"Centre-Left"
Regimes In Latin America
By James Petras
08 April, 2006
Axis
Of Logic
Examined
here is the phenomenon of the "centre left" regime that has
emerged recently in Latin America, and the reasons why such palpably
neo-liberal governments attract the uncritical support of leftist intellectuals
worldwide. The "centre left" governments of Lula in Brazil,
Kirchner in Argentina, Tabare Vazquez in Uruguay, Evo Morales in Bolivia,
Toledo in Peru, and Gutierrez in Ecuador are measured against a set
of criteria designating espousal of leftist politics, a test failed
by them all. It is argued that, in order to develop authentically leftist
views about future patterns of agrarian policy and transformation, and
to support these once developed, it is necessary first to sweep away
the rhetoric that these days is taken for "leftist" views.
INTRODUCTION
Several years ago I asked
an editor of a leading US business journal (Forbes) about how he characterized
the politics of a Mexican President (Luís Echevarria) who was
speaking at a Leftist conference commemorating Salvador Allende, the
socialist President of Chile ousted by the military coup of 11th September
1973. In what was a very revealing answer, the business journal editor
replied: "He talks to the Left and works for the Right".[1]
This response captured more accurately than many leftist analyses, and
certainly more cynically than any of them, the nature of the political
dilemma facing all current and future attempts at grassroots mobilization
- by movements composed of poor peasants, agricultural labourers, and
urban workers - throughout Latin America. Namely, the disjuncture between
a programme of socialist reform promised by radical politicians before
taking office and the actual neoliberal policies implemented once they
are in power.[2] A review of the performance by recent "centre
left" Presidents in Latin America fits very well with the comment
of that Forbes editor, and undermines the faith placed in them by much
of the political left in Europe and the US.
Such political betrayals
fuel a slide into a-political ideology. Combining an initial optimism
with a subsequent pessimism, they culminate in the belief among those
at the grassroots that nothing will change, so there is little or no
point in trying. Alternatively, they license an unalloyed optimism;
the view - more usually held by leftist intellectuals - that the policies
implemented are either the socialist ones promised, or the best that
can be done in the circumstances.[3] Whilst almost everyone (political
leadership and intellectuals alike) seems to be against neo-liberalism,
therefore, it is not always clear what - if anything - they are for.[4]
The assumption frequently made - that if one is against neoliberalism
then this signals an automatic support for a progressive politics, not
to say socialism itself - is incorrect. For this reason, the object
of the brief presentation that follows is twofold. First, to examine
what constitutes a leftist position in the current political climate.
And second, to compare the latter with the policies now being implemented
by the political leadership in a number of Latin American countries:
Lula in Brazil, Kirchner in Argentina, Tabare Vazquez in Uruguay, Evo
Morales in Bolivia, Toledo in Peru, and Gutierrez in Ecuador.
In short, the object is critically
to analyse what passes for leftist credentials among those holding power
in Latin America. The practical importance of this task, as distinct
from the necessity for it, is also clear: in order to develop authentically
leftist views about future patterns of agrarian policy and transformation,
and to support these once developed, it is necessary first to sweep
away the rhetoric that these days is taken for ‘leftist’
views.
PART I
WHAT LEFTISM IS
Given the shift away from
socialist theory and politics, it is in an important sense hardly surprising
that claims made by intellectuals for the leftist nature of a programme
with which they are associated, or implementing, is permitted to pass
without substantial challenge. Prior to any discussion of "centre
left" regimes in Latin America today, therefore, it is important
to understand exactly what it means "to be left" -- from a
historical, theoretical and practical perspective. The method for determining
"What is left" is based on analyzing the substance - and not
the symbols or rhetoric - of a regime or politician. The practical measures
open to scrutiny include budgets, property, income, employment, labour
legislation, and priorities in expenditures and revenues. Of particular
importance is to focus on the present social referents, social configurations
of power and alliances – not the past - given the changing dynamics
of power and class politics. The third methodological issue is to differentiate
between a political campaign to gain power and the policies of a political
party once in power, as the gulf between them is both wide and well
known.
Historically there is a consensus
among academics and activists as to what constitute criteria and indicators
for defining a leftist politics. These include the following fourteen
points, all of which combine to structure what might be termed a minimal
leftist programme:
Decreasing social inequalities.
Increasing living standards.
Greater public and national ownership in relation to private and foreign
ownership. Progressive taxes (on income and corporations) over regressive
taxation (VAT, consumption.).
Budget priorities favouring greater social expenditures and public investments
in jobs, rather than allocating subsidies both to capitalist producers
and to foreign debt payments. Promoting national ownership of raw materials
and resources, and protecting the latter from foreign exploitation.
Diversification of production to value added products as opposed to
selling unprocessed raw materials. Subordinating production-for-export
to the development of the domestic market. Popular participation and
power in decision-making, not least central planning, as opposed to
de facto rule by businesses, international bankers (IMF) and political
elites. The selection of key cabinet ministers in consultation with
mass grassroots movements (representing poor peasants, agricultural
labourers and urban workers) instead of those representing simply local
and foreign businesses. Adoption of a progressive foreign policy targeted
against the global spread of laissez faire economics (= free markets),
military bases and imperial wars and occupation. Reversing privatizations
already carried out, and discarding the policy of extending/consolidating
privatizations. Increasing the level of the minimum wage. Promoting
legislation facilitating trade union organization, plus universal and
free public education and health services.
With these criteria in mind, one can proceed to analyze and evaluate
the contemporary "centre left" regimes, so as to determine
whether "New Winds from the Left" are in fact sweeping Latin
America, as many claim.
PART II
BRAZIL UNDER PRESIDENT
LULA, 2003-06
With the possible exception of Evo Morales (see below), no recent assumption
of the Presidency of a Latin American country has attracted as much
enthusiasm and acclaim from those on the global left as the election
of Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva as President of Brazil.[5]
Even before his election, however, Lula, signed a letter of understanding
with the International Monetary Fund (June 2002) to pay the foreign
debt, to maintain a budget surplus of 4% (up to 4.5% subsequently),
to maintain macro-economic stability and to continue neo-liberal "reforms".
Once elected, he slashed public employee pensions by 30%, and bragged
that he had the "courage" to carry out the IMF "reforms"
that previous right-wing presidents had failed to do.[6] To "promote"
capital investment, Lula introduced labour legislation increasing the
power of employers to fire workers and lowering the cost of severance
pay. Social programmes in health and education were sharply reduced
by over 5% during the first three years, while foreign debt creditors
received punctual (and even early) payments of over US$100 billion dollars
– making Brazil a "model" debtor.
