Sub-Contracting
Palestine
By
Ira Chernus
Commondreams.org
26 April, 2003
If you follow the news casually, you know that there was a big power
struggle in the Palestinian leadership last week. Yasser Arafat, a typical
power-hungry politico, resisted a challenge from the new prime minister
Mahmoud Abbas (aka Abu-Mazen). Arafat's tender ego was bruised, but
he finally saw reason and agreed to share power.
That's the way
our media oversimplified a very complicated story. Egos were involved,
no doubt. More importantly, though, it was a struggle between Arafat's
somewhat independent stance toward Israel and Abbas' preference for
acquiescent compromise. According to renowned Israeli analyst Uri Avnery,
Abbas and his followers "have no solid base among their own people,
but do have connections with powerful players, most importantly the
United States and Israel." They want an end to armed struggle,
believing that "the Palestinians can achieve more in negotiations
with the U.S. and in a political process with Israel."
The U.S., Britain,
and Israel played a key role in Abbas' rise to power. Lebanon's Daily
Star reported that Arafat accepted the power-sharing deal only "under
massive international pressure." A Palestinian official told the
Washington Post, "By having the Americans and European Union insisting
that [Abbas] was the only acceptable leader, it made him look like their
write-in candidate." The appearance may well be the reality.
George W. Bush
offered the reward for acquiescence in a speech last month: he would
release his long awaited "road map" for peace only when Abbas
became prime minister. Bush knows that the Israelis will not even discuss
the "road map" until they have a compliant negotiating partner
in place of Arafat. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon, who has shunned Arafat,
says he will be glad to meet with Abbas as soon as his appointment is
confirmed. As the Daily Star said, "The step-down by Arafat was
likely to be seen by the international community as a first stage in
sidelining the veteran leader."
Some Palestinians
hope their two leaders will work out a plan for sharing governance,
which would keep Arafat an active player. But Avnery is skeptical. He
asks: "What will happen to the armed organizations, and who will
control the security forces? Would Abbas be prepared to risk a fratricidal
war?" The question of security forces has almost provoked fratricidal
war already, when Arafat and Abbas quarreled over who would head Palestinian
security. Abbas demanded, and eventually got, his man: Muhammad Yusuf
Dahlan.
Dahlan is apparently
also the man of the U.S., Britain, and Israel. The Washington Post reported
that "Arafat fielded a fusillade of urgent telephone calls from
European and Arab leaders urging him to relent on Dahlan." The
callers included British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak.
Why would such
luminaries bother about a Palestinian cabinet appointment? Perhaps they,
and the Americans urging them on, believed they were moving the parties
toward a peace settlement, which could defuse tensions created by the
Iraq war. If so, they were probably mistaken.
Dahlan is a
very controversial figure. The New York Times, praising him as the "Palestinian
Security Ace," reported that "he has often dealt with Israeli
and American officials, who hold him in high respect." To many
Palestinians, though, he is more feared than respected. As head of the
Palestinians' Preventive Security forces in Gaza, Dahlan was responsible
for the arrest of senior Hamas leaders in 1996.
Ali Abunimah,
a top Palestinian-American journalist, notes that "Dahlan's security
services were the target of numerous allegations from Palestinian and
international human rights organizations of serious abuses, including
torture." When a Jerusalem Post reporter asked Dennis Ross, Bill
Clinton's Middle East envoy, why the U.S. did not seem to care about
these charges, Ross responded: "It wasn't as if the Israelis were
particularly concerned about the problem."
In fact, the
move against Hamas was just what the Israelis wanted, according to the
former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He said that, by accepting
the Oslo Accords, Arafat essentially agreed to become Israel's "sub-contractor"
in the Occupied Territories. Israeli soldiers would no longer have to
brutalize Palestinians. Other Palestinians, like Dahlan, would do it
for them.
Since Arafat
has not been a compliant "sub-contractor," he will now be
replaced by Abbas. Abunimah rightly concludes: "The vague promises
of the Oslo Accords have been replaced with the vague promises of the
'road map.' Abbas is being promoted not because he represents the future
for the Palestinians, but precisely because he represents a past."
Dahlan is a central part of that past. Sharon recently told columnist
William Safire that he will resume peace talks only after the new Palestinian
leaders "dismantle Hamas, the Jihad, the Popular Front and the
others . seize illegal weapons and hand them over to the U.S. for destruction."
That will be Dahlan's mandate.
Hamas and the
other rejectionist groups know very well what is going on. A Hamas leader
told the Times that his group "won't accept a repetition of 1996.
If the new government begins by working on security, the loser will
be the Palestinian people." "The militant groups say they
will continue with attacks, and have shown no enthusiasm for the new
government, saying it was forced upon the Palestinians by the United
States and other foreign governments," the Times concluded.
Avnery notes
the obvious outcome for Israel: "The US and Israel demand that
[Abbas] liquidate the armed organizations and confiscate their weapons,
even before the Palestinians move one step towards a state of their
own. This will, of course, involve a bloody internecine struggle that
will fill Sharon's government with joy and consolidate its position
still further." Israel has always followed one cardinal rule in
its dealings with its neighbors: keep them divided against each other.
What Israeli governments have feared, beyond anything else, is a unified
front against them. That may be why Israel funded the little upstart
group Hamas years ago, helping it mount a major challenge to Arafat's
power. When Hamas grew powerful enough, the Israelis apparently set
Dahlan upon them. With Dahlan heading Palestinian security, the Israelis
can expect the tensions between the Palestinian Authority and the rejectionists
to grow exponentially.
Sharon's government
may have even more reason for joy. In 1996, a Palestinian official told
the Guardian that the Israelis were "grooming" Abbas and Dahlan
to replace Arafat. Abunimah suggests that "seven years ago such
fears could be dismissed as paranoia." But now "even the most
level-headed observer is tempted" to see Abbas' and Dahlan's rise
to power as "a conspiracy," orchestrated by Israel and the
U.S.
Ziad Abu Amr,
the new Palestinian minister of culture, told the Washington Post he
expects Abbas and Arafat to have frequent power struggles. "There
is a very ambitious Palestinian agenda," Amr said, "but there
are other agendas -- American and Israeli, international and political
-- and Abu Mazen is faced with a challenge of reconciling the irreconcilable."
So the fratricidal war that Avnery predicts could easily become a three-way
struggle. Israeli and U.S. officials, who long ago decided that Arafat
was no longer a "partner for peace," will now proclaim that
they have found their partner in Abbas. They will mean that they have
a Palestinian leader who wants to settle pretty much on Israel's terms.
Abbas can agree
to a settlement on Israel's terms. But that will not produce a lasting
peace agreement. It will only alienate the majority of Palestinians
and plunge them deeper into internal conflict. As Avnery says, this
will fill Sharon's government with joy and consolidate its position
still further. Sharon and his government may be planning to watch, with
pleasure, as the Palestinian body politic disintegrates beyond any hope
of unity.
If Israelis
think this will give them security by dominating the Palestinians, they
are sadly mistaken. A fragmented Palestinian people will breed more
resentment and more armed struggle. That may confirm the common Israeli
belief that Jews will always be threatened by enemies. But it will not
lead to security or peace for anyone.
Ira Chernus
is Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder.
[email protected]