Fake
Peace Festivals
By Tanya Reinhart
14 February, 2005
Countercurrents.org
The Sharm-el - Sheikh summit of Sharon
and Abbas is hailed in the Western media as the opening of a new era.
This is the climax of a wave of optimism that has been generated since
the death of Arafat. In the last four years, the Israeli leadership
singled Arafat out as the main obstacle for peace. Adopting the Israeli
perspective, the media world believes that his departure would enable
a renewal of the peace process. This, in the media world, is coupled
with the faith that Israel is finally led by a man of peace. Sharon,
who might have had some problems in the past, so the story goes, has
changed his skin, and now he is leading Israel to painful concessions.
The same euphoria
has been of course dominant also in the Israeli media, as Aluf Benn
noted in Ha'aretz in December 7,: "The media atmosphere over the
last few days has been reminiscent of the Oslo-era euphoria, or the
early days of Ehud Barak's government... There is once again talk of
cooperation, public embraces and peace conferences. International diplomats
are once again viewing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an arena
for diplomatic successes instead of a guaranteed recipe for frustration
and failure".
Judging from the
optimistic language of the media, the new era exists not just at the
level of declared plans. The praises for Sharon, the feeling of huge
progress, would let one almost believe that things have actually changed
on the ground - some settlements evacuated, the occupation almost over,
cessation of Israeli violence. The Palestinian elections, together with
the Iraqi elections that also took place in January, were hailed as
a big victory for democracy, with hardly any mention of the fact that
in both places, these were elections under occupation. In the CNN report
of the Palestinian election day, the enthusiastic reporter spoke about
the future relations between the two "countries" (Israel and
Palestine), as if the Palestinian state is already founded on its liberated
land.
But the bitter reality
is that nothing has changed. The new "peace plans" are no
more real than the previous ones, and on the ground, the Palestinians
are losing more of their land and are being pushed into smaller and
smaller prison enclaves, surrounded by the new wall that Sharon's government
keeps constructing. On the day of the Sharm-el- Sheikh summit Israeli
sources announced that even the illegal outposts that Israel has committed
to evacuate long ago will not be evacuated until "after implementation
of the disengagement from the Gaza Strip"
Mahmoud Abbas, who
was elected as prime minister of the Palestinian authority on January
9, has served in this role already once before, since April 29, 2003.
These were the days of another promising "peace plan" - the
road map. Just as now, the new era was celebrated, in June 2003, in
a summit in Aqaba Jordan, with Bush, Sharon and Abbas. If we want to
know what awaits Abbas on this round, it would be useful to examine
in detail what happened in that previous round. The road map story contains
all the elements of Israel's policy in the last four years, and of what
Israel will continue to do, if undisturbed by the international community.
The Road Map era
On April 29, 2003,
The Palestinian Legislative Council approved a new Palestinian Authority
cabinet under Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). That followed
a long period of pressure by the U.S. and Israel for Palestinian reforms,
and Abbas, who is considered a moderate, appeared to receive their support.
In his address, presenting his ministers and his political vision, Abu
Mazen said inter alia: "We reject the terror on either side and
in any form, in keeping with our tradition and moral values... We stress
that terror and its various forms does not help our just cause, but
rather destroys it, and will not bring the peace we want."
Israel welcomed
the occasion with a new assassination on that same day. An Israel Air
Force Apache helicopter gunship fired several missiles at a car driving
in a residential neighborhood south of Khan Yunis killing local PFLP
(Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) commander Nidal Salameh
and another PFLP member, Awani Sarhan. " In response to criticism
over the timing of Salameh's killing (on the day that a new, reform-minded
Palestinian government was being approved), IDF Chief of Staff Moshe
Ya'alon said that.... "Salameh's assassination will actually strengthen
the new Palestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen)"
From the Palestinian side, the next day, two terrorists, who smuggled
their way from the Gaza strip, blew themselves up in an explosion at
Mike's Place, a Tel Aviv beachfront pub, killing three Israelis and
wounding about 60.
It was in this setting
that the 'road map' document was ceremonially presented to the two sides,
on April 30, 2003. "U.S. Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer brought the
document to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Jerusalem office. European
representatives delivered the document to Palestinian Prime Minister
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) at his Department for Negotiations, a research
institute he established in Ramallah."