Past privatizations of dubious
legality of lucrative petrol (Petrobras), mining (Vale del Doce), and
banks were extended to public infrastructure, services and telecommunications
– reversing seventy years of history – and making Brazil
more vulnerable to foreign owned re-locations of production.[7] Brazil’s
exports increasingly took on the profile of a primary producer; thus
exporters of iron, soya, sugar, citrus juice, and timber expanded while
its industrial sector stagnated due to the worlds highest interest rates
of 18.5% and the lowering of tariff barriers. Over 25,000 shoe workers
lost their jobs due to cheap imports from China. After Guatemala, Brazil
remained the country with the greatest inequalities in the whole of
Latin America.
Agrarian policy was directed
toward financing and subsidizing agribusiness exports, while the agrarian
reform programme stagnated and even regressed.[8] Lula’s promise
to his "ally", the Landless Workers' Movement (Movimiento
dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, or MST), to distribute land to 100,000
families a year was totally disregarded. Under the previous center-right
regime of President Cardoso, some 48,000 families received land each
year compared to only 25,000 per year under Lula, leaving over 200,000
families camped by highways under plastic tents and 4.5 million landless
families with no hope.[9] Lula’s policy favouring agroexport led
to accelerated exploitation of the Amazon rain forest and deep incursions
into Brazilian Indian territory, thanks to budget cuts in the Environment
and Indigenous Affairs Agencies.
In foreign policy, Lula sent
troops and officials to occupy Haiti and defend the puppet regime resulting
from the US orchestrated invasion and deposition of elected President
Aristide. Lula’s differences with the US over ALCA were clearly
over US compliance with "free trade" and not over any defence
of national interests.[10] As Lula stated, "Free trade is the best
system, providing everyone practices it" - meaning that what he
opposed was not free trade per se but rather the failure of the US to
adhere to this.[11] Whilst Lula opposed the US-sponsored coup against
Venezuela in April 2002, as well as other imperial adventures, and spoke
for greater Latin American integration via MERCOSUR, in practice his
major trade policies focused on deepening his ties outside the region
- with Asia, Europe and North America.[12]
The evidence presented here
in outline suggests that Lula fits closer the stereotypical profile
of a right-wing neo-liberal politician rather than a "‘centre
left" President. Why, then, does he continue to be regarded by
‘opinion-formers’ in the media and the academy as a representative,
not to say the embodiment, of leftist interests? The answer is all too
simple. Intellectuals and journalists who classify Lula as a leftist
do this on the basis of his social, trade union and occupational background,
an identity now twenty to thirty years old and no longer relevant to
the interests and agency he embodies in the present, plus his theatrical
populist symbolic gestures.
ARGENTINA UNDER PRESIDENT
KIRCHNER,
2003 TO THE PRESENT
Under President Kirchner,
Argentina has grown at a rate of 8.5% per year, substantially increased
export earnings, reduced unemployment from over 20% to approximately
15%, raised pensions and wages, re-negotiated a portion of the private
foreign debt and rescinded the laws granting impunity to military torturers.[13]
Compared to Lula's ultra-liberal policies, therefore, Kirchner appears
as a progressive leader.[14] Looked at from a leftist perspective however,
the regime falls far short. Kirchner has not reversed any of the fraudulent
privatizations of Argentina’s strategic energy, petroleum and
electrical industries. Under his regime the profits of major agro-industrial
and petroleum sectors have skyrocketed with no commensurate increases
in salaries. In other words, inequalities have either increased or remained
the same, depending on the sectors.
While Kirchner has financed
and subsidized the revival of industry and promotion of agricultural
exports, salaries and wages have barely reached the level of 1998 -
the last year before the economic crisis. Moreover, while poverty levels
have declined from their peak of over 50% in 2001, they are still close
to 40% - a very high figure a for a country like Argentina which produces
enough grain and meat to supply a population six times its current size.
As in the case of Lula, Kirchner's central banker and economic and finance
ministers have long-term ties to international capital and banks. Whilst
economic growth and some social amelioration have taken place, much
of it can be attributed to the favourable world commodity prices for
beef, grains, petroleum and other primary sector materials. In foreign
policy Kirchner - again like Lula - opposes ALCA only because the US
has refused to reciprocate in lowering its own tariff barriers.
That Kirchner’s foreign
policy is hardly anti-imperialist is evident from the fact that Argentine
troops occupy Haiti at the behest of the US, and engage in joint manoeuvres
with the US. While Kirchner revoked the law of impunity that had hitherto
sheltered military torturers, no new trials have been scheduled, nor
have any punishments been meted out to those guilty of human rights
abuses during the "dirty war". Although Kirchner opposes US
attacks on Venezuela, he supports the US proposal to refer Iran to the
Security Council of the UN. While unemployment has declined, one out
of six Argentines is still out of work. Unemployment relief remains
at a very low level, of no more than US$50 per family per month. Despite
a nominal increase in salaries, growing inflation of over 10% has reduced
real earnings for the majority of public employees.
The structures of socio-economic
power remain in place – in fact Kirchner has played a major role
in restoring and consolidating capitalist hegemony after the mass popular
uprisings of December 2001. He has not redistributed property, income
or power - except among the different segments of the capitalist class.
His criticism of Washington only extends to the most extreme interventionist
measures which seek to prejudice Argentine big business and convert
it into a powerless client: hence Argentina’s opposition to the
State Department’s attempt to form an anti-Chavez bloc. Kirchner's
rejection stems from almost exclusively from economic considerations:
the fact that Argentina receives petroleum from Venezuela at subsidized
prices, has secured a major ship-building contract from Venezuela, and
has signed lucrative trade agreements with Venezuela to market its agricultural
and manufactured products. With regard to Cuba, Kirchner opened diplomatic
relations, but has maintained his distance. While on excellent diplomatic
terms with Chávez, Kirchner shares none of his redistributive
policies.
In conclusion, Kirchner meets
none of the leftist criteria set out above. He is more clearly a pragmatic
conservative willing to dissent from the US when it is profitable for
his agribusiness and industrial capitalist social base. At no point
has Kirchner shifted any of the budget surplus now used to pay the foreign
debt to fund the depleted health and educational facilities and to provide
better salaries for personnel in those vital public sectors.
URUGUAY UNDER PRESIDENT
TABARE VAZQUEZ
Tabare Vazquez was elected
by an electoral coalition (The Broad Front and Progressive Encounter)
which included Tupamaros, Communists, Socialists, as well as an assortment
of Christian Democrats and liberal democrats. However, his key appointments
to the Central Bank and the Economic Ministry (Danilo Astori) are hardline
neo-liberals and defenders of continuing previous budget constraints
where social spending is concerned, while generously financing the agro-export
elites.
