The
Wall Will Fail
By Steve Niva
08 August 2004
The Electronic Intifada
The
case for Israel's wall and fence barrier rests an endlessly repeated
and passionately defended premise: only such a barrier can provide Israel
security from the waves of Palestinian suicide bombers who have brutally
maimed and killed hundreds of Israeli civilians in buses and café's
over the past four years.
Given the devastating
impact of Palestinian suicide attacks on Israeli society, it's not hard
to see why many have embraced the barrier as a remedy to stop the carnage.
Unfortunately, in this case the proposed cure may actually be worse
than the malady itself.
The security benefits
touted by defenders of Israel's barrier are illusory at best. Those
who profess concern for Israeli security are dangerously mistaken if
they believe that building a combination of concrete walls and electrified
fences around Palestinians in the West Bank will end suicide bombings
and enhance Israel's overall security. Not only will it fail in the
short term, as history has shown it will likely lead to even more daring
and devastating forms of violence, not less.
The security case
against Israel's barrier is based on two basic points. First, wall and
barriers meant to provide lasting security never ultimately work. Second,
the current location and path of Israel's barrier, the bulk of which
is built deep inside Palestinian lands in the West Bank, is highly dysfunctional
and even dangerous from an Israeli security point of view.
The belief that
security can be provided by walls and physical barriers is as old as
the most ancient walled city. But that city is Jericho, and any Israeli
schoolchild can tell you what happened to its great defensive walls
once the ancient Israelites emerged from their desert exodus. They came
tumbling down.
A brief glance at
the history of security oriented walls and barriers reveals that they
do little more than sell the illusion of security to a fearful population.
Hadrian's wall, separating Hibernia from Britannia, became useless when
imperial Rome imploded in the face of barbarian invasions. The Great
Wall of China suffered a similar fate when the Mongols eventually swept
over and around it to invade China. The Maginot Line and the Berlin
Wall are now better remembered as monuments to failure than as monuments
to lasting peace and security.
The inescapable
fact is that walls and barriers meant to provide lasting security never
ultimately work. They have a habit of cracking, falling, being breached,
circumvented, written on, or even ignored altogether. And those desperate
enough to build a wall are unlikely to be more desperate or creative
than those striving to get in or across it.
Defenders of Israel's
barrier have provided no answer as to why they believe that this barrier
will escape history's verdict, which has been harsh on wall-builders,
as the defenders of Jericho can attest.
In fact, walls and
barriers have often been a major impetus for military invention and
creativity. In this age of high technology and black market arms trading,
there is every reason to expect that Palestinian militants would continue
to search for ways to undermine, circumvent or ignore the barrier altogether,
with potentially devastating consequences for Israeli civilians.
Yet the most glaring
problem from an Israeli security perspective is the barrier's dubious
location and path, which have no basis in genuine Israeli security considerations.
Amnesty International has just documented that close to ninety percent
of Israel's barrier is being built on Palestinian land inside the internationally
accepted 1967 border between Israel and the West Bank, in some cases
snaking deep into the West Bank. Moreover, as one can see from any full
size map of the barrier's route, the barrier loops and zigzags around
several key Palestinian areas and dissects others, making it the antithesis
of a clean and effective security partition.
The reason for this
dysfunctional location and path is simple. What the barrier's defenders
do not want to admit or recognize is that the barrier is being promoted
by the territorial expansionists in Israel's current government led
by Ariel Sharon, who are compromising Israel's genuine security needs
by using it to annex the maximum possible number of Israeli settlements
and Palestinian land inside the West Bank to Israel.
The inclusion of
so many Israeli settlements extends the barrier's length from 360km,
the length of the 1967 border, to what some estimate to be 650km, straining
Israel's capability to patrol it effectively. Even if the security systems
were to warn of an incursion, by the time the chase was organized, there
is always the possibility that terrorists would already have gained
entry into targeted Israeli towns.
Equally outlandish
from an Israeli security perspective is that its expansionist location
leaves nearly 200,000 West Bank Palestinians trapped on "the Israeli
side" of the barrier, with potentially better access to Tel Aviv
than Ramallah. If one believes that only a barrier can prevent Palestinian
suicide bombers from reaching Israel, then why would one accept that
the old security methods will work for these 200,000 and possibly more
Palestinians whose lives have been decimated by the barrier's location?
The deceptive
security rationale behind Israel's current barrier is even more apparent
when Israeli officials disingenuously point to the success of a similar
electrified fence built around the Gaza Strip. They correctly note that
in the past four years only one Palestinian suicide bomb attack has
managed to get across the Gaza barrier into Israel, and this was through
a shipping container through Karni crossing. All other suicide bombers
have come from the West Bank.