The road map plan
has its roots in a speech of U.S. President George W. Bush, on June
24, in which he outlines a vague two-state solution and calling for
the Palestinian leadership to be replaced. On July 15, 2002, the foreign
ministers of the Quartet - the United States, European Union, United
Nations and Russia - met to detail the principles of the road map formulated
in the U.S. State Department under the direction of William Burns. In
October 2002, the first draft of the document was presented to Sharon,
on the eve of his meeting with Bush at the White House. Sharon appointed
his Chief of Staff Dov Weisglass to coordinate Israel's comments and
corrections to the road map. On December 20, 2002, the final version
of the plan was completed, but Weisglass' team has submitted about 100
correction proposals since then.
The Road Map's text
announces that this time "the destination is a final and comprehensive
settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005" , a goal
expected to be achieved at the third phase of the plan, after two preparatory
phases. To check if it offers anything concrete in this direction, it
is necessary first to refresh our memory regarding what the conflict
is about. From Israeli discourse at the time, one might get the impression
that it is about Israel's right to exist. According to this view, the
Palestinians are trying to undermine the mere existence of the state
of Israel with the demand to allow their refugees to return, and they
are trying to achieve this with terror. It seems that it was forgotten
that in practice this is a simple and classical conflict over Palestinian
land and resources (water) that Israel has been occupying since 1967.
The Road Map document as well is completely absent of any territorial
dimension.
What is demanded
of the Palestinians in the first two phases are clear: to establish
a government that will be defined by the U. S. as democratic, to form
three security forces which will be defined by Israel as reliable, and
to crush terror. Once these demands are fulfilled, the third phase is
to begin, at which the occupation will miraculously end. But the document
doesn't put any demands on Israel in this third phase. Most Israelis
understand that there is no way to end the occupation and the conflict
without the Israeli army leaving the territories and the dismantlement
of settlements. But these basic concepts are not even hinted at in the
document, which only mentions freezing the settlements and dismantling
new outposts, already in the first stage: "GOI [Government of Israel]
immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001.
Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity
(including natural growth of settlements".
Apart from this
reference to the old U.S. demand of freezing settlement expansion, the
plan is pretty general as to its outcome in the final phase: "Phase
III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian
institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance,
and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement
in 2005... leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005,
including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and.... progress
toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon
and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible."
The proposed first
phase, however, is more substantial, because it repeats the cease-fire
plan proposed by then CIA head George Tenet, in June 2001. The essence
of the Tenet plan was that to restore calm, a cease-fire should be declared,
to which both sides should have to contribute. The Palestinians should
cease all terror and armed activity, and Israel should pull its forces
back to the positions they held before the Palestinian uprising, in
September 2000. This is a substantial demand of Israel, because in September
2000, there were large areas of the West Bank that were under Palestinian
control. Implementing the demand to restore the conditions that existed
then, should mean lifting the many road blocks and army posts that Israel
has placed in these areas since that time. The road map specifies the
same for the first phase: Israel shall "withdraw from Palestinian
areas occupied from Sept 28 2000... [and restore] the status quo that
existed then".
There is no doubt
that fulfillment of this demand can contribute greatly to establishing
some calm, even if a temporary one. But was there any basis for the
hope that on the road-map round, Tenet's plan would be finally implemented?
The Tenet cease-fire plan has come into the spotlight many times before.
The previous round, examined in chapter VII, was what appeared to be
an American cease-fire initiative in March 2002, for which Zinni and
Cheney were sent to the region. Already then Sharon clarified that he
does not agree to this demand, and he only agrees to good-will gestures,
like easing the conditions for the population in areas in which quiet
will be preserved (in an unspecified way) . This did not prevent the
U.S. from pointing at the Palestinians as the side that refused the
cease-fire. With the end of this initiative, Israel embarked on the
"Defensive Shield" spree of destruction, with the blessing
of the U.S.