During the Economic Summit
in Mar de Plata (Argentina) in November 2005, while tens of thousands
protested against Bush, and Chávez declared ALCA dead, Tabare
Vazquez and Astori signed a wide reaching ‘investment protection’
agreement with the US, which embraced the major free market principles
embodied in ALCA. With the full backing of Tabare Vazquez, Astori has
not only rejected re-nationalization of enterprises, but has given notice
of an intention to privatize major state enterprises, including a water
company, despite a popular referendum in which more than 65% voted in
favour of maintaining state ownership. The Tabare Vazquez regime has
taken no measures to lessen inequalities, and has put in place a paltry
‘job creation’ and emergency food relief programme which
covers a small fraction of the poor, indigent and unemployed Uruguayans.
Meanwhile the government
has laid down the royal carpet for a Finnish-owned, highly contaminating,
cellulose factory which will have an adverse effect on fishing communities
and perhaps even the important tourist facilities downstream. Tabare
Vazquez and Astori’s unilateral signing off on the controversial
factory has resulted in a major conflict with Argentina which borders
the Uruguay River, where the plant will be located.
The Tabare Vazquez regime
has repudiated every major programmatic position embraced by the Broad
Front (Frente Amplio) in its 30 years of existence: from sending troops
in support of the occupation of Haiti, to privatizing public properties,
embracing free trade, welcoming foreign investment and imposing wage
cuts and salary austerity controls on the working class. Like Kirchner,
Tabare Vazquez has re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba, but
he avoids any close relationship with Venezuela. Probably the most bizarre
aspect of the Broad Front government is the behaviour of the Tupamaros,
the former urban guerrilla group now converted into Senators and Ministers.
Mujica, the Minister of Argiculture, supports agribusiness enterprises
and foreign investment in agriculture, and simultaneously upholds the
law on evicting landless squatters in the interior. Senator Eleuterio
Huidobro attacks human rights groups demanding judicial investigations
of military officials implicated in assassinations and disappearances
of political prisoners. According to Huidobro, the ‘past is best
forgotten’, thereby embracing the military and turning his back
on scores of his former comrades who were abducted, tortured, murdered
and buried in unmarked graves.
BOLIVIA UNDER EVO
MORALES
Probably the most striking
example of the "center-left" regimes that have embraced the
neo-liberal agenda is that of Evo Morales in Bolivia.[15] His background
is both rural and radical: an indigenous farmer growing coca (cocalero),
he is also the leader of the Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo,
or MAS), which draws on strong support from peasant smallholders in
the Chapare region. Not only was Morales’ election victory beyond
dispute - he obtained 54 per cent of the vote cast, a majority unrivalled
in the past half century - but it was greeted with enthusiasm by a wide
spectrum of world political opinion, especially on the left.[16] Just
why the latter in particular should be so pleased about the accession
to the Bolivian Presidency of Morales, however, is unclear. Even before
he took power, therefore, his political record could only be described
as ambivalent.
Between October 2003 and
July 2005, scores of factory workers, unemployed urban workers and Indian
peasants were killed in the struggle for the nationalization of petroleum
and gas, Bolivia’s most lucrative economic sector and source of
revenue. Two presidents were overthrown by mass uprisings in a two and
a half year period for defending the foreign ownership of the energy
resources. Yet Evo Morales did not participate in either uprising; in
fact he supported the hastily installed neo-liberal President Carlos
Mesa until he, too, was driven from power.
As President, Evo Morales
has ruled out the possibility that gas and petroleum will be expropriated.
Instead he has provided long-term, large-scale guarantees that all the
facilities of the major energy multinational corporations will be recognized,
respected and protected by the Bolivian state. As a consequence, the
multinational corporations have not only expressed their support for
Morales, but have also lined up to extend and deepen their control and
exploitation of these non-renewable resources. By means of a none-too-clever
linguistic sleight of hand, Morales claims that anyway "nationalization"
does not correspond to the expropriation and transfer of property to
the state. According to his "new" definition, minority state
ownership of shares, tax increases and promises to ‘industrialize’
the raw materials are all equivalent to nationalization.
While the exact terms of
the new contracts have yet to be published, all the major multinational
corporations are in full agreement with Morales' policies. Evidence
of this is that Petrobras, the primarily privately owned Brazilian oil
and gas giant, is prepared to invest US$5 billion dollars over the next
six years, in the exploitation of gas and petroleum and in the construction
of a petro-chemical complex. Other multinational corporations have followed
suit: Repsol (a firm based in Spain) promises to invest US$150 million
dollars, while Total and BP (French and British respectively) plus a
whole host of other major energy and mining corporations are all prepared
to expand investments and reap billions in profits under the protective
umbrella of Morales and his MAS regime.
No previous government in
Bolivian history has opened the country to mineral exploitation by so
many foreign capitalist enterprises in such lucrative fields in such
a short period of time. In addition to the oil and gas sell-offs, Morales
has declared that he intends to privatize the Mutun iron fields (60
square kilometers with an estimated 40 billion tons of ore with an estimated
worth of over US$30 billion dollars), following the lead of his neo-liberal
predecessors. The only changes which Morales will introduce in the bidding
is to raise the share of taxes Bolivia will receive from US$0.50 a ton
to an undisclosed ‘but reasonable’ amount (according to
the multinational corporations).
Reneging on his promises,
Morales has refused to triple the minimum wage. His Minister of the
Economy has undertaken to retain the previous regime's policies of fiscal
austerity and "macro-economic stability", while the increase
in the minimum wage will amount to less than 10%. And although the Morales
government raised the teachers' basic salary a meager 7%, in real terms
this amounted to less than 2%. Now the basic salary earned by a teacher
is US$75 a month, so their net gain under the new "revolutionary"
indigenous president is less than US$2 dollars a month, and this at
a time of record prices for Bolivian raw material exports, and a budget
surplus.
Despite being the leader
of coca growing peasant farmers, Evo Morales has declared his support
both for the continued presence of the US military base at Chapare,
and for the intrusive presence of the US Drug Enforcement Agency. In
keeping with US policy demands, he has reduced the areas of coca production
to less than half an acre for domestic medical uses. To appease his
peasant supporters, however, Morales not only promotes and funds indigenous
cultural events/celebrations, but also encourages the use of indigenous
language use in schools located in the Andean highlands, and at public
functions. Land reform will involve colonization projects in hitherto
unsettled or uncultivated terrain.
Taking land away from large
proprietors or plantations, however, is not on the agrarian reform programme.
