Gambling
For Greater Israel
By Jonathan Freedland
25 August, 2004
The Guardian
I know
this is a stretch, but imagine, if you will, that Ariel Sharon is one
of those suave, high-rolling gamblers at a Monte Carlo casino. Slim
in his white dinner jacket, he sips from his martini, his eye never
leaving the roulette wheel. Standing beside him, one supportive hand
on his shoulder, is his elegant partner: the Likud party.
Sharon is on a winning streak: each spin brings more chips to his pile.
He calmly stacks up his winnings, calculating the odds. His partner
is not so cool: she's getting excited. Finally, Sharon decides he has
hit his peak; the heap of chips before him is not going to get any bigger.
He wants to cash in his winnings.
"You can't
leave now!" insists his companion, firmly pushing him back into
his seat. "We're winning. Let's keep playing! Who knows? We might
take the lot!" Sharon is determined to quit while he's ahead; his
Likud partner won't let him.
OK, so the bit about
Sharon looking slim in his tux is a bit fanciful - but that, in essence,
is the situation currently playing out in Israeli politics. Ariel Sharon
has spent the best part of four decades gambling for the prize that
is Greater Israel: a Jewish state in roomier, more spacious borders
than those that confined it until 1967. Bit by bit his pile of chips
- in the form of the network of settlements that dot the West Bank and
Gaza - has got larger.
About a year ago
he calculated that it was time to visit the cashier and realise his
gains. Sure, he would have to leave behind the last prize on the table
- the Gaza Strip - but, in return, he would be able to keep choice cuts
of the West Bank. Not Greatest Israel, perhaps, but Greater Israel most
definitely. What's more, he would do so with the explicit backing of
the US president, defying all those who insisted that any gains Israel
made after 1967 would eventually have to be handed back.
Sharon reached his
assessment by looking around the table. He concluded that his Palestinian
rival was weaker than ever before. Ostracised internationally, faulted
for failing both to improve security and to reform the way the Palestinian
Authority does business, Yasser Arafat now faces an internal revolt.
Last month it came on the streets of Gaza, with anti-Arafat riots; yesterday
it took the form of a vote of no-confidence, slated for a meeting of
the Palestine Legislative Council. Hobbled by long-standing accusations
of corruption, the only peace process Arafat is engaged in right now
is between himself and the disaffected within his own ranks.
The Israeli prime
minister also noticed a change in the demeanour of the dealer at the
table. For years the US sought to be an honest broker, insisting it
showed no favour to either of the competing players. But since George
W Bush took up the job, that neutrality has been shelved. Washington
won't so much as meet the Palestinian leader; meanwhile the White House's
Middle East coordinator takes his summer holidays in Israel. With an
election looming, and a Bush campaign determined to peel off at least
some of the 80% of Jews who traditionally vote Democrat, Sharon gambled
that this was the year when Washington would not dare refuse him.
Taken together,
these amount to the most conducive circumstances advocates of Greater
Israel are ever likely to enjoy. Wait around and the weather could change,
Sharon reasons, bringing either a renewed Palestinian leadership or
a John Kerry presidency - either of which could revive the old demand
that Israel give up most of the territories it gained in 1967.
Sharon's reasoning
is, in his own terms, shrewd, far-sighted and strategic. He knows that
now is the moment to strike, when the Israeli right has a chance to
achieve the closest approximation of its dreams imaginable. Gaza, a
hard-scrabble strip of land with few of the biblical resonances stirred
by the West Bank, will be the price - but the reward will be a US licence
to hold on to all the key settlement blocs west of the River Jordan.
Large Jewish cities standing on what is now fiercely contested occupied
territory will be absorbed into Israel itself in perpetuity. Just in
case anyone missed the point, Sharon underlined it last week by announcing
plans to build 1,001 housing units on the West Bank. Lose Gaza, but
tighten the grip on the West Bank: that's the deal.
The Israeli prime
minister must be cursing his Likud party for failing to see what a huge
prize he is bringing home to them. Each time he seeks their approval,
most recently last week, they rebuff him - convinced they can win all
that he promises and keep Gaza too. They are being strikingly obtuse,
denouncing him for abandoning the Greater Israel project when he is,
in fact, about to entrench an albeit modified version of it, forever.
It is clear enough
why Sharon is pursuing this strategy. He is not a hawk turned dove,
as some initially hoped. On the contrary, the Gaza pullout plan is aimed
at keeping as much land as possible, while easing the "demographic"
strain of ruling over too many Palestinians. Sharon's goal is the same
as it ever was: he is just pragmatic enough to know a bargain when he
sees one.
Harder to fathom
is the reasoning, even the basic stance, of the Americans. Saturday's
New York Times reported that Washington had shifted its view, now tolerating
some settlement growth while before it had insisted on a total freeze.
On Monday, however, a state department spokesman denied any policy change,
insisting that all settlement activity must stop. How to explain this
contradiction?
A starting point
is to remind ourselves that the Bush administration is no monolith:
the state department has long been less indulgent of Greater Israel
aspirations than the Bush White House. It is hardly a surprise that
they take different lines now.
It's also true that
Washington in 2004 is addressing at least two audiences on this issue.
In an election year, pro-Israel voters are one constituency: the White
House will hope Saturday's message in the New York Times reaches them.
But next month Colin Powell will meet America's partners in the quartet
- the EU, Russia and the United Nations - which authored the road map
that calls for a settlement freeze. Monday's "clarification"
is aimed at them.
Not that anyone
should be shocked if Washington has indeed given a green light to 1,001
new apartments on the West Bank. When Bush gave his approval to Sharon's
Gaza plan in April, he said "new realities on the ground",
made it "unrealistic" for Israel to give up settlements in
major population centres. That surely gave Sharon his signal.
With each day, the
Israeli prime minister inches closer towards his lifelong goal. Ironically,
the greatest obstacle in his way is the Israeli right, a Frankenstein's
monster partly of his own creation. The Palestinians themselves pose
littleresistance: they are too divided and too depressed. Never have
they cried out more urgently for stronger leadership. What they need
is a player every bit as shrewd as Ariel Sharon.
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