Was there any chance,
then, that in this round, things would turn differently? On the face
of it, the circumstances seemed potentially different. Since 2001, Israel,
followed by the U.S., argued that the real obstacle to restoring calm
was the continued leadership of Yasser Arafat, who, they said, orchestrated
terror behind the screens. They demanded the appointment of a different
Palestinian Prime Minister and favored Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) for
the role. Furthermore, at the time, there were many reports of Abbas
and others negotiating with the various Palestinian organizations a
complete cease-fire (Hudna) during which they will refrain from any
attacks on Israeli civilians and soldiers. What could be more suitable
for a new peace initiative than starting with a period of some calm
- quiet for the Israelis without terror, quiet for the Palestinians,
without the constant presence of the IDF in their midst?
This, however is
not how the Israeli authorities viewed the matter. They changed their
tone as soon as Abbas was elected. Already the day Mahmoud Abbas was
sworn we heard that, "military Intelligence told the political
echelon at the beginning of the week that the new Palestinian government
headed by Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) has no intention
of uprooting the terrorist infrastructure. 'According to what we know
now, Abu Mazen plans to speak with the Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders,
and not to clash with them.' "
The background for
this dissatisfaction with Abbas is a demand that Israel posed as a condition
for accepting the road map. Israel clarified that it would not be sufficient
to halt terror, but a reliable Palestinian authority should engage in
an actual clash with the various armed organizations, with the aim of
destroying them. This demand was later reiterated in the resolution
the Israeli cabinet passed when it approved the road map on May 26,
2003: "In the first phase of the plan and as a condition for progress
to the second phase, the Palestinians will complete the dismantling
of terrorist organizations (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front,
the Democratic Front, Al-Aqsa Brigades and other apparatuses) and their
infrastructure" The dismantling should involve "arrests, interrogations,
prevention and the enforcement of the legal groundwork for investigations,
prosecution and punishment."
From the Palestinian
perspective, carrying out this Israeli demand means, in essence, civil
war. The list of organizations Israel demands dismantling comprises
most Palestinian organizations. Israel demands that not only their military
wings be dismantled, but also their "infrastructure", which
means the political and social organizations that support them. Furthermore,
this long process of dismantling should take place as a precondition
to any further progress towards the goals of the road map, namely right
at the start of the process at which the Palestinians have not yet received
anything. There is no reason to assume that the various organizations
will just obediently dismantle, or let their members be imprisoned or
killed by the new Palestinian security forces that Israel expects the
Palestinian Authority to form. Rather, the process must involve armed
clashes with these organizations. As mentioned in chapter IX, right
from the start of Oslo, some Palestinians organizations (most notably
the Hamas) warned that Israel is trying to push the Palestinians into
a civil war, in which the society kills and destroys itself. One of
the achievements of Arafat's leadership, in collaboration with virtually
all fragments of the Palestinian society, has been that they managed
to avoid deterioration into civil war. The new Prime Minister, Mahmoud
Abbas, was neither able, nor willing, to risk civil war. But he was
able to offer cessation of terror and attacks on Israel. As Khalil Shikaki,
a Palestinian political analyst, explained to the Guardian, "a
ceasefire and the dismantling of groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad
were in contradiction... Why would Hamas continue a ceasefire if it
was merely cover for its destruction? And if Abbas had the infrastructure
to dismantle these groups, he wouldn't need the ceasefire in the first
place."
The Israeli leadership
viewed the cessation of terror offer as a threat, rather than as progress.
As Aluf Benn summerized this in Ha'aretz', "as the Abu Mazen confidence
vote drew closer, the tone changed in Jerusalem. At first Israel presented
his election as a large celebration, as Israel's fruit of victory in
the intifada. Now the prime minister, foreign minister and defense establishment
are warning of another trick of those cunning Palestinians. The Israelis'
position, supported by an intelligence analysis of Abu Mazen's statements
in various conferences, is that the new prime minister will try to push
Israel to concessions by means of hudna, an agreed cessation of attacks
among the Palestinian organizations... Jerusalem sources warn that the
international community is deaf to... nuances and, as soon as a false
calm prevails, will demand from Israel withdrawals and settlement freezes.
Israel is demanding a Palestinian 'Altalena,' no less than a confrontational
showdown between Abu Mazen and Mohammed Dahlan on the one hand and Hamas,
Jihad and the Al Aqsa Brigades on the other."
The Aqaba Summit
At the beginning
of June, 2003, a ceremonial summit took place in Aqaba, Jordan, with
Bush, Sharon, and Abbas, to mark the beginning of the road map era.