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, both Morales and his Agricultural Minister
are opposed to any expropriations of large landowners, ‘whether
they are owners of…5,000, 10,000, or 25,000 or more acres as long
as they are productive’. This has effectively put an end to the
hopes of millions of landless Indian peasants for a "profound agrarian
reform" as promised by the indigenous President. What Morales is
doing instead is to promote agro-export agriculture, a policy effected
by means of generous subsidies and tax incentives.
Like those of Lula and Kirchner,
the appointments made by Morales to the economic, defence and a number
of other ministries all have previous links to the IMF, the World Bank
and earlier neo-liberal governments in Bolivia. Indicative of Morales'
favourable disposition towards capitalist enterprise was the signing
of a pact with the Confederation of Private Businessmen of Bolivia in
February 2006, whereby he committed himself to maintain "macro-economic
stability" and the "international credibility" of the
country. This means in effect curtailing social spending, promoting
foreign investment, prioritizing exports, maintaining monetary stability
and above all promoting private investment.
Morales' capitulation to
the Bolivian capitalist class was evident in his decision to re-activate
the National Business Council, which will analyze and take decisions
on economic and political issues. About this Morales said, "I am
asking the businessmen to support me with their experience." (Forgetting
to add their experience in exploiting the labour force.) He went on
to ask these capitalists to advise him on "ALCA, MERCOSUR…
on agreements with China, the USA…as to their benefits for the
country". The president of the Business Confederation, Guillermo
Morales, immediately emphasized the importance of signing up to the
free trade agreement (ALCA).
Whilst Evo Morales was busy
signing a pact with the business community, he refused to meet with
the leaders of FEJUVE (The Federation of Neighbourhood Councils of El
Alto in La Paz), the biggest, most active, democratic urban organization
in Bolivia. It had been very active in leading the mass struggle, both
to overthrow the previous neo-liberal presidents and to demand the nationalization
of gas and petroleum. Ironically, Morales received 88% of the vote cast
in El Alto, an area of the national capital where scores of deaths and
injuries occurred in the run-up to his election. He showed his contempt
for FEJUVE by naming two of its members as ministers - Mamani as Minister
for Water and Patzi as Education Minister - without even consulting
the organization, which takes all decisions via popular assemblies.
Both Ministers were forced to resign from FEJUVE, in part because Patzi
rejected the long-standing grassroots demand to create a teachers' college
for the 800,000 residents of El Alto, claiming it was an "unacceptable
cost to the system" (given Morales’ selective austerity budget).
For his part, Mamani refused to expel the foreign multinational company
Aguas del Illimani, which overcharges consumers and fails to provide
adequate services.
According to FEJUVE the Morales
regime has failed to deal with the most elementary problems, such as
the exorbitant electricity rates, the absence of any plan to provide
and connect households with heating, gas and water lines. The major
trade union confederations and federations (COB, Miners and others)
have protested against the refusal of Morale to rescind the reactionary
labour laws passed by his predecessors which "flexibilized labor"
- depriving workers of legislative protection against dismissal, and
thus empowering employers to hire and fire workers at will. As a reward
for his pro-business policies, Japan, Spain and the World Bank have
"forgiven" Bolivia’s foreign debt.
In order to sweeten this
kind of bitter neo-liberal economic pill, Morales has adopted a familiar
ploy: the rhetoric and agency of populism.[17] He has excelled in "public
theatre", consisting of a populist folkloric style that reproduces
the discourse about a socio-economically uniform people, one of whom
is himself. Such images of ‘being’ no different from the
masses, of "belonging" to them, of sharing their not only
their interests and background, but also (and therefore) their discomforts
and aspirations, are aimed at securing grassroots acceptance of his
programme/policies as theirs. To this end, therefore, Morales not only
dances with the crowds during carnival, declares a reduction of his
presidential salary as part of the austerity programme affecting the
living standards of already impoverished Bolivians, but also delivered
a section of his Presidential Speech to Congress in the Aymara language.
The same populist logic informed
the announcement by him of a "plot" aimed against his person
by unspecified oil companies, the object being to rally support among
his followers while he prepares to sign away the country’s energy
resources to these same oil companies.[18] Needless to say, neither
the Defence or Interior Ministries were aware of the "plot",
nor was any evidence of its existence ever presented. But the non-existent
‘plot’ did indeed serve to distract attention from his energy
sellout. In a similar vein, while Morales has spoken of his dear friend
Hugo Chavez, and embraced Fidel Castro, he has conceded military bases
to the US and offices to its DEA (the Drug Enforcement Agency), as well
as granting concessions to international (= "foreign") capitalist
enterprises interested in access to and extraction of Bolivian energy
and mining resources.
Although Morales has improved
diplomatic relations with Cuba and Venezuela, and secured social and
economic aid, therefore, the economic foundations of his policies are
oriented toward an integration of Bolivian development with the interests
of Western capitalist countries. In this and other respects, the Morales
regime is following in the footsteps of his neo-liberal predecessors,
not least his pro-big business outlook and his obedience to IMF fiscal,
monetary and budgetary imperatives. Accordingly, the policies, appointments,
institutional ties of the Morales government all suggest that the most
appropriate political label in his case is not a leftist but much rather
a "centre right" one.
A NOTE ON PERU UNDER
TOLEDO AND
ECUADOR UNDER GUTIERREZ
The election of Toledo in
Peru and Gutierrez in Ecuador was hailed by many of those the political
left, who in support of this endorsement cited the plebeian origins
of both presidential candidates, their alliances with Indian organizations
(such as CONAIE in Ecuador) or indigenous identity (Toledo spoke Quechua
and wore a poncho during his election campaign).[19] Notwithstanding
the fact that Toledo emerged from the neo-liberal graduate programme
at Stanford University, and was subsequently a functionary at the World
Bank, leftists acclaim centred on his opposition to the Fujimori dictatorship
(with US backing) which they asserted was a sign that "change would
come".
Change did indeed come, but
not of the kind that the global left had anticipated. Much rather, it
took the form of intensified privatizations of mining, water and energy,
subsidies for agribusiness and mining exporters, the lifting of trade
barriers, and a decline in living standards of the middle class as well
as the rural and urban poor. For the last three years, the diminished
popularity of Toledo's neo-liberal programme can be gauged from the
fact that his support in opinion ratings never exceeded 15% and mostly
hovered below 10%.
