
5. an eclectic alliance with
Lula's Brazil (via Petrobras), Kirchner's Argentina (Repsol); Bachelet's
Chile, Chavez' Venezuela, Castro's Cuba, Bush's USA and the EU and IMF/World
Bank
The regime's initial policies
to secure the collaboration of the foreign and local economic elites
was to pursue orthodox stabilization policies, restrict social/public
investments, defend big property holdings and demobilize popular protest.
The regime secured the support of Venezuela, Cuba and overseas progressive
intellectuals and leaders with rhetorical 'anti-imperialist' speeches,
cultural affirmations and personal diplomacy. On the domestic front,
Morales co-opted leaders of social movements with positions in the governments,
made minimal concessions on local economic demands, mystified (temporarily)
mass supporters with the rhetoric of nationalization and promises of
agrarian reform and conjured 'conspiracies' and 'plots' at convenient
moments of popular questioning.
The M-GL 'State Theory"
The Morales-Garcia Linera theory of development is based on a Bolivarian
version of liberal economic theory of stages of development.
During the first stage, the
economy is stabilized via orthodox economic and fiscal policies. Existing
property and class relations are guaranteed and state incentives, subsidies
and long-term agreements are put in place. Wage demands and social expenditures
are controlled to allow for high returns to increase the investments
of the national and foreign bourgeoisie in industrial projects. During
the second stage, the 'take-off', rising industrial production and commodity
exports increase government revenues based on a strategic triple alliance
of public, nationals and foreign capital. The theory is that greater
wealth at the top will 'trickle down' to the bottom. Trade unions are
tied to tripartite pacts. Efforts are made to contain and fragment wage
and welfare demands to allow capital to accumulate. Parallel unions
and enterprise contracts are used to divide workers.
During the third stage, Bolivia
achieves 'normal capitalism' – landless peasants are displaced
from the countryside and absorbed in the new industrializing-mineral
sector or emigrate abroad. A minimum public welfare program is put in
place. The economy expands, exports flourish and finance the state,
taxes and expenditures are balanced and class conflict is confined to
narrow 'economic demands'. The MAS manages a corporatist system of State
Capital-Trade Unions.
The final stage, some decades
or centuries in the future – 'normal capitalism' will outlive
its usefulness as a motor of development and be superseded by a version
of 'Andean Socialism', in which presumably Indians, workers and the
national bourgeoisie will come together and socialize production.
This theory of development
of 'normal capitalism' is largely derived from a critique of the previous
'neo-liberal' model embodied in the policies of ex-President Sanchez
de Losada.
Comparison: Sanchez de Losada,
Evo Morales and the Social Movements
The Morales-Garcia Linera
(M-GL) attempt to create a Bolivian version of 'normal capitalism' (NC)
grows out of a critique of the kleptocratic, predator 'neo-liberal'
project of Sanchez de Losada and a rejection of the social revolutionary
movement's anti-capitalist program. The M-GL model of NC is neither
a complete rupture or simple continuation of the past nor an exclusion
of the social movements. The M-GL model is premised on 'harnessing'
the agro-business, banking and overseas MNCs which backed Sanchez de
Losada, policies by regulating their behavior so that they pay their
taxes and invest, and encouraging them to play by the rules of 'normal
capitalism'.
In order to pressure the economic elites to conform to M-GL model of
NC, the regime relies on the social movements as a 'battering ram'.
M-GL use the social movement to block separatist movements against the
'Luna' coalition of provinces-centered in Santa Cruz. The regime relies
on the movements to counter obstructionist activities in the Congress
and Constituent Assemble and to secure passage of its petroleum and
gas contracts with the MNCs. The Morales regime needs the movements
to create a political counterweight to the predator kleptocratic neo-liberals,
just as M-GL depends on the private economic elites to 'develop' the
economy.
The problematical 'balancing
act' is precarious because it requires economic concessions to the business
sector (which supports the political right) and constant dramatic acting
out of 'political theater' filled with symbolic acts for the social
movements.
The social movements are
the instruments, not the beneficiaries, of M-GL model. They serve to
back Morales attempt to enlarge the state economic sector as part of
a triple alliance composed of foreign MNCs in the extractive sector
(petroleum, gas, tin and iron), in partnership with state enterprises
and a private 'national' sector dominant in agro-export, banking, trade
and medium sized mining sector ('co-operatives').
The Morales entire theoretical-conceptual
model of 'normal capitalism' is based on the harmonization and articulation
of the 'triple alliance' (TA). The TA excludes any structural changes
in property and social relations. Equally important it depends on excluding
the working class and peasantry from any of the economic and political
positions of decision-makers or 'levers of power'. Instead the TA is
totally dependent on the cooperation of movement leaders, the de facto
incorporation of the movements as appendages of the state. Periodic
'mass meetings' are convoked. Theatrical 'military' occupations of foreign
enterprises are headed by Morales for dramatic publicity and propaganda.
Unsubstantiated foreign elite 'conspiracies' and 'plots' are periodically
denounced (precisely while prejudicial contracts are signed) to give
the image of a besieged anti-imperialist president. No plotters are
ever arrested or even named and the 'investigations' are inconsequential.
To clarify the distance between
Morales-Garcia Linera from the social movements and the contrast between
normal' and predator capitalism, it is useful to identify their differences
in crucial socio-economic and political issues.
From the above synoptic overview
of the three political-economic projects it is clear that the only political
force favoring structural changes are the social revolutionary movements.