Towards the occasion, Hamas leaders started to openly declare their
willingness to enter a cease-fire (hudna) with Israel, for the first
time since the establishment of the movement in 1987. "A senior
Hamas spokesman in Gaza, Abdel Aziz Rantisi, who usually represents
movement hardliners, said on Friday: 'The Hamas movement is prepared
to stop terror against Israeli civilians if Israel stops killing Palestinian
civilians ... We have told (Palestinian Authority Prime Minister) Abu
Mazen in our meetings that there is an opportunity to stop targeting
Israeli civilians if the Israelis stop assassinations and raids and
stop brutalizing Palestinian civilians".
Sharon was just
as open in immediately rejecting this proposal. On the eve of the Aqaba
summit, the headline in Ha'aretz declared: "The prime minister:
A Palestinian ceasefire is not enough"; and the text continued
to explain that "in his meeting with U.S. president George Bush
at the Aqaba summit, prime-minister Ariel Sharon will seek the U.S.
backing of his demand that the Palestinian authority use forceful [military]
means against the terror organizations and their infrastructure in the
territories, as a precondition for any diplomatic advance. Sharon will
tell Bush that it is not acceptable to settle just for agreements between
the Palestinian organizations to a cease fire (Hudna)
In return
Sharon will promise Bush that Israel will evacuate illegal outposts
in the West bank " . Two weeks later, on June 10, came the more
explicit reply of the Israeli army to Rantisi's cease fire offer. Two
helicopter gunships fired seven missiles that set his car ablaze in
Gaza City, killing two people and wounding about 20. Rantisi managed
to escape this assassination attempt, and survived another year, until
he was killed by the Israeli army on April 17, 2004.
Still, none of this
seemed to have registered in Western consciousness, and certainly not
in Israel. The perception of the events was shaped solely at the level
of general and abstract declarations. The road map document requires
that "at the outset of Phase I... Israeli leadership issues unequivocal
statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent,
viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside
Israel, as expressed by President Bush" . This, in fact, is the
only clause of the road map that the Israeli leadership did comply with.
Sharon declared on several occasions that he "accepts Bush's vision
of two states", and the Israeli cabinet, following a "stormy"
six hours debate, approved the road map on May 26 (with fourteen reservations
that deprived it of content, but did not attract much media attention).
At the level of declaration, Sharon was willing to go even further and
utter the taboo word "occupation". In a meeting of the Likud
Knesset faction on May 27 he said: "I think the idea that it is
possible to continue keeping 3.5 million Palestinians under occupation
- yes it is occupation, you might not like the word, but what is happening
is occupation - is bad for Israel, and bad for the Palestinians, and
bad for the Israeli economy". That was sufficient to arouse a storm
in right wing circles and lend complete credibility to Sharon in the
eyes of the Israeli doves. The idea that words can lie, that this is
perhaps another Israeli deceit, did not seem to cross anybody's mind.
The Israeli public
discourse stormed around "Sharon's revolutionary change of mind".
The extensive debate on his psyche focused on the question whether he
has changed from the inside, or whether it is all just U.S. pressure.
Either way, Sharon turned suddenly into the beloved leader of the Israeli
"peace camp". The furious right wing and the celebrating peace
camp agreed on the substance of what they perceived had occurred: Sharon's
Israel has already taken the fatal historical step, and gave up on the
occupation. - "In Aqaba, the State of Palestine was founded"!
- declared the headline of Yediot Aharonot on June 5. This is because,
following in the tradition of Oslo, the mere declaration of a willingness
to give away something at some future time, is by itself perceived in
Israel as the most painful and crucial of concessions. As stated by
Labor MP Abraham Burg in his excited address of appreciation to Sharon,
"even if you will regret this later; even if you will not stand
the pressure of your own party, you already made your contribution,
because you said occupation, you said evacuation, you said peace, you
started to believe".
In the Israeli consciousness,
it is not the test of actions that matters, but the test of words -
the complex art of the simulation of peace, which so eased the liberal
conscience during Oslo. In this perception, Bush and Sharon are the
indubitable proponents of world peace. Who would stop to notice what
actually occurs in the real world?