Much the same is true of
Ecuador. Once in office, Gutierrez embraced IMF doctrines, extended
support to the US-instigated Plan Colombia, backed the US military base
in Manta, proposed the privatization of the state oil and electricity
companies, jailed protesting trade union leaders, divided the Indian
movement through selective funding and ties to right wing evangelical
leaders. He was eventually ousted in a popular uprising in 2005. The
legacy of Gutierrez was a much-weakened Indian social movement (CONAIE),
the discrediting of Pachacutik, its fraternal party, and a neutered
trade union movement.
Somewhat predictably, those
on the political left was slow to comprehend the direction being taken
by these two "centre left" Presidents whose election they
had greeted with such optimism. It was only after the political damage
was an accomplished fact, therefore, that those on the left belatedly
recognized the reactionary nature of the Gutierrez and Toledo regimes.
At this point, and almost reluctantly, they dissociated themselves from
these politicians, and stopped referring to them as part of the "New
Left Winds". When combined with leftist endorsement of Lula, Kirchner,
and Morales, that of Toledo and Gutierrez points to a serious failure
on the part of progressive opinion to understand the nature of the political
programme being supported. Why?
PART III
THE UNFORTUNATE HISTORY
OF THE LEFT INTELLECTUAL
The great majority of Latin
Americans – workers, peasants, unemployed and poor - have suffered
grave consequences as a result of the support given by movements to
which they belong to "centre left" parties and coalitions.
Much of the blame for this situation must fall on the immediate leaders
of these movements, some of whom were co-opted, others deceived, manipulated
or self-deluding. Part of the fault, however, lies with leftist intellectuals,
journalists, NGOs, and academics who wrote and spoke in favor of "centre
left" politicians and parties. They promoted their virtues, their
histories and their promises; they lauded their opportunities, their
plebeian backgrounds, and their probity - in a vastly uninformed, uncritical
and superficial manner.
The list of leftist intellectuals
culpable of this covers three continents, and reads like a "Who’s
Who" of progressive opinion: Emir Sader, Adolfo Gilly, Michel Lowy,
Heinz Dietrich, Perry Anderson, Atilio Boron, Raul Zibechi, Frei Betto,
Noam Chomsky, Ignacio Ramonet among others.[20] To a greater or lesser
degree, and over a long or short time frame, all sang to the chorus
of "New Left Winds are blowing in Latin America". A close
reading of their writings, however, reveals that these left intellectuals
were more influenced by the text and rhetoric of "centre left"
personalities and parties, and less by their class practices, economic
policies, strategic political appointments, and their elite linkages
before and after being elected.
In general, the Left intellectuals
were seduced by what might be termed superstructural phenomena. The
latter encompass political symbols, political forms and identity politics
- especially the presence of "Indians" and women in positions
of power - and not the socio-economic content and class nature of the
policies concerned. Much was made by those on the left of "Indian"
and/or ethnic identity, or the social origins of the party or politician,
ignoring or overlooking thereby their neo-liberal transformation, their
current business elite reference groups, plus their current socio-economic
elite associates. They bought into the carefully choreographed political
gestures and theatre: the promises to reduce Presidential salaries (Morales),
ceremonies paying homage to past struggles (Tupamaros), and weeping
or "feeling" for the poor (Lula), all this rather than the
selling off of the strategic raw materials to foreign multinational
corporations.
It is difficult to overestimate
the gravity of the resulting political focus by leftist intellectuals/
academics on form rather than substance. This uncritical espousal by
many on the political left of ethnic "otherness" simply because
it is an identity that is indigenous, without interrogating the class
ideology and politics of this "other" identity, has on occasion
played directly into the hands of the political right, who have factored
this kind of response into their own agendas. Thus, for example, in
the case of the US-engineered coup in 1954 against the democratically
elected government of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, the US Central
Intelligence Agency selected Castillo Armas as a puppet to head the
"opposition".[21] To those organizing the coup, one of the
main attractions of Castillo Armas was that he appeared to be of an
indigenous "other" identity in a country where half the population
was Mayan.[22]
In part, the judgment of
leftist intellectuals was impaired by a nostalgic remembrance of years
past - when they knew Lula as a trade union leader (a quarter of a century
earlier), the Frente Amplio as an organization of grassroots struggle
(resisting the military dictatorship in Uruguay during the 1970s), Evo
Morales as a militant peasant leader (of coca farmers in the 1990s),
and Kirchner as a leftist sympathizer (with the Montoneros in the 1970s).
Writing on the basis of identities which were no longer current, and
thus irrelevant to the present political situation, leftist intellectuals
failed to appreciate the extent to which there had been a shift from
left to right. Instead they invented a non-existent but hospitable "centre
left" label which was affixed - inappropriately, and without reason
- to those such as Lula, Kirchner, Morales, Toledo and Gutierrez. In
this way, the label created neatly fits in with their wishes and desires
to be ‘against’ the system while being part of it.
Not a few of these left intellectuals
were impressed by the "centre left" diplomatic gestures of
friendship towards Cuba and Venezuela, the warm reception of Hugo Chávez,
even the occasional embrace of progressive leaders. No doubt they confused
the favorable diplomatic gestures by Cuba and Venezuela toward the "centre
left" regimes - understandable from the view of state policies
aimed at countering US pressures – as a general endorsement of
their internal policies. Regardless of any reasons for Cuban and Venezuelan
support, leftist intellectuals have invented a "common purpose"
with the "centre left", some - such as Dietrich - even fantasizing
about the presence of a new "left bloc".[23] The latter was
based, presumably, on policies such as deepening foreign ownership of
strategic materials, widening social inequalities, and promoting free
trade.
Symbolic politics is visually
accessible on the front pages of the mass media - it does not require
a capacity to research, collect and analyze data. Insofar as left intellectuals
substituted the "symbolic left" for the real existing converts
to neo-liberalism, they can with an easy conscience do things like become
political advisers, accept invitations to Presidential inaugurations,
and imbibe cocktails at receptions. As history teaches us, this chance
to be close to power is indeed a heady experience. Most cynically, it
could be argued that the only place where the "Left Winds"
blow is through the empty space between their ears.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
There are powerful left-wing
forces in Latin America, and sooner or later they will contest and challenge
the power of the neo-liberal converts, as well as their allies in Washington
and in the multinational corporations. In the case of Bolivia this is
likely to be sooner, not least because the scale and scope of Morales'
broken promises, together with his embrace of the business elite, has
already provoked the mobilization of the class-conscious trade unions,
the mass urban organizations and landless agricultural workers and poor
peasants. The insurrectionary movements on whose back Morales rode to
office are still intact, and - more importantly - their co-opted leaders
have been replaced by new militants. Populist "gestures" and
"folkloric" theatre can have at best only a short-term impact,
in that the capacity to divert class-conscious miners and the Indian
militants in El Alto from the reality of grinding poverty is of necessity
limited. The insurrectionary forces that brought Morales to power can
also bring him down.