Morales policies are basically incremental changes organized toward
reforms of the capitalist system to incorporate a broader sector of
capitalists, to expand the state capitalist sector and to provide greater
representation for sectors of the private petit bourgeoisie. His policies
revolve around 'moralizing' the bourgeois – to ensure they pay
taxes, avoid corrupting officials, abide by regulations and report real
profits and earnings.
It is precisely in Morales
bourgeois ethical agenda that he most differs from the predator kleptocratic
Sanchez de Losada's policies. This is clear from the continuity of the
same agro-export, big business and banking elites and MNC's in the commanding
heights of the economy. It is also evident tin the same disparities
in income and landownership.
In style of rule, Morales
relies on both the state apparatus and mass mobilization to maintain
his rule and contain separatist elites of Santa Cruz, Beni, Cochamamba
and Tarija. In contrast, Sanchez de Losada depended exclusively on the
state apparatus and to lesser degree paramilitary groups allied with
the agro-export groups. Under Sanchez de Losada, the state was implicated
in repeated massacres; Morales relies on milder forms of repression,
negotiations, co-optation and social control over force.
In summary, the empirical
record demonstrates that Morales represents a new style of capitalist
rule, a reform of capitalist 'modus operandi', new rules of capitalist
expansion, an eclectic foreign policy and a modified coalition of capitalist
rulers. In no way does it represent a radical or revolutionary break
with capitalism – it represents an attempt to 'moralize' existing
capitalist elites. Even Morales' 'reformist' credentials are questionable
– as no substantial budgetary changes have taken place, reducing
social inequalities or substantially increasing the share of income
going to wage/salary earners. Only in the narrowest sense of incremental
increases in the minimum wage and public salaries can Morales be considered
a 'reformist'. In the area of foreign policy, he is diplomatically eclectic
– economically dependent on the MNCs, Morales is rhetorically
'anti-imperialist' while in practice following a high level of aid dependence
on both Europe and the US ...
Theoretical Critique
Over the years, leftists inside and outside of progressive regimes have
counterpoised two divergent strategic conceptions of political-economic
development with profoundly different consequences.
One school of thought argues
that a newly elected regime should stabilize the economy, overcome the
'crisis', reconstruct the productive structure left in 'shambles' by
the preceding reactionary regime before proceeding at a later period
with structural changes.
The alternative view argues
that the progressive government was elected precisely because of the
crisis of the economic system and its task is to change the economic
structures in order to consolidate power while the capitalist class
is still discredited, disorganized and in crisis.
The 'stabilization' strategy
of development presents several strategic problems. First of all, it
allows the capitalist class time to regroup and recover from their political
defeat, discredit and disarray. When the progressive government does
not act at the moment of maximum political strength and when the opposition
is at its weakest it loses a strategic advantage.
The M-GL strategy of stabilization
illustrates the weaknesses and debilitating consequences of losing a
historic moment. In the course of a year, the rightwing parties had
regrouped, mobilized supporters and paralyzed the Constituent Assembly.
The bourgeoisie and landowners effectively dictated the limits of any
social changes.
The second problematic aspect
of the 'stabilization' policy is that the progressive government imposes
the socio-economic costs of reconstruction and crisis management on
the working class through austerity budgets, tight monetary and incomes
policies. By holding back on social spending and imposing restraints
on labor demands and mobilization, the regime allows the capitalists
to recover their rates of profit and to consolidate their class hegemony.
Thirdly a regime, whose economic
policy weaken its popular social base and strengthens the recovery of
its class opponents, is creating major obstacles to any subsequent effort
at structural change. Even if the progressive regime 'adapts' to the
regrouped capitalist class it cannot expect any strategic alliance because
the capitalist class prefers its own political leaders and instruments
and rejects any party or movement whose mass base can still exercise
pressure.
Finally the stabilization
policy revives a powerful economic power configuration within the political
institutional structure which precludes any future changes. It is impossible
to engage in serious structural changes once the popular classes have
been demobilized, the capitalist class has overcome its crisis and the
new political class is integrated into consolidated economic system.
Stabilization strategy does not temporarily postpone change; it structurally
precludes it for the future.
History has repeatedly demonstrated
that when a ruling class is challenged or threatened by an insurrectionary
movement, it will yield regime power to an electoral opposition committed
to operating within the institutional parameters of the bourgeois state.
The accession to government by 'popular leaders' is accepted in so far
as the new governing class exercises control over the 'dangerous classes'.
In so far as the regime proceeds to simply 'moralize' the capitalist
economy, guarantee the sanctity of big property interests and submit
to the stalling tactics and frivolous procedural arguments in the Assembly
or Congress, the capitalist class is emboldened and goes on the offensive,
attacking the very existence of the unitary state, the legitimacy of
the regime and even the minimum reforms.
While Morales-Garcia Linera
look to a 'national unity' strategy of economic development based on
a corporatist social-political model, the resurgent capitalist class
(foreign and national) operating from the command of the strategic heights
of the financial and export sectors, seizes each concession and demands
more. The capitalist class substitutes the class struggle from above,
from within the institutions and outside. The fundamental assumptions
of 'normal capitalism' exposited by Morales-Garcia Linera come into
fundamental conflict with the rationality and logic of capitalist accumulation
and the need of the capitalist to rule exclusively by and for themselves.
Tolerance for cultural revivals,
populist theater and old fashion political demagogy has its use in times
of crisis and real threats in the street. Once consolidated the capitalist
class looks to its own organic leaders, technocrats and cultural revindication
of its rule.
Caught between a demobilized
popular class, increasingly on the defensive and an ascending bourgeois
on the offensive, the leaders of 'Andean capitalism' have no where to
turn, except to grant new spaces to party loyalists, neo-liberal technocrats
and even more clearly defined neo-liberal concessions.
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