It was possible
to learn from the Israeli papers at the time that nothing whatsoever
has changed in the daily reality of the occupation. The Israeli army
continued to arrest, shoot, and assassinate Palestinians. Even during
the week of the Aqaba summits, when in the world of simulation the headlines
heralded an easing of the closure, the IDF made sure to clarify that
nothing would change. On the contrary, the restrictions over Palestinian
movement were increased. Here is how Arnon Regular described this in
Ha'aretz: "The Palestinians might have heard about Israel's easing
conditions for travel, but they haven't seen this on the ground. In
fact, there are signs that nothing at all has changed. ...The picture
that emerged yesterday after a day of driving up and down and back and
forth across the West Bank is of tens of thousands of people who have
seemingly been thrown back into the Middle Ages, when the only mode
of transport was by foot."
The diabolic aspect
of Sharon's deception, which the U.S. backed, was that from that point
on, only the Palestinians would be accused of whatever happens. Since
the Aqaba summit, Palestinian resistance to the army's continued brutality
could not be tolerated because in the Israelis' perception, Israel already
fulfilled its part of the bargain when Sharon declared that he had had
enough of the occupation, and will even evacuate a number of outposts.
Now it was the turn of the Palestinian Authority to fulfill its part
of the generous agreement and to prove that it is capable of controlling
terror, even without any change in the situation on the ground.
There is never a
partner for peace
Nevertheless, the
Palestinian Authority and the various Palestinian organizations did
fulfill their part in the road map plan and declared a complete cease-fire
for three months, during which they agreed to cease attacks both in
Israel and in the territories, as required in phase I of the road map.
The first announcement that they reached an agreement on this was made
on June 25, 2003. "The Hamas spokesmen said it was noteworthy that
they had accepted the three-month lull without receiving any guarantees
from Israel that it would cease its military activities against them
in exchange for the cease-fire".
The Israeli immediate
reaction was clear and decisive: Within minutes of the Hamas' announcement
"Israeli helicopters fired missiles at two cars near the southern
Gaza city of Khan Yunis, killing two people, including a woman. The
Israel Defense Forces said the helicopters fired the missiles at a Hamas
cell that was about to fire mortar shells at an Israeli settlement".
And in Jerusalem, "Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Defense Minister
Shaul Mofaz decided... that Israel will ignore any agreements on a hudna,
or cease-fire, reached by the Palestinian organizations, and will instead
insist that the Palestinian Authority disarm militias in any area in
which it assumes security responsibility... The Foreign Ministry...
instructed foreign delegations to prepare for a Palestinian propaganda
assault that will blame Israel for violating the "cease-fire"
while ignoring the PA's responsibility for continued terrorist activity
by "local" cells."
In perfect coordination,
U.S. reaction was pretty similar: "President George W. Bush reacted
skeptically yesterday to the reported agreement on halting attacks against
Israelis for three months. 'I'll believe it when I see it,' Bush said.
Bush demanded that Hamas and groups like it be taken out of business...
'It's one thing to make a verbal agreement,' he said. 'But in order
for there to be peace in the Middle East, we must see organizations
such as Hamas dismantled, and then we'll have peace, we'll have a chance
for peace.'... Bush said he did not know details of the reported deal,
but was dubious about it, 'knowing the history of the terrorists.' During
the meeting with Romano Prodi, president of the European Commission,
and Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis, the outgoing head of the EU...
Bush pressed for the EU to outlaw Hamas in European countries, where
a distinction is made between the movement's military and political
wings."
Although both Israel
and the U.S. made their intentions clear, it was not possible to keep
pursuing this line at the level of public declaration once the Palestinians
stuck to their cease fire. On June 29, the official Palestinian cease-fire
was declared . This time, Israel appeared to cooperate partially. The
Israeli army pulled out forces from one town in the northern Gaza Strip
and opened the main road in the Strip (- the "Tancher" route)
to Palestinian traffic. Sharon promised to consider release of Palestinian
prisoners. Later, in July, Israeli forces pulled back in Beit Lehem
in the West bank, and three check points were removed in the area of
Ramallah, as "goodwill gestures to the Palestinians to coincide
with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's trip to Washington, where he is expected
to face pressure from the U.S. to ease humanitarian conditions in the
territories."