Left-wing forces are also
powerful in Colombia. More than US$3 billion of US military assistance
has been spent on Plan Colombia over the past four years by the Uribe
regime. Although the latter is propped up by paramilitaries and some
1,500 US Special Forces "advisers", the government of Uribe
has nevertheless failed to defeat the FARC (The Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia), and have suffered major defeats in late 2005-2006
in the face of a guerrilla offensive. Uribe may indeed win re-election
as President of Colombia, but he will at best rule only half of the
country.
In Brazil, the control/co-optation
of the class collaborationist labour confederation (CUT) by the Lula
regime has led to the formation of a new militant confederation ConLuta
(founded May 2006). The not uncritical collaboration with the Lula regime
on the part of the MST has led to a political impasse, internal debates
and a sharp decline in support within and outside of the organization.
This may lead to a political rectification and re-orientation toward
class politics. It is nevertheless the case that the Brazilian left
faces a "long march" toward re-establishing its political
credibility gaining. Much the same is true of the left in Uruguay and
Argentina: the new "centre left" neo-liberals, unlike the
old right, have co-opted many of the leaders of the major trade unions
and some of the unemployed workers groups. This has been done by means
of allocation of government posts, inclusion in Congressional electoral
slates, and generous stipends.
President Chávez of
Venezuela stands as the major political figure representing a real governmental
challenge to US imperialism.[24] He has led the fight against ALCA and
the US invasion of Haiti; he defeated a US-sponsored coup attempt and
has demonstrated that social welfare, nationalism and political independence
is viable in the Hemisphere. But as in Cuba, Chávez faces not
only US aggression from the outside but opposition from within. Many
officials in his party (The Fifth Republic), the state apparatus and
sectors of the military are not in favor of his proposed Twenty-First
Century Socialism. Between Chávez and the ten million voters
who support him is a political apparatus of dubious political credentials,
with notable exceptions. In the case of Cuba, Fidel Castro has spoken
of a similar internal threat from a ‘new class' of rich emerging
from the scarcities of the "Special Period in Peacetime" (1992-2000)
and the opening to tourism.[25] He has called for a new revolution within
the revolution.
If there are "New Left
Winds blowing in Latin America", therefore, they come from the
call by Castro for a new revolution within the left, from the insistence
by Chávez that socialism is the only alternative to capitalism,
from the new grassroots leadership in Bolivia, Brazil and elsewhere,
as well as from the advancing 25,000 strong guerrilla movement in Colombia.
A new generation of autodidactic popular leaders and young militants
who are also intellectuals, are emerging in the urban councils of El
Alto, in the new class-oriented trade unions of Brazil, and among the
students joining the peasant fighters in the jungles of Colombia. They
are the ‘Left Winds’ of Latin America.
By contrast, the "centre
left" regimes and their leftist intellectual supporters represent
a sad epitaph on the "radical" generation of the 1970s and
1980s: they are a spent force, lacking critical ideas and audacious
proposals for challenging imperialism and capitalist rule. They will
not fade away - they have too much of a stake in the current system.
Although there is a long history in Latin America (and elsewhere) of
this kind of deception - by others of the leftist self, and by the leftist
self of the leftist self him/herself – there is a huge irony in
the pattern of delusion that currently exists.
In the past, therefore, leftist
intellectuals aligned with pro-Soviet communist parties tended to put
a break on revolutionary mobilization, arguing that the time was not
yet ripe. Although such misrecognition persists, now it has been reversed.
Leftist intellectuals who are politically non-aligned currently argue
that the revolution is already here and must be supported. The element
of irony is unmistakable: whereas earlier leftist intellectuals saw
no revolutionary potential where this actually existed (at the rural
grassroots during the 1960s), present-day ones see revolutionary potential
in places (the Presidential Palace) where it is actually non-existent.
When measured against a set
of criteria commonly accepted as designating a leftist politics, the
Latin American regimes hailed by many intellectuals as "New Winds
from the Left" fail to meet the test: none pursue redistributive
policies; most have implemented regressive budgeting policies, subsidizing
big business and reducing expenditures for social policy; class selective
austerity programs have been applied prejudicial to minimum wage earners
and low-paid public employees in health and education; privatizations
- legal and illegal - have been extended and deepened, even of lucrative
publicly-owned mineral and energy sectors; foreign investors have been
given privileged access to local markets, cheap labour and privatized
enterprises and banks. All the latter have had – and will continue
to have - a deleterious impact on the living standards of the rural
poor.
While none of the so-called
"centre left" regimes can accurately be designated "leftist",
there are some variations in the degree of adherence to the neo-liberal
model. Kirchner has channelled some of the economic surplus towards
the funding of national capitalist development, and also supported some
price controls on basic foodstuffs and electricity rates. Lula, by contrast,
is found at the other end of the spectrum: he has undermined a specifically
national development of manufacturing with an overvalued Brazilian Real
and exorbitant interest rates favouring financial capital.
Occupying a slightly different
position on this same spectrum, Morales combines the pro-foreign investment
programme of Lula - especially in minerals and petroleum - with a policy
of increasing tax rates on foreign-owned mining, gas and oil producers.
While most of the "centre-left" regimes considered here provide
troops for the US-sponsored occupation of Haiti, and continue to support
US military bases in Bolivia and Brazil, they are unanimous in their
opposition of US direct intervention in Venezuela. And although most
on the "centre-left" promote minimalist subsistence anti-poverty
programmes, none pursue structural changes in land tenure and public
investments aimed at creating employment, so as to get at the root of
poverty.
A final irony is that a US
policy designed and executed by one of the most extreme rightwing governments
in recent Western history has led to some frictions, particularly in
its attempt to impose non-reciprocal free trade agreements and a legal
basis to punish electoral regimes for not conforming to the dictates
of Washington. Such impetus from above is in turn countered by impetus
from below. Within the framework of neo-liberal politics, therefore,
these "centre-left" regimes also face strong pressures from
popular organizations and threats of renewed mass direct action. This
in itself serves to compel these regimes to resort to populist discourse:
making symbolic gestures of solidarity with the grassroots on the one
hand, and asserting their independence from the ultra-imperialist Bush
regime, to which they offer only rhetorical defiance/opposition, thereby
seeming to distance themselves from the US.
It would be a mistake however
to consider such "centre-left" regime gestures as a sign of
a major left revival. The credit for the latter development is due to
the mass movements outside the regime, mobilizations that in a majority
of instances are composed of poor peasants and agricultural workers
who demand more than just symbolic defiance and empty gestures of (economically
non-existent) "sameness" and solidarity with the grassroots.