But they routinely
fail to note that Gaza's barrier, in contrast to that planned for the
West Bank, is geometrical, easily visible and short (55km), and is located
directly on the recognized 1967 border between Israel and Gaza. The
Gaza barrier has had horrible humanitarian consequences for Palestinians,
but its security rationale rests on a distinctly different and more
defensible basis than that proposed for the West Bank.
Finally, given its
aggressive and expansionist location, the most dangerous aspect of the
planned barrier is that it will likely endanger Israel's long-term security
by fueling Palestinian desperation, creating an incentive for even more
destructive forms of terrorism.
A 2002 World Bank
study contends that imprisoning Palestinians within tiny enclaves and
separating them from fertile land and Israeli markets (particularly
for labor) would condemn them to permanent impoverishment and trigger
intense national frustration. The Israeli human rights organization
B'Tselem, in its April 2003 report on the barrier, asserts that the
barrier will likely inflict severe economic or social dislocation on
at least 210,000 Palestinians in 67 towns and villages in its first
phase alone.
When the wall from
the northern West Bank to Jerusalem is completed, Israel will have annexed
over 15% of the West Bank, as well as 39 illegal Israeli settlements
with 270,000 settlers, and also 290,000 Palestinians. 70,000 of these
do not have Israeli residency and have no right to travel or get services
from Israel, although Israel is depriving them of their livelihoods
in the West Bank. These Palestinians are extremely vulnerable and will
probably be gradually forced to emigrate from these areas.
As with all
previous walls and physical barriers, those fueled by anger and desperation
will eventually shift tactics by attempting to go under through tunneling
or over by using missiles or mortars. As a result, the Israeli defense
analyst Ze'ev Schiff admitted in a Ha'aretz article that the barrier
itself could not provide complete protection and that the Israeli army
would be compelled to operate on the Palestinian side of the barrier.
So much for the idea of separation. Moreover, desperation may lead some
to ignore the barrier altogether and carry out innovative and destructive
actions of horrific proportions, as the United States witnessed on September
11, 2001.
The barrier's defenders,
oblivious to the lessons of history and severe security flaws in the
barrier's current location, continue to insist that the barrier works.
They now frequently claim that it has led to a 90 per cent decrease
in terror attacks since its first phase was completed in July 2003.
The problem with this claim is two-fold. On the one hand it misleadingly
compares a one-year period (July 2003-July 2004) with a three-year period
(September 2000-July 2003) and undercounts the number of suicide bombings
in the past year (there have been 10, not 3).
On the other hand
it conveniently overlooks the fact that the primary reason for a decline
in suicide attacks is that there have been two major Hamas cease-fires
on suicide bombings in the past year, each lasting nearly two months.
Moreover, there has been no suicide bombing since the assassinations
of Hamas leaders earlier this year primarily due to political and operational
factors. At best, one can claim only marginal support for claims about
the barrier's effectiveness.
Fortunately, in
contrast to Israel's most strident supporters in the United States,
many Israeli security analysts and peace activists have clearly seen
the writing on Israel's wall and recognize the danger inherent in its
construction. In a strongly worded recent editorial in Israel's prestigious
Ha'aretz newspaper, the Israeli writer Yoel Esteron warns that:
"The result
will be more and more terror that circumvents the fence; the longer
the occupation continues, the more horrible the terror. The fence will
not stop it for long, it will only make it more sophisticated and more
terrible. Here is an urgent proposal to the agenda for Israelis from
the center and leftward: Let's dismantle the fence."
The recent ruling
by the International Court of Justice should be endorsed by those who
genuinely care about Israel's security. Palestinian human rights are
an essential component of Israeli security, not a clashing imperative
or marginal concern. The best way for Israel to ensure its security
needs is to immediately dismantle the barrier and withdraw its soldiers
and settlers behind defensible borders, namely the 1967 border with
the West Bank and Gaza, alongside a viable and independent Palestinian
state that has the ability and every incentive to police its militants.
A legitimate and
recognized international border based on international law, not a unilaterally
imposed barrier that confiscates the land of another people, is the
only way to bring lasting peace and security for both Israeli's and
Palestinians.
Steve Niva teaches international politics and Middle East Studies at
The Evergreen State College, Olympia, Washington and is a participant
with Faculty for Israeli-Palestinian Peace. He has had articles recently
published in Al-Ahram Weekly, The Jordan Times and Peace Review.