But this, more or
less, exhausts Israel's "goodwill" measures. For about six
weeks, as the Palestinians fully kept their part of phase I of the road
map, Israel did nothing to implement its part. As mentioned, Sharon
clarified in advance that he does not agree to the basic requirement
in the Tenet plan, reiterated in phase I of the road map, that the Israeli
army pulls back to the positions it held before the Intifada. But one
could still expect at least the freezing of military activities in these
areas during the cease-fire. Instead, the army maintained and even increased
its level of activities in all Palestinian towns and villages. Arrests,
shooting, house demolitions, closures and blocking exits continued as
usual.
Nevertheless, the
Palestinians stuck to the one-sided cease-fire they declared (with one
exception, on July 7). The Israeli society was optimistic and relieved,
but apparently this was a cause of concern for those "Jerusalem
sources" who right from the start, "warned that the international
community is deaf to... nuances and, as soon as a false calm prevails,
will demand from Israel withdrawals and settlement freezes." After
six weeks of a complete Palestinian cease fire, Israel resumed its policy
of assassinations, targeting mainly leaders of the Hamas.
The day the Palestinian
cease-fire was declared, some of the assessments of the security echelons
were shared with the public: "The IDF's intelligence units believe
that, of the three organizations that declared a suspension of attacks
yesterday, Hamas activists will most closely adhere to the deal. Hamas
is considered strictly hierarchical and relatively disciplined, and
it seems that the group's leaders will do all they can to enforce the
hudna". It is hard not to interpret the steps Israel took in August
2003 as an attempt to break this Hamas resolution and provoke it back
to arms.
On August 9, 2003
a squad of naval commandos killed two leading Hamas figures, Hamis Abu
Salam and Faiz al-Sadar, in the refugee camp Aksar near Nablus.. In
the riots that erupted at the Askar camp following the assassination,
two more Palestinians were killed. Three days later, two suicide bombers,
both from the camp of Askar, blew themselves up in two terror attacks
in the Ariel settlement and in Rosh Ha'ain, killing two Israelis. Hamas
leadership in Gaza had finally made the mistake the Israeli security
echelons were waiting for. It announced that although it was still committed
to the ceasefire, the conditions had changed so as to permit retaliations
against Israeli attacks . Israel immediately seized the opportunity
to provoke local Hamas cells into action. In this context of frustration
on part of the Palestinian organizations that tried to stick to the
cease fire, Israel targeted next Mohammed Sidr, the head of Islamic
Jihad's military wing in Hebron, on August 14. As always, Israel claimed
that the killings were necessary to prevent terror. Amos Harel, a senior
security reporter and analyst in Ha'aretz raised some doubts. Reporting
security sources' claim that "recently, new intelligence has indicated
that some of the Islamic organizations' field operatives have tired
of the cease-fire and have resumed planning near-term attacks",
he states: "If this is indeed what happened, the facts should be
presented in full. As long as Israel makes do with generic statements
about 'ticking bombs' and 'an attack the wanted man was planning in
the near future,' there will always be those who suspect it is Israel
that is stirring up trouble in order to free itself of the yoke of the
concessions demanded by the road map".
Already on the day
of Sidr's 'liquidation', security echelons informed the Israeli media
that the cease-fire was soon to be over. "-We must assume that
everything is going to fall apart, and if so, it had better fall apart
on the neighbor's side rather than on ours - a Jerusalem source said."
It was obvious that the failure of the cease-fire would also be a deathblow
to Mahmoud Abbas' new government. But by that time, the Israeli leadership
was openly no longer interested in maintaining his rule. Abbas, whose
appointment was hailed, just less than four months before, as a victory
to Israel's tireless pursuit of peace, has lost his favor with the rulers,
and apparently, Israel managed to convince also the U.S. administration
that it is time to replace him. On that same day, it was reported that
"Jerusalem received indications that the White House too is becoming
increasingly disappointed with Abbas. The Americans had pinned many
hopes on him, believing that his weight and authority would grow with
the job, but they learned that his cabinet is not making the necessary
changes and is not fighting against terrorism.... Israeli sources assume
that if the Americans despair of Abbas, they will threaten to cut the
PA's funds off, thus leading to the collapse of its government and the
rise of an alternative leadership."