What the rural (and urban) poor require - indeed, demand - is a sharp
turn toward substantial socio-economic transformations. The way in which
such changes will affect the current agrarian structure is thus a matter
of some political urgency. It is an issue which leftist intellectuals
and academics who are enthusiastic supporters of "centre left"
regimes in Latin America have yet to address in terms that are specifically
leftist.
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Anderson, Perry, "Cardoso
Legacy", London Review of Books, Vol. 24, No. 24 December 2002
Betto, Frei, "Zero Hunger
in the Municipalities", Panama News, April 13-26, 2003
(Frei Betto was one of Lula’s
chief advisers until Dec. 2004).
Borón, Atilio, "La
encrucijada Boliviana", http://rebellion.org
December 28, 2005.
Brass, Tom, 2000, Peasants,
Populism and Postmodernism: The Return of the Agrarian Myth, London
and Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers.
Chomsky, Noam, "Latin
America and Asia Breaking Free of Washington’s Grip",
http://counterpunch.org
Deere, Carmen Diana, Niurka
Pérez, and Ernel Gonzales, 1994, ‘The View from Below:
The Cuban Agricultural Sector in the "Special Period in Peacetime",
The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2.
Demmers, Jolle, Alex E. Fernández
Jilberto, and Barbara Hogenboom (eds.), 2001, Miraculous Metamorphoses:
The Neoliberalization of Latin American Populism, London and New York:
Zed Books.
Dietrich, Heinz, 2006, "Evo
Morales, Communitarian Socialism and the Regional Power Bloc,"
at: http://kalawaya.gnn.tv/headlines/7048/
Evo_Morales_Communitarian_Socialism_and_the_Regional_
Power_Bloc and http://www.rebellion.org January 8, 2006.
Foot, Paul, 2005, The Vote:
How It was Won and How It was Undermined, London; Viking/Penguin Books.
Gilly, Adolfo, 2005 "Bolivia:
a 21st Century Revolution", Socialism and Democracy, vol.19, no.3,
November 2005, pp 41-45.
Gott, Richard, 2005, Hugo
Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution, London and New York: Verso.
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio
Negri, 2000, Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio
Negri, 2005, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, London:
Hamish Hamilton.
Löwy, Michel, (ed) Marxism
in Latin America from 1909 to the Present, Humanities Press, 1992
Lucas, Kintto, 2000, We Will
Not Dance on Our Grandparents' Tombs: Indigenous Uprisings in Ecuador,
London: Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR).
National Commission on Disappeared
People [Argentina], 1986, Nunca Mas: The Report, London and Boston,
MA: Faber and Faber.
Petras, James, 2002, "A
Rose by Any Other Name? The Fragrance of Imperialism," The Journal
of Peasant Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2.
Petras, James, 2006, "The
Bankers Can Rest Easy – Evo Morales: All Growl, No Claws?",
Counterpunch, 4th January, http://counterpunch.org/petras01042006.html
Petras, James, and Henry
Veltmeyer, 2000, Neoliberalism and Class Conflict in Latin America,
London and New York: Macmillan Press/St. Martin’s Press.
Petras, James, and Henry
Veltmeyer, 2001a, Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century,
London and Halifax: Zed Press/Fernwood Publishing.
Petras, James, and Henry
Veltmeyer, 2001b, Brasil de Cardoso: expropriação de un
pais, Petrópolis: Editorial Vozes.
Petras, James, and Henry
Veltmeyer, 2001c, "Are Latin American Peasant Movements Still a
Force for Change? Some New Paradigms Revisited," The Journal of
Peasant Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2.
Petras, James, and Henry
Veltmeyer, 2002, "The Peasantry and the State in Latin America:
A Troubled Past, an Uncertain Future," The Journal of Peasant Studies,
Vol. 29, Nos. 3&4.
Petras, James, and Henry
Veltmeyer, 2003a, System in Crisis: The Dynamics of Free Market Capitalism,
London and Halifax: Zed Press/Fernwood Publishing.
Petras, James, and Henry
Veltmeyer, 2003b, "Whither Lula’s Brazil? Neo-Liberalism
and 'Third Way' Ideology," The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.
31, No. 1.
Ramonet, Ignacio, "Bolivia",
http://www.rebellion.org,
December 29, 2005.
Sader, Emir, 2005, "Taking
Lula’s Measure", New Left Review (Second Series), No. 33.
and "Lula: Um oportunidad perdida", 7/ar/libros/osal/sader.doc
Schlesinger, Stephen, and
Stephen Kinzer, 1982, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American
Coup in Guatemala, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
Taylor, Lewis, 2005, A review
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Research, Vol. 24, No. 3.
Washbrook, Sarah (ed.), 2005,
"Rural Chiapas Ten Years after the Zapatista Uprising," a
special issue of The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 32, Nos. 3&4.
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Uruguayan Left: From Cultural to Political Hegemony", CVP Web Site
no. 567
NOTES
[1] This imagery conjures
up a classic scene in film comedy: The Paleface (1948), in which the
eponymous and cowardly dentist on the frontier, played by Bob Hope,
stalks and is stalked by a gunfighter. On his way to a showdown with
the latter, Hope encounters all sorts of contradictory advice –
"he shoots from below, so duck to the side", "he fires
to the left, so lean to the right," etc., etc. – that fuels
the hilarious outcome. Both the confusion generated by advice received,
and the kind of advice itself, are not so different from the ones experienced
by the ranks of rural and urban workers when confronted with a politician
who, like the gunman in the film comedy, says one thing but does another
(= "talk to the Left [but] works for the Right").
[2] For the element of class
struggle occasioned by the imposition of neo-liberal programme, see
Petras and Veltmeyer [2000; 2001a; 2001c].
[3] An example, in rather
a minor key it has to be said, is the review by Taylor [2005: 418-20]
of a book about Latin American peasants that critically examined the
leftist credentials of postmodern theory (including "moral economy"
and "everyday forms of peasant resistance"). Objecting to
the view expressed by a number of contributions to the volume that what
such an approach endorses is neither progressive nor socialist but a
reactionary form of populist/nationalist politics, the position taken
by the reviewer was by contrast that "anyone with firsthand experience
of grassroots rural organization in Latin America knows that issues
such as 'moral economy' and ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’
comprise an essential part of the warp and woof of micro-level politics.
Without an understanding of these, no progress can be achieved."