As we saw in chapter
VII, Israel has often applied the assassination policy before, with
the full awareness that it is bound to stall any Palestinian attempt
at restoring calm. As many times before, the Israeli society paid a
horrible price for the killing of Sidr. On August 19, 2003 (optional
of course but might help orient at least many u.s. readers?) a suicide
bomber belonging to a Hamas cell in Sidr's hometown, Hebron, blew himself
up in a Jerusalem bus, killing 20 people, including 6 children, and
wounding about 100. The cease fire was on life support. Still, it was
possible to save it. Abbas was quick to react. "Overnight he had
secured the endorsement of Yasser Arafat to crack down on Hamas and
Islamic Jihad for violating the ceasefire with the Jerusalem bombing.
The tentative plan called for the arrest of the militants involved in
the bombing, shutting Hamas mosques, and disabling its patronage network
of schools and hospitals". Foreign media reported that the U.S.
administration was informed that the crackdown operation on Hamas, including
in the Gaza strip, was to begin on August 21. But Israel did not wait,
and on that same day, it struck the final blow to the cease fire.
As senior Ha'aretz'
analyst Ze'ev Schiff reported, it was known that the bombing was decided
locally, with no coordination with the Hamas leadership. "The Hamas
leadership in the Gaza Strip did not have advance knowledge about the
Jerusalem bus bombing. Hamas leaders in Gaza, like members of Islamic
Jihad, were sure that it was an operation carried out by Islamic Jihad."
Nevertheless, Israel chose to retaliate against the Hamas leadership
in Gaza. Furthermore, the strike was not aimed at the Hamas military
wing, but at one of its most moderate political leaders. Here is how
The Guardian described the event: "Five Israeli missiles incinerated
Ismail Abu Shanab in Gaza City yesterday, killing one of the most powerful
voices for peace in Hamas and destroying the ceasefire that Palestinian
leaders believed would avert civil war... Ariel Sharon could not have
been in any doubt that killing Abu Shanab would wreck the ceasefire.
He was widely seen as more pragmatic than fellow leaders. He broke a
taboo within Hamas by recognising that there would have to be a Palestinian
state alongside Israel, not in place of it."
Abu Shnab's death
prompted tens of thousands of Palestinians to take to the streets of
the Gaza strip. Hamas activists launched mortars at Israeli settlements
within the Gaza strip. Hamas leadership, and other organizations, announced
that they were calling off the cease fire. At that time, the Israeli
army had already launched a military raid of Palestinian cities of the
West Bank and gathered forces around the Gaza strip for a large scale
operation. That was the end of the road map plan, which had ignited
so much hope for so many Israelis and Palestinians.
Just as in the previous
round of an apparent U.S. attempt to broker a cease fire along the lines
of the Tenet plan, the U.S. administration fully backed the Israeli
side also in this round. After the Aqaba summit in early June, it seemed
that Colin Powell attempted a hesitant denunciation of Israel continuing
its liquidation operations just as the Palestinians were working to
enforce a cease-fire. But he was soon brought into line. Following the
Israel's killing of Abdullah Qawasmeh, head of military operations for
Hamas in the Hebron region in June 22, we heard that "U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell was critical of the operation and said... that
he 'was sorry for the killing of Abdullah Qawasmeh,' which he considers
to have been unnecessary and 'a possible impediment to progress [for
peace].' The Bush administration clarified to Israel last night that
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell had not condemned the IDF's killing
Qawasmeh. U.S. ambassador to Israel Dan Kurtzer called the Prime Minister's
Office and said that Powell had expressed sorrow over the fact that
the situation in the Middle East leads to such measures being taken."
In the subsequent
months of the Palestinian cease-fire, there were no more slips of tongue.
The U.S. position was one of unequivocal support of Israel's liquidations
policy, which the U.S. administration refers to as "Israel's right
to defend itself". Even when it was clear that the cease fire was
about to collapse, "the administration avoided asking Israel to
restrain itself and rein in its forces following the Jerusalem attack,
instead placing all the responsibility for the crisis on the Palestinian
side. The Israel Defense Forces's operations in Nablus and Hebron in
the West Bank [prior to the Jerusalem attack], in which Hamas and Islamic
Jihad militants were killed, have been met with American understanding.