The inference both that it is necessary to fit in with rural ideology
as presently constituted, that this is somehow compatible with a progressive
(never mind a socialist) politics, and that anyway this is the only
way forward politically, highlights as clearly as one could hope the
malaise among those who continue to think of themselves as on the left.
It is this, more than anything else, that has resulted in defeat after
defeat for the left in many parts of the Third World, where socialist
and communist parties have locked onto existing grassroots discourse
in the fond (and frequently unexamined) belief that the politics of
opposition are ipso facto socialist and progressive. What it overlooks
is the fact that agrarian mobilization against international capitalism
is in class terms heterogeneous, and thus projects economic interests
and contains programmatic demands that are contradictory, not to say
incompatible. Rich peasants in these movements rather obviously want
different things from the poor peasants and workers who are also part
of the same mobilization, a really rather simple fact that seems to
have escaped Taylor.
[4] This is especially true
of the now hugely fashionable analysis of Hardt and Negri [2000; 2005]
based on frothy and essentially meaningless concepts such as "multitudes"
and "empire", for a critique of which see Petras [2002]. Like
many other "leftists", they have pinned their political hopes
on new social movements such as the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico. Composed
for the most part of Mayan peasants, the Zapatista movement is largely
a defensive one, about the reproduction of indigenous cultural identity
and institutions (see the volume edited by Washbrook [2005]). As such,
it has little to do with socialist objectives.
[5] For the details of the
effusive celebration by the left generally that greeted this election
victory, see Petras and Veltmeyer [2003b].
[6] This kind of "hard
man" boast by newly elected politicians espousing what they claim
to be "centre left" views (= "Third Way") is designed
to demonstrate fiscal rectitude both to the domestic middle class and
to international capital. The same kind of utterances were made in the
UK after 1997 by Tony Blair and ‘New’ Labour (or, more accurately,
New "Labour"), a situation memorably described by the late
(and much lamented) Paul Foot, a socialist of the "old" school.
About this he wrote [Foot, 2005: 429]: "The case against capitalism,
and for a democratic socialist society to replace it, seems every bit
as strong in 2003 as it was when the vote was first granted to most
people some 85 years ago. Yet the sad fact is that in those years Labour
Governments, including particularly the majority Labour Government that
came to office at the end of the twentieth century, have done little
or nothing to achieve the Party’s founding aim - namely to use
the power given them by the franchise to represent the organized workers
and to close the gap between the rich and the workers in this country
or in any other. In the past Labour ministers used to apologize for
this failure. Now they boast about it."
[7] Lula's key economic ministers
were dominated by right-wing bankers, corporate executives and neo-liberal
ideologues, all linked to the IMF and multinational corporations. These
ministers occupied the Finance, Economy, Trade and Agriculture Ministries,
plus the Central Bank.
[8] On the agrarian reform,
see Petras and Veltmeyer [2003b: 17ff.].
[9] The dynamics of the previous
regime, that of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, is outlined in
Petras and Veltmeyer [2001b].
[10] ALCA (Área de
Libre Comercio de las Americas) is the Free Trade Area of the Americas.
[11] What Lula objected to,
specifically, was the policy of US agricultural subsidies combined with
tariff protection extended to US commercial farmers and agribusiness
enterprises.
[12] The MERCOSUR treaty
established a common market covering the Southern Cone countries of
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
[13] A quarter of a century
after the end of the military dictatorship, immunity extended by the
Argentinean state to those who operated death squads during the "dirty
war" (guerra sucia) that lasted from 1976 to 1982 remains a live
political issue. According to the report of CONADEP, the National Commission
on Disappeared People [1986], nearly 9,000 people "disappeared"
during this period, although the real figure is said to be around 30,
000. Among the "disappeared" were many participants in rural
labour organizations [National Commission on Disappeared People, 1986:
378]: "There were numerous disappearances amongst workers and small
farmers…particularly in the northern provinces of Tucuman and
Jujuy and the border provinces of Chaco, Formosa, Corrientes, and Misiones,
in the two latter especially in connection with the Agrarian Leagues.
There were many amongst the members of these Leagues who are now dead,
in prison, or disappeared."
[14] For more on Kirchner,
and general background information on the economic crisis faced by Argentina,
see Petras and Veltmeyer [2003a: 68ff.].
[15] This section draws on
materials contained in Petras [2006].
[16] Morales received congratulations
from Fidel Castro, as well as from President Chirac of France and Wolfowitz
(of the World Bank).
[17] On a resurgent populism
in Latin America, see Brass [2000], Demmers, Fernández Jilberto
and Hogenboom [2001], and Petras and Veltmeyer [2002].
[18] This, of course, corresponds
to the relay-in-statement common to populism: namely, that I - your
representative, who embodies your (= plebeian) interests and those of
the nation - am threatened by "foreigners" who are against
me, you, and Bolivia. Such a discourse not only fuses the identity of
President and people, fostering thereby the element of national solidarity,
but also focusses this on the "outsider" who is, it is inferred,
to blame for the ills of ‘the people’ and their President.
[19] Formed in 1986, the
Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador (CONAI) was the public
voice of all the different indigenous groups in Ecuador [Lucas, 2000].
For an account of the mobilization in Ecuador of its indigenous population,
see Petras and Veltmeyer [2003a: 185ff.].
[20] For this intellectual
support, see Sader [2005], Löwy […], Dietrich [2006], Anderson
[…], Boron […], Zibechi […], Betto […], Chomsky
[…], and Ramonet […].
[21] A wide ranging agrarian
reform was central to the Arbenz government programme, a policy which
entailed the expropriation of the large uncultivated reserve belonging
to the US-owned agribusiness enterprise, the United Fruit company. The
latter was, unsurprisingly, the main instigator of the move to overthrow
Arbenz [Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982].
[22] The intention was to
present to the Guatemalan population a seemingly plebeian figurehead
of what was actually a foreign coup, thereby presenting the latter action
as a form of grassroots agency. According to the CIA [Schlesinger and
Kinzer, 1982: 122], therefore, Castillo Armas 'had no strong ideology
beyond simple nationalism and anti-Communism. But he "had that
good Indian look about him. He looked like an Indian, which was great
for the people' ".
[23] For this "new left
bloc", see Dietrich [2006].
[24] See Gott [2005] for
an interesting account of the domestic policies effected by the Chávez
regime.
[25] See Deere, Pérez
and Gonzales [1994] for an account of the contradictions that surfaced
in Cuba during the "Special Period in Peacetime". The relaxation
by the Cuban state of controls on peasant markets in the 1980s generated
a trend towards privatization, in the form of decollectivization, sharecropping,
and diverting inputs from state enterprises into private production.