The U.S. sees these operations as justified in order to stop 'ticking
bombs'..." It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the U.S. was
no more interested in actually implementing even the first phase of
the road map than Israel was.
As anticipated by
the "Israeli sources" above, Mahmoud Abbas' government collapsed
following the failure of the cease-fire. He was replaced with Ahmed
Qureia (Abu Ala), who, just as his predecessor, wasn't given any chance
to restore calm. "Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom... rejected Ahmed
Qureia's cease-fire offer, and labeled it a deceitful trick. An Israeli
government source said... that Qureia's (Abu Ala) new government, which
was sworn in earlier in the day, is 'a long tentacle of Arafat.' According
to the source, Israel will not establish official ties with the Qureia
government, before it proves in deeds its intention to fight terror
and to dismantle the terror infrastructure." .
And in 2005.
If we examine the
press of just the first week of Mahmoud Abbas second cadence as a prime
minister, in January 2005, it is easy to notice that the road map pattern
repeats itself almost verbatim. Abbas has been working on declaring
a cease fire, and on the day of the elections, in January 9, Hamas announced
that it is open to the idea of a cease fire . But already at the eve
of the elections, in a meeting with Jimmy Carter, Sharon clarified that
"there will be no progress until ... the terror organizations are
eliminated". Israeli official spokesmen in interviews to international
media have repeated the message that Abbas must uproot the organizations,
and not just reach a cease fire. In fact, the same demand was made explicitly
in Sharon's speech in the Sharm-el-Sheikh summit: "We must all
make a commitment not to agree for a temporary solution ... [but] to
dismantle the terrorist infrastructure, to disarm and subdue it once
and for all."
Already in his first
week in power, security sources were "disappointed" with Abbas:
" 'We became increasingly concerned by Abbas' apparent decision
to use the same counter-terrorism measures he did last time (as PA prime
minister), i.e., to persuade the terrorists and reach an agreement with
them,' a senior source said". Amos Har'el, the security analyst
of Ha'aretz, repeats almost the same text he produced a year before,
based on briefings of security sources: "In recent weeks, Jerusalem
fostered many expectations of Mahmoud Abbas. Officials were impressed
by his explicit statements denouncing terror, the orderly transfer of
power after Arafat's death, the former chairman's quiet funeral, and
Abbas' sweeping election victory. But the window of opportunity has
not opened up by more than a narrow crack. Assuming Abbas plans to achieve
a cease-fire with the Palestinian opposition groups, he wants to do
it in his own way and time - through persuasive talks and quiet agreements,
without aggressive steps. The trouble is that Israel does not have time
to see if he succeeds". During the week of the summit, these disappointment
voices were suppressed. They will surface again when Israel would have
had enough of this enforced cease fire. The Palestinian organizations
demanded that in return for their cease-fire, Israel too should take
commitments such as stopping the targeted killings and house demolitions.
But on the ground, " the IDF has renewed its incursions into Palestinian
Authority territory, following a hiatus it had enforced in view of the
elections in the territories. In operations to capture militants since
the elections, two armed Hamas men were killed near Ramallah".
In Sharon's speech in the Sharm-el-Sheikh summit, it appeared that Israel
was taking a commitment to also stop all its operations in the occupied
territories. But the interpretation of this statement was clarified
already at the day of the summit: Israel would continue only those operations
targeted at "ticking bombs", or necessary to prevent terror
attacks. "The Israel Defense Forces are continuing at this stage
to operate according to instructions issued by Chief of Staff Moshe
Ya'alon two weeks ago. At that time, Ya'alon gave orders to stop offensive
actions in the Gaza Strip and to limit those in the West Bank to actions
required by an urgent need to prevent planned terror attacks."
Thus, just as in the previous round, the Israeli army plans to continue
to provoke the local cells of the Hamas, until the next terror attack
would relieve it from this temporary enforced "restraint".
Nevertheless, just
as in the days of the Aqaba summit, the majority of Israeli society
is euphoric with expectations for change and calm. As always before,
there is an absolute lack of collective memory. It is the media's responsibility
to remind the readers of recent history, the background for the events,
how it started and ended in the previous round of the road map. But
the cooperative Israeli media does not do that. So when the next explosion
comes, the Israelis will be convinced that again, they tried everything,
but the Palestinians failed it.